

J A P A N ' S FOREIGN RELATIONS

1542-1936

A SHORT HISTORY

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THE HOKUSEIDO PRESS

1936

EDW: G. ALLEN & SON, LTD

12 & 14, Grape Street, Shaftesbury Ave.,
London, W. C. 2

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PREFACE

FOR nearly three centuries, during which period the Western Powers were extending their dominions through conquest and colonization, Japan was content with her peaceful and self-sufficient life in the Far East. In fact, it was not until the middle of the last century, when the Western Powers had pushed their sphere of activities to their last frontiers and when they had successfully penetrated into China, that Japan awoke to find herself defencelessly confronting the Western encroachment and yielded to join the comity of nations. Eighty years which followed saw a record of marvelous achievements, unparalleled in world history, of Japan's rise from a hermit kingdom in the Far East to a great world Power. And yet scholars' attempts at researches have been confined to the studies of limited fields and no complete story of those marvellous achievements in the arena of international relations has been told in any foreign language. The need is universally felt to-day, therefore, for a connected story of Japan's past foreign relations.

During 1931-1934, the author had served Columbia University in New York as the Visiting Lecturer on Japanese Affairs and felt this urgent need as he did never before, both in and out of the lecture hall. Especially true was this when the Sino-Japanese relations exploded in September, 1931, and when Japan's foreign relations became the scrutinizing subject of international discussions. During those three years, the author had been obliged to participate in literally hundreds of forums and conferences and every time he realized in increasing way the lack of the Western knowledge of Japan's foreign relations. The present volume was conceived and written during those trying years to fill the need which the author had so urgently felt himself.

"Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1935: A Short History" is an attempt to summarize in English and in one handy volume the main acts and scenes in the unfolding drama of Japan's foreign relations during the past four hundred years, from her first contact with Western Powers through the recent Sino-Japanese crisis. The subject is admittedly too vast for a detailed treatment and the author necessarily confined his effort to dealing with more outstanding and significant events, often at the expense of lesser and more insignificant ones. Nevertheless, he had utilized the cream of latest but scattered scholarly researches in the field and aimed to present "a short history" which brings the kaleidoscopic events in Japan's past foreign relations within the grasp of all who desire to understand the background, both the vibrating motive and the penetrating significance, of Japan's diplomatic game in the world to-day. Should this pioneer volume stimulate another scholar and lead him to produce a fuller work on the subject the author feels that his effort and labor will have been amply repaid.

In anglicizing Japanese personal names, the author took the liberty of transcribing them in the way they are used in Japan. This explains the peculiarity of all family names preceding the given names rather than unnecessarily transposing the given and family names as is customary. Thus, Prince Ito Hirobumi instead of the transposed form of Prince Hirobumi Ito. Much the same usage is almost universally followed in transcribing the Chinese names, such as Li Hung-chang instead of Hung-chang Li, unless the name is completely anglicized such as Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo. This practice is adopted throughout the present volume. Personal titles and ranks as well as place names are used as they were at the time of description, thus following the stages of evolution with years. Also the Japanese terms which have no equivalent in English are used in their vernacular instead of stretched English translations, but the meaning is obvious everywhere. Such, for instance, are the terms "shogun" and "ronin."

The author wishes to express his grateful appreciation of encouragement and unselfish cooperation given him by Mr. Nakatsuchi, the Proprietor of the Hokuseido Press. Especially indebted is he for the most careful but sacrificing manner in which Mr. Nakatsuchi helped to put the manuscripts into the present shape and to see them through all the required mechanical processes of the publication, including the tedious work of proof reading and the making of an index. The author assumes, however, the entire responsibility with regard to the contents and the form of expression.

R. H. A.

DAIREN, JANUARY, 1936.

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PART I

THE BEGINNINGS OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

JAPAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHAPTER I

JAPAN CLOSED

FOR centuries before the middle of the sixteenth century, Japan's foreign relations were confined to the Far East, largely with China and Korea. Then came the Westerners. It was in the days of discoveries and colonizations, when merchant adventurers and Christianity and flags marched together. And Japan's first experiences with those vanguards of Western aggression were ill-doomed, forcing her to close her doors as a measure of self-protection.

FIREARMS AND CHRISTIANITY

In 1542 storm-bound Portuguese sailors found refuge at Tanegashima in Kyushu. They were warmly received and became instrumental in opening the trade relationship between Europe and Japan for the first time in Japanese history. Incidentally, they introduced to Japan the firearm, for years thereafter known as "tanegashima." The Portuguese, thus accidentally opening the trade relations with Japan, traded at several ports in Kyushu and completely monopolized Japan's trade with the West for fifty years. The Spaniards followed their suit forty years later but their presence did not alter the situation. Then came the Dutch and English traders during the closing years of the century.

The introduction of the gun to Japan was soon followed

by the coming of Christianity. Francis Xavier, a Jesuit priest, persuaded and led by Paul Yajiro, a Japanese fugitive who was converted to Christianity in a foreign land, came to Japan in a Chinese vessel and landed in Satsuma in 1549. After an unsuccessful visit in disguise to Kyoto, then the capital of the country, he began to propagate Christianity at Hirado in Kyushu, where the first Japanese convert was obtained. The new religion, wholly strange but peculiarly appealing to the Japanese people, spread rapidly from Kyushu to the main island and finally to Kyoto itself. One of the very first Christian daimyos was famed Otomo Sorin, who ordered the destruction of Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples. Later Ishida Mitsunari and Konishi Yukinaga became famed as powerful Christian daimyos.

Oda Nobunaga, who had successfully unified the contending factions under him in 1573, favored the missionaries and protected the churches for unknown reasons, and Christianity thrived during his short reign of ten years. When Toyotomi Hideyoshi followed his master at the helm of the state, the tide began to turn. He perceived a menace in the allegiance of his Christian vassals to a foreign power, the Roman Catholicism, which was inscrutable to him. His feeling is best illustrated by the following set of questions which he asked the Jesuit missionary leaders whom he had invited to Kyoto for the purpose of investigation: (1) reasons for spreading Christianity in Japan; (2) reasons for causing the destruction of shrines and temples against national laws; (3) reasons for killing cattles and using them as food instead of agricultural aid; (4) reasons for persecuting Buddhist priests; and (5) reasons for buying and selling Japanese people as slaves. After repeated investigations, he could obtain no satisfactory explanations, became convinced that Christianity was a "jashumon" or fanatical sect, and issued in 1587 the famous edict which prohibited the propagation of Christianity, and ordered all foreign missionaries to withdraw at once. This edict, however, was leniently overlooked, largely due to impending civil wars, and the propagation of Christianity continued. Nor should we overlook the im-

portant fact that Toyotomi Hideyoshi made a clear distinction between religion and trade, and the commercial intercourse continued unmolested.

THE CAUSES OF SECLUSION POLICY

A new element was then added to make the situation worse. In defiance or ignorance of the prohibitory decree, the Spanish Franciscans reached Japan in 1592 and began to propagate Christianity fearlessly. The situation became precarious when, in 1596, the *San Felipe*, a Spanish merchant ship, stranded off Urato in Tosa and one of the rescued sailors unwittingly boasted of the power and territorial extension of Spain, then the mistress of the sea, and praised the Spanish method of expanding her dominion by sending Christian missionaries first and then following them up with an army to conquer the land. Toyotomi's suspicion of Christian missions as tools of territorial aggrandisement was sharpened and he caused a thorough investigation once more. When the truth of the incident was established, he took more drastic actions against Christianity, arresting and even crucifying the responsible leaders. Then followed, however, a series of civil wars until Tokugawa Iyeyasu unified the country. The Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries took advantage of the internal troubles in redoubling their effort to spread Christianity, while the Dominicans and the Augustinians were added to their forces in 1602. The coming of the Dutch and English traders aggravated the situation further by supplying derogatory information about the Spanish and Portuguese traders.

When Tokugawa Iyeyasu became the Shogun in 1603 and established the Tokugawa regime which lasted until 1867, he wisely adopted a policy of peaceful relations with foreign powers. He laid the foundation of friendly relations with Korea; he allowed and encouraged open trade by Chinese traders who had been quietly trading for years; he sought trade and intercourse with the European powers, a sort of commercial agreement with Spain having been con-

cluded by the mission sent by Lord Date Masamune to Rome and Spain in 1614, and even sent a special mission to Mexico; he planned a sound monetary system to facilitate trade; and he fostered shipbuilding and trade activities among the Japanese people themselves. Tokugawa Ieyasu's vision was doomed for disappointment, however, for the Tokugawa authorities became increasingly involved in the uninvited task of freeing the country of the political menace of the Western religion.

Rightly or wrongly, the political implication of Christianity became more evident through various incidents during the first quarter century of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Especially revealing were the alleged secret letters and plots involving the Spaniards and Portuguese missionaries. Moreover, taking advantage of the piety of the Japanese adherents, the missionaries became arrogant and were often contemptuous of and disrespectful to the high officials of the government. In extreme cases, some of the missionaries cleverly intrigued among the daimyos and played politics in order to extend their power. These discoveries, combined with the growing national self-consciousness, clearly demonstrated to the Shogunate authorities the futility of attempting to divorce religion from politics and commerce, and gave them determination to restrict foreign intercourse in an effort to avoid possible religious complication before it was too late.

By 1622, thus, the Shogunate had reasons to suspect the complicity of the Roman Catholic Church in an alleged Spanish plot to invade Japan and ordered in 1624 the deportation of all Spaniards in the realm, both priests and laymen. In 1633 the Shogunate prohibited under heavy penalty the coming of Christian missionaries, the exportation of Japanese arms, and the sailing to the outer world of all Japanese except in the licensed ships. Two years later, in 1636, followed the now-famed "Sakoku-Rei" or Seclusion Decree of seventeen articles which, among other things, forbade foreign missionaries to come to Japan and Japanese to go abroad on pain of death, promised reward for inform-

ation concerning secret Christian activities, and laid down strictest regulations for the trading at Nagasaki. In 1638, the Portuguese, largely because they were suspected of their complicity in the Shimabara rebellion of the previous year, were expelled from the Japanese shores. Long before this, in 1623, the English abandoned their trading post as profitless enterprise. After 1840, therefore, the Dutch who professed a different brand of Christianity and who were from the beginning dissociated from religious propaganda and the Chinese were the only ones who were permitted to carry on trade through Dejima, a small island off Nagasaki, under the strictest regulations. Thus Japan lapsed into isolation for nearly three hundred years, in the midst of the age of unchecked expansion based upon discovery and colonization and in the face of the flowering splendors of the Renaissance in Europe.

THE COMING OF THE RUSSIANS

For one hundred years after the proclamation of the Seclusion Decree, Japan had enjoyed an uninterrupted peace. Japan's only link with the outside world consisted of a semblance of trade which passed through Dejima through a handful of Dutch and Chinese traders and shipwrecked sailors of various countries who drifted to the Japanese coasts from time to time. The nation was thus free from any anxiety of Western aggression. Toward the second half of the eighteenth century, however, the northern Pacific began to attract Russian, English, French, and Spanish traders in search of leather and fur and gold, and a larger number of foreign vessels came drifting along the Japanese shores. It became increasingly difficult for Japan to remain aloof and the demand for the opening of the country to the world intercourse was growing within and without.

The first to disturb Japan's torpor this time were the Russians who had carried their standard clear across Siberia and who were looking beyond the Okhotsk and Behring Seas for further expansion and trade possibilities. As early as

1783 a Russian company was organized for the purpose of exploiting the trade and industries in the Alusian Islands and Alaska. Long before this the Russians had come into contact with stray Japanese castaways who were stranded on their coast and their desire to open trade relationship with Japan was growing. With explorers and traders came Russian fishermen who were no strangers in the Kurile Islands and even Hokkaido. However, no actual attempt to establish the official relationship between the two countries was made until the last decade of the century. In 1791 Lieutenant Laxman persuaded Catherine II to organize a north-eastern expedition by pointing out the importance of treating the shipwrecked Japanese fishermen sympathetically and the possibility of opening trade relations with Japan in exchange for their return. In 1793, he actually visited Hakodate to return some Japanese seamen and attempted to open friendly relations with Japan but failed.

The close of the century saw Russia evolving more definite and determined policy in consolidating her interests in the Far East. The Russo-American Company was organized and Alexander I authorized a Far Eastern expedition. Early in 1803 an elaborate expedition was organized under Resanoff with full power to open diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan, to inspect the Russian interests in the Far East, and to open direct trade route between Alaska and China. The immediate pretext for such an action was the presence in Russia of some fifteen shipwrecked Japanese fishermen, several of whom wanted to return to Japan. It is significant to note, among other things, the following items contained in the Tzar's instructions to Resanoff which clearly reveal as yet unmapped conditions in the Far East: to open trade relations with Japan, preferably through a northern port, or, if that is unsuccessful, to get the privilege of at least exchanging goods at one of the Kurile Islands; to explore Sakhalin and to discover whether it belonged to Japan or China; to explore the mouth of the Amur River and to investigate the Japanese knowledge thereof; to examine the existing relationship between

Japan and China and Korea, as well as the status of the Ryukyu Islands.

After a careful preparation and a long voyage around South America and through the northern Pacific and along Kamchatka, Resanoff appeared at Nagasaki in September, 1804. He returned the Japanese fishermen and requested the opening of trade and diplomatic relations between the two countries. Protracted negotiations followed. The Shogunate stood firm, however, in insisting upon its traditional policy and even refused to accept the Tzar's presents. Resanoff was disappointed and sailed away empty-handed early in April, 1805, and thus ended in futility the first elaborate effort to end the Japanese isolation. Another attempt in 1807 failed to arouse the Japanese response.

In 1806 and 1807 occurred violent plundering expeditions in the Kurile Islands, Hokkaido, and Sakhalin in which the Russians attacked and destroyed Japanese posts and captured and burned several Japanese ships. In 1811, when a Russian vessel, the *Diana*, under the command of Captain Golowin, came drifting along Hakodate, therefore, the Japanese authorities arrested and imprisoned the Captain and several members of the crew in reprisal. Captain Rikord came the following year and, upon hearing the false report that the arrested Russian sailors were executed, captured a Japanese ship in counter reprisal and carried away Takataya Kahei to Kamchatka as a hostage. Kahei's fearless effort to clear the misunderstanding between the two countries bore fruit in bringing the Japanese and Russian representatives together in 1813, the Japanese safely returning the arrested sailors and the Russians explaining the plundering exploits of 1806-1807 as individual deeds without the official sanctions. As a part of the settlement, it was agreed in 1814 that Urup Island should constitute a neutral zone between the two countries, that Japan should administer all islands south of Eterup, and that Russia should regard Shimoshiri Island and northward as its sphere. This settlement was peculiarly silent concerning the status of Sakhalin. On this rather vague basis the Russo-Japanese relations re-

maintained for some years, and the first series of Russian attempts to open Japan's closed doors ended unsuccessfully.

THE SECLUSION POLICY AT WORK

It has been already made clear that isolation, at least commercial isolation, was not the ultimate aim of the Tokugawa authorities, but that the fear of a possible political domination of the Roman Catholicism in Japan forced them to adopt that policy. It was not, therefore, an absolute measure. Throughout the two and a half centuries the intercourse with the outside world continued in cooperation with the Dutch and Chinese traders who brought to Japan products from Europe, Asia and the South Seas. Economically, thus, Japan was not isolated from the rest of the world. Intellectually, moreover, the Dutch agents at Dejima were instrumental in teaching the eager Japanese scholars Western learning, especially history, government, philosophy, sciences, military art and medicine, and liberal Japanese leaders kept themselves abreast with the thinking world outside. As long as the political menace of the Western religion was absent, the Tokugawa Shogunate was lenient in overlooking the spread of Western knowledge in Japan. Thus, in 1720, the Shogunate lifted the ban on the importation of foreign books except those relating to Christianity, and Dutch learning began to thrive thereafter. Eventually, however, the spread of Western learning was destined to undermine and overthrow the whole philosophy of the Seclusion Policy.

The coming of the Russians brought the Shogunate face to face with new problems. Chief among them were the fear of Western aggression in direct form, the realization of the urgency of organizing and strengthening the national defence, and the necessity of tightening the policy of seclusion. Until the Russians began to disturb Japan's northern frontiers, the Tokugawa Shogunate encountered no problem of national defence. In fact, one hundred and fifty years after the adoption of the Seclusion Policy saw a

period of comparative peace, free from external invasions. With the appearance of the Russians and the occasional visits of Western "black ships" later, the national defence became an all-important problem. In the eighties of the eighteenth century, thus, the Shogunate began to give a close attention to the defence of its northern frontiers. It was in the wake of such a need that Hayashi Shihei (1738-1793), the first ardent champion of national defence who studied under the Dutch at Dejima, wrote "*Oranda-Sen Zusesu*" in 1782 and advocated the building of ocean-going ships. After another book, "*Sangoku Tsuron*," a treatise on the international relations and the Russian menace, he published in 1786 the famous "*Kaikoku Heidan*" in which he boldly advocated the perfection of national defence through the studied use of cannons and forts and the encouragement of shipbuilding, as a result of which he was imprisoned. Ohara Kokingo and Honda Rimei also wrote and propagated the cause of national defence about the same time. It was during the last decade of that century and the first decade of the following century that Lord Matsudaira Sadanobu, one of the famed Shogunate leaders, caused the study of coast strategy and national defence, and instructed Ino Chuhei to survey the entire Japanese coasts and to prepare maps. The defence of Yedo Bay and the northern shores were planned and organized through the building of fortifications and the stationing of regular garrisons. It was in the same era that Mamiya Rinzo explored, not only Hokkaido and Sakhalin, but also the Amur River district and a portion of Manchuria.

At the same time laying the foundation of national defence, the Shogunate began to enforce the policy of exclusion as well as seclusion more rigorously than before. In 1791 the Shogunate, under the leadership of Lord Matsudaira, decreed that all foreign ships visiting Japanese shores without permits should be driven away; in 1802 it prohibited all manner of secret trade with foreigners; in 1806 it issued regulations against Russian ships and in 1810 against all foreign ships; and in April, 1825, it issued the famous

Expulsion Decree under which all foreign vessels were to be driven away by force. All these efforts were fruitless, however, in keeping the foreign vessels away from the Japanese coasts.

No matter how earnestly did the Shogunate try to perpetuate its policy of seclusion, the general trend of the world outside was beyond its control. The great tide of Western invasion in the Far East was rising higher with years and Japan increasingly felt the formidableness of its impact. After the Napoleonic Wars, the Europeans more vigorously pushed their aggressive tactics and the trade between China and Western powers developed rapidly. The first great triumph for the cause of Western aggression in the Far East was achieved by Great Britain in the Opium War, 1839-1842, as a result of which five ports in China were forced open to foreign trade. America, France, and other countries closely followed the British heels and secured similar treaties. The next objective of the Western aggression was naturally Japan.

Within Japan, a growing number of political-economists clearly saw the fated failure of the Seclusion Policy and began to urge its modification, even openly. One wing voiced the need of stronger national defence to withstand the eventual Western aggression, while the others demanded the return of free intercourse with the West. Notable among the latter group were Dutch scholars such as Watanabe Noboru, Takano Choyei, and Koseki Sanyei who organized Shoshi-Kwai, freely discussed the folly of the foreign policy of the Shogunate, severely criticized the policy of driving away foreign vessels bringing Japanese seamen as unhumanitarian and against public law, and pleaded for the opening of the country. Such an outspoken criticism of the national policy aroused the ire of the Shogunate officials and the first was forced to commit suicide, the second was imprisoned for life, and the third was completely ostracized.

One of the tragic commentaries upon the Shogunate policy of rigid exclusion, especially the Expulsion Decree of

1825, was the "Morrison Affair." In June and July, 1837, the *Morrison*, an American ship under the command of an English captain, appeared off Kagoshima Bay and Yedo Bay. The local officials, faithfully obeying the decree of 1825, fired upon it and eventually drove it away. When it was learned soon afterward through the Dutch traders that the *Morrison* came to Japan with the sole purpose of returning several Japanese seamen and to negotiate for the opening of Japanese ports to English trade, the Shogunate leaders were naturally divided upon the wisdom of the decree of 1825. Hayashi Jussai, a Confucian scholar who occupied one of the high Shogunate posts, represented the liberal views and maintained that it was unhumanitarian to drive away foreign ships which were bringing back Japanese seamen and that Great Britain should be allowed to trade with Japan. Not long afterward, China was forced open and in 1842 the Shogunate abolished the 1825 Decree in favor of the milder 1806 Decree, allowing shipwrecked Japanese seamen to be returned to Japan only in Dutch or Chinese ships. And thus the Tokugawa authorities were gradually beginning to see the difficulty of maintaining the Seclusion Policy in the midst of Western aggressive advance in the Far East.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE ENGLISH

The first English visit to Japan was an auspicious one. In 1600, a Dutch ship under the command of Captain William Adams, an Englishman, came to Japan and Adams, after a rigid examination before Tokugawa Iyeyasu, was naturalized under the Japanese name of Miura Anjin. The English trade assumed a definite form with the arrival in 1613 of Captain Saris who bore with him a letter and presents from James I to Shogun Tokugawa. Through Adams's assistance, he succeeded in obtaining very liberal trade privileges and established, under the auspices of the East India Company, a trading station at Hirado. The English activities later spread to more than a dozen other cities but

the whole enterprise ended in a failure largely through mismanagement and the East India Company withdrew from Japan in 1623.

While the Spaniards and the Portuguese were expelled from Japan by the decrees of the Shogunate, no such ban was issued against the English, and the East India Company either planned or actually attempted to renew relations with Japan no less than nine times during the following half century. A revealing incident which is illustrative of the spirit of the times occurred in 1673. Captain Simon Delboe appeared at Nagasaki aboard the *Return*, presented the royal message from Charles II, and asked for the renewal of commercial relations on the basis of the old agreement. An extensive examination of the plea followed and the information that the English monarch had married a Portuguese Princess was, in view of the Japanese suspicion of the Portuguese, sufficient to ruin the English cause. For a century after that affair, no English vessel seems to have appeared on the Japanese waters. In 1791, an English vessel, the *Argonaut*, appeared on the west coast of Japan. When Viscount Macartney was sent to China in 1792, he was given freedom to reopen commercial relations with Japan but nothing was done. Four years later, an English vessel under the command of Captain Broughton visited Japan's northern shores but his interest was largely in explorations and not in commercial intercourse.

During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, English vessels visited Japan occasionally and made renewed attempts to open commercial relations but all failed. An incident of 1808 is illustrative of the growing spirit of Western aggression in the Far East. In August of that year, the *Phaeton*, an English frigate flying the Dutch colors, appeared at Nagasaki, ostensibly in search of two Dutch merchantmen. When an examiner of the port with two Dutch secretaries went aboard the frigate, Captain Pellew had the Dutch secretaries arrested, refused the examination, sent the examiner ashore, replaced the Dutch flag with the English colors, and even attempted an unlawful survey of the

harbor at night. Commissioner Matsudaira Yasuhira, in indignation, proposed to attack the frigate but, accepting the advice of the Dutch Resident Commissioner, supplied them with fuel and water and food, and sent the frigate away. Commissioner Matsudaira, however, like a true *samurai* of old, considered the incident as a blot upon his otherwise honorable record and valiantly paid for it with his own life. In a note which he left behind him, he apologized for his "ineffective handling which brought disgrace on Japan" and explained that "while it was partly due to the cowardice of my under-officers, that cowardice was due to the lack of their master's discipline and training, and I deeply regret that I was responsible in bringing such needless reproach to the illustrious name of the Shogunate."

In the meanwhile, the European war sentiment was carried on to the Far East and the English, after capturing the Dutch headquarters at Batavia, tried in 1813 to take over the Dutch trading post at Dejima under the English administration which was set up at Batavia. Hendrick Doeff, the Dutch Resident Commissioner at Dejima, refused to surrender and the scheme failed. Another vain attempt was made in 1818 when Captain Gordon appeared off Uraga aboard the *Brothers* and demanded the opening of commercial relations at Yedo. Then followed English whalers. The *Saracen*, the first recorded English whaler in the Japanese waters, drifted into Yedo Bay in 1822 but met the same fate as the *Brothers*. For several years thereafter the English whalers annually visited the Japanese coasts and the Yedo officials were extremely perturbed. Yet peace generally prevailed until 1845 when the *Saramang*, an English frigate under the command of Captain Pelcher, arrived at Nagasaki, insisted upon exploring and surveying the harbor, and left the country only after repeated protests of the Japanese officials. In 1849, the *Mariner*, an English corvette under Commander Matheson, appeared near Yedo Bay, surveyed Shimoda Bay and thereabout, and went away. In this manner, the English merchant-ships, whalers, and warships were all turned away empty-handed. On the other hand,

they naturally helped to accelerate the progress in Japan in expediting her national defence against foreign invasions.

ENTER THE FRENCH

The French participation in the Far Eastern affairs dates from the conclusion of the Franco-Chinese Treaty of 1844. Even before that date, however, the Société de Mission Étranger had opened its missionary posts in China, as well as in Korea and the Ryukyu Islands. The Franco-Japanese relations begin with the arrival in the Nagasaki harbor in 1846 of a French fleet under the command of Admiral Cecille, consisting of one frigate, the *Cleopatra*, and two corvettes, the *Sabine* and the *Victorieuse*.

In the Japanese eyes, there seems to have been no difference between English and French fleets and the French commander was met with usual cold attitude, being told not to fire guns or cannons in the harbor, not to come ashore, and not to row about in the harbor. Admiral Cecille's chief mission was to request the Japanese authorities that, in view of repeated wrecks of French whalers off the Japanese coasts, the French shipwrecked seamen be kindly treated and safely returned to France. He found it impossible, however, to enter upon official negotiations due to various prohibitive measures then still existing, and left the country without success.

FUTILE DUTCH ATTEMPTS

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Dutch traders quietly carried on trade at Dejima and there was nothing remarkable to record except the changes of the Dutch administrations there until Siebold came to Japan.

Dr. Philipp Franz von Siebold arrived at Nagasaki in 1823. Being a noted physician, he immediately won Japanese admiration and took steps to establish a medical institute as well as a hospital. His real mission was, however, to study Japan, her land and people and political and

economic conditions. He began to execute that mission in earnest. In the course of his extensive studies, he secretly conspired with a certain Takahashi Sakuzayemon to secure copies of official maps and the discovery of the unhappy scandal caused his premature expulsion from the country. What he succeeded in procuring during his study, however, became the basis of his great work on Japan.

More pleasant, though fruitless, was the Dutch attempt to open Japan to the world intercourse. Seeing the sudden turn which the international relations in the Far East were taking after the Opium War and fearing the possible danger to Japan of the Western aggression, Jean Chretien Baud, the Colonial Minister of the Netherlands, felt the urgency of Japan's modification of her isolation policy and decided to advise her in the name of King William II. Captain H. H. F. Coops was appointed a special envoy and left for Japan aboard the *Palembang*, a frigate, with the royal letter and presents. The Dutch representative at Dejima was previously informed of the proposed visit and was instructed to make necessary preparations in cooperation with the Japanese officials to facilitate the mission. The *Palembang* arrived at Nagasaki on August 15, 1844, and took steps to present the royal letter, but, without awaiting the answer, left for Batavia soon afterward.

The royal letter from William II to the Emperor of Japan declared, among other things, that "recently China provoked war with England and fought with all the national strength but could not win over the superior military art of Europe and finally went down to defeat, revised old orders, and opened five ports to the European trade"; it observed that "when we consider the general trend, the relations between nations are widening, and the invention of steamships brought distant countries into close neighborhood" and that "at such time when others are exchanging relations, to reject intercourse necessarily creates enemies, and to maintain the old order of things strictly is to invite national disaster"; and it advised that all prohibitive laws relating to foreigners be replaced with more lenient ones.

The Dutch were the only trusted link between Japan and the Western world for centuries and the advice emanating from such a source was seriously considered by the Shogunate in repeated conferences. Lord Midzuno Tadakuni, then holding the highest office in the Yedo Government, proposed that, instead of opening the country through external compulsion, Japan should take the initiative in welcoming the world intercourse, stimulate the rising tide of national spirit within, and adopt the aggressive policy of conquest without. All other leaders were unanimously opposed to the modification of the traditional policy and the august conference before Shogun Tokugawa Iyeyoshi decided against Lord Midzuno's otherwise far-sighted plea, the latter thereby resigning his position. Japan's negative answer thus arrived at was sent to the Dutch representative at Dejima and relayed back to the Netherlands in 1845. Another attempt in 1847 was also unsuccessful. Thus ended the Dutch attempts, most timely and friendly ones, to terminate the folly of Japan's isolation policy.

Again, in 1852, when the news of the proposed American expedition to Japan reached the Netherlands, another effort was made to impress the Japanese officials of the impossibility of further maintaining the closed doors and a draft of commercial treaty was presented for consideration. But the task of opening Japan had remained still unaccomplished when Perry came.

THE COMING OF THE AMERICANS

The coming of the Americans to Japan was motivated by practical necessity. With the development of direct shipping between San Francisco and Shanghai, the Japanese islands began to occupy a position of growing commercial importance. Moreover, the presence of American whalers in the northern waters of Japan from the third decade of the nineteenth century made the Japanese cooperation indispensable, especially in securing access to ports of refuge and supply and in getting guarantees for the humane treat-

ment of shipwrecked American mariners. And the United States of America, through Commodore Perry's cautious but dignified effort, succeeded in forcing Japan's closed doors open, the task which all other nations, even the Dutch, had failed to attain. Commodore Perry, however, was not the first American to visit Japan with that mission and the failures of his predecessors furnished a fitting prelude to the determined Virginian.

From the closing years of the eighteenth century, American vessels were casually seen in the Japanese waters. During the Napoleonic Wars, the Dutch trade was carried on under the American flag and the first American vessel recorded as entering a Japanese port was the *Eliza*, under the command of Captain Stewart but flying the Dutch colors, which visited Nagasaki in 1797. Captain Stewart repeated his visits as a Dutch employee and in 1800, after leaving the Dutch service, made an independent voyage of his own but his request for trade privileges was refused. His other attempt in 1803 also ended in failure. In 1789 the *Franklin*, another American vessel under the command of Captain James Devereaux but flying the Dutch flag and in 1799 a Salem vessel under the command of Captain John Derby, sailing under the charter of the East India Company, also visited Japan.

More definite plans on the part of the Americans to open Japan are in evidence from the second decade of the nineteenth century. In 1815 Commodore Porter, who had been despatched to the Pacific for the protection of American whalers, addressed a letter to Secretary Monroe on the subject of opening Japan and consequently a plan to send him to Japan for that purpose was drawn up but it was defeated. John Quincy Adams, a few years later, in vain urged the opening of Japan as a duty of the Christian nations. After the elapse of another decade, an official attempt to establish commercial relations with Japan was to have been made in 1832 and 1835 when Edmund Roberts, the American Minister to Siam and Muscat, had borne a letter of credence to Japan to negotiate a commercial treaty, but he

died before he succeeded in accomplishing his mission. In 1844 Caleb Cushing, who was sent to China at the head of an American diplomatic mission, was commissioned to make such a treaty but the instructions failed to reach him before he left China for home. In the following year similar instructions were issued to Alexander H. Everett, the American Commissioner in China, but his place was taken by Commodore Biddle who, in 1846, with two warships, carried a friendly letter from President Polk to the Japanese Emperor but departed empty-handed after a stay of ten days in Yedo Bay.

In the meanwhile, the problem of rescuing American whalers was vexing the officials at Washington and unwittingly widening the narrow cleft in the sealed door of Japan. The *Lawrence*, an American whaler, was wrecked off a Kurile Island in 1846, two months before Commodore Biddle's visit, and the seven surviving members of the crew were imprisoned, later sent away to Batavia in a Dutch vessel. In 1848, the *Ladoga* and the *Plymouth*, both American whalers, were wrecked at two different places off the Japanese coast and the survivors were again imprisoned. In the following year, the U. S. S. *Preble*, under the command of Captain James Glynn, entered Nagasaki and rescued the imprisoned American seamen. In the same year, the *Trident*, another American whaler, was wrecked near one of the Kurile Islands and, after much difficulty, the American sailors, together with a score of English seamen in a similar predicament, were returned home through the Dutch assistance.

Such was the background of unofficial American-Japanese relations when, at last, more serious efforts to open official intercourse were made at the turn of the half century. In 1851, Commodore Aulick, in command of the East India squadron, was instructed to visit Japan with his naval forces, to present President Filmore's letter to the Mikado and to secure, if possible, a treaty of amity and commerce. He was recalled, however, in November, 1851, and the mission was entrusted to no other than the now-famed Com-

modore Matthew Calbraith Perry, brother of the equally illustrious hero of Lake Erie.

Commodore Perry's instructions set forth that the object of the mission was to secure protection for shipwrecked American seamen and property, to obtain permission for American ships to enter Japanese ports for supplies, to establish a depot for coal and to urge the opening of one or more ports for commerce; that these various goals were to be attained by "argument and persuasion" but that, if unsuccessful, he was to demand "in the most unequivocal terms" the humane treatment of American seamen; that he was "not to resort to force unless in self-defence"; that he was to be "cautious and conciliatory but at the same time firm and decided," and that he was to "do everything to impress them with a just sense of the power and greatness of this country." After a most cautious preparation which extended over nine months, Perry set sail in the *Mississippi*, a steam frigate, from Norfolk, Virginia, in November, 1852. He first went around Africa to Shanghai where he assembled his squadron, visited the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, entered Yedo Bay at the head of four war vessels on July 8, 1853, and anchored off the small town of Uruga.

The Japanese officials were not wholly unprepared for the occasion due to the Dutch warning, but they were well-nigh panic-stricken and the popular commotion was beyond description as they beheld the impressive strength of Perry's squadron, containing the largest naval force and the first steamer ever seen in the Japanese waters. The Commissioners at Uruga, however, lost no time in reminding Perry of Japan's exclusion decrees and advised him to go to Nagasaki. Perry stood firm and insisted upon going to Yedo, meeting the Shogun in person and presenting President Filmore's letter. The officials realized the tenseness of the situation and received the President's letter, but told Perry that the answer would be given the following year through the Dutch agent at Nagasaki and that in the future Nagasaki instead of Uruga should be used in accordance with national decrees. Perry made some surveys and demonst-

rations in Yedo Bay, going as far as the present site of Yokohama, and went away on July 17, promising to return the following spring for the answer.

THE DILEMMA OF THE SHOGUNATE .

The presence of four American "black ships" so near the capital had occasioned consternation in the Shogun's Court. When at last the American fleet sailed away, the Yedo Government was now faced with a delicate task of answering President Filmore's letter which contained a three-fold American demand: (1) opening of the country for friendly and commercial intercourse; (2) humane treatment of shipwrecked American seamen; and (3) permission to establish a coaling station in Japan. Their dilemma was obvious: to refuse the American demand meant, as Perry himself had intimated in unmistakable terms, a disaster, possibly a war, for which ordeal Japan was entirely unprepared; and yet to acquiesce in the request signified the nullification of the traditional policy which lasted over 200 years. Japan stood at the cross-road of her national policy and the best of statesmanship was required to choose the right road.

The Shogunate, therefore, took an unprecedented step in transmitting the President's letter to the Mikado and the daimyos for their consideration. The Imperial Court at Kyoto naturally directed the Yedo officials to drive the Americans away without hesitation, while an overwhelming majority of the daimyos favored the maintenance of the exclusion decrees. The most outspoken leader of the opposition was Tokugawa Nariaki, Lord of Mito, one of the *Sanke* or Three Tokugawa Families and one of the most powerful daimyos in the country. On the other hand, a few far-sighted daimyos dared to suggest a policy of conciliation and the opening of intercourse with the outside world. Among this group was Ii Naosuke, Lord of Hikone, about whom we shall hear more later. He, with Lord Hotta and other liberal-minded daimyos, was willing to try the experiment of foreign intercourse for a few years, ranging from

three to ten and, if the result was not satisfactory at the end of the period, Japan in the meanwhile would have become strong enough to close her doors again. Lord Abe Masahiro and the Shogunate Court were well aware of the hopelessness of resistance and found more wisdom in the compromise opinion of experimental procedure. Nevertheless, hasty efforts were made everywhere to strengthen the national defence by building forts, casting cannon from temple bells, organizing the national guards and encouraging the building of large ships after rescinding the old edict against it.

Soon after Perry left for China where the Taiping Rebellion was raging, a Russian squadron under Vice-Admiral Poutiatine visited Nagasaki and pressed another three-fold demand: initiation of friendly intercourse, opening of ports for commerce and clarification of the boundary line in Sakhalin. The Commissioner at Nagasaki refused to entertain the request in the usual manner and the Russian fleet left the port. In November, Poutiatine approached Perry to consider "mutual cooperation" in dealing with Japan but the American Commodore courteously declined the suggestion. Rumors were then current that the French and Russian squadrons were about to visit Japan to seek treaties together, while the English squadron on a similar mission was already in the Asiatic waters. Perry saw no time to be lost, hastened his return to Japan and left Hongkong in the middle of January. En route, he received a letter from a Dutch agent which informed him of the Shogun's death and the Japanese request to postpone his promised return in view of the season of mourning. Perry was unmoved and proceeded straight to Yedo Bay, where he arrived on February 13, 1854, at the head of a stately squadron of seven, later nine, war vessels.

The Yedo officials were surprised to see Perry back so soon but they were now prepared to face the issue. After an exchange of views with regard to the place of meeting, Kanagawa was selected in the way of compromise and the representatives of the two nations met there on March 8.

Then followed the epoch-making negotiations. The Japanese representatives, headed by Lord Hayashi, expressed the willingness of the Yedo Government to promise humane treatment of shipwrecked Americans and to furnish fuel and water through the port of Nagasaki, but rejected the request for the opening of commercial relations. Perry insisted upon the latter and offered the Sino-American Treaty of 1844 as a basis of discussion. After four conferences which were marked by heated arguments and considerable equivocations, Lord Hayashi finally agreed to open Shimoda and Hakodate. During the progress of the negotiations, gifts and banquets were exchanged and on March 31, 1854, the historic Treaty of Kanagawa was signed by the representatives of the two nations, thus ending the two centuries of isolation policy and opening a new chapter in Japan's international relations.

CHAPTER II

JAPAN REOPENED

THE opening of Japan to international intercourse became inevitable in the middle of the nineteenth century. But the nation, both the Government and the people, were neither willing nor ready for the sweeping consequences of the new departure. The Shogunate, being forced to take the momentous step, courageously struggled to keep faith with the Treaty Powers in spite of the rising tide of the anti-foreignism of the Imperial Court at Kyoto and the opposition of powerful feudatories all over the land. It was during those trying years that the Japanese people had learned their first bitter lessons in modern diplomacy based upon force.

JAPAN'S FIRST TREATIES

The epoch-making American-Japanese Treaty of 1854 which Commodore Perry succeeded in securing under the shadows of the "black ships" is a simple document containing twelve articles. It established a "perfect, permanent, and universal peace and a sincere and cordial amity" between the two countries; provided for the opening of the ports of Shimoda immediately and of Hakodate a year later for supplies, the visits of American ships being limited to those two ports except in time of distress; assured the humane treatment of shipwrecked Americans in Japan and the freedom from the restrictions and confinements suffered by the Dutch at Nagasaki; permitted trade under temporary Japanese regulations and through the agency of Japanese officers; allowed the appointment by the United States of

consuls or agents at Shimoda after eighteen months "provided that either of the two governments deem such arrangement necessary"; and finally incorporated the "most-favored-nation" clause. The Additional Regulations which were signed at Shimoda on June 21, 1854, defined and regulated various matters relating to the opening of Shimoda. In short, the Treaty of Kanagawa granted everything which the United States had asked for at the time. The absence of an extraterritorial provision is conspicuously noteworthy.

No sooner than the news of Perry's great achievement was spread abroad, the Powers most concerned renewed their efforts to secure treaty relations with Japan. Moreover, the breaking out of the Crimean War pitted England and France against Russia and Turkey, and the contemplated allied expedition against the Russian naval station in Kamchatka necessitated some sort of Japanese cooperation. Thus the first Power to follow the American footsteps was Great Britain, and Admiral Sir James Stirling, with a squadron of four war vessels entered Nagasaki on September 7, 1854. Admiral Stirling lost no time in asking for the opening of the Anglo-Japanese treaty relations. The Japanese officials were already informed of the War and, desirous of avoiding unnecessary complications, promptly granted the British request. The result was the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of October 14, 1854, slightly modified at the time of exchanging ratifications on October 18, 1855. It was somewhat less liberal than Perry's although it contained a "most-favored-nation" clause which secured for Great Britain all that the United States had gained. The chief difference between the two instruments was the assignment of Nagasaki and Hakodate to British ships, whereas Perry abhorred Nagasaki and secured the opening of Shimoda. It also contained a crude form of extraterritorial regulations.

Russia followed next. Two months after the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, Admiral Poutiatine appeared at Shimoda, being his fourth visit to Japan, and successfully negotiated the Russo-Japanese Treaty which was signed on February 7, 1855. The provisions of the Treaty closely

followed the American-Japanese Treaty, except the opening of three ports to Russian ships, Nagasaki, Hakodate and Shimoda. New departures were introduced in the clauses which defined the Russo-Japanese boundary in the Kurile Islands but which left the boundary question in Sakhalin unsettled, and in the clauses which defined the full principle of extraterritoriality.

The Dutch at Nagasaki, who continued to trade with Japan throughout the seclusion period under decidedly rigid regulations, naturally desired to improve their status. On November 9, 1855, J. H. Donker Curtius, the Dutch Commissioner in Japan, signed a Preliminary Convention which was replaced by a Treaty on January 30, 1866. It largely concerned removing the irksome restrictions under which the Dutch had traded at Dejima; it also granted extraterritorial and "most-favored-nation" privileges.

In signing away all these Treaties, the Shogunate acted without the Mikado's sanctions. But its influence at Kyoto was still supreme, and the Imperial approval of the first Treaties with the United States, Great Britain, and Russia was obtained in February, 1855. The result was far-reaching. The Shogunate endeavored to save itself from embarrassment by shielding its actions with the Imperial sanction while the emergence of the Imperial Court from behind its curtained past to assert its own power eventually spelled the downfall of the Shogunate itself.

THE COMMERCIAL TREATIES OF 1858

The signing of the treaties with the four leading Western Powers was a mere prelude to a more disturbing drama of modern Japan. The first line of that drama was written when, early in the morning of August 21, 1856, the U. S. S. *San Jacinto* entered the harbor of Shimoda with Townsend Harris on board.

During 1848-1855 Harris was engaged in the Eastern trade and gained a useful knowledge of the countries, the peoples and the situations in the Far East. In 1855 he was

appointed United States Consul General to Japan, and, before reaching Japan, he had successfully concluded a new treaty between Siam and the United States. One of several instructions which were issued to him by Secretary of State Marcy frankly admitted that the Kanagawa Treaty "does not expressly provide for any commercial intercourse" between the two countries and that "from the notorious jealousy of the Japanese in regard to foreigners, it is at least questionable whether they would assent to such a construction of the instrument"; that "a principal motive" in selecting him for the post was the hope that through his "knowledge of Eastern character" and "general intelligence and experience in business," he would make such an impression upon the Japanese as would in time induce them to enter into a commercial treaty with the United States; that he was "furnished with a full power to negotiate and conclude such a treaty" so that he could avail himself of any favorable opportunity without losing time in communicating with Washington; that it was "sufficient, at least as a beginning," if "its commercial stipulations" were similar to those which he was instructed to insert in the treaty with Siam; and that "the intolerance of the Japanese in regard to the Christian religion forbids us to hope" the allowance of missionaries to enter the country or the permission of Christian worship in any form. He was furnished with a letter from President Pierce to the Emperor of Japan. Harris thus had two important missions to perform: to present his credentials as an American diplomatic representative at Yedo and to secure, if possible, a real commercial treaty.

The Shogunate officials were in consternation for the second time. Moreover, they had objected to the consular arrangement during Perry's negotiations and naturally refused to receive Harris under the Japanese reading of the Kanagawa Treaty, that a consul should be appointed only when difficulties arose and when both nations wished it. Thus began a struggle between them and Harris, the former trying to keep the already opened door of international in-

tercourse as narrow as possible and the latter endeavoring to widen it until the task is completed.

Harris succeeded in breaking the ice of difficulties by the sheer force of his personality and patience. His first victory was won by the conclusion on June 17, 1857, of the Convention "for the purpose of further regulating the intercourse of American citizens within the Empire of Japan." In the meanwhile, Harris was requesting an audience before the Shogun and a beginning of negotiations for a final commercial treaty. The Yedo officials resisted such a move but Harris was determined. Again patience and friendly persistence bore fruit and Harris was received in a most dignified manner by the Shogun on December 7, 1857. Five days later he visited Lord Hotta, the successor of Lord Abe and a leader of the progressive group, and eloquently pleaded for the necessity and benefit of a complete commercial intercourse between nations. As a result, Lord Inouye and Lord Iwase were appointed to negotiate with Harris. Thus begun, Japan's first formal Treaty of Amity and Commerce was concluded at Yedo on February 26, 1858. Harris returned to Shimoda, awaiting the Imperial approval and the promised signing of the Treaty on April 21.

At this juncture entered both internal and external factors which again forced the issue in favor of progress rather than retrogression. Internally, the wave of opposition against the treaty negotiations broke out anew on all sides and the tide of anti-foreignism was rising steadily. The powerful influence of the Prince of Mito endorsed the court party at Kyoto which viewed the proposed treaty with disfavor. In vain did the Shogunate send first Lord Hayashi and then Lord Hotta to persuade the Imperial Court at Kyoto and the signing of the Treaty was accordingly postponed until September. Externally, the British and French ambassadors to China, fresh from new victories there, were reported on their way to Japan to negotiate treaties. Harris had no time to lose and at once proceeded to Kanagawa and informed the Yedo officials of the dangerous situation which they would be facing soon and urged

them, advisedly as well as intimidatingly, to sign the American-Japanese Treaty before other powers would force severe terms upon Japan. Lord Ii Naosuke, now at the head of affairs, weighed the dilemma, took a far-sighted view of the crisis and decided to sign the Treaty without securing the approval of the Kyoto party. On July 29, 1858, the new Treaty was signed on board the U.S.S. *Pawhattan*.

The American-Japanese Treaty of 1858 thus concluded was a commendable improvement over the previous instrument. The chief features of the new Treaty were: the appointment of a diplomatic agent at Yedo and Consuls or Consular Agents at the treaty ports; the opening of Kanagawa (in place of Shimoda), Nagasaki, Hakodate, Niigata, and Hyogo (later Kobe) for trade, and of Yedo and Osaka for foreign residence; the right to collect customs duties and tonnage dues; the prohibition of the importation of opium; the extraterritorial rights of Americans in Japan in civil as well as criminal matters; the freedom of religion; the permission for the circulation in Japan of foreign coins and the regulation of exchange at a specified rate; and the provision for the revision of the Treaty, on the desire of either party and on one year's notice, after July 4, 1872. Accompanying the Treaty were the Regulations under which the American trade was to be conducted in Japan. The appended Tariff Schedule defined the tariff on imports under four classes, and the five per cent tariff on all articles exported except gold and silver coin and copper in bars, of which duties were subject to revision five years after the opening of Kanagawa if the Japanese Government so desired. Of these provisions, those relating to the free export of Japanese gold and silver, the conventional tariff, and the revision of the Treaty were to cause much trouble in later years.

The conclusion of the American-Japanese Treaty once more served as a beacon light to the other Western Powers in charting the difficult diplomatic waters at Yedo and other Treaties followed in rapid succession during the same year. J. H. Donker Curtius was the first to avail himself of the

American experience and the Dutch Treaty was signed on August 18. Admiral Poutiatine hurried to Yedo from China and concluded the Russian Treaty on August 19. Lord Elgin, at the head of a squadron of three ships and conveying a yacht which the British Queen had sent as a present to the Shogun, followed closely and easily obtained the British Treaty on August 23. Baron Gros and his squadron of three ships arrived a month later and wound up the parade with the French Treaty on October 7. Townsend Harris was correct when he maintained that what was satisfactory to the United States would be acceptable to other Powers and all four Treaties followed the general lines of the American Treaty with a few minor changes. Among the new departures introduced the most notable was that contained in the British Treaty relating to the shifting of cotton and woolen manufactured goods from the class which paid twenty per cent duty to that which paid five per cent. Portugal in 1860 and Prussia in the following year were added to the list of "Treaty Powers," but no new concessions were offered.

In short, the Treaties of 1858 enlarged but unified Japan's foreign relations by transforming a number of scattered and complicated engagements into a series of similar agreements, all coordinated by the "most-favored-nation" clause. Modified later by tariff changes and supplemented from time to time by minor regulations regarding quarantine, traveling and other matters, they governed Japan's foreign relations until 1899.

JAPAN DIVIDED

Japan which the Western nations had forced open was beset with complicated internal problems. The power of the Shogunate which ruled the nation for two hundred and fifty years was still apparently supreme both at Yedo and Kyoto but its political philosophy which was based upon feudalism was gradually being undermined by various forces. Now the new departure in the foreign policy of the Shogun-

ate, coupled with the question of the Shogun's successor, contributed the final impetus to divide the whole nation into two camps.

The readiness with which the leaders of the Shogunate overturned the traditional policy of seclusion naturally strengthened the anti-foreign party throughout the land, which in turn increased the anti-foreign sentiment of the public at large. The leader of the opposition was Lord Tokugawa Nariaki, the ex-Prince of Mito, and the majority of local feudatories supported him. The negotiations for a new American-Japanese Treaty gave further strength to those conservative forces. It was to save the Shogunate from further censure that Lord Hotta sent Lord Hayashi to Kyoto early in February, 1858, and asked for the Imperial sanction which he thought would be forthcoming as a matter of course. The Kyoto Court was already under the influence of the opposition party and the mission failed, widening the breach between the two capitals. Then Lord Hotta himself visited Kyoto. He found the ready support of Prince Kujo, Prime Minister of the Imperial Court, and presented an eloquent plea for the cause of enlightened international relations. His initial success came to naught, however, when, the opposition forces having won over most of the Court nobles to their views, the final message from the Throne advised that not only must all demands for further concessions be rejected but also those already granted should be denied. Lord Hotta returned to Yedo, completely baffled and disappointed.

The Shogunate was now facing a delicate situation. Quite innocently it turned to the Imperial Court at Kyoto, believing that the Imperial sanction may help to override the rising tide of anti-foreignism, and, for the first time since its establishment, the Throne had rejected the measure it recommended. The Imperial Court, having been kept out of touch with practical politics for centuries and placed in a forced ignorance of the affairs of the outside world, naturally, raised its sacred voice, in tune with the popular sentiment of the time, in favor of the traditional policy. In

short, the Shogunate stumbled quite unexpectedly into a lively opposition against its policy.

No less serious was a bitter controversy, which had been brewing for some years, as to the appointment of an heir to Shogun Tokugawa Iyesada. Lord Nariaki of the Mito branch of the Tokugawa family naturally desired that his son, Keiki or Lord Hitotsubashi, be named the successor. The majority of daimyos supported him. Shogun Iyesada's relationship with the Mito branch, however, was not cordial and he preferred Iyemochi, the young Prince of the Kii branch, his nearer kinsman. The Yedo officials naturally supported the Shogun's personal preference. And thus the question of succession added further complication to the already complicated Yedo affairs.

It was at this critical moment that Lord Ii Naosuke came to the head of affairs as Tairo at Yedo. First of all he reasoned with Harris for the postponement of the signing of the Treaty until September ; he then consulted local daimyos again and began to persuade the Imperial Court anew. Before he went far in the latter task, Harris brought the pressure to bear upon the Shogunate on the ground that the British and French might exact severer terms from Japan if the American-Japanese Treaty remained still unsigned. A special conference of the higher officials which Lord Ii called favored, by a large majority, the immediate signing of the Treaty. Lord Ii counseled delay until the Imperial sanction could be obtained, largely to avoid unnecessary criticisms, but finally he gave way to the majority opinion. When at last he signed away the American-Japanese Treaty on July 29, 1858, to be followed in rapid succession by the signing of four other treaties, against the clamorous criticism of the opposition party and without the Imperial sanction, there were reasons to believe that the position of the Yedo Government, especially that of Lord Ii, was not in the least an envious one.

Lord Ii, having made the momentous decision upon his own responsibility, now addressed himself to the question of heirship. He began by consolidating his power through

the dismissal of high officials who were opposed to his views. One of the most unfortunate victims of this sweeping policy was no other than Lord Hotta whose liberal foreign policy was the towering strength of the Shogunate but who favored Lord Hitotsubashi as the Shogun's successor. Lord Ii thus lost a champion of progressive diplomacy in an attempt to weaken the party opposed to his policy regarding the heirship. In the meanwhile, Lord Ii had a measure of success at Kyoto and obtained the Imperial approval for the appointment of the Prince of Kii. The last and desperate effort on the part of Lord Nariaki, together with such powerful leaders as the Lords of Owari, Mito, and Echizen, to annul the procedure failed, and the appointment was proclaimed on August 4, 1858. Twelve days later the Shogun died and Tokugawa Iyemochi immediately filled the vacant seat. The storm of protests against Lord Ii and his supporters naturally arose on all sides.

While the question of heirship was being thus swiftly settled, the Powers were ruthlessly pressing upon the already harassed officials of the Shogunate for treaties similar to that which Harris had obtained. And once more the scene of contest was shifted to Kyoto where feud was already in progress between the two parties of the Court. Prince Kujo led the Shogunate party, while the nobles such as Prince Konoye and Prince Sanjo supported the Mito party. Intrigues after intrigues were openly played by both sides until Prince Kujo was forced to resign his post as Prime Minister of the Imperial Court. Lord Ii maintained that such a procedure without the Shogun's approval was illegal and urged Prince Kujo to withdraw his resignation, and took drastic steps in punishing the opposition leaders. On the other hand, in an effort to enlist the Imperial support for its foreign policy, the Shogunate adopted a temporizing attitude and made many concessions in point of form, concessions indeed which, strictly interpreted, might have been regarded as stultifying its own actions. This attitude undoubtedly conveyed the impression that the treaties in question were simply provisional arrangements which

might be cancelled at the pleasure of Japan at an opportune time in the future. Thus was issued an impractical edict of February 2, 1859, which approved the concessions offered by the Shogunate to keep the foreigners at a distance and eventually to restore the traditional policy of seclusion, and authorized the Shogun to take *ad interim* measures to that end. This idea lay at the bottom of the Court's attitude toward the treaty question and it was destined to cause more than passing troubles for the Shogunate which offered it as a measure of passing strategy.

Lord Ii now proceeded to further strengthen his position by consummating the marriage between the Shogun and a younger sister of the Mikado. Before this plan was consummated, the struggle culminated in the most dramatic assassination of Lord Ii, one snowy morning in March, 1860, by a small band of Mito ronins as he made his way to the Shogun's Palace. Six months later, Lord Nariaki, the opposition leader, also passed away. But Japan remained still divided.

DIFFICULTIES OF TREATY ENFORCEMENT

The treaties of 1858 were enforced before Lord Ii died and in the act of enforcement he found as much difficulty with the Treaty Powers as he did with the opposition party in negotiating them.

Two problems taxed his immediate attention. The first was the task of receiving the official representatives of the five "Treaty Powers." This was easily solved, however, by the arrangement to lodge them in five Buddhist temples at Yedo, such as the British in Tozen-ji at Takanawa, the Americans in Zempuku-ji at Shiba, the French in Saikai-ji at Mita, and the Dutch in Cho-o-ji at Shiba. Townsend Harris became the first American Minister to Japan and Rutherford Alcock, later knighted, the first British Consul General to Japan. Then followed Duchene de Bellecourt as the French Minister and De Witt as the Dutch Consul General, while the Russian representative was not

named for some years. On the other hand, Japan dispatched her first embassy to the United States in February, 1860, and to the Treaty Powers in Europe in January, 1862.

The other question was the inadvisability of opening Kanagawa in accordance with the treaty stipulations. Lord Ii favored the little fishing village of Yokohama in place of Kanagawa and he urged it with reason. Yokohama not only possessed an excellent harbor but it was removed from the Tokaido, the main artery of communication, where the foreigners were more liable to meet the unruly fate at the hand of ronins filled with anti-foreign spirit. Accordingly, under the direct supervision of the Shogunate, officials were sent to Yokohama, land was reclaimed, streets were planned, piers were built, and merchants were urged to build their shops and residences there. The American and British representatives protested in vain, for Lord Ii was determined. Fortunately, the question was actually settled by the merchants, both foreign and Japanese, who quickly realized the superior commercial advantage of Yokohama no matter what the political disadvantage might be. Indeed, the great British firm of Jardine, Matheson and Company was one of the very first to establish its headquarters at Yokohama, as did some Dutch merchants. Thus Yokohama, not Kanagawa, became Japan's chief seaport and Lord Ii's far-sightedness has been once more epitomized. Of course, the opening of Nagasaki and Hakodate followed in due time.

The immediate disheartening results of the opening of the treaty ports were the outflow of gold from Japan and the rise in commodity prices. The ratio of gold and silver in the Japanese currency was one to five instead of one to fifteen as in the world at large and foreign merchants could reap an enormous profit in exchanging the Japanese gold abroad. This the Treaties recognized. The later change in the Japanese ratio to one to ten did not prevent the gold outflow. Besides, the circulation of foreign coins as stipulated in the Treaties also worked disadvantageously to the Japanese. Moreover, the chief commodities which attract-

ed foreign merchants were silk and copper, the prices of which enormously rose in Yedo. The proportionate rise in the prices of other commodities was the natural consequence. These were the perfectly understandable economic results of the new treaty relations, but merely added further fuel for anti-foreign agitations.

Graver in consequences were the rising tide of anti-foreignism and the accompanying activities of the ronins which harassed the Shogunate in the extreme. The first incident involved Russia. In August, 1859, Count Muraviev, the Governor-General of East Siberia, arrived at Yokohama with a squadron of seven ships, which number being increased to nine later. His ostensible mission was to secure the cession of Sakhalin by Japan. On the day he proceeded to open negotiations, a lieutenant and two seamen were attacked by the ronins, one of the seamen being instantly killed and the lieutenant expiring during the night. The news alarmed the foreign community at Yedo and Yokohama and a strong policy was urged. The Japanese officials expressed their profound regret and promised the quickest possible enforcement of justice; one of the high officials of Kanagawa even attended, against the Japanese custom, the funeral of the victims. Fortunately, Count Muraviev was satisfied with the efforts of the Japanese officials and sailed away without proceeding with his negotiations, leaving behind him Captain Ounkovsky and the *Askold* to settle the affair and to help protect the foreign community. Captain Ounkovsky's demands were mild: the expression of regret, the dismissal of the Governor of Yokohama, and the arrest and execution of the assassins in the presence of Russian officers. The demand for an indemnity was significantly absent. The Japanese accepted the demands on August 26 and declared in addition that they would guard the mortuary chapel in perpetuity.

In spite of vigilance, violence continued. A servant in the employ of the French agent was killed in November, 1859. In January, 1860, the Japanese interpreter of the British Legation followed in a similar fate. Two Dutch

merchant captains met the same end one month later. In all cases, the Japanese officials expressed their profound regret and promised to apprehend and punish the assassins. In the last two cases, the Japanese officials were again compelled to attend the funeral against the Japanese custom and in the last case an indemnity was demanded. Graver in result were the assassinations of Heusken, an interpreter attached to the American Legation, in January, 1861, and of Oliphant and Morrison, both British officials, in the course of an attack on the British Legation by a band of ronins in July. After protracted negotiations, Japan made retributions by paying an indemnity of \$10,000 in each case. These sporadic violences loomed large in the eyes of the foreigners at the time, but they little realized that they were the natural consequences of the opening which they had forced upon Japan and that their attitude toward the Japanese people was not always gentlemanlike. Besides, more Japanese were sacrificing their lives for the cause of progress in those troubled days. The crowning example of the latter was Lord Ii himself, while Lord Ando, his successor, miraculously escaped a similar fate only with two heavy injuries two years later.

Another incident of a different nature helped to arouse the anti-foreign party. Russia, taking advantage of the internal dissensions, suddenly seized the Island of Tsushima in 1861. The repeated remonstrances on the part of the Yedo officials failed to effect the Russian withdrawal. Finally the Shogunate consulted the British Minister and through his effort the Russians were forced away. It was only natural that such an action should be regarded as humiliating and the opposition party most effectively used it in further fermenting the anti-foreign sentiment.

Under such perplexing circumstances, the Shogunate, placed as it was between the devil and the deep sea, was convinced of the folly of the opening of Hyogo and Niigata, as well as of Yedo and Osaka. Accordingly the negotiations for the postponement were started. Harris understood the anomalous situation well and promised coopera-

tion, but the British, French, and Dutch representatives saw no reason for such a delay. Finally, the special Japanese mission which was sent to Europe for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of Treaties labored and succeeded in securing the postponement for five years. Such was the importance of the London Protocol of June 6, 1862, and the Paris Protocol of October 2, 1862, in which the British and French Governments, respectively, acquiesced in the Japanese plea on certain conditions to facilitate their commercial positions.

THE REVIVAL OF EXPULSION POLICY

The wave of opposition against the progressive foreign policy of the Shogunate was rising with years. The malcontents, appealing to sword rather than bowing to reason, continued to play havoc alike on the liberal leaders of the country and the foreigners. The Shogunate and the Imperial Court stood farther apart and the powerful local daimyos, especially in western Japan, were rapidly shifting their support to the side of the latter. Since the passing of Lord Nariaki of Mito, the most outspoken leaders of the opposition were the powerful daimyos of Satsuma and Choshu, respectively Lord Shimadzu and Lord Mori. The country had found, in the meanwhile, a new rallying cry of "Sonno Jo-i" or "Revere the Emperor and Expel the Foreigners."

In that atmosphere the Imperial Court recovered its own and began to assert itself rigorously. During 1862, therefore, the Shogun's former dictatorial position was changed to that of submission, at least temporarily, as a result of two forceful Imperial missions which were sent to Yedo, and the Imperial Court was pressing the Shogun to enforce his promise, as expressed in the acceptance of the Imperial Order of February 2, 1859, of driving foreigners out of Japan and closing the doors once more. In December was issued another Imperial Order, urging the determination and the proclamation of the date of expulsion.

As the new year dawned over Kyoto, the Imperial Court was dominated by the anti-Shogun party which was then led by Lord Shimadzu of Satsuma, Lord Mori of Choshu, and Lord Yamanouchi of Tosa. Consequently, the agitation for the speedy expulsion of foreigners has become louder and more intense. It was into such an unfavorable atmosphere that the Shogun had decided to make his long-promised visit and to fight for his place and power. Lord Hitotsubashi, the Shogun's guardian, and Lord Matsudaira Shungaku, the Tairo, and their advisers arrived at Kyoto in advance in order to smooth the way for their master. On the contrary, at an important conference held at the palace, on April 8, a new mandate for the expulsion of foreigners was communicated. Lord Hitotsubashi was then pressed to fix the expulsion date but insisted that nothing could be done until the Shogun's arrival. The agitation became more fierce and even astounding acts of violence were openly committed.

The Shogun's arrival at Kyoto, on April 21, was a great spectacle as the people had not seen a Shogun appearing in Kyoto since 1634, but the visit was ill-fated from the beginning. The result of the first conference between the Mikado and the Shogun was the meek acceptance by the latter of an Imperial Order anew to expel all foreigners from Japan. The Order was to be executed, if possible, by peaceful negotiations; but, if necessary, by force. The news of this decision was promptly transmitted to all daimyos throughout the realm. The Shogun and his advisers knew what it meant to force the dazzling array of foreign fleet away from the Japanese shores, but they were miserably impotent at Kyoto. The expulsion movement reached its climax on June 5 when another conference was held between the Mikado and the Shogun and June 25, 1863, was designated by the Emperor as the date for the execution of the above Imperial Order. Daimyos all over the land were once more notified to that effect and instructed to defend their coasts and to sweep away all "invaders." Soon afterward the Choshu and Satsuma men left Kyoto homeward to enforce the

decree. Moreover, although the Shogun had intended to stay in Kyoto no more than ten days, he was kept there almost three months much as a hostage for the enforcement of the expulsion decree, while the Lord of Mito was appointed by the Emperor to proceed to Yedo in his stead and expel foreigners. It was as a result of this expulsion decree, as we shall see presently, that the Choshu men fired upon foreign vessels at Shimonoseki and thereby drove Japan into one of the earliest disgraceful international complications.

The Yedo authorities had exerted no special effort toward the enforcement of the expulsion decree except to give notice of future negotiations, while the Imperial Order urging immediate action was issued and the Emperor announced to take the field in person for the cause. Before any progress was made in that direction by either party, however, an unexpected turn in the wheel of internal politics took place late in 1863. The anti-Choshu factions gained strength at Kyoto and on September 30 effected a *coup d'état*, as a result of which the Choshu forces were driven out of Kyoto and seven supporting nobles of high rank fled from the city. Without the aggressive leadership of the Choshu group, however, the anti-foreign agitation lacked vigor and the fantastic scheme of expelling foreigners fell to pieces "like ice during a thaw." And the Shogunate party once more rode into power on the crest of the reactionary forces. Thus, early in 1864, when the Emperor and the Shogun had met in another conference at Kyoto, the previous relationship between the two had been reversed and the Imperial Order now conferred full powers upon the Shogunate in all matters, including the punishment of Choshu and seven nobles. Both the external pressure and the internal complications spared the Shogunate from an impossible task of enforcing the expulsion decree.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF KAGOSHIMA

The anti-foreign agitations and the ruthless activities of the ronins had left disastrous imprints upon Japan's for-

eign relations and soon Japan became involved in grave international complications. On June 26, 1862, a ronin made his way through the heavy guards, both Japanese and British, at the British Legation, killed two British marine-sentries, and then committed suicide on the spot. Before the settlement of this unfortunate affair was effected, another incident occurred on September 14 of the same year. Four British subjects, including a woman, were riding on the Tokaido near Kanagawa, and at Namamugi met the procession of Prince Shimadzu Saburo, the father of Lord Shimadzu of Satsuma and a leader of the Imperial faction. Perhaps unacquainted with the strict etiquette enforced in Japan on such an occasion, the equestrians, in defiance of the Japanese custom, not only refused to dismount but dared to cross the path of the procession. The retainers took such a behavior as an insult upon their master and swords flashed in accordance with the age-old custom of the land, killing one, C. L. Richardson, and severely injuring the other two men. Ill-fated negotiations followed.

The British representatives, of course, had very little appreciation of the tangled internal situation which made the Richardson case doubly difficult for the Shogunate to solve. It will be recalled that the Shogunate was then facing a crisis even if no foreign complication arose. The incident was especially vexing to the Shogunate as the whole question centered around a most powerful daimyo who was leading the opposition party at Kyoto and whom it dared not to arrest for fear of further crisis in internal politics.

There was still another incident which added fuel to the Anglo-Japanese relations already aflame. After the first attack on the British Legation in 1861, Sir Rutherford Alcock, British Minister, led the demand for a new site for the legation headquarters of the five "Treaty Powers" and successfully secured Goten-yama for the purpose. Lord Ando, who succeeded Lord Ii and who was responsible for this occasion, was attacked by a ronin in 1862, but all attempts to change the site failed. By the beginning of 1863, there was every reason to believe that the establishment of

the Legations, which were already proceeding, would result in further difficulties. The Japanese people commonly remarked at the time: "The British have our plum-garden, but the blossoms will be red." So it did. On January 16, 1863, a Japanese guard there was killed and on February 1, the unfinished British Legation was burned to ashes. The American Legation, it may be added, met a similar fate on May 24.

Such were the tangled circumstances under which the British ultimatum was delivered to the Shogunate on April 6. It demanded reparations from both parties, "an ample and formal apology" and the payment of £100,000 by the Shogunate, and "the immediate trial and capital execution" of the responsible persons and the payment of £25,000 for the relatives of the victims by Satsuma. It also demanded peremptorily an indemnity of £10,000 for the two marines who were killed in the earlier incident. Twenty days were allowed for a reply, at the end of which, if the demands were not accepted, the British navy would, within twenty-four hours, "proceed to enter upon such measure as may be necessary to secure the reparation demanded." It is not necessary to add that Rear-Admiral Kupper's squadron of more than a dozen warships were formidably arrayed at sea.

Seven days previously, the Shogun had left for Kyoto to fight for his place and power in spite of the British advice to the contrary in view of the approaching ultimatum as the visit had been long-promised and it was unwise to postpone it further. In his absence, the ultimatum was extended first to May 11 and then to May 23, while the British and French naval forces were offered to the services of the Shogunate against the hostile daimyos. When the extended date of ultimatum expired, the Yedo officials rejected the offer of assistance and proposed to pay the indemnity at some later date. The protracted indemnity discussions were finally brought to a close by a new British ultimatum and the formal agreement was signed on June 14, calling for the first payment of \$140,000 (Mexican) on June 18 and \$50,000

weekly thereafter until the last payment was made on July 30. At the same time, the Yedo officials offered to pay immediately £25,000 demanded of Satsuma if, in the face of difficulties involved, the British Government would desist from pressing the Lord of Satsuma further. The offer was coldly rejected.

When the agreed date of the first payment approached, the Yedo Government announced that the money would not be paid on account of an Imperial Order. Col. Neale, British Chargé d'Affaires, then placed the entire matter in the Admiral's hand on June 20, requesting him to adopt "prompt coercive measures of reprisal." After more protracted negotiations, the total indemnity of £110,000 or \$440,000 (Mexican) was paid to the British Chargé, thus settling the Shogunate's two cases with Great Britain. The precarious position of the Yedo Government is shown by its attempt to begin negotiations for the purpose of carrying out the Imperial Order to close commercial relations. A communication to that effect was issued, but the Powers refused even to negotiate regarding the matter.

The Satsuma phase of the crisis had now to be solved. Col. Neale requested Admiral Kupper on July 15 to order a portion of the British squadron to proceed to Kagoshima. The Yedo officials in vain tried to stay the expedition and Col. Neale with a British fleet of seven vessels arrived at Kagoshima on August 11. On the following day, the British Chargé presented to Lord Shimadzu the identical demands that had been contained in the British ultimatum of April 6. The reply deprecated the murder, promised the punishment of the assassins when discovered, blamed the failure for not inserting in the Treaties the ancient laws of the country governing the Japanese customs, and agreed to arrange for the payment of the money indemnity with the Shogunate. The British representatives considered the reply unsatisfactory and seized three small steamers belonging to the daimyo with the intention of holding them until he had complied with the British demands. Immediately the batteries opened fire on the squadron. Admiral Kupper

replied by setting fire to the captured ships and firing upon the batteries, which eventually resulted in the levelling of half of the city to ashes. The action was renewed the next day, and, after accomplishing "every act of retribution and punishment within the scope of operation of a small naval force," the squadron returned to Yokohama.

Col. Neale personally believed that the damage done at Kagoshima more than covered the demands made upon Satsuma. Upon returning to Yokohama, however, he once more requested the Yedo officials to take necessary steps in compelling Lord Shimadzu to comply with the British demands. Finally, in November, two Satsuma envoys arrived at Yokohama and, after negotiations lasting only three days, agreed on November 16 to pay the indemnity of £25,000 and to continue to search for the assassin for the purpose of punishing them when discovered. The money \$100,000 (Mexican) was duly paid on December 11 and the "Kagoshima Affair" lapsed into history. At home in England, this diplomatic victory based upon force was severely criticized, while the Japanese people had learned a bitter lesson in international relations.

THE SHIMONOSEKI AFFAIR

Lord Mori of Choshu, one of the leaders of the anti-Shogun and hence the anti-foreign faction, had taken literally the Imperial Order for the expulsion of foreigners after June 25, 1863, and his men fired upon the first foreign vessel which happened to pass through the Strait of Shimonoseki after that date. The vessel was a small American steamer, the *Pembroke*, and the date was June 26. On July 8, a small French steam gunboat, the *Kienchang*, was fired upon by the ships and the batteries, while on July 11 a Dutch steam sloop, the *Medusa*, was attacked.

When the news of the attack upon the American steamer reached Yokohama, Minister Pruyn and Commander McDougal of the *Wyoming*, after taking the matter up with the Japanese authorities, decided to send a punitive expedi-

tion in spite of the Japanese protest. The *Wyoming* hurried to Choshu and, in an engagement, sunk a steamer and a brig. The *Kienchang* affair likewise angered Admiral Jaures who, with two vessels, reached Shimonoseki, landed a small force, and destroyed one of six batteries, burned a small village, and caused other destructions.

The Shogunate was once more in a delicate predicament. The anti-foreign party was paramount at Kyoto and the Shogun was kept there much as a hostage for the execution of the expulsion decree; only the indemnity phase of the British crisis was surmounted and the Satsuma phase remained still threatening; the Treaty Powers coldly refused to negotiate for the reclosure of commercial intercourse; and now occurred the Shimonoseki incidents which were, no doubt, aimed at the Shogunate more than the foreign powers. The Yedo officials, therefore, promptly disavowed the actions of the Choshu men but promised investigation. They actually sent envoys to Choshu in September to investigate the incidents, but the Choshu men fired upon the *Choyo-Maru* and two of the envoys who were compelled to land were assassinated.

In the meanwhile, the influence of the Shogunate was restored as a result of a *coup d'état* which drove the Choshu power out of Kyoto late in 1863. But the foreign representatives suspected the Kyoto deliberations and, under the leadership of Sir Rutherford Alcock, who had returned to Japan in March, 1864, were urging concerted coercive measures against Choshu. The Yedo officials tried to stay such an expedition by informing Sir Rutherford that the Shogun himself was planning to initiate punitive measures against the clan. Of course, they paid no attention to such a plea and, after repeated conferences, agreed on May 25 upon a protocol which bound Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Netherlands to take concerted actions in dealing with important diplomatic matters which lay before them. The Protocol was referred to the Yedo Government and, after receiving their views, a more comprehensive memorandum was drafted and signed by the same four

Powers on July 22. In this new document, the representatives agreed upon five principles: (1) neutralization of Japan; (2) maintenance of treaty rights; (3) protection of the open ports against any attack, especially in consequence of any operation in the Inland Sea; (4) determination neither to ask for nor to accept any territorial concession or exclusive advantage in the open ports or elsewhere in Japan; and (5) non-interference in the jurisdiction of the Japanese authorities over their people and non-intervention in the internal politics of the country. It also endorsed the punishment of Choshu as best suited to meet the exigencies of the time, the concerted action based upon identical notes in matters relating to possible military actions, the refusal to discuss the closing of Yokohama, and the insistence upon the immediate opening of Hyogo, Niigata, Yedo, and Osaka in case the conditions as outlined in the London Protocol of 1862 were not fulfilled.

Before the above memorandum was signed, however, two young Choshu samurai, alarmed at the trend of the home news and eager to convince their Lord of the folly of opposing Great Britain, returned from England. The foreign representatives considered it wise to cooperate with them and two British ships of war escorted them back to Choshu with the hope of negotiating with Lord Mori through them. Ito Shunsuke and Inouye Monta, later Prince and Marquis respectively, pleaded with their Lord, but the Choshu leaders were firm and maintained that their actions were the result of the Imperial as well as Shogunal orders, and requested a delay of three months in order to effect the withdrawal of the orders. The young "diplomats" suggested that the foreign representatives disregard the Yedo Government and negotiate a new treaty directly with the Imperial Court at Kyoto.

This unsuccessful mission stimulated definite actions. The representatives of the Treaty Powers now agreed upon a punitive expedition against Choshu in order to strengthen the Yedo Government and with the latter's tacit approval. As such, it was primarily an interference in the domestic

politics of Japan. Before the expedition was actually carried out, two important events occurred. The one was the sudden return of the Japanese mission which had been sent to Europe, among other things, with a Franco-Japanese Convention. In that Convention, the Japanese envoys agreed, among other things, to pay an indemnity of 140,000 Mexican piasters for the *Kienchang* outrage, to open the Strait of Shimonoseki, and to reduce tariff duties on certain articles. At the same time, the envoys had paid \$35,000 for the family of Lieutenant Camus. This Convention was embarrassing both to the Yedo Government and the French representatives, to the former because it bound Japan to what she could not then fulfil and to the latter because it withdrew France from the concert of the Treaty Powers as expressed in the memorandum of July 22. The difficulty was overcome when the Yedo Government signified its intention to disavow the Convention. The other event was the ill-timed and unsuccessful coup in August which the Choshu followers had staged in order to drive the pro-Shogun party out of Kyoto. Its failure seemed to indicate the speedy downfall of the Choshu influence and made the proposed foreign demonstration unnecessary.

Nevertheless, the joint expedition left Yokohama for Choshu late in August with an imposing array of seventeen vessels, nine British, four Dutch, three French, and one American. On September 5, an attack upon the batteries was commenced and by September 8, all the batteries had been destroyed and all cannons carried away. The negotiations were then started and an agreement was speedily reached on September 16: (1) that the passage through the Strait would be unmolested; (2) that no new forts would be built nor the old ones repaired; (3) that a ransom would be paid to the town of Shimonoseki and the whole expenses of the expedition would be defrayed; and (4) that facilities would be offered to foreign vessels in procuring supplies and in finding security in time of storm.

Then the scene once more shifted to Yedo, where negotiations were started for the settlement of the Shimonoseki

affair and a Convention was signed on October 22, 1864. It fixed the amount of indemnity at \$3,000,000 to include all claims, payable in six quarterly instalments. It also recognized the option on the part of the Powers to accept in place of indemnity the opening of Shimonoseki or some other eligible port in the Inland Sea should the Shogunate so prefer. The Shimonoseki Convention thus stands forth through Japan's diplomatic history as a monument to Western aggressive policy in Japan in complete disregard of Japan's national laws and domestic politics during Japan's most trying years.

It may be added that the United States later refunded the entire sum, principal and interest, which she had collected from Japan as a result of the Shimonoseki Convention. Moreover, long before the joint expedition was planned, Minister Pruyn had brought all the American grievances against Japan to a friendly settlement. He received \$10,000 for the burning of the Legation; obtained an agreement to pay \$11,200 as principal and interests on the *Pembroke* claim; secured an agreement that, if the claim for damages to American citizens in Yokohama were not settled within a certain period, they would be submitted to the arbitration of Russia; and secured a promise to rebuild the American Legation. Incidentally, this marked the introduction of the principle of arbitration for the settlement of unadjusted claims in Japan.

THE IMPERIAL RATIFICATION OF TREATIES

The negotiations for the opening of Hyogo and Osaka dragged in spite of the London Protocol of 1862, but the British and French representatives were determined; they preferred the opening of those ports to the payment of the Shimonoseki indemnities. Finally, securing Dutch and American cooperation, a joint expedition, consisting of five British, three French, and one Dutch ships, was organized and the four representatives under the leadership of Sir Harry Parkes, the new British Minister, went to Hyogo to

deal with the Shogun and his officials who were then in Kyoto. The imposing fleet arrived off Hyogo on November 4, 1865, and the negotiations were started on the following day on what the representatives called "a certain question of grave importance growing out of the Convention of October 22, 1864." To the Japanese the meaning of "a certain question of grave importance" was not clear as the first payment of the indemnity had already been paid, a year in advance, and the date for the second payment had not arrived; nor did they promise Imperial ratification of the Convention. Thus the Treaty Powers, backed by a powerful fleet, at a time when civil war was again threatening the nation, demanded "a prompt and satisfactory settlement" of new questions instead of those which have arisen from the Convention of 1864.

The new demand was nothing but the opening of the ports of Hyogo and Osaka, which Lord Abe quickly refused. The latter, however, unfortunately asked for a delay in the second payment of the indemnity in view of the internal difficulties. The Powers quickly grasped the opportunity and offered a compromise plan: remittance of the two-thirds of the indemnity as stipulated in the Convention of 1864 in exchange for the immediate opening of Hyogo and Osaka, Imperial ratification of the Treaties, and regularization of the tariff on the five per cent basis. The Japanese insisted upon the payment of indemnities rather than the opening of additional ports while the Powers threatened that they might insist, on the basis of the London Protocol of 1862, upon both the opening of the two ports and the payment of \$3,000,000. The negotiations dragged.

In the meanwhile, the Shimonoseki affair brought the Imperial Court and the Shogunate once more into full accord. This position was further strengthened by the civil war in Mito resulting in the triumph of the party in power which advocated liberal foreign policy and by the *coup d'état* in Choshu which brought to power the party opposed to the former anti-foreign politics. Although the anti-Shogunate party was revived in Choshu soon afterward and the recon-

ciliation between Satsuma and Choshu was effected for the purpose of working together for the restoration of the Imperial power, the anti-foreign element practically disappeared as a result of the Kagoshima and Shimonoseki affairs. Thus the Shogun and his advisers now in Kyoto had little fear of anti-foreign opposition in facing the new threat and they urged the Imperial Court to ratify the Treaties in order to avoid war between Japan and the allied Powers. An unfortunate result of these negotiations was the dismissal of Lord Abe and Lord Matsumaye, and the foreign representatives, fearing that a reactionary movement might triumph at Kyoto, immediately addressed identical notes, insisting upon a categorical reply to the proposals to be made within ten days, which if not complied with would bring such action as they "may judge convenient." The armed threat once more had its effect. After a memorable all-night session, the Imperial Court consented, and the Shogun's representatives, on November 24, 1865, informed the Powers that the Mikado had ratified the Treaties, that the tariff would be revised downward, but that they would pay the indemnities in full at the promised dates instead of the opening of Hyogo and Osaka.

The Powers, thus, once more imposed their will upon Japan as a result of their armed threat and Japan learned another bitter lesson in diplomacy. The Powers had won two of their three demands, and eventually the third, without losing a penny from the Shimonoseki indemnity which was paid in full in due time. As promised, the tariff was revised in 1866 and remained in force against Japanese protest and attempts at revision until 1899; the ports of Hyogo and Osaka were opened in accordance with the ratified Treaties on January 1, 1868, while the Imperial ratification of the Treaties paved the way, at the time of the Restoration of 1868, toward the establishment of direct relations between the new Japanese Government and the Treaty Powers.

THE TARIFF CONVENTION OF 1866

The negotiations for the promised downward revision of the tariff were begun in January, 1866. Protracted discussions were necessary due largely to the internal difficulties which the Shogunate was again facing. The new Tariff Convention, however, was speedily concluded and signed on June 25, 1866, between the representatives of the Shogunate and of Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Netherlands, without its being referred either to the Emperor or to the Shogun.

The Convention of 1866 substituted a new tariff schedule for the Harris tariff of 1858 as modified by other Conventions. The revised tariff schedule which was annexed to the Convention effected a wholesale reduction of import duties on certain specified goods to five per cent *ad valorem* and fixed specific duties based upon the average price of 89 enumerated articles during the preceding five years. It listed a few duty-free goods and prohibited the importation of opium. It drew up a similar export tariff with specific duties on 53 articles, calculated in a similar way, with gold and silver coins, gold, silver, and copper on the free list, as in the case of import tariff, and forbade the exportation of certain goods such as rice, wheat, barley, and saltpetre. All articles not given specific duties would be taxed at the rate of five per cent *ad valorem*.

The Convention also incorporated additional facilities for foreign commerce. It abolished the permit fee; established a system of bonded warehouses; proposed the modification of the existing currency provisions in the Treaties; directed the drawing up of necessary regulations at the open ports by the foreign representatives and the governor to end abuses and inconveniences connected with trade; permitted direct trading between Japanese and foreign merchants; gave a treaty sanction to the passport regulations, already proclaimed on May 23, 1866; and obligated Japan to light and buoy the approaches to all open ports. The new tariff was to go into effect at Yokohama on July 1, 1866,

and at Nagasaki and Hakodate one month later, and was to be subject for revision on July 1, 1872, except in the case of the export duties on tea and silk which might be readjusted after two years, on six months' notice, on the basis of the average value of those articles during the preceding three years, and in the case of timber which might be changed from *ad valorem* to a specific rate six months after the signing of the Convention.

The Bonded Warehouse Regulations and the Schedule of Storage Charges were speedily drawn up and approved on June 29, and an Englishman and an American were appointed to train the Japanese officials. In the enforcement of various regulations and stipulations, however, much difficulty was naturally experienced. The levying of *ad valorem* duty was also fraught with many inconveniences and even hardships. The clause which was to cause most trouble was the one which set July 1, 1872, as the date for the revision of the Convention. The Shogunate Government accepted the reduced tariff with the understanding that it was to be in effect for only a few years, and the Powers also conceded it as a temporary measure, but in fact the Convention was to remain in force until August, 1899.

CHAPTER III

RESTORATION AND CONSOLIDATION

THE fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate was fated from within and precipitated from without. The Meiji Restoration was the signal for the release of an irresistible energy for progress and expansion which had been suppressed for centuries. The statesmen of the Meiji Restoration immediately became students of the Western civilization, secured expert foreign advisers in every branch of administration or enterprise, and began to take steps for reformation and reconstruction in order to transform a feudal into a modern State. It was on this basis of a reformed and reconstructed statehood that New Japan began to make a serious bid for her place in the comity of nations. Her experiences were bitter before attaining that goal, but she had made an auspicious beginning during the early years of the Meiji Era.

THE RESTORATION OF 1867-8

The nineteenth century was an age of revolutions and Japan was no exception to it. The one in Japan is known in the modern history as the "Restoration of 1868."

When Perry came, Japan was a feudal State and the Shogun's power was still supreme over the land. The issues regarding the reopening of relations with the Western Powers had divided Japan into two hostile camps, while the experience of direct contact with the representatives of modern States, completely revealed the impotence of a divided feudalistic State. Already the moral, financial, and military forces of the Shogunacy were discredited by scholars and were steadily weakening. The doctrine of "Sonno

Jo-i" or "Revere the Emperor and Expel the Foreigners" was fearlessly preached by patriots and was rapidly impregnating the nation with a spirit of revolution. And thus, lacking a united front, the Shogunate lost both the foundation of its power and the confidence of the nation; its collapse was merely precipitated by the ominous presence of external pressure. In 1867 the inevitable happened.

Shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu became convinced that the country would no longer be successfully governed and the foreign pressure triumphantly resisted if the administrative power was divided between the Mikado and the Shogun. Had he so willed, there is no doubt that the faithful Tokugawa vassals would have united to uphold the Tokugawa prestige. But that meant a civil war, and he was aware that such a war would leave Japan a pitiful prey to Western exploitation and aggression. He therefore chose that which meant greatest sacrifice to himself but peace and unity for the country. In a memorable statement, dated October 14, 1867, he admitted that the unsatisfactory state of affairs was due to his shortcoming and incompetence, but that "as our intercourse with foreign nations become daily more extensive and complicated, our foreign policy can not be pursued satisfactorily unless directed from a single central authority." Accordingly, he proposed to restore the civil and military powers to the rightful sovereign so that "all evils be amended," "all affairs of the State be directed by the Imperial Court on a broad basis," and "the Empire be sustained by the harmonious efforts of a united people in order to maintain its rank and dignity among the nations of the earth." The resignation was eventually consummated and the Imperial power was restored before the end of the year, two and a half centuries after Iyeyasu had established the Tokugawa regime. Out of chaos arose a new banner of hope and around that standard the nation was united.

Meiji Tenno, then a youth of fifteen, proclaimed his restored power and the termination of the Shogunate on December 15, 1867. From January 1, 1868, the new era of Meiji, so memorable in Japanese history, began and an

age of reform and reconstruction unprecedented in any history opened for Japan. The Restoration of 1868, indeed, signalized the emergence of New Japan and the passing of feudalism.

On January 15, 1868, Lord Higashikuze, a member of the newly created Board of Foreign Affairs in the Imperial Government, communicated to the foreign representatives an Imperial Ordinance dated January 10, 1868, under the great seal of Meiji Tenno. It proclaimed the resignation of the Shogun and the restoration of the Imperial Power, and announced that henceforth the Emperor through his proper functionaries would deal with Japan's foreign affairs. On the same date was issued another Imperial Ordinance which proclaimed to the nation that he was determined to cement amicable relations with the Western Powers and that all Japanese subjects, high and low, must unite in responding to and upholding that spirit. The concluding paragraph is most significant: "Public deliberation will decide as to which parts in the treaties signed by the Shogun's Government are not in the interests of the nation, and proceed to their early revision. Moreover, the intercourse with foreign Powers shall be conducted according to the public law of nations." The first interview between the members of the Board of Foreign Affairs and the foreign representatives took place on February 4, at which gathering Lord Higashikuze whole-heartedly pledged the new Imperial Government anew to the responsibilities emanating from all Treaties, Conventions, and Agreements which the Shogunate had concluded with the Powers. Nine days later, Prince Yoshiakira was announced as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to be assisted by Lord Sanjo, Lord Higashikuze, and Lord Date, and in March the young Mikado granted the first audience to the foreign ministers. And so were instituted, simply and speedily, the foreign relations of the restored Imperial Government of Japan.

One aspect of the Restoration politics concerned the Powers directly. Sir Harry Parkes and the British Government were sympathetic with the Imperial cause from the be-

ginning, but other Powers, especially France and the United States, at least their representatives in Japan, frankly regarded the Imperial Court as anti-foreign and sympathized with the Shogun's Government as the defender of a liberal foreign policy. Under such circumstances, the newly restored Imperial Government feared possible foreign interference on behalf of the Tokugawa followers and rebel forces. On January 21, 1868, therefore, Lord Higashikuze requested the foreign representatives to uphold an attitude of strict neutrality. The Powers readily consented and, after some delay in negotiations, formally proclaimed their neutrality on February 18. It was withdrawn on February 8, 1869.

The proclamation of neutrality by the Powers was without doubt a tremendous help for the Imperial cause. It brought, however, confusion and friction among the Powers themselves. First of all, there was a troublesome question relating to the deliveries of all foreign-built warships which had been bought abroad and were on their way to Japan. The representatives agreed that the delivery to either party would be a breach of neutrality and that they would use their utmost endeavors to withhold them until they received instructions from home or peace was restored. This agreement was enforced with many accompanying difficulties and inconveniences. The best example was the ram, the *Stonewall*, which the Shogun had purchased in the United States and which, having been delivered to the Shogun's agent in American waters, manned by Japanese and flying the Japanese flag, reached Yokohama on April 14, 1868. In spite of several attempts both by the Shogun's Government and the Imperial Government to get the delivery, the United States representative refused to deliver it until after the withdrawal of the neutrality proclamation, and held it at the expense of the Japanese Government.

There was also a delicate question of transport service. The vessels of various Powers were chartered and impressed into service for the transportation of men and ammunitions. Through this irregularity, foreign adventurers assisted both parties and reaped fat profits. In spite of the

determined effort of the United States Minister, nothing was done in actually preventing this irregularity and the cooperative policy of the Powers received a decided setback thereby.

Another effect of the Restoration politics was the revival of anti-foreign violence. The Sakai incident was the best example of this kind. On March 9, 1868, occurred a clash between a French surveying party from the *Duplex* and the Japanese guards at Sakai, as a result of which eleven French sailors were killed and five were injured by Tosa men. But the Imperial officials acted quickly and with good judgment, and no serious complications followed. The French demanded on March 12 for (1) the execution of all who had participated in the attack, (2) an indemnity of \$150,000 for the families of the murdered sailors, (3) an apology by the Imperial Government through the Foreign Office, (4) an apology by the Lord of Tosa, and (5) the exclusion of all armed Tosa men from the treaty ports. The Japanese authorities accepted these demands promptly on March 14. The most dramatic phase of the whole incident came when, eleven out of twenty Tosa men having committed hara-kiri, the French naval officers could not stand the ordeal any longer and begged that the remainder be spared. And so ended the Sakai incident.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE EMPIRE

The consolidation of the Empire was one of the earliest tasks which taxed the energies of the restored Government. The task concerned the establishment of the Japanese title over the Ryukyu Islands, the settlement of the boundary dispute with Russia over the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin, and the recognition of Japanese sovereignty over the Ogasawara Islands.

(1) The Ryukyu Islands

For centuries there existed an intimate relationship between Japan and the Ryukyu Islands. As early as 1165,

Minamoto-no Tametomo, a half brother of the great Yoritomo, when exiled to Idzu Island, sailed to the Ryukyu Islands and married a native princess. Their son, Shunten-Marū, later became the ruler of the Islands. In 1187, Shimadzu Tadahisa, the ancestor of the daimyo of Satsuma, was made the lord of "the twelve islands of the South Seas," including Okinawa, and his descendants ruled over the archipelago since. Two centuries later, in 1372, civil disturbances in the Islands resulted in the withdrawal of China's claim over the Islands, while in 1609 Shimadzu Iyehisa of Satsuma reduced the Islands into submission once more, established a local government, took census, surveyed lands, passed laws, and collected taxes annually thereafter. At the same time, the Islands maintained a semi-independent status and the King paid an annual tribute to the Peking Court as well as to Satsuma. It was in that autonomous capacity that the Ryukyu Islands concluded treaties with the United States in 1854, with France in 1854, and with the Netherlands in 1858.

With the restoration of the Imperial Power, Japan faced the urgent necessity of clarifying the status of the Ryukyu Islands. In the Formosan affair of 1871, involving the massacre of the Ryukyuan by the Formosan savages, the Japanese authorities found an opportune impetus to terminate the ambiguous status of the Islands and began to take positive steps directly. In 1872 the Japanese authorities invited King Sho Tai to Tokyo, made him a member of the Japanese peerage, constituted the Ryukyu Islands into a vassalage under him, and effected necessary arrangements to terminate his tributary relationship with China. In October, they informed the foreign representatives at Tokyo that the Ryukyu Islands had been formally incorporated into the Empire and that the Foreign Office will assume all diplomatic responsibilities of the Islands, including their treaty relations. In the negotiations over the Formosan affair in 1873, Soyejima successfully induced China to recognize, though orally, the Ryukyuan as the Japanese subjects while the Treaty of Peking of 1874, which settled the diplomatic angle

of the Formosan expedition, actually called the Japanese expedition as being motivated by "the humane object of affording security to its own subjects."

The Japanese Government at Tokyo utilized this new position of advantage to obliterate every possible trace of Ryukyu's apparent dual status. In July, 1874, it incorporated the Islands into the Home Department; in May, 1875, it ordered the Ryukyu King to stop its tributary relationship with China and garrisoned the Islands with a portion of the Kumamoto division of the Imperial Army. Finally in June it introduced a complete administrative reorganization, including the use of the Japanese calendar. Matsuda Michiyuki, Secretary of the Home Department, was then dispatched to the Islands to proclaim and solidify the Japanese position. In the conference which followed between Matsuda and King Sho Tai, the latter in vain insisted upon the continuance of the dual protection, from China as well as Japan. This was followed in 1876 by the establishment of the Japanese judiciary system and the organization of the police. When in March, 1879, Matsuda made a final trip to the Islands, the King officially transferred all rights to the Japanese authorities. The Islands were then formally termed Okinawa Prefecture, and King Sho Tai was pensioned.

All these events naturally became the subjects of Sino-Japanese negotiations. China maintained that the Islands constituted an independent state but tributary to China, and accused Japan of disregarding those rights. Japan contended, on the basis of her historical claims, that the Islands had always been actually governed by the daimyo of Satsuma and therefore were a part of her realm. It was during the same year, 1880, when General U. S. Grant visited the Far East, that, through his effort, together with that of General Gordon of England, the impasse was brought back into the diplomatic arena once more. China named Prince Kung and the Yamen Ministers representatives with full powers to negotiate with Japan, while the Tokyo Government appointed Minister Shishido as the Japanese Commissioner for the same purpose. Prince Kung's first pro-

posal was to make a three-fold division of the Islands, the northern portion under Japan, the southern portion under China, and the middle under the restored Ryukyu King. This Japan opposed and Minister Shishido made a counter-proposal to cede to China the two southernmost islands, the Miyako and the Yayeyama, if China would revise the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1871 in such a way as to grant to Japan the rights which the Western Powers enjoyed in China. At first, Prince Kung insisted upon separating the two questions of treaty revision and the Ryukyu Islands, but finally accepted the Japanese proposal and the provisional draft of the treaty was made accordingly. As usual, however, an unexplained delay in the signing of the treaty followed and finally Prince Kung explained that the whole subject must be referred to the Northern and Southern Superintendents of Foreign Trade for report. Minister Shishido in vain protested against his misrepresentation of authority and unnecessary delay.

China, in the midst of difficulties with the Powers, especially with Russia and France, at last realized the wisdom of securing Japan's friendship. Again through the good offices of an American, this time United States Minister Young at Peking, negotiations were resumed and China unofficially recognized the Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands. After the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese position in the Islands became definitely recognized. In short, natural settlement rather than diplomatic agreement ended the long-standing Ryukyu question between Japan and China.

(2) *The Kurile Islands and Sakhalin*

For over a century the Russo-Japanese relations concerning the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin were rather stormy. In 1814 a feeble attempt was made to settle the boundary question by an Agreement which recognized Japanese jurisdiction over the Islands south of Eterup and Russian jurisdiction north of Shimoshiri and constituted Urup as a neutral zone, but saying nothing about Sakhalin. The first

Russo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1855 defined the boundary line in the Kurile Islands on the same basis but left the Sakhalin question in a similarly vague manner. Count Muraviev, in 1858, attempted to negotiate with the Yedo officials for the recognition by Japan of a Russian title to the whole island of Sakhalin but failed. In the meanwhile, taking advantage of this unsettled condition, Russia began to explore Sakhalin and to send emigrants there with the intention of asserting her rights in future negotiations.

Alarmed by this inroad, the Japanese envoys who were sent to Europe in 1862 had been empowered to negotiate with the Russian Government and to settle the whole question of Sakhalin by dividing the Island at the fiftieth parallel. Lord Matsudaira and his party visited St. Petersburg in 1862 and began negotiations with Ignaturff for a settlement. After some attempts to prove the Russian title to the whole Island, Ignaturff proposed the division at the forty-eighth parallel. In the course of protracted discussions which followed, Lord Matsudaira happened to discover in the Government Astronomical Observatory a globe which divided Sakhalin in two colors at the fiftieth parallel, the southern half being represented as belonging to Japan. Lord Matsudaira seized the opportunity and pressed the issue. Finally Ignaturff was willing to accede to the fiftieth parallel in principle on condition that a Russo-Japanese commission be appointed to determine an appropriate natural boundary line by the examination of the topography of the Island, but his colleagues advised caution and Lord Matsudaira passed over this splendid opportunity without signing an agreement. In 1863, the Russian Commissioner actually came to Hakodate, but the Yedo officials were pressed with delicate issues of internal politics and neglected to appoint a Japanese Commissioner for several months. When finally they had decided to make good their delay by accepting the forty-eighth parallel as the boundary line, however, the Russian Commissioner had already departed. In 1866, the Yedo Government sent Lord Koike to St. Petersburg in a vain mission to make Kushunrai the boundary line, while the

Convention of 1867 made no improvement except to legalize the joint jurisdiction over Sakhalin. Another attempt was made in 1868 but failed. In 1869 the new Imperial Government instituted the Bureau of Exploration for Hokkaido and another in 1870 for Sakhalin under the direction of Kuroda Kiyotaka. No negotiations resulted, however, as diplomatic representatives were absent both at Tokyo and St. Petersburg. In the meanwhile a feeble attempt had been made to colonize Sakhalin with Japanese farmers. Thus, by 1870, the boundary dispute began to assume a grave appearance.

Early in 1870, the representatives of the Powers became apprehensive of the controversy and suggested the mediation by the President of the United States. Preparatory to such an action, Minister De Long requested a complete list of evidence of the Japanese claim and a comprehensive history of all transactions between the two Governments. The Tokyo officials favored such mediation and on March 1 presented the Japanese proposals: (1) division of Sakhalin along the fiftieth parallel; (2) opening of Aniwa Bay as an "open port"; and (3) promise to respect lands cultivated by the nationals of either country beyond the proposed boundary line upon payment of ground rent to the proper authorities. De Long requested a more explicit statement of the Japanese claim and a more comprehensive historical background, in answer to which the Japanese authorities on March 28 furnished a summary of the long-standing controversy. The auspicious beginning thus made came to an unexpected end, however, when Russia rejected the American offer of mediation and the Russo-Japanese direct negotiations were resumed once more.

In 1871, Soyejima Taneomi, then a State Councillor, was sent out to Possiet Bay to confer with the Russian Governor but with no definite results. Nor could the Iwakura Mission, negotiating in St. Petersburg, obtain any better success. Meanwhile the Russians, taking advantage of the unsettled conditions, established local governments, extended their sphere of action in various directions, and even

began to encroach upon the Japanese settlements on the southern portion of the Island.

Soyejima was one of the very first Japanese statesmen to see the true value of Sakhalin. When he became Minister for Foreign Affairs, therefore, he proposed, after getting the idea from the American purchase of Alaska, to buy the Russian claim south of the fiftieth parallel for 2,000,000 yen and Okuma Shigenobu, Minister of Finance, approved the proposal. The negotiations were started at Tokyo but the Russian Chargé d'Affairs refused the offer. Thereupon Soyejima made an alternative offer of ceding the whole of Sakhalin to Russia in return for the cession of Urup, Kunashiri, and Eterup to Japan on condition that Russia agree to permit the passage of the Japanese troops through the Russian territory in case of war with a continental power.

Early in 1873, while the negotiations were still pending, Soyejima went to China in connection with the Formosan affair. Upon his return in August, he learned through the United States Minister that the Russian Government had decided to sell to Japan all claims on Sakhalin. Almost on the same day, Councillor Itagaki informed him that the Cabinet had just decided to adopt the views advocated in a memorial by Kuroda, the Director of the United Bureau of Hokkaido and Sakhalin, and to abandon the whole Island. Kuroda maintained in his memorial that the Island was "worthless" in view of the extreme coldness of the climate and the barrenness of the soil, and that the possession of a portion thereof would merely furnish a source of constant trouble between the two countries. Under the circumstances, Soyejima reluctantly abandoned what seemed to be a brilliant and far-sighted proposal.

Then followed the Cabinet crisis of September, 1873, and Terashima Munenori succeeded Soyejima as the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He appointed Vice-Admiral Enomoto Buyo as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to Russia in 1874 for the purpose of negotiating a boundary settlement. The instructions directed him to induce Russia to agree to some natural boundary line between

the Japanese and Russian territories in Sakhalin; in case Russia should insist upon claiming the whole Island, then, to make her recognize the Japanese sovereignty over the whole of the Kurile Islands. In the latter event, to demand from Russia some compensation for Japanese improvements in Sakhalin and the guarantee of Japanese fishing rights in the adjoining seas. Russia rejected the Japanese offer and refused to make the slightest concession. Meanwhile, fortunately for Japan, war clouds in the Balkans began to gather and Prince Gortchakoff finally accepted the Japanese offer.

The Treaty which was signed on May 7, 1875, recognized Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands respectively as Russian and Japanese territories; arranged for the payment of indemnity in exchanging public buildings owned by the Japanese Government in Sakhalin and by the Russian Government in the Kurile Islands and assured the right of option and protection of the nationality of the Japanese in Sakhalin and of the Russians in the Kurile Islands. It granted to Japanese ships entering the port of Kirsakov exemption from the customs tariffs and harbor duties for ten years and the right of appointing the Japanese Consul there, and to Japanese vessels and merchants the rights and privileges enjoyed by the vessels and merchants of the most favored nations in regard to fishing and navigation in the Okhotsk Sea and along the coast of Kamtchatka. While Japan had lost Sakhalin and the question was to return to the diplomatic arena thirty years later, Japan had one consolation, namely, that the Treaty of 1875 was drawn up in a spirit of perfect equality and in terms quite honorable to Japan.

(3) The Ogasawara Islands

The Ogasawara Islands, sometimes known as the Bonin Islands, lay some 480 miles south of Yokohama in the trade route east and south. Naturally the Islands for years attracted the attention of sailors. In 1828, Captain Beechey raised the British flag there, while in 1853, one of Com-

modore Perry's men had hoisted the American colors. Yet the Islands were first discovered by Ogasawara Sadayori in 1593 and named after him. The Tokugawa Shogunate, however, practically neglected the Islands under the enforced seclusion policy.

When the Westerners began to visit the Islands and even settle there, the Shogunate, in 1864, appointed an official to administer the Islands and encouraged emigration but without much success. Meanwhile some twenty-seven Americans established themselves on the three larger Islands, together with some seventeen British and four French subjects. In 1873, however, the United States renounced the American claim to the Islands and by 1875 Japan's full territorial sovereignty over the Islands was established and recognized.

The Japanese Empire, thus consolidated along the eastern shores of Asia, a long chain of islands from Kamtchatka to Formosa, and came to occupy an important and unique role in the international relations of the Far East.

DATE AND IWAKURA MISSIONS

In 1871, the Japanese authorities dispatched two memorable missions, one to China and the other to the United States and Europe. The second or the Iwakura mission was largely concerned with the revision of treaties and will be discussed later. Here we are chiefly concerned with the Date mission to China.

Throughout the Tokugawa period of seclusion, the Chinese traders were allowed at Nagasaki together with the Dutch. When Japan was forced open by the Western Powers, the Shogunate also realized the wisdom of establishing regular diplomatic relations with her neighbors but was so pressed by internal and external complications that nothing was done until 1861. In that year the Commissioner at Nagasaki dispatched a special envoy to Shanghai and in vain urged the opening of treaty relations. Three other official attempts were made for a similar purpose but

China evaded the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Japan. This important task, therefore, remained unaccomplished when the Tokugawa Shogunate passed into history.

The statesmen of the Meiji Restoration were deeply aware of the existing anomalous relations unbefitting two neighbors and decided in 1870 to dispatch Kido Koin, a State Councillor, to China for the purpose of establishing treaty relations. However, the mission was withheld largely in view of China's internal disturbances, especially the Franco-Chinese crisis over the Tientsin incident, and Yanagiwara Mayemitsu was sent in his stead to observe the general situation in China and to enter into preliminary parleys if the circumstances were favorable. Yanagiwara conferred with the Yamen Ministers who were at Tientsin at the time, and even presented a draft treaty, but the latter showed no sign of willingness to negotiate. Finally, after repeated conferences, he succeeded in obtaining a promise that China would negotiate a treaty with Japan when the latter appointed an official mission for the purpose.

Accordingly, in June, 1871, Lord Date Muneki, the Minister of Finance, was appointed Envoy Extraordinary to the Peking Court and Yanagiwara Mayemitsu and Tsuda Shindo as his associates. At Peking, Lord Date entered into negotiations with Li Hung-chang. Japan's original intention was to negotiate for a treaty for the purpose of regulating the Japanese rights and responsibilities in China in tune with Chinese treaties with the Western Powers, but China insisted upon its extension also to Chinese rights and responsibilities in Japan. This main point having been settled in China's favor, the negotiations proceeded speedily and the Treaty was concluded on September 13, 1871.

The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1871 is notable for several reasons. First of all, it was concluded on the basis of perfect equality and its terms were reciprocal. The most important provision in this respect was that criminal jurisdiction in the treaty ports of each country involving the citizens of the other country would be handled by a joint court composed of the local official and the resident Consul, and in the

interior by the local official alone. In the second place, the most-favored-nation clause was omitted so that the Japanese merchants and ships in China were deprived of all the commercial privileges conceded to the Western Powers. In the third place, the Treaty forbade the bearing of arms. These three stipulations immediately became the targets of criticism in Japan; the first in view of the imperfect state of Chinese criminal law; the second in view of an unequal footing upon which Japan was placed with respect to the other Powers in China; and the third in view of the yet unabolished Japanese custom of bearing two swords, a practice which persisted throughout Japan's feudal period. Then also there was another provision which caused much concern among the Powers. The second article provided that "it is the duty of each to sympathize with the other, and in the event of any other nation acting unjustly or treating either of the two Powers with contempt, on notice being given, mutual assistance shall be rendered or mediation offered for the arrangement of the difficulty." The Regulations of Trade were annexed to the Treaty.

For the reasons already stated, the Treaty was unpopular in Japan. Lord Date was bitterly criticized on the ground, it was charged, that he exceeded his instructions, especially in consenting to articles II and XI, respectively relating to the questions of mutual assistance and of bearing arms, and was forced to resign his office. Under such circumstances, the ratification of the Treaty was delayed. In 1872, Yanagiwara Mayemitsu was sent to Peking to negotiate for the revision of the unpopular provisions without success. Japan then realized that the ratification of the Treaty might favorably affect the settlement of other pending issues, such as the Korean question, the Formosan affair and the Ryukyu issue, and ratified it in 1873. Japan's repeated attempts to revise the Treaty were all without avail and it was in force until the close of the Sino-Japanese War.

An international aspect of the Treaty of 1871 may be noted here in passing. As soon as the contents of the Treaty became known, the Powers felt uneasy about the possible

construction of the second article. Chargé Shepherd of the United States Legation at Tokyo, for example, addressed a communication to the Foreign Office and pointed out that it might be construed as an offensive and defensive alliance. The Foreign Office replied that nothing of the sort had been contemplated, and that the article in question in the Chinese version was similar to the clause in the Burlingame Treaty, but that it would endeavor to open negotiations with China regarding the omission of the objectionable article. The uneasiness arose from the reading of the text as published in the press at the time and when the official text was made known, the suspicion gradually faded away.

THE FORMOSAN EXPEDITION

The Formosan expedition constituted one of the earliest Sino-Japanese complications, and the ensuing diplomatic entanglement arose from the massacre committed by the Formosan savages upon the Ryukyans. In November, 1871, a Ryukyuan junk was stranded off the eastern coast of Formosa and fifty-four of the sixty-six Ryukyans who made up the crew were cruelly massacred by the Botan savages. Such incident was not uncommon, both Japanese and foreigners meeting a similar fate from time to time. The Ryukyu government then sought the protection of Japan and the latter took upon herself the whole matter as she claimed the Ryukyu Islands as a part of her realm.

The Japanese authorities were well aware that European maritime Powers had never failed to inflict reprisals upon offending savages such as the "Rover" incident. When the American bark, the *Rover*, was wrecked off the Formosan coast in 1867 and the members of her crew were completely massacred except for one Chinese, China refused to take the responsibility on the ground that the eastern portion of Formosa was not under Chinese jurisdiction and an American punitive expedition settled the affair directly with the native chiefs. The Japanese authorities found in this incident a perfect precedent, but decided first to nego-

tiate with China and, if unsuccessful, then to send a punitive expedition. At this time, moreover, the Korean question was already reaching a crisis, while China was still hesitating to recognize the Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands. The newly concluded Sino-Japanese Treaty of July 29, 1871, was also awaiting an exchange of ratifications. In order to clarify all of these important issues, therefore, Soyejima Taneomi, then the Minister for Foreign Affairs, went to China in the capacity of an Ambassador Extraordinary in 1873.

The negotiations were without avail. As in the "Rover" case China evasively maintained that the eastern coast of Formosa was outside of Chinese jurisdiction, and consequently refused to take any responsibility for the massacre perpetrated by the native savages. However, Soyejima had succeeded, through Yanagiwara's conversations with the Yamen Ministers at Peking, in ascertaining verbally that China (1) renounced the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Korea, (2) did not object to calling the Ryukyans, Japanese subjects, and (3) entertained no objection to Japan's punitive expedition against the Formosan savages. It was a diplomatic victory but the inexperienced Japanese statesmen of those days were soon to learn that oral promises, unless written, were rather worthless in the realm of diplomacy. It may be added that it was during this visit to China that Soyejima accomplished the extraordinary feat of being received by the Chinese Emperor prior to all other Foreign representatives.

Before Soyejima returned to Japan, four Japanese seamen were cast ashore on Formosan Coast and again inhumanly massacred by the savages. As soon as he reached Tokyo, therefore, Soyejima began preparations to dispatch a punitive expedition and took steps to secure the services of Le Gendre, an American, as adviser. Before the project could be consummated, the Cabinet had to face a crisis over the Korean question and resigned. Terashima then replaced Soyejima as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Terashima was aware that his predecessor had received, in the course

of his negotiations at Peking, China's oral sanction for a punitive expedition against the Formosan savages. He was also aware that such an expedition would vindicate Japan's national dignity, support her claim over the Ryukyu Islands, and appease in some measure the advocates of strong policy as the new Cabinet came into power by opposing the forceful diplomacy over the Korean situation. The internal atmosphere was so tense in consequence of the great Cabinet crisis, however, that it was not until early in April, 1874, that the Formosan expedition was finally decided upon and April 17 that it was announced. Lieutenant-General Saigo Yorimichi, nephew of great Saigo Takamori, was named commander of the expeditionary forces by land and sea, while Okuma Shigenobu was appointed Director of the newly organized Bureau of Formosan Affairs. Nagasaki was chosen as the basis of operation; an American vessel, the *New York*, was chartered, among others, for transport purposes; and Le Gendre was finally engaged as adviser.

Immediately upon the announcement of the expedition, the Powers, including the United States and Great Britain, vigorously protested; so did China, being encouraged by the actions of the Powers. John A. Bingham, United States Minister to Japan, protested against the employment of any American ships or officers in an expedition hostile to China, as it violated the neutrality of his Government. Terashima summarized Japan's grievances, cited precedents, emphasized that it was a punitive expedition against the Formosan savages and not a war against China, and recited that China, in 1873, not only sanctioned such an expedition, but also declared that the eastern coast of Formosa was not Chinese territory. Bingham pointed out the lack of "the written consent of China" and requested that the *New York* and three American citizens be detained until such written consent was obtained. And thus Terashima, fearing grave implications, was compelled to call off the expedition and sent Okubo to Nagasaki to stay the departure of the forces. Le Gendre, being accordingly detached from the expedition, returned to Tokyo.

General Saigo, however, refused to abandon the expedition. He proposed to take all responsibilities upon himself and set sail late in April. From May 6 to May 22 the punitive expeditions were carried out under great difficulties and several native chiefs were severely chastised and punished, a task which had vexed the Chinese authorities for years. Also a basis of settlement had been agreed upon on June 25 between Pan Wi, a Chinese representative in Formosa, and General Saigo, the Chinese agreeing to reimburse Japan for the cost of the expedition and to guarantee the prevention of the recurrence of similar outrages through an effective control of the savages, and the Japanese agreeing to withdraw upon those terms. This arrangement was to be confirmed by the Chinese Government and the Japanese Minister.

Meanwhile, Yanagiwara Mayemitsu was appointed Japanese Minister to China and reached Peking late in July. The success of the Japanese forces in Formosa came as a complete surprise to the Chinese officials but, in the negotiations which followed, Li Hung-chang, not only refused to consider the Saigo-Pan settlement, but took a position which was decidedly different from that which China had maintained at the time of the Soyejima negotiations. Now he claimed that the eastern portion of Formosa was an integral part of the Chinese Empire and that Japan had invaded Chinese territory, not only without her approval, but against her protests! Minister Yanagiwara reminded him of the declarations of the Yamen Ministers to the Soyejima mission only a year ago, but Li would not listen and the negotiations drifted into fruitless discussions.

Japan was now face to face with China's perennial policy of evasion and delay. But seeing that the delay would merely complicate the matter unnecessarily, the Imperial Government at Tokyo appointed Okubo Toshimichi as Minister Plenipotentiary. Okubo reached Peking in September and presented two queries to the Peking authorities: first as to the facts to support China's administrative sovereignty over the Formosan savages, and second as to the

reason why China did not take the full responsibility in protecting, under international law, the shipwrecked foreigners. China's answers were vague, and after repeated conferences, therefore, Okubo sent an ultimatum to the Peking Government on October 10, demanding a definite response within five days as to whether China would relinquish her claim of sovereignty over the savage territory or accept the responsibility toward Japan for having left their depredation unpunished. The Chinese reply finally came on October 18 and agreed to regard the Japanese expedition as just but proposed to pay, in place of an indemnity, a gift in money to the families of the massacre victims on condition that the Japanese forces would evacuate Formosa completely. Okubo proposed ¥3,000,000 under a written contract as indemnity, payable before evacuation. The negotiation again dragged as China evaded to accept or promise anything in writing. Seeing no hope of a settlement, Okubo decided to return to Japan on October 26.

At this juncture, British Minister Wade offered his good offices in bringing the negotiations to a happy conclusion. On the day Okubo sent his final note to the Chinese authorities, announcing the termination of the negotiations, Wade called upon Okubo and informed him that he was asked by the Chinese authorities to convey to him China's definite offer for the solution of the Formosan incident, namely, that China was willing to pay an indemnity of 100,000 taels to the families of the victims immediately and 400,000 taels as military expenses after the Japanese withdrawal. Okubo questioned the sincerity of verbal Chinese promises and requested in writing (1) that the Chinese Government recognize the Japanese expedition as a just undertaking, (2) that all the diplomatic papers exchanged between the two Governments on the Formosan expedition should be mutually returned and destroyed so as to leave no root of contention for the future, and (3) that the Chinese Government pay 500,000 taels, as was proposed by them, to the Japanese Government before the Japanese withdrawal. These terms were finally accepted and the Treaty was signed at Peking

on October 31, 1874. Annexed to the Treaty was a Contract in which the name of British Minister Wade was incorporated as a virtual guarantor, defining the details of the indemnity transactions.

It was estimated that the Formosan expedition had cost Japan ¥9,550,000 and the indemnity stipulated in the Treaty was no adequate recompense for it. But Okubo's chief aim was to induce China to recognize the Ryukyans as the Japanese subjects, which was done. Thus, the first article of the Treaty recognized that the expedition undertaken by the Japanese Government was "a just and rightful proceeding to protect its own subjects" and that the Chinese Government "will not therefore impute blame to it." The indemnity was paid on December 1 and the Japanese forces embarked homeward on December 3, seventeen days before the promised date of evacuation, thereby proving that Japan's sole aim was a punitive expedition and not political or otherwise.

Thus was concluded one of the earliest Sino-Japanese complications. The difficulty of negotiations which Japan had experienced throughout, however, was to be repeated during all succeeding Sino-Japanese negotiations.

THE "MARIA LUZ" CASE

One of the very first international complications faced by the Restoration Government was the "Maria Luz" case through which Japan received the acclaim of the world for upholding the cause of humanity. It concerned the Chinese coolie trade and Asiatic contract labor system then in vogue and as preliminaries the Japanese Government had faced the "Scioto" case and the "Cayalte" case.

The "Scioto" case occurred in 1868. Under the pretext of negotiating a treaty relationship between the Kingdom of Hawaii and Japan, but ostensibly for the purpose of contracting coolies for the Hawaiian plantations, Van Reed, an American merchant, came to Japan and approached the Japanese Government. The Japanese authorities refused

to recognize him, and the Hawaiian Government now asked Van Vaulkenburgh, the United States Minister, to do so. But before Van Vaulkenburgh could act, the Japanese authorities had discovered Van Reed's high-handed activities. He had contracted for some 350 coolies in Japan and requested passports for them. While the Shogunate had granted passports to 180 of them, the Imperial commissioners refused either to recognize the passports already issued or to accommodate the remainder on the ground that no treaty relationship existed with Hawaii. Before anything could be done, however, the *Scioto* had sailed from Yokohama, carrying the coolies without proper clearance papers, to say the least without proper passports. It was a British vessel but the responsible person was an American. In a quandary, Van Vaulkenburgh proceeded to apply an Act of Congress of 1862 forbidding the Chinese coolie trade to Japan, but he had no legal foundation to do so until Congress had acted. Meanwhile the coolies had been landed at Honolulu and were disposed of at \$70 a head under a labor contract for three years. Later Van Reed returned to Japan but he declared that he was then a citizen of the Kingdom of Hawaii, and so Van Vaulkenburgh was powerless to act against him. Thus 350 Japanese citizens were sacrificed in the interest of an American coolie trader and the Imperial Government faced a hopeless situation of legal battles.

A similar incident, less grave in result for Japan, occurred also in 1868. On August 19, the *Cayalte* with 24 Chinese coolies aboard was forced into the Hakodate harbor during a storm. It was soon discovered that the vessel was owned in Chile, that she had been engaged in the South Pacific coasting trade under the American flag, that she had left Callao bound for Peru with coolies for a banker in Lima under a labor contract. The coolies had murdered the entire crew except the captain, who was directed to take them back to China, but the captain had escaped to an island and left them helpless. As the ship was deemed unseaworthy, she was detained for the winter at Hakodate in charge of the Japanese authorities, but the American Minis-

ter refused to act and the coolies were eventually saved while the ship was sold in 1873.

As an aftermath to the "Cayalte" case, Peru sought to protect her Chinese coolie trade against any further interference through the good offices of the American Minister and succeeded in 1870 in obtaining the American approval of an anomalous plan by which the American Ministers in Japan and China would act also as Ministers of Peru. Accordingly instructions were issued in April, 1870, underwriting such a procedure "so far as this can be done compatibly with other instructions" by the State Department, evidently referring to the coolie trade which was prohibited by the American law.

On the heels of these preliminaries followed the "Maria Luz" case. In July, 1872, a Peruvian ship, the *Maria Luz*, with 232 Chinese coolies bound from Macao to Peru, was driven into the port of Yokohama by storm. One of the coolies escaped from the ship, reached a British ship, disclosed their pitiful conditions and treatment, and asked for protection. He was returned to the ship, but the British Chargé reported the matter to the Japanese officials at Tokyo. The latter, through the advice of the British and American representatives, ordered the Governor of Kanagawa to institute an investigation and a trial as the Japanese law forbade the sale or purchase of human beings. In the course of the investigation, the coolies were landed as witnesses and obtained their eventual freedom as the Japanese authorities refused to compel them to return to the ship and to perform their contract. Needless to add, they were well taken care of until a Chinese official arrived later to take charge of them.

Col. Shephard, the American Chargé, refused to help Captain Hereiro, but De Long, United States Minister, who returned to Japan on August 10, came forward as the protector of Peruvian interests in Japan under the 1870 arrangement, and asked the Foreign Office to explain the Japanese action. In reply Soyejima maintained, in a brilliant memorandum of September 2, that Japan was under no obligation

to receive any communication from De Long on behalf of the Peruvian Government and his answer was for Hereiro's information and not for Peru's; that the investigation had been conducted to ascertain the British Chargé's information that various acts of cruelty had been committed in the *Maria Luz*; that the Chinese witnesses were not being held in custody but remained ashore of their own free will, and that they were kept under surveillance in case they were summoned in any suit based on their alleged contract; and that he knows "no law, custom, or precedent which requires this Government, or any other government, to force any person to return to a ship against his will unless he be a fugitive, a criminal, or a deserting seamen." Later, Soyejima made it clear that the American Minister might act for Peru in a personal, but not in an official, capacity. De Long's actions were highly criticized at home, both by the State Department and the press, as aiding the detested coolie trade.

Now the question became an issue between Japan and Peru. The Peruvian Government considered the incident an insult upon its name, demanded an apology, an indemnity and a commercial treaty as a guarantee against a repetition of the offence. Captain Garcia came to Japan in February, 1873, and began negotiations with Soyejima. Soyejima was about to go to China on an important mission and advised the Peruvian that nothing could be finished until his return but that arbitration might be resorted to if negotiations failed. After protracted negotiations with Uyeno Kagenori, Second Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs in Soyejima's absence, a satisfactory settlement was reached through De Long's good offices. A Protocol was signed on June 19, agreeing to submit the case to the decision of an impartial judge, and another Protocol was signed on June 22, designating the Emperor of Russia as the arbitrator. Following this, it may be added, the Treaty of Commerce between Japan and Peru was signed on August 21.

The "Maria Luz" case thus evolved was argued before Alexander II at St. Petersburg in 1875. The Japanese side

was ably presented through the brilliant supervision of E. Pershine Smith, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office at Tokyo, and the Tzar decided on June 14 in favor of Japan, announcing that the proceedings of the Japanese Government were entirely legal. The decision helped the prestige of the newly restored Imperial Government tremendously before the world.

THE RELIGIOUS TOLERATION

The resumption of international intercourse with the Western Powers reopened the religious issues which precipitated the adoption of the Seclusion Policy early in the seventeenth century, and which continued to baffle the Japanese Government. Throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate both the public and private profession of Christianity were illegal. After the negotiation of new treaties, foreigners in Japan enjoyed religious freedom and, under the system of extraterritorial jurisdiction, they were safe in the conduct of their religious belief. For Japanese subjects, however, it was a different matter. The anti-Christian laws still existed and the Japanese Government carefully avoided the acceptance of a treaty provision for the toleration of an alien faith among the native Japanese. From this peculiar situation arose one of the early difficulties between the new Imperial Government and the foreign Powers.

The status of Christianity in Japan became an international issue even before the Restoration of 1868. Aroused by the Catholic activities in and near Nagasaki, the Shogunate took steps in 1867 to suppress the propagation of Christianity among the Japanese people, in consequence of which some native Christians were arrested, punished, and even deported. Several Powers protested, but the Shogunate insisted upon its treaty rights as long as foreigners were not molested in continuing their Christian practices among themselves. After protests and replies, French Minister Roches, for the issues most concerned the French Catholic missionaries, recognized that a premature and unsuitable

measure would jeopardize the future, and promised to warn French missionaries to avoid any act which might be calculated to encourage Japanese Christians in resisting the authorities. Upon this understanding the Japanese officials also promised to release the arrested native Christians.

In spite of the French Minister's instructions to the contrary, the French Catholic missionaries continued to push their proselytizing activities in and near Nagasaki. This led the new Imperial Government, in 1869, to adopt a policy of repression. One of the edicts issued maintained that the Christian religion was prohibited by law in Japan and that its violation would be considered a serious matter, and directed the western daimyos to arrest and deport all native Christians for the purpose of inducing them to renounce "their evil ways." Soon afterward, placards prohibiting Christianity were revived. Exaggerated reports of persecution were then freely circulated and the Powers made repeated protests. De Long, the United States Minister, was the most agitated among the foreign representatives. However, the issue did not reach any serious stage due largely to the mild attitude taken by the Washington and London Governments. William H. Seward, Secretary of State at Washington, was apprehensive of troubles between foreign Christians in Japan and the officials of the Japanese Government on account of the sympathy shown by the foreigners for native Christians, and urged a firm but friendly procedure in obtaining the adoption of a more humane policy. Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister, was in deep sympathy with the aspirations of the new Imperial Government and Lord Stanley, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, believed that a common action on the part of the Christian Powers "to repress or revenge a policy of sympathetic religious persecutions" would merely expose the Japanese Government to serious dangers, and advised that the actions to be taken in concert with other Treaty Powers on behalf of native Christians should go no further than friendly representations and remonstrances "unless indeed the persecution of native Christians should lead to a

similar persecution of foreign Christians" including British subjects, in which case strong action should be taken and the Japanese Government should be held responsible for such actions.

There is no doubt that the repressive measures decreed were enforced and continued but that many of the wild stories of persecution were grossly exaggerated. In fact, an American investigation which was conducted by Portland in April, 1869, had shown that "perfect tranquillity" prevailed in Kyushu, "that the reports of persecution of native converts to Christianity in Kiusiu have been greatly exaggerated," and "that in many instances they probably have had no foundation whatever." It was a result of such an investigation as well as contradictory reports of the French missionaries that the foreign representatives communicated to the Japanese Government identical notes on May 18, 1869, urging that inquiries be instituted so that the truth of the situation would be disclosed. The results of the Japanese investigation were described in detail in a note in reply, dated January 1, 1870, and amplified by another note six days later.

All this finally resulted in an impressive conference which was held in Tokyo on January 19, 1870, and which was attended by Lord Sanjo, Lord Iwakura, Terashima, and eight other members of the State Council and Parkes, Outrey, De Long, and Von Brandt. The Japanese representatives clarified the issues by presenting the views of the Imperial Government: that Japan desired friendly relations with all the Powers but that her Government must be allowed to govern and control her own subjects; that the Christians were trouble-makers and that the measures of correction had been enforced, not because of their religious faith, but because of their conduct which was considered insubordinate and disrespectful to the Mikado; and that the missionaries, in violation of the Treaties, were proselytizing among the Japanese and that the Government considered it easier to deal with its own subjects instead of protesting to the foreign representatives. Under such circumstances,

they now asked the foreign representatives to control their missionaries.

Another conference was held on February 9, which resulted in drawing up a memorandum signed by Parkes, Outrey, De Long, and Von Brandt. It recognized the Japanese contention that the action of some "foreign missionaries in preaching outside of the limits of the foreign settlements has caused serious disturbances" and that the deportation of the native Christians from the neighborhood of Nagasaki was "a political necessity," and then pledged that they "will do everything in their power to restrain the foreign missionaries from such acts and will punish them therefore if such acts be persisted in" provided that the deported native Christians were returned to their homes. In short, the whole matter was restored to the status which it enjoyed in 1869 when French Minister Roches made a similar admission. As indicative of the illogical philosophy behind the contentions of the Powers, it is peculiarly revealing to note that the above memorandum promised the enforcement of the treaty obligations only on condition that the Japanese Government would undo the acts which it had every legal right to perform in exercising administrative power over its own subjects.

Christianity continued to break into the diplomatic arena sporadically during the following two years. The Japanese authorities were convinced that the foreign Powers had no right to interfere in this domestic situation as the practice of Christianity by Japanese subjects was not a treaty right, but realized that the Foreign Powers would go as far as they possibly could in bringing the Japanese Government to tolerate the faith they all professed. Early in 1873, therefore, Soyejima intimated to the foreign representatives that steps would be taken to relieve the situation, and on February 19 the Imperial Government issued an Edict which marked real advance toward religious liberty in Japan by ordering the removal of all anti-Christian proscriptions throughout the Empire. In a carefully prepared memorandum, which was addressed to De Long, dated March 14, So-

yejima pointed out two reasons for such a decision, namely, that the persecution of the native Christians offended the Powers whose good will Japan sought to foster, and that its enforcement was futile as a means of eradicating the faith, and confessed that education, rather than force, was the better means of restoring the converts to their original faith. Accordingly, the restoration of deported native Christians to their homes was quietly begun and completed soon afterward.

The revival of the anti-Christian proscriptions which had been started during the closing years of the Tokugawa Shogunate and which had caused considerable friction in Japan's international relations was thus brought to a satisfactory close. The Japanese Government had never accepted a treaty provision for the toleration of the Christian faith; it was always aware of its treaty obligations and would not permit the Powers to enlarge them under pressure. Thus religious liberty in Japan came from within as a result of her free will rather than from without as a result of foreign pressure. For such was the case when the Constitution of the Empire was proclaimed in 1869, and its twenty-eighth Article guaranteed the "freedom of religious belief" to all Japanese subjects "within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects."

PART II

DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER IV

THE REVISION OF TREATIES

SINCE the early years of the Meiji Restoration, the attainment of equality and security became the two cardinal principles of Japanese diplomacy. It was in quest of equality with the Powers that the succeeding Ministers for Foreign Affairs for twenty years struggled against odds in their effort to revise the unequal treaties. It was in defence of her security against external aggression that the Island Empire courageously championed the cause of Korean independence and desperately fought, first with China and then with Russia. We shall outline Japan's first bid for equality with the Powers in this Chapter, and devote the succeeding Chapters to Japan's problem of security.

THE IWAKURA MISSION

One of the most vital yet most difficult problems which the Restoration Government had to face, second only to the gigantic task of reconstructing the government and consolidating the nation and its territories, was the revision of the unequal treaties. While the new Government assured the Treaty Powers that it was determined to observe all treaties concluded by the Shogunate and to cultivate friendly relations with them, an Imperial Ordinance synchronously announced that the Government would endeavor to secure revision of such treaty provisions as might be found pernicious and inequitable. This proclamation marked Japan's first step toward the revision of the unequal treaties.

Accordingly, in February, 1869, Lord Higashikuze proposed to the foreign representatives that the Treaties of

1858 should be revised before 1872 as stipulated therein in order to bring them "in harmony with the new state of things." The foreign representatives took a passive attitude and no progress was made. Then the Government hoped to carry out its promise in the pending treaty negotiations with Austria-Hungary. Its aspiration was again crushed in its bud. British Minister Parkes acted for Austria-Hungary and, when the treaty was concluded in September, 1869, the result was far from remedying the old ills; it was, in fact, worse than the existing treaties with other Powers. In 1870, Sawa Noriyoshi, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, invited the Powers to open negotiations for the purpose of revising the treaties, but none of them answered the invitation. The treaties were, however, subject to revision after July 1, 1872, and the Government notified the Powers in 1871 of its intention of seeking a revision of the treaties and designated Tokyo as the seat of negotiation. The Terashima memorandum, which was presented to the foreign representatives that year, outlined, among other things: (1) reciprocity of the treaties; (2) revision of the tariff; (3) standardization of all treaty texts; (4) substitution of tonnage dues for clearance and entrance fees; and (5) reservation of the coasting trade to Japan. This is perhaps the first enunciation of what the Government then desired to accomplish through the proposed treaty revision.

The statesmen of the Meiji Restoration soon realized the difficulties as well as the seriousness of the situation which they were facing and rightly gauged that protracted negotiations extending over years would be required before the goal of equality in treaties could be attained. It was thought wise, therefore, to sound out the various Treaty Powers before the contemplated opening of negotiations, and a special mission was organized to visit America and Europe. The Mission was headed by Prince Iwakura Tomomi, the Junior Prime Minister, who was assisted by Kido Takayoshi, a State Councillor, Okubo Toshimichi, the Minister of Finance, Ito Hirobumi, the Vice-Minister of Public Works, and Yamaguchi Naoyoshi, a Vice-Minister

for Foreign Affairs. The Mission, with a total membership of over one hundred officials and servants, left Japan in December, 1871, reached Washington on February 29, and were received by President Grant on March 4. Warm hospitality awaited them everywhere, and they were heartily welcomed.

At the first conference between the Mission and Secretary of State Fish on March 11, Prince Iwakura presented a memorandum containing a summary of the most important changes which Japan desired to effect. The memorandum outlined seven proposals: (1) tariff autonomy; (2) definition of neutrality in time of war; (3) relinquishment of extraterritoriality "upon the establishment of a national code of Japan based upon the best laws of the United States and European countries"; (4) revision of coinage and currency provisions; (5) reciprocal extradition of criminals; (6) prohibition of landing organized military force in Japan; and (7) "pacific solution" of difficulties before recourse to reprisals or war. These desires, though so naively presented, were the fruits of bitter experience which it was Japan's lot to taste during the two decades of her forced intercourse with the Western Powers and they were the *sine qua non* of the Japanese diplomats of 1872, still unfamiliar with the intricate and delicate procedure of Western diplomacy. Two days later, at the second conference, Secretary Fish presented the American proposals consisting of eleven points which entirely ignored the all-important questions of tariff autonomy and abolition of extraterritoriality and were largely concerned with the further amplification of the existing treaty rights of foreigners in Japan. The cards were now on the table.

After further exchange of views in two extended conferences, Prince Iwakura once more led the way in presenting, at the fifth conference on March 27, the Japanese draft of the Protocol in fifteen articles and the Supplementary Regulations in seven articles. The draft Protocol contained, among other things: a conditional most-favored-nation clause; reciprocal privileges and most-favored-nation treat-

ment of imports and exports; reciprocal extradition; reciprocal right to lease land; reciprocal protection of the person and property; reciprocal right of freedom of conscience and worship; pacific negotiations before reprisals or war and reciprocal prohibition of landing military forces; abrogation of all former treaties; and specification of the life of the treaty. The supplementary articles, to be proclaimed by an Imperial Ordinance, granted, among other things: opening of five additional ports; gradual extension of the limits of foreign settlements; travel in the interior; continuance of consular jurisdiction until the establishment of properly organized courts; alteration in customs duties to be effective after six-month notice; and recognition of the Japanese gold yen in international trade with Mexican dollars as an equivalent. It should be noted that most of the American proposals were incorporated in the above drafts.

These proposals received the scrutinizing study of the State Department experts and on June 1, being the sixth conference, the American draft of a treaty in twenty-four articles and an accompanying schedule in five articles was presented to the Japanese Mission. The American plan contained neither reference to extraterritoriality nor provision as to the life of the treaty, but it incorporated the conditional most-favored-nation clause in respect of trade, commerce, and navigation; it conditionally waived the right to participate in drafting harbor regulations; it limited religious tolerance; it continued all non-conflicting provisions of the Treaties of 1854 and 1858. The schedule more carefully defined the provisions proposed by the Japanese Supplementary Regulations, omitting reference to consular courts. The Japanese amendments to the American draft proposal, largely to include the omitted Japanese proposals, were made on July 10th, and the seventh conference was scheduled for July 22.

In the meanwhile, Prince Iwakura early perceived the possibility of concluding a new treaty with the United States and hurriedly sent Okubo and Ito back to Japan to acquaint the Tokyo Government with the American proposals and

to secure full powers to negotiate the treaty. The labor of Okubo and Ito was in vain, however. The Government preferred to conclude treaties at a conference in Europe attended by the representatives of all Treaty Powers rather than to proceed with them one by one. The two messengers reluctantly proceeded to America again and rejoined the Iwakura Mission at Washington on July 22, the day upon which the last conference was scheduled in expectation of their return. The conference was held as scheduled, but under the circumstances, the negotiations for the revision of the American-Japanese Treaty was abruptly terminated.

While in Europe, the Mission visited England, France, Belgium, Holland, Russia, Prussia and other German States, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Switzerland. Their activities were confined to observations and studies, and no progress was made in the direction of treaty revision. They returned to Japan in September, 1873. The immediate results of the Mission were to be found, naturally, not in Japan's foreign relations, and less in the actual revision of the unequal treaties, but in the realm of domestic reforms. Needless to add, Ito, Okubo, and Kido became leading figures in the political life of new Japan.

SOYEJIMA'S ITALIAN TREATY

The Cabinet crisis of 1873 over the Korean question caused the retirement of Soyejima from the Foreign Office and Terashima Munenori became Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Terashima's first experience in treaty revision was also related to the question of travel in the interior, which the Powers had been demanding ever since the first treaties were signed. Stimulated by the ill-fated Italian treaty of 1873, the foreign representatives renewed their joint attempt to secure the right of travel in the interior of Japan, beyond the limits of the treaty ports. The question became an issue when Von Brandt, the German Minister, dictatorially informed the Foreign Office on July 2, 1873, that Germans

entering the interior without passports were no longer subject to the usual penalties, and the Japanese Government rejected such an outrageous procedure by immediately denying a passport to a German. The foreign representatives took up the question and held several joint conferences. On July 26, they submitted identical notes, demanding the opening of the country under the passport system with the obligation to obey the laws of Japan but enforceable in the Consular Court, and on September 27, drafted a set of regulations as to the issuance of passports. Restoring nothing to Japan, they contrived to obtain more concessions, an illustration of Western arrogance toward Japan in those days. Terashima replied to the identical notes on November 8 and to the regulations on December 20, with a detailed memorandum, avowing that Japan would be willing to admit trade and travel throughout the Empire if the Treaty Powers would surrender their extraterritorial jurisdiction and stressing the abuses of the prevailing system. The discussion of the question continued throughout the following year.

The above course of events made Terashima realize that the desire of the Powers for greater facilities of travel and trade might lead them to permit some modifications of the pernicious treaty stipulations. He also perceived that the Powers were far from ready to give up their extraterritorial jurisdiction but that there was a possibility of recovering tariff autonomy if the two questions were separated. In short, Terashima became fully conscious of the difficulty of killing extraterritoriality and conventional tariff with one stone. Of the two evils, he considered the abolition, or at least revision, of the conventional tariff more urgent because of the straitened condition of the national finance and probably the easier because of the deficiency in the prevailing judicial administration as compared with the Western judicial system.

Terashima, therefore, began to seek the views of the Treaty Powers by verbally proposing in 1875 that the existing treaty restrictions upon her rightful authority to impose reasonable duties upon foreign imports to Japan should be

removed on the condition that Japan would agree to abolish all export duties and open new ports. Informal conversations followed throughout 1875 and 1876 between the Foreign Minister and the foreign representatives. The proposal was naturally rejected by all European Powers, especially by Great Britain and her spokesman in Japan, Sir Harry Parkes. Terashima, however, found in John A. Bingham, the United States Minister to Japan, an ardent supporter. Bingham considered the proposition "so reasonable, so just, and so much in the interest of Japan and in no sense hurtful to the rights of any one of the Treaty Powers" and urged the State Department that the United States "should be the first to say that this proposition is accepted."

Encouraged by Bingham's views, Terashima instructed Minister Yoshida to begin negotiations at Washington, which was begun on June 8, 1876. Secretary of State Fish was opposed to the proposal and insisted upon continuing the "cooperative policy" with the Powers notwithstanding Bingham's tremendous effort. Yoshida did not give up hope, however, and on February 5, 1877, went so far as to suggest the conclusion of a new treaty conditionally, to take effect when all the Treaty Powers assented. Secretary Fish remained unmoved and refused even to reply.

In March, 1877, with the inauguration of President Rutherford B. Hayes, William M. Evarts succeeded Hamilton Fish as the head of the State Department. The new Secretary of State accepted Bingham's experienced views, decided in favor of individual negotiation against the anachronistic cooperative policy, and advised the Japanese Government to that effect through Bingham. Unfortunately the Satsuma rebellion which broke out in January, 1877, called forth the united effort of the Tokyo authorities especially throughout the first half of that year. As soon as its pressure receded, Terashima revived his effort at treaty revision. However, in view of the failure of the initial individual negotiations with the United States in 1876-77, he now adopted the program of simultaneous individual negotiations at the capitals of all the Treaty Powers. Accordingly, as early

as October, 1877, he was formulating circular instructions to the Japanese representatives abroad and the final drafts were dispatched late that year. In these instructions, Terajima continued the general principle of the proposal already enunciated, namely, the restoration to Japan of tariff autonomy for which Japan would abolish export duties and open two or more ports for foreign trade and residence.

At Washington the negotiations which were started in the middle of January, 1878, between Minister Yoshida and Secretary of State Evarts, proceeded so smoothly that an agreement for the cancellation of the Tariff Convention of 1866 was speedily reached by the end of June, and the new Convention was signed on July 26. The new Convention, among other things, annulled the existing tariff, harbor, and trade regulations; renounced discriminatory duties on imports and exports; recognized Japan's right to control her coastwise trade. The Japanese Government, in turn, agreed to open Shimonoseki and one other port to citizens and vessels of the United States for residence and trade, and also to remove the export duty on goods shipped to America. Alluring as this Convention was, the tenth article made it entirely ineffective because of the fact that the force of the new agreement was made contingent upon the conclusion of a similar treaty with "all the other Treaty Powers" which numbered sixteen at the time. Bingham's later attempts to eliminate the tenth article were fruitless.

The success of the new American-Japanese Convention now entirely depended upon the outcome of the negotiations which were also progressing at the other capitals of the Treaty Powers. The proposal affected Great Britain most and Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister, vehemently opposed it and used his powerful influence to persuade, not only the home Government, but also the other foreign representatives to do so. Naturally, the negotiations between Uyeno Kagenori and Lord Salisbury failed to induce the latter to sign an agreement. Samejima at Paris, Saigo at Rome, and Enomoto at St. Petersburg fared no better, to say nothing about the negotiations elsewhere. Thus the

new American-Japanese Revised Convention of 1878 came to naught and with it the Terashima plan for the revision of treaties.

ABUSES OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN

While the Powers continued to criticize the inefficiency of the Japanese judicial administration and to reap the benefit of the conventional tariff, they were on the whole extremely negligent in improving the machinery of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Where Consular Courts existed, they were ever eager to extend their jurisdiction and even unhesitatingly interfered with the enforcement of the Japanese laws necessary for the protection of Japanese life and general welfare. In short, the abuses of extraterritorial rights in Japan were mounting with years and increasingly impressing the Japanese public of the unreasonableness of those rights. We may briefly review a few typical instances.

One of the very first issues which involved Japan and the Powers in this respect arose from the Hunting Regulations of 1871, which were designed to prohibit hunting by foreigners in temple groves, castle moats, burial grounds, game preserves, and like places and the use of firearms in cities and near dwellings, and which decreed the payment of fines for damage done to crops. Sir Harry Parkes, on the authority of the Orders in Council, maintained "that British subjects could only be tried and punished in Japan for violation of British Law" and defied the Japanese contention by insisting that the Japanese Government could not enact laws applicable to British subjects. De Long stood for the enforcement of the Japanese laws and maintained, on the other hand, that there was no danger in recognizing all Japanese laws as long as the power to try and punish remained in the Consular Courts. In the face of such divided opinions, much correspondence took place between the Foreign Office and the foreign representatives during the following three years and Revised Regulations were offered, but Soyejima refused to accept a revision of the Regula-

tions. Finally, in May, 1873, the American, French, and German representatives published the necessary notices to warn their respective countrymen, but no agreement could be reached between Sir Harry and Soyejima. Terajima failed to improve the situation in the 1873-74 negotiations when he attempted to claim the fines paid in the Consular Courts. The issue was finally settled in January, 1877, when the Powers agreed, upon Bingham's suggestion, that the foreigners should take out a hunting licence and sign a convention for the payment of a fixed penalty in case of violation or non-compliance with the Hunting Regulations, cases to be tried in the Consular Courts and damages, payable to Japan, to take the place of objectionable fines.

The enforcement of the Quarantine Regulations, which were drawn up by Soyejima and the foreign representatives in 1873 and which were to be promulgated when emergency arose, faced a similar rough sailing. In 1877, for instance, the report of cholera in Amoy, China, caused the Japanese Government to declare a quarantine on all vessels from that port in accordance with the 1873 Regulations but the interference of the foreign representatives prevented the application of those regulations and the epidemic spread to Nagasaki, Osaka and Kyoto, and also to Yokohama and Tokyo. Again in 1878 and 1879, the Japanese attempts to check the menace of cholera through the application of her own quarantine regulations met a similar opposition on the part of the British and German representatives. Such persistent attempts by the British Minister to control the law-making power of Japan could not help but convince the Japanese Government and public that the abolition of extraterritoriality must be achieved in some way at the earliest possible opportunity.

Japan's attempt to control and regulate opium trade in accordance with the treaty stipulations and the domestic laws met similar difficulties. Sir Harry Parkes championed the cause of a joint control of the traffic in 1873 and again in 1875, but the Japanese Foreign Office insisted upon Japanese control and Bingham supported the Japanese view.

Finally the issue was forcibly brought before the Japanese public in the famous Hartley case. John Hartley, a British subject, had been brought before the British Consular Court in Yokohama on February 20, 1878, on a charge made by the Japanese authorities that he had smuggled twenty pounds of opium into the port on December 14 preceding, its importation into Japan having been prohibited by all the treaties as well as by Japanese laws. The Court adjudged him not guilty on the ground that "medicinal opium" was allowed under the Tariff Convention of 1866 and the case was dismissed. Storms of protest, both Japanese and foreign, arose from all sides. Another action was lodged against Hartley for smuggling sixteen pounds (12 catties) of opium on January 8, and he was tried in April, the Court finding him guilty and punishing him with a fine at the rate of \$ 15 per catty. But this second case helped the situation very little. The whole trend clearly demonstrated to the Japanese public the unreasonableness of extraterritoriality.

Other instances of a similar nature, in which the Japanese authorities had to confront the unreasonable opposition of the Powers in the enforcement of Japanese laws, were numerous in those days. Such, for example, were the establishment of a Court of Kanagawa-Ken which would take over the jurisdiction of the Governor and foreign Municipal Director in cases involving the nationals of non-Treaty Powers in 1873 as an encroachment upon the Municipal Regulations for Yokohama; the Marriage Law of 1873 as it allegedly conflicted with the naturalization laws of some of the Treaty Powers; the Railway Regulations of 1873 containing penalties for infractions; the Press Laws of 1875 prohibiting foreigners to publish newspapers in the Japanese language; and the Harbor Regulations of 1878 for the port of Yokohama. In those days it is no exaggeration to say that the Occidentals in Japan as a rule acted as though they were the élite of human race, incapable of doing wrong. All these cases, therefore, aroused the Japanese public which henceforth began to demand the abolition of extraterritoriality as well as the regaining of tariff autonomy.

TREATY REVISION CONFERENCES

Inouye Kaoru followed Terashima as Minister for Foreign Affairs in September, 1879. He was convinced that tariff autonomy and the repudiation of extraterritoriality should be handled together, and in July, 1880, presented for the consideration of the Powers, drafts of proposed treaties with annexed memorandum and tariff schedules. The Inouye project consisted of a revision of the conventional tariff and a clear definition of extraterritorial privileges which the foreigners were enjoying in Japan. He was motivated by the fact that the Consular Courts not only controlled civil and criminal cases, but violated Japan's administrative and police regulation, thereby causing administrative inconveniences, and tried to regain all the administrative powers, such as the enforcement of the Hunting Regulations, the Harbor Regulations, and the Quarantine Regulations, which had never been conceded to the Powers by any treaty but which the Powers had usurped to advance their self-interests under the guise of extraterritorial rights. Thus the most important proposals concerned the restoration of full judiciary autonomy upon the completion of the codification of laws and the immediate abolition of consular jurisdiction over the matters relating to police administration, partnerships between Japanese and foreigners, and customs affairs. In this way, he hoped to pave the way for the eventual abolition of extraterritoriality in its entirety.

The Inouye proposals provoked the vigorous opposition of the Powers, especially of Great Britain, chiefly because it contained suggestions looking forward to the termination of the conventional tariff. The negotiations thus reached an impasse. In July, 1881, however, the Earl of Granville, the British Foreign Secretary, suggested a preparatory conference at Tokyo to be attended by the Ministers of European Treaty Powers for the purpose of discussing the Japanese proposals. Inouye acted upon the suggestion and a Preparatory Conference for Treaty Revision, attended by the Ministers of twelve Treaty Powers, was organized at

Tokyo on January 15, 1882. Deliberations began three days later. Bingham, still holding aloof from the coöperative procedure under instruction, at first refused to participate therein but joined it in March, without however committing the United States.

To this Preparatory Conference, Inouye communicated fresh suggestions and, after preliminary discussions, presented two memoranda, one on April 5 and the other on June 1, containing his revised plan for changes in the judicial clauses in the treaties as well as the conventional tariff. Following the fundamental principles already summarized, Inouye more specifically proposed, among other things, the abolition of extraterritorial jurisdiction in five years and the employment of foreign judges in the Japanese courts during the transition period. In return, he offered the enlargement of foreign rights relating to residence and land tenure within the Treaty Ports and the opening of the country to all foreigners. Inouye's project for the revision of tariff contained some 485 items, divided into 13 groups, with *ad valorem* rates ranging from 3 to 25 per cent.

Bingham welcomed these proposals in principle, as did German Minister Von Eisendecker. Most of the other representatives were willing to accept them as a basis of discussion. Uncompromisingly opposed to them was Sir Harry Parkes, who availed himself of every opportunity in pointing out the defects of the proposal. The Preparatory Conference ended on July 27, the foreign representatives agreeing to refer the Inouye Proposal to their respective Governments. Besides the question of extraterritoriality and tariff revision, the proposal in the final form also included the incorporation in the revised treaty of a reciprocal and conditional most-favored-nation clause and a provision for the termination of the treaty after twelve years.

On the basis of the Japanese proposal and the deliberations of the Preparatory Conference, the Powers suggested various exchange items in the course of the negotiations which followed and finally, on August 4, 1884, Count Inouye, made a member of the peerage in July, again offered a

memorandum to be used as a basis of new treaties. Its chief provisions were the maintenance of revised tariff schedules, the abolition of Consular Courts, the opening of the country for foreign trade and residence, and the grant of property ownership to foreigners. During 1884 and 1885, the foreign representatives conferred several times to study the Japanese proposals and to exchange views and they seem to have reached a general agreement that the Treaties should be revised, not only concerning the tariff but also the consular jurisdiction.

With such preparations, the Official Conference of the Treaty Powers was opened at Tokyo on May 1, 1886. Foreign Minister Count Inouye himself headed the Japanese delegates and Vice-Minister Aoki assisted him, while the Ministers of the leading Treaty Powers participated. After several sessions, Sir Francis Plunkett, the British Minister, and Baron Von Holleben, the German Minister, presented on June 15 an Anglo-German project, which became the basis of discussion thereafter. The chief features of the Anglo-German project were similar to the Inouye proposal: opening of the entire country to foreign residence, trade, and travel within two years after the ratification of the revised treaty; extension to foreigners of the same rights and privileges as were enjoyed by the Japanese; maintenance of Consular Courts for three years following the enforcement of the revised treaty; organization of courts in accordance with Western principles and codification of various laws and the submission thereof to the Powers in English translations; appointment of foreign judges and prosecutors in Japanese courts for fifteen years after the ratification of the revised treaty; termination of the treaty at the end of seven years; and adoption of graduated tariff with rates ranging from 5 to 25 per cent.

The Conference continued its deliberations and on April 22, 1887, a draft jurisdictional convention was finally approved. It practically adopted the Anglo-German draft of June 15 in principle, with minor amendments. Thus the principle of mixed courts and foreign public prosecutors as

originally proposed by Inouye in 1882 and presented as an Anglo-German project in 1886, was adopted by the Conference. There now remained the task of drafting a commercial convention, to which task the Conference addressed itself and which was completed on July 12. It was in general based upon Inouye's proposal of 1882. Thus the prospect was bright for the early revision of the treaties.

Meanwhile, a strong opposition was gathering its momentum against the Westernization movement which was inspired and led by Count Ito and Count Inouye. With it, widespread popular agitation arose against the Inouye principles, especially the proposed system of mixed courts and the humiliating promise to submit the constitution of the courts and the codified laws to the Powers for their approbation. At this juncture General Viscount Tani, with General Kuroda and General Saigo Judo returned from visits in Europe and America and brought their influence to bear upon the opposition. M. Boissonade, the French legal adviser who was largely responsible for the compilation of the civil code of Japan, added his weight in depicting the defects in the decisions reached by the Conference, calling it a continued disgrace upon Japan's judiciary system. Finally, the issue was debated at length before the Throne, General Viscount Tani leading the opposition and Premier Count Ito and Count Inouye defending the policy of the Cabinet. Although the Throne had decided in favor of the Cabinet, popular agitation was spreading rapidly. Confronted by such widespread opposition and becoming convinced that Japan should codify her laws before revising her treaties, Count Inouye adjourned the Conference *sine die* on July 18, 1887, "until the Japanese Government be able to show the results of codifications." He resigned his office on September 17. Thus after twenty-eight sessions, the negotiations for the revision of the treaties was abruptly interrupted, and with it ended Count Inouye's effort for a period of over seven years.

THE COMING OF OKUMA

The attack upon the Westernization movement continued on all sides, and the newspapers joined in sharp criticism of its leaders. Premier Count Ito, assuming the portfolio of Foreign Affairs after Count Inouye's resignation in September, wielded the "big stick" of censorship to suppress such violent criticisms and expelled a large number of opposition leaders from Tokyo.

In February, 1888, Count Okuma Shigenobu became Minister for Foreign Affairs and the opposition subsided a degree. In April, Count Ito resigned the premiership and accepted the presidency of the Privy Council, while General Count Kuroda Kiyotaka became Premier and Count Okuma was retained as Foreign Minister.

Count Okuma at once addressed himself to the task of treaty revision which had so many times proved the pitfall of his predecessors. And he had a few convictions. He believed that the best way to attain the end of treaty revision was to let the foreigners themselves see the wisdom of accepting a new treaty by upholding even the most trivial of treaty rights and by impressing them with the inconvenience of the existing treaties. Count Okuma declined, for instance, to protect foreign trade marks and copyrights on the ground that Japan had no treaties on those matters. He also subjected to the strictest regulations all foreigners residing, travelling, or owning property outside of the Treaty Ports. Count Okuma also saw the disadvantage of dealing jointly with the Treaty Powers and reverted to the policy of separate negotiations with each of the Treaty Powers in place of group conferences. Furthermore, he introduced a new interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause in treaties. Under the existing interpretation, the most-favored-nation clause had invariably been so interpreted as to extend, unconditionally and with no *quid pro quo*, all privileges enjoyed by any one of the Treaty Powers to all the rest of the Powers. Count Okuma reversed the practice and insisted that any nation desirous of obtaining

the same privileges as were conceded to another nation must submit to the same restrictions as were accepted by that nation.

An occasion to test his principles, especially his theory of the most-favored-nation clause, presented itself in the pending negotiation of the first treaty with Mexico, as Mexico had few of her subjects residing in Japan and had little commercial relationship with Japan. The Japanese-Mexican Treaty was negotiated by Minister Mutsu with the Mexican representative at Washington and was signed on November 30, 1888. It was the first treaty to be concluded on the basis of equality and complete reciprocity. It allowed the Mexicans to reside and trade in all parts of Japan, subject to Japanese jurisdiction, but denied them the right of land ownership. In short, while the Japanese laws unreservedly applied to the Mexicans in Japan, the latter had obtained more concessions in return than the Americans and the Europeans. And Count Okuma announced that, should any nation desire to obtain similar rights as the Mexicans, they should first of all become subject to the Japanese laws. In this procedure, Count Okuma tried to establish the precedent that most-favored-nation treatment did not mean that a nation enjoying such treatment was entitled automatically and unconditionally to share the privileges extended to another nation. The Mexican Treaty was ratified by Japan on January 29, 1889, and the ratifications were exchanged at Washington on July 18, 1889.

Encouraged by such a significant success, Count Okuma then turned his whole energy to the far more difficult task of negotiations with the Treaty Powers. He proposed to deal with judiciary and tariff in one treaty instead of making two separate instruments as had been planned by his predecessor. In regard to tariff, he adopted in the main the tentative agreement arrived at by the Conference initiated by Count Inouye. As to judicial matters, the Okuma plan proposed, among other things, to open the entire country to foreign residence, trade, and travel on condition that foreigners submit to Japanese jurisdiction, to abolish con-

sular jurisdiction and the concession system upon the expiration of a five-year period, and to grant the right of possessing real estate to aliens after the abolition of consular jurisdiction. For obvious reasons, Count Okuma did not follow the Inouye project of writing into the treaties an agreement to appoint foreign judges for Japanese courts; he preferred to make such a declaration through diplomatic channels, independent of the treaties.

With such principles of negotiations and demands firmly fixed Count Okuma approached the United States in the first instance. The negotiations were started at Tokyo through Minister Hubbard on December 29, and a revised treaty was successfully concluded and signed on February 20, 1889. The Revised Treaty incorporated most of the Japanese demands, including the principle of reciprocity, the abolition of Consular Courts in five years, the conditional most-favored-nation clause, the right of termination, and the Japanese plan of determining *ad valorem* values.

The Revised Tariff annexed to the Treaty enumerated some 445 articles and *ad valorem* duties ranging from 5 to 20 per cent. The Diplomatic Notes dealt with (1) the codes of laws to be promulgated and to be submitted to the United States for her information, and (2) the appointment of foreign judges in the Supreme Court. The Trade Regulations and the Government Bonded Warehouse Regulations completed the annexed papers. John Franklin Swift, who had succeeded Hubbard during the Spring of 1889, vehemently opposed the adoption of the Treaty, and Secretary of State Blaine withheld it from the Senate during the Special Session of Congress.

After the negotiations with the United States had been started, Count Okuma also placed a similar project before the Ministers of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, and the negotiations were started separately at their capitals. A new treaty with Germany was concluded on June 11 and with Russia on August 8. These two Treaties were practically the same as the American-Japanese Treaty. On June 13, Count Okuma proposed

a similar negotiation with the other Treaty Powers.

All the while, the Government, for fear that premature publicity might arouse public opposition, placed a veil of secrecy around the treaties it had already concluded or had been negotiating. It had planned to put all of the new Treaties into force on February 11, 1890, the first anniversary of the proclamation of the Constitution. Unfortunately, the negotiations with Great Britain were unduly prolonged. Viscount Okabe presented the Japanese project to Lord Salisbury on January 19, 1890, and Lord Salisbury transmitted to Minister Hugh Frazer at Tokyo the British counter-proposal on June 21. The negotiations then dragged. It was at this critical moment when the *London Times* published the substance of the draft treaty. This was soon reproduced in Japan and at once stirred up public indignation against the proposed treaty. Count Okuma's opponents immediately caught the opportunity and began to attack the provisions, especially the one proposing to include foreign judges in the Japanese judiciary, as unconstitutional, and the other fixing a date for the completion of the Codes as an interference in the domestic legislation.

Public opinion in Japan was becoming, following the proclamation of the Constitution, more insistent than ever upon the principle of absolute equality of treatment in whatever arrangements were made with the Powers. Consequently, public feelings ran high and innumerable memorials were addressed to the Privy Council. Finally, a division of opinion within the Cabinet was evident and culminated in another dramatic discussion before the Throne, Count Okuma defending his position and Count Goto, the Minister of Communication, leading the opposition. When Count Yamagata and Count Matsukata swung to the opposition, the Cabinet was forced to discontinue the negotiations which had been proceeding successfully with Great Britain and the other Powers. It was under such circumstances that, on October 18, as Count Okuma was entering the Foreign Office building, a misguided fanatic threw a bomb into the Count's carriage, a tragedy in which he escaped death but

lost his leg. The Cabinet resigned six days later, having notified the United States, Germany, and Russia of the unavoidable postponement of the enforcement of the Treaties it had concluded with them. Thus was interrupted for the fourth time the task of revising treaties.

AOKI'S REVOLUTIONARY PLAN

The temporary administration which was organized with Prince Sanjo as Premier and Aoki Shuzo as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was succeeded by the Yamagata Ministry on December 24, 1889, and Aoki became Minister for Foreign Affairs. By this time Japan's attitude had been greatly stiffened. Public opinion was strongly opposed to undue concessions on the part of the Government. Yet the experience gained through the previous negotiations helped Japan to feel that the conclusion of treaties upon an equal footing with the Powers was not impossible. Furthermore, the successful launching of the constitutional government at that time also encouraged her to take bolder steps.

Consequently, in December, the Cabinet had decided upon the acquisition of equality with the Powers through treaty revision as the fundamental principle of its foreign policy. In order to carry out that principle, it proposed certain amendments to the Treaties already signed but, should amendments fail, to stop the revision project and to await a more favorable opportunity. The reasons for the proposed amendments to the already concluded Treaties were at once the subject of amendments: that the inclusion of foreign judges in the Supreme Court was unconstitutional; that the publication of codified laws as a reward for the abolition of consular jurisdiction would arrest Japan's future legislative power; and that the continuation of Consular Courts for five years in spite of the opening of the country would violate the principle of equality.

These fundamental principles having been settled, Aoki notified the Powers that the maintenance of consular juris-

diction and the appointment of foreign judges to the Japanese bench were in violation of the new Constitution and would never be approved by the Diet, and that unless those obstacles were removed the American, German, and Russian Treaties already signed by Count Okuma could never be ratified. He then proposed the revision of those Treaties on the basis of his own program which included the following revolutionary provisions: cancellation of the engagement concerning the foreign judges in the Supreme Court; withdrawal of the stipulations concerning the elaboration, codification, and promulgation of laws; withdrawal of the provision concerning the alien ownership of land but the continuation of the conventional leasing rights in the concessions; restriction of the rights of aliens in certain economic and political matters such as operating mines and railways and owning shares in Japanese banks and shipping concerns; opening of the entire country in exchange for the relinquishment of consular jurisdiction which might be retained in the concessions for five years; and adoption of the tariff schedule as initiated by Count Inouye. The Inouye plan proposed the abolition of consular jurisdiction in exchange for the opening of the interior, while the Okuma project proposed the opening of the interior without limitation and the conditional abolition of consular jurisdiction; the Aoki program now proposed the unconditional abolition of consular jurisdiction and the opening of the interior with limitations. It was natural that a storm of opposition should arise against the Aoki program among the foreign residents in Japan.

If the Aoki program was revolutionary, the Aoki procedure also marked a new departure. In the revision movement from 1872 until 1889, Japan turned to the United States in the first instance and American leadership prevailed while Great Britain led the opposition. In 1890, Aoki turned from the United States to Great Britain, who became the key Power in the subsequent negotiations. Because many a negotiation to date had been wrecked on account of the British attitude, the Japanese Foreign Office

became convinced that it must first of all win her and that other Powers would then follow suit. Moreover, United States Minister Swift's hostility toward the treaty revision program was well known. Viscount Aoki accordingly drew up a memorandum on February 8, 1890, and transmitted it to Hugh Frazer, the British Minister, on February 28. Two days previously, Swift under instruction informed the Foreign Office that the United States would not accept the 1889 Treaty without numerous modifications. During the following month, Aoki sent memoranda to various Powers.

To Japan's great surprise and relief, however, Great Britain came forward with a favorable response. Frazer assisted the Home Government in formulating its new plan in response to Japan's new proposal and the British counter-proposal in the form of a new draft treaty was presented to the Foreign Office on July 15. This draft treaty was on the whole based upon the Aoki program and practically accepted Japan's new aspirations. The only important departure was the proposal to postpone the "extension of Japanese jurisdiction to foreigners" for five years on condition that the newly codified Japanese laws should have been in actual and satisfactory operation for one year before the expiration of that period. The wisdom of this proposal was the postponement of the application of Japanese codes and courts to foreigners until after the actual demonstration of their fitness. Great Britain in 1890, then, was prepared to agree to a date when the consular jurisdiction should cease and no longer held out for the appointment of foreign judges to the Japanese bench. In short, while the Okuma plan proposed conditional but immediate recovery of judiciary powers, the Aoki program proposed the unconditional abolition of consular jurisdiction, and the British project proposed the unconditional recovery of judiciary at the end of five years.

What caused Great Britain who led the opposition and consistently blocked every revision project during 1872-1889 to change her attitude so suddenly is an interesting question to speculate upon. Perhaps the completion of the

Siberian railway and the steady advance of Russia toward the Far East caused no little apprehension in England, and may have induced the British statesmen to realize the wisdom of courting Japan's special friendship as a means of counteracting that advance, the whole idea of which ten years later bloomed forth, to the amazement of the world, in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Perhaps the very confidence which Japan had now placed upon Great Britain as the key Power in her treaty revision movement may have influenced the British statesmen to feel a pride as well as the necessity of leading the way in the inevitable revision of Japan's unequal treaties.

Encouraged by the favorable attitude of Great Britain, the Tokyo Government made preparations for the opening of official negotiations with her. In September, in addition to Aoki as the chief representative, Saigo, the Minister of Interior, and Count Goto, the Minister of Communication, were named on the Treaty Revision Commission. After a careful study of the British proposal, Japan's revised proposal was communicated to the British Minister in March, 1891. In it, Aoki practically accepted the British proposal except the promise to put Japanese codes in force one year before the abolition of consular jurisdiction. The negotiations were thus begun.

The political situation in Japan, complicated by the new Diet's active interest in the revision negotiations, necessitated slow and cautious action. In addition, an unexpected incident once more totally upset the Government plans. In May, 1891, a fanatic assaulted the Russian Crown Prince who was then visiting Japan. This tragic incident caused the resignation of the Yamagata Ministry while Aoki's resignation held up the pending negotiations with Great Britain at least for the time being, the treaty revision work thus being interrupted for the fifth time.

THE TERMINATION OF UNEQUAL TREATIES

Viscount Enomoto succeeded Aoki as Minister for For-

eign Affairs in the newly organized Matsukata Cabinet. His short tenure was marked by a minor success. Portugal withdrew her Consuls from Japan in 1892 but did not replace them. The Japanese Government considered this a breach of treaty stipulations to provide for an effective system of jurisdiction over the Portuguese in Japan, and asserted its right to judicial authority over them in an Imperial Ordinance of August 3, 1892, denouncing all treaty provisions with Portugal relative to consular jurisdiction. Portugal did not protest. However, the Matsukata Cabinet soon fell because of the issues of enforcing the newly codified codes and of the budget.

The Matsukata Cabinet was succeeded by the second Ito Cabinet on August 8, 1892, and Mutsu Munemitsu, the former Japanese Minister at Washington and the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce in the Yamagata Cabinet of 1890-91, became Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mutsu once more set sail on the troublesome sea of treaty revision, where many a ship of State had been wrecked previously, with the determination of an experienced captain. He was convinced that the revised treaties must correspond to the constitutional system just adopted and be acceptable to the Japanese nation. He consulted Premier Count Ito, called upon his secretary Naka and Attaché Dennison to draw up draft plans, and submitted his program of treaty revision to the Cabinet Council on July 5, 1893. The Mutsu plan, which was approved both by the Cabinet and the Emperor, coincided in principle with the Aoki plan and incorporated the British proposal for the enforcement of treaties and the abolition of consular jurisdiction five years after the signing of the treaty. In other words, the Mutsu plan accepted the proposal to wait five years both for the enforcement of treaties on an equality basis and the abolition of consular jurisdiction rather than to insist upon the immediate enforcement of unequal treaties. He frankly believed that it would take at least as many years for the codification and application of Japan's new civil and commercial codes.

Mutsu continued the plan of separate negotiations and

instructed Japanese Ministers at the capitals of the various Treaty Powers to carry on negotiations there. Japan again opened negotiations first with Great Britain, and Lord Rosebery, the Foreign Secretary in the new Liberal Cabinet, received the overture favorably. Aoki Shuzo was then serving in Berlin as Japanese Minister to Germany while British Minister Frazer was back in London on leave. Mutsu thoughtfully planned to bring these two friendly diplomats together and instructed Minister Aoki on August 4, 1893, to revive negotiations at London. The preliminary negotiations were instituted in September, and by December sufficient progress had been made to warrant the opening of formal negotiations.

But before Mutsu was able to take any definite step, the Diet which met in November threatened the life of the Cabinet. It adopted a hostile attitude toward the Government, censured it for failure in the proper enforcement of the existing treaties, and finally voted an Address to the Throne, demanding the abolition of consular jurisdiction, the recovery of tariff autonomy, and the prohibition of coastwise trade by foreigners. Premier Count Ito avoided a Cabinet crisis by causing the dissolution of the Diet.

The internal crisis thus met, Aoki on December 27 communicated to Lord Rosebery a draft diplomatic note, a draft tariff, and a memorandum respecting the same. The proposed draft treaty was similar to the Aoki proposal of 1890 and contained the principles adopted by the Cabinet Council in July. The most important provision of the Japanese proposal asked for the complete abolition of consular jurisdiction from the date of treaty enforcement which would be five years after the signing of the treaty. A draft Protocol set forth that the foreign settlements would be abolished, and a draft diplomatic note declared that the treaty would not be enforced until Japanese codes were put into full operation. The Japanese proposal also maintained reciprocal freedom of commerce and navigation on condition that all domestic laws and regulations were applied to all foreigners, and dropped the Salisbury stipulation that

British subjects should retain all privileges and rights not especially abrogated by the new treaty.

The British Government was now reconstructed by Lord Rosebery as Prime Minister and Lord Kimberley as Foreign Secretary. Lord Kimberley was willing to accept the Japanese proposal as a basis of discussion, but Count Ito's and Mutsu's alleged assertions that Japan would repudiate all existing treaties threatened to wreck the negotiations. The misunderstanding was cleared to the satisfaction of the British Government by the end of March, and the negotiations were resumed. The discussions between April and July, spread over eight conferences, modified the Japanese proposal in more than one respect without sacrificing the fundamental principle, and the following provisions on points of conflict were adopted through compromise: adoption of an unconditional most-favored-nation clause and treatment of foreigners on an equal footing with the Japanese in regard to travel, residence, and trade; abolition of consular jurisdiction and foreign settlements; enforcement of the treaty five years after its signature, being made contingent upon the enforcement of newly codified laws; prohibition of alien land ownership by domestic legislation but confirmation of the existing conventional leases; prohibition of coastwise trade by foreigners except between the open ports with minor exceptions; establishment of a protocol of a new *ad valorem* tariff for a certain important group of imports, to be converted into specific duties by the conclusion of a new tariff convention six months after the ratification of the treaty; and termination of the treaty at the end of twelve years.

With these compromises, an agreement was reached at last between Great Britain and Japan, and the treaty was ready for signature by July 13, 1894. Aoki cabled back that it would be signed the next day. At this point occurred the disturbance in Korea which suddenly stiffened the British attitude and which threatened the treaty for the second time. The incident in question concerned the removal, through alleged Japanese advice, of Coldwell, a Britisher, as

naval instructor in Korea. The difficulty was fortunately easily settled and the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed on July 16, 1894, twenty-six years after the first announcement of the Japanese desire for treaty revision.

The negotiations with the United States were started in February, 1894, but Mutsu in vain pressed for action during March and April. On May 28, the drafts of the proposed treaty and tariff which included the modifications arrived at in the Anglo-Japanese negotiations at London up to that time were submitted to the State Department at Washington and the negotiations were pushed by Minister Tateno. Secretary of State Gresham took a passive attitude by awaiting the outcome of the proceedings at London, and thus missed the opportunity of taking the leadership in the treaty revision for the third and decisive time. With the conclusion of the British Treaty, Mutsu sought to expedite the negotiations and Kurino replaced Tateno as Japanese Minister at Washington. It was discovered that the principal American objection lay in the reciprocal clause providing for the right of entrance, travel, residence, and property ownership. Japan was willing to insert a clause in the treaty mutually to exempt laws relating to laborers and labor immigration from the treaty. The immigration question being thus disposed of, the negotiations proceeded leisurely and the new American-Japanese Treaty was signed on November 22, 1894. The Senate delayed ratification and finally proposed a small amendment which almost nullified the Treaty. Fresh negotiations followed and in February, 1895, after making amendments satisfactory to both parties concerned, the Senate ratified the Treaty and the task of exchanging the new American-Japanese Treaty was completed.

The British and American Treaties were followed, true to Mutsu's belief, by the conclusion of similar treaties in quick succession with Italy on December 1, 1894; with Germany on April 4, 1895; with Russia on June 8, 1895; with France on August 4, 1896, and so on. The task was

completed with the conclusion of a treaty with Austria-Hungary on December 5, 1897, making it the sixteenth revised treaty.

Upon the conclusion of these Treaties, Japan lost no time in making necessary preparations for putting them into force, and all conditions were fulfilled within the prescribed period of time. Thus in 1899, not on July 17 as provided for in most Treaties but on August 4, when the French Treaty was stipulated to go into effect, the Revised Treaties with the Powers were put into operation and the extraterritorial jurisdiction was at last terminated throughout the confines of the Japanese Empire. So far as the tariff question was concerned, however, it still remained unilateral without any *quid pro quo* being undertaken by the Powers. In 1911, therefore, when the Treaties were again revised and renewed, the unilateral tariff conventions were replaced by bilateral engagements on a more rational basis of mutual concessions. In this manner, the unequal treaties under which Japan had labored for half a century were terminated in their entirety.

CHAPTER V

JAPAN, KOREA, AND CHINA

KOREA was long a source of danger to Japan, all past invasions having come either from or through that peninsula. It was thus regarded as a dagger pointed at Japan's heart, a source of constant irritation and menace to Japan's security. So long as Korea was able to maintain her independence, that dagger was not dangerous to Japan. Once she was controlled by another Power, however, she became a menace to Japan's very existence. Therefore, Japan had always championed, during the three closing decades of the past century, the cause of Korean independence. In the exercise of that policy, however, Japan was destined to clash with China's claim of suzerainty over the Hermit Kingdom of the Far East.

JAPAN TRIES TO OPEN KOREA

For centuries Korea was cut up by the succession of dynasties and, though an independent state, often was, at least in part, a vassal nation paying tribute either to Japan or China. Japan's official relations with Korea date back to the traditional conquest of the peninsula by Jingu Kogo in the third century, B. C. Japan's overlordship, however, lasted only for a short period. Centuries later more pleasant relationships were established in which the Koreans became instrumental in bringing continental civilization to Japan and assumed the role of master in the realm of culture. Commercial interests also bound the two neighboring nations across the sea into closer relations, and a Japanese trading settlement was built at Fusan as early as the middle

of the fifteenth century. Late in the sixteenth century, Toyotomi Hideyoshi conquered the peninsula again, but Tokugawa Iyeyasu, following a more peaceful policy, restored diplomatic relations with Korea. Since then the accession of successive Tokugawa Shoguns saw the Korean envoys at the Yedo Court.

With the Restoration of 1868, the Japanese Government felt the necessity of establishing diplomatic relations with its neighbor across the sea and repeated attempts were made to start a new page in the Japanese-Korean relations. In that task, however, the Japanese statesmen discovered quite an anomalous situation.

Under the Tokugawa Shogunate, the protection of trade between Japan and Korea was entrusted to the daimyo of Tsushima, and the restored Imperial Government at Tokyo naturally commissioned Lord So of Tsushima in 1868 to send a special mission to Korea and to inform her of the political change which had taken place in Japan and to make overtures for the establishment of commercial and diplomatic relations. When the mission reached Seoul, the Korean Court refused to recognize the envoy or to receive his message. The Hermit Kingdom at the time was under the domination of Prince Heung Sung, the Regent. In January, 1864, the direct line of the House of Yi, which had been ruling Korea since 1392, came to an end on the death of King Chul Chong without issue or nomination of an heir. Myung Bok, a mere boy of 12 and a son of Prince Heung Sung of the Yi House, was appointed heir to the throne and Prince Heung Sung, assuming the title of "Tai Won Kun" or the Lord of the Great Court, became Regent during the King's minority. The Tai Won Kun strengthened his position by having his wife's niece, a member of the Min family, married to the King. The Tai Won Kun was bitterly anti-foreign and despotically reactionary, and left no stone unturned to stir up anti-foreign sentiment among his people. It was not surprising, therefore, that Korea should have turned a deaf ear to the messengers of peace and friendship from Japan.

Undismayed, the Japanese Government in 1869 sent a commission of investigation to Korea with special instructions to inquire into her relations with China and Russia. The attempt was futile. A new mission was sent in October of the same year to persuade Korea to enter into treaty relations with Japan, but the result was as unsuccessful as before. In September, 1872, Hanabusa Yoshikata, the Chief Secretary of the Foreign Office, was dispatched to Korea with a warship for the purpose of negotiating a new commercial treaty, but he too was unable to break the ice of cold reception. It was during the same year that a similar attempt by Frederick F. Low, the United States Minister to China, was defeated when the American vessels were fired upon and repulsed by the Koreans. The Tai Won Kun was supreme and determined against all overtures, and the anti-foreign sentiment in Korea was rising higher with years under his leadership.

Meanwhile, public opinion in Japan, indignant at the haughty attitude of the Korean Government, was becoming more and more inflamed. In the face of Japan's repeated overtures being so coldly rejected, the belief that force would be the only means of inducing Korea to open her doors to international intercourse was gaining in momentum. It was because of this belligerent policy that the first Cabinet crisis in Japan was precipitated in 1873.

Soyejima Taneomi, the Foreign Minister, was sent to China in 1873 to exchange ratification of the first Sino-Japanese treaty, and also to sound out China's policy with regard to the Korean, Formosan, and Ryukyuan issues. Concerning Korea, Soyejima was assured by the Ministers of the Tungli Yamen that, although China claimed suzerainty, Korea alone was responsible for her internal administration and the question of peace and war. Upon his return in July, therefore, he proposed the conquest of Korea as he was convinced that declaration of war would be the only way to punish the haughty and insulting Korean attitude toward Japan.

At that time, the Japanese Government was dominated

by the Sat-Cho-Do-Hi leaders: Saigo Takamori and Okubo Toshimichi of Satsuma; Kido Takayoshi, also commonly called Kido Koin, Ito Hirobumi, and Inouye Kaoru of Choshu; Goto Shojiro and Itagaki Taisuke of Tosa; and Soyejima Taneomi, Okuma Shigenobu, and Eto Shimpei of Hizen. Above them all were Prince Sanjo Sanetomi and Prince Iwakura Tomomi. Soyejima found the ready support of Premier Prince Sanjo, Generalissimo Saigo, Itagaki, Goto, and Eto Shimpei. Prince Iwakura, who had returned from his mission to America and Europe in September, vehemently opposed such a policy and was supported by Kido, Okubo, Ito Hirobumi, and Inouye Kaoru, together with the members of his mission. The issue reached a crisis in October and the debate divided the Council of State for ten days, October 14-23. It was in the course of that memorable debate that Okubo rose to the fearless height of a prophet and pointed out that Japan was still in a transition stage and financially too weak for such an adventure. Also that both Japan and Korea would become an easy prey to Russia who was the most dangerous rival. The question was finally referred to Meiji Tenno, who decided wisely in favor of peace. As a result, the "Peace Ministry" was organized under the premiership of Prince Iwakura, and Terashima Munenori replaced Soyejima as Japan's Foreign Minister. The new Cabinet assumed the responsibility of establishing friendly relations with Korea through diplomatic channels and the war clouds disappeared.

THE JAPANESE-KOREAN TREATY, 1876

The climax of the diplomatic impasse between Japan and Korea was reached in 1875 when a small Japanese warship, the *Unyo*, which was engaged in soundings off the coast, was fired upon by the Koreans at Kianghwa. The Japanese commander sent a small boat under the flag of truce to inquire into the attack, but it too was fired upon. On the third day, therefore, the Japanese warship retaliated with bombardment, destroyed the fort, landed a body of

marines, and attacked the garrison, producing many Korean casualties and capturing numerous cannons. As soon as the news reached Japan, the incident rekindled the old agitation for a punitive war upon Korea. The Government continued to insist upon a peaceful policy and appointed Lieutenant-General Kuroda Kiyotaka and Inouye Kaoru as special envoys to negotiate with Korea. The envoys were instructed to utilize the opportunity to conclude a treaty of amity and commerce. At the same time, the Japanese Government dispatched Mori Yurei to the Peking Court in order to negotiate with the Chinese Government concerning the Korean affair. This extra measure of caution was taken as China claimed suzerainty over Korea and was thought to be encouraging Korea's consistent policy of slighting Japan by rejecting her friendly overtures for commercial relations. Li Hung-chang, however, declined any responsibility as regards the Korean actions toward Japan, and Mori was assured that China raised no objection to Japan's procedure as long as her intention was merely to enter into a treaty relationship with Korea and to terminate the latter's policy of seclusion.

The negotiations which were started at Kianghwa on February 10, 1876, were similar to those which transpired between the Shogunate and Commodore Perry in 1853 and 1854. At the time, the situation in the Korean Court was complicated by bitter factional intrigues in which the Tai Won Kun headed the anti-foreign party and Queen Min led the progressives. The Tai Won Kun and his followers were absolutely opposed to the idea of entering into treaty relations with Japan or any other Power and were determined to resist overtures, if necessary, by the use of force. The Queen's party believed in the inevitable necessity of opening the country and pointed out the folly of armed resistance. Thus followed an unprecedented scene of division and contest in the Korean Court, providing a bitter struggle for power among contending factions, and delaying the negotiations. Finally, the Queen's party emerged victorious, at least temporarily, and so the Treaty was signed on February 27, 1876.

The Kianghwa Treaty thus concluded was the first official document which the Korean Government had ever signed with a modern nation and occupies the same place of importance in the annals of Korea as the Perry Treaty does in Japanese history. Japan, herself only recently opened to international intercourse, now acted as a medium in bringing Korea out from her hermit existence. The most important clause of the Treaty related to Japan's outright recognition of Korea as "an independent state" enjoying "the same sovereign rights as does Japan." Among other things, the Korean Government confirmed Sorio in Fusan as the Japanese settlement and agreed to open two additional ports, Genzan and Chemulpo, which agreement was fulfilled in 1880 and 1883, respectively; granted the right of extraterritoriality in criminal matters to Japanese subjects in Korea without making any reference to Koreans in Japan; approved the Japanese right of appointing Consuls in each of the treaty ports in Korea without granting a similar right for Korea in Japan; confirmed the Japanese right of surveying the Korean coasts; granted the freedom of commerce and stipulated the drawing up of trade regulations by special commissioners; and agreed to make the Treaty binding from the date of the signing without waiting for its ratification. With the signing of the Treaty, Korea also agreed to send a mission to Japan to apologize for the outrage of 1875, which was done soon afterward. In a supplementary Convention of August 27, which included trade regulations, Japan succeeded in inserting a clause which prohibited the importation of opium into Korea.

The Treaty of 1876 is significant for two reasons. It opened Korea to international intercourse for the first time. Previous attempts to open Korea by France, the United States and other Powers were all futile. Now the Powers followed in Japanese footsteps, the United States in 1882, Great Britain and Germany in 1883, Russia and Italy in 1884, and France in 1886. Still more important is the fact that it clearly defined for the first time the Japanese policy with regard to Korea. Japan had rejected from the very

first the policy of conquest and annexation, and of all the nations Japan thus became the first to recognize the full independence of Korea against China's claim of suzerainty. It was upon this question of Korean independence that Japan and China were fated to clash time and again until the Sino-Japanese War became inevitable.

ANTI-FOREIGNISM IN KOREA

The effect upon Korea of the signing of her first Treaty with Japan was similar to that of Japan's first treaty with the United States. The Treaty caused a division of the country into two camps, progressive and reactionary. There was, however, one vital difference in the two situations: in Japan the contest was dictated by patriotic and unselfish motives on both sides, while in Korea it became the means of furthering personal and selfish motives and consolidating the power and influence at the Court. Alike in both countries the anti-foreign feeling became higher and more assertive.

The Korean Government was still in the hand of the Queen's party which had signed the Treaty with Japan. Opposed to that party was the faction led by the Tai Won Kun. The Queen's party was no real advocate of friendship with Japan but, as it actually turned out, was merely utilizing the occasion as a clever means of depriving the Tai Won Kun of his governing power, and, having attained that end, it was ready to fall back upon China as a better protector of their interests. Now rose a third party which was opposed to both and which favored friendly relations with Japan. The dominant figure in the new party was Kim Ok Kiun, and he had won over such leaders as Pak Yong Hio and Su Kwong Bum. They now sent to Japan several younger leaders to communicate their ideas to the Japanese statesmen, and they, upon their return from Japan, won the King over to the cause of Japanese-Korean friendship. The King, in his turn, dispatched a party of ten leaders to Japan for the purpose of observation and study. The Queen's

party, naturally hostile to such a move, banished Kim Ok Kiun to a distant province, and caused the assassination of other leaders.

By 1881, the Queen's party became unpopular and Kim Ok Kiun was recalled from his banishment. Kim, together with Pak and Su, then began to introduce a series of reforms in the administration. For that purpose, Kim and Su visited Japan in a semi-official capacity in January, 1882, and induced the Japanese statesmen to assist them in their reform movement. Japan became thus involved in the internal affairs of Korea.

At the beginning of 1882, therefore, there were three major parties in the Korean Court, each intriguing against the other to gain a preponderant position in the Government. The Tai Won Kun party, whose support came from the army and the reactionary elements, was violently anti-foreign and out of power then; the Queen's party, relying upon China and hostile to Japan, was nominally in power; and the new progressive party of Kim, Pak, and Su was under the patronage of a portion of the Min family. It was in such an atmosphere of divided and intriguing party movements that the *coup d'état* of 1882 occurred.

We must here turn the pages back a few years and follow the development of the Japanese position in Korea. Following the conclusion of the Kianghwa Treaty, Hanabusa was sent to Korea in 1877 as the Chargé d'Affaires at Seoul, and became Minister in 1880 upon the completion of the Japanese Legation. The anti-foreign feeling was prevalent everywhere as in Japan following Perry's Treaty. In fact the feeling against Japan and the Japanese people was especially hostile, and unpleasant disturbances marred the new page of Japanese-Korean relations. In October, 1878, for instance, the Korean Government had imposed a prohibitive tariff of 20% on both imports and exports which virtually amounted to the annihilation of Japanese trade with Korea. The discriminatory tariffs were withdrawn only after Japan had made a strong protest on the ground that the procedure was an open violation of the treaty stipu-

lations. Again in 1879, a party of Japanese officers and crew from the *Hanabusa* were taking a walk through the streets of Torai, near Fusan, when a Korean mob attacked them and they were forced to retaliate in self-defence. As a result, however, Torai was opened to Japanese visits.

Behind the anti-foreign and anti-Japanese movement in Korea was the masterful hand of Li Hung-chang, who, in spite of the Kianghwa Treaty, insisted that Korea was China's tributary state. In 1878, for instance, when the Japanese Government, acting upon the French request, appealed for the release of a French missionary who was imprisoned as a result of the Tai Won Kun's anti-foreign activities, the Korean Government insisted that it could not do anything without China's approval. Japan naturally protested against such an attitude as opposed to the principle of the Kianghwa Treaty. The Chinese domination at the Korean capital was further strengthened as a result of the *coup d'état* of 1882.

THE JAPANESE-KOREAN CRISIS, 1882

In July, 1882, a revolt in the Korean army against misrule was turned, through the instigation of the Tai Won Kun, into a movement for the overthrow of the Queen's party and for the clearance from Korea of all Japanese influence. The rioting soldiers seized the arsenal and besieged the palace. They ran amuck in the royal palace, smearing it with the blood of leading administrative and army officials, and assassinated Li Sao Wo, the Presiding Minister, in his home. The Queen's followers and the pro-Japanese leaders retired into hiding, and the Tai Won Kun became the civil and military dictator. It was true in form to the usual Korean custom of political changes.

Meanwhile, on July 23, the rioting soldiers attacked and burned the Japanese Legation. Out of the twenty-five persons who were then in the Legation, only two army officers and six members of the police force were armed, and the Japanese were faced with a precarious situation. Minis-

ter Hanabusa and his party desperately fought their way through the mob and called upon the Governor of Seoul whose duty it was to protect the Legation, but found the building empty. The Minister then proceeded to the royal palace, but all the gates were closed and he was forced to retire to Chemulpo on the following day. There the Minister and his party were again treacherously attacked in the midst of pretended hospitality, but the Minister miraculously escaped from the scene after several persons were killed in trying to defend him and the flag. The party then put out to the high sea in a small fishing junk, found hospitality in a British surveying vessel, the *Flying Fish*, and reached Nagasaki on July 29.

Hanabusa telegraphed the news of his plight to Tokyo from Nagasaki and waited for instructions. At Tokyo, an emergency Cabinet Council was immediately called by Prime Minister Lord Sanjo and was attended by all the Councillors including Minister of Right Lord Iwakura, Foreign Minister Inouye, Kuroda, Yamagata, Terashima, Oki, Yamada, and Matsukata. Lieutenant-General Kuroda Kiyotaka, who had signed the Kianghwa Treaty, advocated the unhesitating policy of retaliation, but Lord Iwakura and Foreign Minister Inouye proposed peaceful negotiations in place of war. At a conference before the Throne, Inouye eloquently presented his reasons for a peaceful policy by pointing out Japan's own experiences with anti-foreign violence during the early stages of her intercourse with the Powers and especially the parallel cases of the burning of foreign legations in Tokyo, and proposed to send Hanabusa back to Korea under the escort of several warships to negotiate a satisfactory settlement with the Korean Government. Meiji Tenno wisely decided upon a peaceful mission and entrusted the management of the entire affair to his Minister for Foreign Affairs. Inouye immediately consulted with the foreign representatives as to the status of Korea and, being assured of their view that Korea was an independent state, hurried to Nagasaki. There the Foreign Minister and the Minister to Korea conferred at length, and Hanabusa returned to Seoul under

the escort of three warships and 800 men. Major-General Takashima and Rear-Admiral Nire were instructed to follow him soon afterward with 1,150 men.

Meanwhile, a new factor had appeared at Seoul. The Queen's party, having been driven from power, immediately appealed to China for assistance. Li Hung-chang saw the opportunity for which he had been waiting, and ordered General Wu Ting-fang and Admiral Ting Ju-chang to proceed to Korea with land and sea forces. The name of China still loomed invincible in the Korean estimate and the Tai Won Kun was, not only powerless to resist the interference of the suzerain Power, but was then inclined to seek her aid in facing the storm of protest, which was bound to come from Japan.

Minister Hanabusa reached Chemulpo on August 12, 1882. In spite of Korean appeals for delay and for the dispensation of escort, Hanabusa with his guards arrived at Seoul a few days later only to find the Chinese forces already guarding the four gates. The Japanese Minister immediately asked for an audience with the King, but the Ministers would not grant it and suggested a delay. Hanabusa consented to wait, but made it clear that upon his mission depended the question of peace or war between Japan and Korea. After more delays, the audience finally took place on August 20 and Hanabusa presented the Japanese demands, among which were an indemnity for the outrages of the previous month and a permission to allow Japan to station her garrisons at Seoul for the protection of the Legation. The Japanese Minister pointed out that the diplomatic relations between the two countries were facing a crisis and that the key to the whole situation would lie in the Korean attitude toward the Japanese demands, allowing three days for an answer. Hong Chung Pak, the Presiding Minister, who was appointed to negotiate with Hanabusa, informed the latter on the 22nd that the negotiations would have to be delayed several days on account of his unavoidable absence from the capital. Hanabusa now saw the usual policy of procrastination clearly at work and announced his de-

parture on the following day, admonishing Hong in a note to calculate his procedure well before it was too late.

There was a definite reason for delay in the negotiations. Admiral Ting Ju-chang, who had returned to China a short while ago, reached the port of Nunyo with six war vessels and two transports containing six garrisons of picked Chinese soldiers. On the 23rd, a few hours after the Japanese Minister had left for Chemulpo, a Chinese messenger entered Seoul. It became now evident that the Korean Government was waiting for Chinese advice and that it was relying upon the Chinese show of force to get the best of the negotiations with Japan. After seeing the Korean authorities, the Chinese messenger sought Hanabusa at Chemulpo and proposed to mediate between Japan and Korea. When the Japanese Minister declined the offer, he advised the postponement of the Minister's departure as there was still some definite hope for an amicable solution of the difficulties.

The Chinese intention soon became clear. The Tai Won Kun was enticed into the Chinese camp, transported in captivity to Tientsin and thence later to Paotingfu, where he was to be confined for several years. At Seoul, the Chinese announced that such a procedure was necessary to restore order in the Korean Government which was "a tributary of China," and the Queen's party was restored to power under the protection of the Chinese forces. The stage was now set to suit Li Hung-chang, who advised the Korean Government to begin negotiations with Japan. When Min Yong Ik, the Presiding Minister, informed the Japanese Minister of his readiness to settle everything peacefully early on the 26th, Hanabusa was already aboard the ship but agreed to postpone his departure two days. The negotiations were then opened at Chemulpo late on the 28th and the Treaty was signed two days later.

By this Treaty of Chemulpo, the Korean Government promised to pay an indemnity of 600,000 yen; pledged to arrest and punish within twenty days the persons guilty of the late attack upon the Japanese Legation and, in case it

failed to do so within the stated time, empowered the Japanese Government to arrest and punish them by sending its own police force into Korea; assured that it would institute a funeral ceremony for the murdered Japanese officers; granted to the Japanese Government the right to station garrisons for the protection of its Legation at Seoul, which forces were to be withdrawn if nothing occurred within a year and the presence of such forces was deemed no longer necessary by the Japanese Minister; and promised to send a high commissioner to Japan with the King's letter of apology for the late disturbance. By an additional Convention, the travelling radius of the Japanese residing in the treaty ports was extended, an additional port of Yokwatin was opened, and the Japanese Minister and Consuls with their families and suites were given the right of travelling in the interior of Korea with passports, under the protection of escorts furnished by the local governors.

In October, 1882, the Korean Government sent Pak Yong Hio to Japan as High Commissioner in accordance with the Treaty stipulations. He and his party, including Kim Bam Sik and Su Kwang Bum, were received by the Tenno. Others, such as Kim Ok Kiun, Min Yang Whon, and Yi Fuk Kwun, also visited Japan and were received by the sovereign at a private audience. Eventually, these men became instrumental in strengthening the pro-Japanese party at the Korean Court.

The greatest result of the 1882 crisis, in the sense that it was destined to disturb the diplomatic relations in the Far East during the following decade, was the calling of the Chinese forces into Seoul. Under the circumstances, the Japanese Government insisted upon and gained, under the Treaty of Chemulpo, the right to station its garrison there also. Thus the Japanese and Chinese armies faced each other within the gates of the Korean capital, and the clash was bound to come.

THE *COUP D'ÉTAT* OF 1884

A wave of Europeanization was sweeping Japan. Lord Iwakura died in 1883, and Ito Hirobumi, who had just returned from Europe after studying the constitutional systems of leading countries there, and Inouye Kaoru became the central figures of political life in Tokyo. They became the vanguards of Westernization activities in Japan, and the study of German law, administration, and politics became a prevailing vogue.

It was in connection with such a zeal for Westernization that some of the leaders conceived an idea of assisting Korea to reform herself much as Japan had done. Count Goto and Fukuzawa Yukichi, the founder of Keio University, as well as Foreign Minister Inouye, favored the idea. The Yokohama Specie Bank placed at their disposal a large sum of money for the purpose of founding a political newspaper in Seoul, of training the Korean army, and of carrying out general reforms. The disciples of Goto and Fukuzawa going to Korea to further the cause of reforms found the Koreans helplessly confused.

The Queen's conservative and pro-Chinese party, led by Min Yong Ik and backed by China, was still supreme. The Reformists, grouping themselves around the Independents, were then led by Kim Ok Kiun and Pak Yong Hio and others who had visited Japan following the conclusion of the Chemulpo Treaty and who were profoundly impressed with the remarkable progress which Japan was making in her gigantic work of reform and reconstruction. They resented the prevailing misadministration and the domination of the Chinese, and aspired to achieve complete independence through Japanese aid. The Queen's party was naturally opposed to Japanese influence of any color. Therefore in the Reformists the Japanese found ready corroborators for their ideals, but they were deprived of important positions in the administration and their influence was too small to effect any great reforms. The Tai Won Kun was captive in China and his party was practically impotent.

Under such circumstances, China became the decisive factor in Korean politics. The Chinese influence was paramount as long as the Queen's party was supreme. The Chinese garrison at Seoul consisted of some 3,000 men as compared with 130 Japanese soldiers guarding the Legation; China supplied Korea with arms; Chinese officers, among them the famed Yuan Shih-kai, under instruction from Li Hung-chang, virtually dictated all measures to the Korean Government. China also provided Korea with financial assistance and sent P. G. von Möllendorff, a German, as a foreign adviser who would be to Korea what Sir Robert Hunt was to China. One method which Li Hung-chang used most effectively in bringing China and Korea into closer relationship was the transformation of the administration of the Korean maritime customs into a service subsidiary to the Chinese customs and the appointment of an inspector from the Chinese service as head of the Korean Customs Bureau. Moreover, two thousand Chinese merchants who were crowding into Seoul after China had obtained the right to open shops there, far outnumbered the handful of Japanese editors and pioneers. It was no wonder, therefore, that the Japanese one after another returned to Japan, disappointed, and the Japanese cause in Korea seemed to have lost ground.

Meanwhile, Minister Takezoye, who was on a visit to Tokyo, returned to Seoul in October, 1884, and began to press the Japanese cause vigorously. He was received in audience by the King on November 2, and made a formal announcement that the Tenno of Japan had decided to present to Korea 400,000 yen, the remainder of the 1882 indemnity, on condition that the money be used for the much-needed military reforms. He also pointed out the injustice of Chinese intervention in the internal affairs of Korea and of detaining the Tai Won Kun in China, and assured him that the Japanese Government was looking toward the day when the Korean Government would assert her real independence. Two days later, Takezoye requested the Korean Government to treat the Japanese subjects in Korea as being

on an equal footing with the Chinese, especially with regard to commercial privileges in Seoul, and this request was readily granted. At the same time, tension was growing between the Chinese and Japanese guards stationed within the walls of the capital.

While Takezoye was vigorously pushing the Japanese cause in Korea, France began an armed conflict with China and the Celestial Empire was in a helpless predicament. Consequently, the Chinese grip over Korea relaxed and the Reformists in Korea found this an opportunity to overthrow the Queen's party from power. Late in November, Kim Ok Kiun obtained an audience with the King and explained to him the danger which would befall Korea should Japan and China fight over the Korean question. He pointed out the arbitrary acts of the Chinese representatives in Korea, and the possible annexation of Korea to Japan should the latter defeat China in concert with France. The Queen who was listening behind the door now made her appearance and the royal pair asked Kim what could be done to avoid such a calamity. Kim, hesitant at first but persuaded by an earnest entreaty, finally disclosed his proposal to clear Korea of the principal leaders of the pro-Chinese party and to entrust the administrative power in the hands of the Reformist Independents, and received the royal sanction. The Queen, overpowered by the unimpeachable arguments, acquiesced in the proposal.

On the evening of December 4, the Korean Government gave a great banquet in celebration of the opening of the Seoul Post Office. Leading officials and foreign representatives were present in brilliant colors. When the feast was at its full swing, the Reformists, in accordance with a carefully prepared plan, carried out the revolutionary coup with precision. The banquet broke up in confusion and several principal pro-Chinese Ministers were assassinated. The King formally asked for Japanese help and immediately Japanese troops began to guard the royal palace. On the following day, the Reformists took over the helm of the Government. The King appointed Li Tai Gen, his nephew, the

Presiding Minister ; Pak Yong Hio, the Commander of the Guards ; Su Kwong Bum, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs ; and Kim Ok Kiun, the Vice-Minister of Finance. Several reform measures immediately followed, such as, among others, the declaration of real independence from China, equality of political rights between noble and common people, fiscal reforms, and the concentration of all financial affairs in the Finance Minister.

The Min's party, although their leaders were either injured or killed, now appealed to Yuan Shih-kai for help. On December 6, the Chinese troops attacked the royal palace. The Japanese guards, far outnumbered, could not cope with them and retreated to the Japanese Legation. The Chinese forces pursued them and attacked and burned the Legation for the second time, with many casualties. The Japanese Minister was once more forced to retire to Chemulpo, whence he reported the whole incident to Tokyo, while many Japanese subjects were massacred and Japanese properties damaged at various places. The remnants of the pro-Chinese party immediately returned to power, restored the old form of government, and severely punished the rebels. The King himself, seeing the failure of the coup, again took active part in suppressing the influence of the Reformists. Kim and Pak, completely defeated, quickly escaped and found refuge in Japan.

SETTLING THE 1884 INCIDENT

When the news of the outrage and the accompanying damages upon the Japanese lives and property reached Tokyo, public resentment was beyond control. The cry for war arose from every direction. The opinion of the Cabinet Ministers, however, was once more divided between peace and war, while France offered to cooperate with her should Japan declare war against Korea. Here was a supreme opportunity to crush China with the aid of France and to uphold the independence of Korea, but the issues were extremely complicated and delicate. It was the

King of Korea who had asked for Japanese protection, but it was the Chinese forces which had fired upon the royal palace and the Japanese forces guarding it; yet the King afterward went over to the Chinese side and allowed the burning of the Japanese Legation and the massacre of many Japanese subjects. Thus Japan had to settle with Korea as well as with China, and the Cabinet Ministers once more decided to follow peaceful negotiations instead of war.

Count Inouye was appointed Special Ambassador to Korea late in December and reached Seoul on January 3, 1885. He was backed by a small force and accompanied by Minister Takezoye, Lieutenant-General Takashima, and Rear-Admiral Kabayama. Already Wu Ta-cheng, the Chinese Commander, was in the Korean capital with his forces and Count Inouye had to keep the Japanese forces outside the city gate to avoid possible collision. Count Inouye was received in audience on January 8 and presented Japan's modest demands. On the following day, the Treaty of Seoul was signed, by which Korea conceded to Japan the following five points: (1) to send a special mission to Japan to express the official apology of the Korean Government; (2) to pay an indemnity of 110,000 yen for the Japanese lives lost or injured and properties destroyed; (3) to punish the murderer of Captain Isobayashi who was travelling in the interior at the time of the outrage; (4) to offer ground and to pay 20,000 yen for the rebuilding of the Japanese Legation; and (5) to rebuild the barracks for the Japanese guards. These promises were faithfully executed in due time and the issues with Korea were settled. The indemnity was rather small as compared with that of 1882, but Count Inouye was more anxious to free the name of the Japanese Minister from the possible implication with the *coup d'état* than to obtain indemnity.

There still remained a more delicate task of making China assume the full responsibility for the conduct of her forces in Korea. This difficult task was entrusted to Count Ito in February, 1885, and he proceeded to China, accompanied by Count Saigo Yorimichi. Upon arrival at Tien-

tsin, Count Ito was officially informed that Li Hung-chang was appointed to deal with him and that, therefore, it was not necessary for him to go to Peking. After a short visit to Peking, largely for the purpose of presenting his credentials and attending the funeral of Sir Harry Parkes, the negotiations were started at Tientsin on April 3, and after six conferences, the Treaty of Tientsin was signed on April 18, 1885.

The Treaty stipulated three important principles: (1) that both Japan and China should withdraw troops from Korea within four months from the date of the signing of the Treaty; (2) that whenever either party felt the necessity of dispatching troops to Korea, it must so inform the other party in writing; and (3) that both Japanese and Chinese officers should not take part in the training of the Korean army.

The Treaty was unmistakably a diplomatic victory for Japan, but such an agreement did not fundamentally solve the Korean question. From China's point of view, while she successfully evaded recognition of the complete independence of Korea, to withdraw her troops from Korea, which she regarded as her tributary, and to obligate herself to notify Japan whenever she decided to dispatch her troops to Korea in the future were tantamount to the recognition of the Korean independence and of Japan's position in Korea as being on an equal footing with herself. But China was then facing France in the south and Russia in the north, while her internal political situation was none too harmonious, and she had neither time nor resources to press Japan for a permanent solution of the Korean question especially as it might lead eventually to an unwelcome war. Thus China found the Tientsin Treaty rather inconvenient, and later made several vain attempts to annul it, but it was to remain in force until the Sino-Japanese War. Practically speaking, however, the Chinese influence in Korea still remained as strong as before under the clever leadership of Yuan Shih-kai and the principles enunciated in the Tientsin Treaty became dead letters as soon as they were signed.

RUSSIAN PENETRATION INTO KOREA

The Sino-Japanese entanglement around the 1884 affair afforded a splendid opportunity for Russian penetration into Korea. The first entering wedge was made through the instrumentality of P. G. von Möllendorff, and the Korean question assumed a triangular aspect. Since the days of Peter the Great, Russia devoted all her energies toward the realization of her traditional policy of securing an ice-free outlet to the sea. Her attempts on the Baltic Sea, on the Bosphorus Strait, and on the Persian Gulf were all futile in the face of Great Britain's determined opposition. Meanwhile, the Russian Bear had crossed the frozen steppes of Siberia and was looking across China to the sunny shores of the Pacific. Through the use of a policy of pacific penetration, the Northern Colossus had crossed the Chinese frontier at various points. By 1858 the Tzar's successful march to the sea resulted in the acquisition of the left bank of the Amur River and by 1860 annexed the Maritime Province facing the Japan Sea. Vladivostok was founded in July, 1860, but, to the disappointment of Russian expansionists, its harbor was frozen almost half of the year. Under the circumstances, it was only natural that Russia should have fixed her coveting glances next upon Manchuria and Korea.

It was at this opportune moment that von Möllendorff planned the reform of the Korean army. He first appealed to China late in 1884 to send her army officers to Korea for the purpose, but China ignored the appeal. Von Möllendorff then advised the Korean Government to approach the Russian Government. Waeber, the Russian Minister at Seoul, saw the supreme opportunity to expand Russian influence in the Far East suddenly unfolding itself, and pushed the plan of cooperating with von Möllendorff. Thus was reached an understanding between Russia and Korea in July, 1884, by which Russia agreed to send Russian officers to assist the reorganization and training of the Korean army, and Korea in return promised to Russia the free use of Port

Lazaref near Wansan Bay. The possession of this port would give Russia an ice-free naval base, her dream of a century.

This new development aroused Japanese and Chinese suspicions. To Japan, the Russian possession of Port Lazaref across the Japan Sea was an unbearable menace to Japan's security as well as to Korean independence, which she was championing against China. To China, the Russian advance was an unmistakable challenge to her claim of leadership in the Far East and her dominant position in Korea. To meet the new situation, Great Britain occupied Port Hamilton in April, 1885. China was now thoroughly aroused to the danger and, before the project reached its culmination, Li Hung-chang allowed the Tai Won Kun to return to Korea, to oppose the pro-Russian Min family, to persuade the King to reject such a dangerous understanding with Russia, and to dismiss von Möllendorff as adviser. Li was completely successful in his manoeuvre and the Russian project was dropped. Von Möllendorff was dismissed and replaced by Henry F. Merrill in October, 1885.

The dropping of the Russian project was merely temporary, however, for Russia had just commenced her Far Eastern adventures and she continued her plans for expansion. Thus Russia joined Japan and China to complicate the international rivalries in Korea, eventually resulting in two great wars.



GATHERING WAR CLOUDS

The decade following the Tientsin Treaty witnessed the increasing rivalry between Japan and China in Korea and the Japanese influence slowly declined in the face of masterful Chinese machinations. Yuan Shih-kai, strongly entrenched as Chinese Resident at Seoul, dominated all the other foreign representatives and freely interfered in all important affairs of the Korean Government.

Under the circumstances, the Japanese and Chinese interests clashed at every turn. One of the very first affairs

which brought the two countries into direct antagonism was the question of telegraphic communication with Korea. Under the Japanese-Korean secret Treaty of March, 1883, the Korean Government agreed to employ the submarine cable line between Nagasaki and Fusan exclusively for twenty years for all telegraphic communications between Seoul and abroad, and not to allow the establishment of any other direct communication by land with her neighboring countries. The cable was completed in 1884. But in July, 1885, Yuan Shih-kai succeeded in inducing the Korean Government to sign a Treaty by which China acquired the right to extend her Shanghai-Tientsin line through Wiju to Seoul and to control it for twenty-five years. As yet there was no telegraphic line between Seoul and Fusan and all telegraphic communications between Seoul and foreign countries came to be transmitted over the newly constructed Chinese line, in violation of the Japanese-Korean secret Treaty. Japan protested in vain. She then demanded the right to establish the Seoul-Fusan line in order to connect the Nagasaki-Fusan cable directly with Seoul. Korea refused the request on the pretext that she was planning to build it herself, and granted the right to China, who completed the line and operated it from 1888 until the Sino-Japanese War.

Another question which troubled the Japanese-Korean as well as the Sino-Japanese relations arose from the anti-rice laws of 1889. The governors of two provinces adjacent to China suddenly prohibited the export of rice to Japan under the pretext of a shortage of the crop although in reality there was an abundant harvest. The result was a tremendous loss to the Japanese rice merchants. The Japanese Government protested on the ground that it was a violation of the 1876 Treaty, and demanded an indemnity for the loss inflicted upon Japanese rice importers. In April, 1890, the anti-rice laws were withdrawn but the Government refused to pay an indemnity. For three years the negotiations dragged. In 1893, Oishi Masami was appointed Japanese Minister to the Seoul Court, and was given a free

hand in dealing with the Korean Government. Unable to see any progress in the negotiations, Oishi finally threatened to break off all diplomatic relations and succeeded in obtaining an indemnity of 110,000 yen instead of the 140,000 yen demanded. It was obvious that, behind the stubborn attitude of the Korean Government stood Yuan Shih-kai and the Chinese Government, which added further tension between Japan and China whose relations were none too friendly.

The third question which further estranged the Sino-Japanese relation related to the Japanese attitude toward Korean political criminals who sought refuge in Japan after their unsuccessful coup in 1884. One phase of this entanglement concerned the assassination of Kim Ok Kiun in which China's guiding hand was clearly seen. Kim, it will be remembered, championed the cause of Korean independence against Chinese dominance and advocated reforms in the internal affairs of the Korean Government and the friendly relations with Japan. After the unsuccessful coup of 1884, he escaped to Japan and there he awaited another opportunity to realize his dream. Finally he was enticed out of Japan to Shanghai by a Korean agent and assassinated. Not only did China refuse to punish the murderer, but helped to send the culprit and his victim's body to Seoul, where the former was rewarded and the latter was dismembered and ruthlessly displayed in a public place. Such an arbitrary conduct on the part of China once more inflamed Japanese public opinion, and the old agitation for war with Korea was now transformed into a cry for war against China in order to stop her interference in the internal affairs of Korea.

Japan's friendly and peaceful policy toward Korea, in recognizing her independence and in assisting her reforms, had received not cooperation but rebuffs from China, and the Sino-Japanese relations were steadily entering upon a critical stage. Thus in 1894, with a Sino-Japanese clash awaiting only a slightest provocation, the Tong Hak uprisings in Korea raised the curtain on the tragic drama of a Far Eastern war.

CHAPTER VI

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

THE Sino-Japanese relationship which had become strained over the Korean question was destined to reach its crisis and to explode into actual warfare. Between 1876 and 1894, Japan unhesitatingly championed the cause of Korean independence against China's persistent claim of suzerainty. The policies of the two neighbors on either side of the Hermit Kingdom were so diametrically opposed to each other that, by 1894, nothing was left but an armed contest. The Sino-Japanese War was the inevitable outcome of Japan's fundamental policy to safeguard her security against external aggression and against the Chinese menace through her control of the "dagger pointed at Japan's heart."

THE TONG HAK REBELLION

In 1885 Japan practically passed out of the picture in Korea. In her place, from 1885 until 1894, China became the dominant power at the Seoul Court and Yuan Shih-kai's powerful influence over Korea's foreign relations went unchallenged. By the spring of 1894, after ten years of intrigues and bickerings, the Sino-Japanese relationship in Korea was so strained that it only needed a spark to start a conflagration. That spark was supplied by the Tong Hak rebellion.

The Tong Hak Tong or the Society of Eastern Learning was founded by a Korean scholar in 1859. It was a reactionary body whose creed was based upon the tenets of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism, and whose aim was

to resist foreign influences, especially Christianity. Its leader was soon put to death as a heretic and his followers were persecuted. Nevertheless, the Tong Haks survived and gradually increased their influence as a politico-religious order, especially in voicing discontent with the maladministration and corruption, and in spreading the spirit of anti-foreignism. In March, 1893, the Tong Haks threatened Seoul, and American, Japanese, Chinese, British, and German warships hurriedly assembled at Chemulpo and prepared for any emergency, but the incipient revolt was nipped in the bud. A year later, the Tong Haks rose in rebellion once more, this time with a greater force, and successfully occupied several southern provinces. Late in March, they again threatened the capital and, during the following month, they succeeded in gathering added momentum by defeating the government forces. British, French, Japanese, and Chinese warships were again assembled at Chemulpo to meet the emergency.

China was waiting for just such an opportunity to intervene openly and to annex Korea. In May, Yuan Shih-kai had urged Li Hung-chang, the famed Viceroy of Chihli, to send over Chinese troops to aid the inefficient Korean army. Li, instead of acting upon Yuan's initiative, cleverly directed Yuan to manœuvre the whole situation in such a way as to induce Korea to ask for the Chinese military aid, thus creating the cause for the Chinese intervention. Yuan accordingly conspired with the Min family and had them secretly memorialize the King. The King, although at first learning that Chinese military intervention would result in similar action by the Japanese army, made a formal request on June 2, and China lost no time in dispatching her troops and warships to Korea. On June 7, China, in accordance with the terms of the Tientsin Convention, notified Japan that she had decided to send her troops "to restore the peace of our tributary state" through the latter's request and that they would be withdrawn as soon as peace was restored there. It appears that Li had no idea of the consequences of his action. In his eye Japan did not exist. In

fact, the average Chinese in 1894 was so certain of himself that he thought the Chinese mobilization would instantly darken the land of the Rising Sun. In this Li completely misunderstood the Japanese nation, and he moved swiftly but blindly toward certain disaster.

Meanwhile, Japan was cautiously following developments in Korea, especially the march of the Tong Haks and the Chinese intrigues. At home, there were two forces. One group insisted upon immediate intervention on behalf of the Seoul Government as it was impotent to suppress the rebellion; the other sympathized with the Tong Haks, who were revolting against maladministration and corruption, and proposed to aid the rebels. The Japanese Government, however, was carefully weighing the true significance of the rebellion, the attitude of the Seoul Court toward it, and the relations between the Korean and Chinese representatives. Suddenly the report that Korea had asked for the Chinese military aid reached Tokyo at the time when the Cabinet was facing a crisis in the internal political situation. Foreign Minister Viscount Mutsu attached grave importance to the news, and on June 1 at a Cabinet meeting, which was primarily called to dissolve the Diet, he presented the news and urged that, in case China decided to dispatch her troops to Korea, Japan should also send her military forces there in order to be ready for any emergency. The Cabinet council supported the Mutsu thesis and Premier Count Ito immediately obtained the Imperial sanction.

The Diet was dissolved on June 2 for its interference in the treaty revision, but Viscount Mutsu rushed all preparations to forestall the imminent danger. On June 5, Minister Otori Keisuke left Yokosuka aboard the *Yayeyama*, a warship, carrying extra forces of marines and with extraordinary emergency powers although he was to deal with everything as peacefully as possible. He reached Chemulpo four days later and resumed his post at Seoul on June 10 with some 300 marines. By June 16, some 3,500 Japanese troops were landed at Chemulpo. Meanwhile, Viscount Mutsu in-

structed Chargé Komura at Peking to inform the Chinese Government that Japan had sent an expeditionary force to Korea for the purpose of protecting Japanese lives and property, assuring its withdrawal upon the restoration of peaceful conditions.

In the Chinese communication of June 7, Viscount Mutsu discerned a justification for any complications that might accompany the Japanese action, and clarified the issue upon which the declaration of war became inevitable by replying: "I beg to declare that, although the words 'tributary state' appear in your note, the Imperial Government has never recognized Korea as a tributary state of China." China, on June 9, insisted that she was sending her troops "in protecting our tributary state" through request, and ventured to suggest that the Japanese troops sent without Korean request should not proceed to the interior of Korea. Chargé Komura, under instruction, reiterated on June 12 that "the Imperial Japanese Government has never recognized Korea as a tributary state of China," and stated that the Japanese troops had been dispatched "in virtue of the Chemulpo Convention" of 1882 and followed "the precedence laid down in the Treaty of Tientsin," but assured that "the Japanese Government is confident that they will not precipitate a collision with the Chinese forces" and hoped that "China has adopted similar precaution."

Thus dark clouds covered the Korean firmament and a storm was imminent. By the middle of June, there were assembled at Chemulpo almost thirty war vessels, representing Japan, China, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia and, with the presence of Japanese and Chinese troops face to face on the Korean soil, the situation became dangerous.

JAPAN'S BID FOR COOPERATION REBUFFED

In the meantime, the Cabinet, under the leadership of Premier Count Ito and Foreign Minister Viscount Mutsu, had formulated its policy: to suppress the rebels in Korea

through the cooperation of Japanese and Chinese forces; to organize, after the suppression of the revolt, a Sino-Japanese permanent commission in Korea charged with the duty of investigating the financial, administrative, and military affairs of the Korean Government for the purpose of projecting reform measures; to adjust the national finance and to issue bonds for the benefit of general national welfare; not to withdraw Japanese troops until the final outcome of the Korean situation became clear, irrespective of the Sino-Japanese negotiations; and to carry out the reform projects in Korea as outlined above single-handed if China refused the Japanese proposal.

Viscount Mutsu conveyed the first three proposals to Minister Wang at Tokyo on June 16, and instructed Chargé Komura at Peking to present the same to the Chinese Government. Minister Wang replied on June 21 that the Sino-Japanese cooperation was no longer necessary as the internal disturbances had already been suppressed (the truth of the matter was that the internal disturbances continued throughout 1894 and 1895), that Korea should carry out the reform measures herself, that Japan had no right to interfere with the same as "even China herself would not interfere with the internal administration of Korea," and that there was no room for the discussion of the withdrawal of troops as that question had been settled by the Tientsin Convention. Such response, considered in the light of China's persistent interference in the internal affairs of that wretched Kingdom, was merely a clever evasion of issues and could not convince the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. Therefore, in his reply on the following day, Viscount Mutsu expressed regret for his inability to share the hopeful views of China as to the prevailing situation in Korea; pointed out that the continued internal disturbances proved the impotence of the Korean Government; maintained that "the interests of Japan in Korea, arising from propinquity as well as commerce, are too important and far-reaching to allow her to view with indifference the deplorable condition of affairs" there; and concluded that Japan could not with-

draw her forces until some understanding had been established which would serve to guarantee future peace, order, and good government in Korea.

By June 22, then, the questions at issue became increasingly clear: "independence" and "reforms"—whether or not China would renounce her claim of suzerainty over Korea and would cooperate with Japan in carrying out reform measures in Korea. Being assured that China would not consent to either proposition, Viscount Mutsu threw off his passive attitude and launched a positive diplomacy. Minister Otori, under instruction, obtained an audience before the King on June 26 and requested, after explaining to him the need of radical reforms for the mutual welfare of the two nations, an appointment of a special commission to meet with him and to discuss the details of the reform projects. The Korean Government delayed setting up such a council, and Minister Otori on June 28 bluntly asked the Korean Foreign Office whether or not Korea was China's tributary state. This caused great consternation in the Seoul Court as a negative answer would offend China and an affirmative reply would arouse Japan, but Korea assured Japan that she was an independent state as recognized by the Kianghwa Treaty of 1876. Minister Otori then pressed for the appointment of a commission and when this finally assembled, he presented his program of reforms:

First, reform of the central and local governments; second, reconstruction of finances; third, development of national resources; fourth, codification of laws and reform of the judiciary; and fifth, establishment of a national educational system.

As for China, Japan by the end of the month saw the futility of Sino-Japanese negotiations and by July 3 she brought to a close her discussions, leaving to China the opportunity of making the next move.

In short, Japan was forced to take such strong measures for two reasons: (1) Korea's maladministration and corruption, causing continuous disturbances and revolts, and offering pretext for the Chinese intervention and control of the

country; and (2) China's haughty attitude in claiming Korea as her tributary state and thus endangering Japan's national existence. The Tientsin Convention of 1885 turned out to be totally ineffective in remedying such a situation.

ATTEMPTED FOREIGN MEDIATIONS

As the situation between Japan and China became more tense, the Seoul Court appealed to the foreign representatives to induce the "simultaneous withdrawal" of the Japanese and Chinese troops, and the representatives of the United States, Russia, France, and Great Britain, acting without instructions, addressed, on June 25, a joint note to the Japanese and Chinese representatives in which they submitted the Korean proposal and asked them to convey the same to their respective Governments. On the following day, Yuan Shih-kai cleverly replied that China could not withdraw her troops until Japan withdrew hers. Japan's position also remained unchanged.

On the same day the joint note was delivered, Russian Minister Hitrovo called upon Viscount Mutsu and informed him that Russia was asked by China to mediate the Sino-Japanese difficulties in Korea, and asked him if Japan would agree with China for the simultaneous withdrawal of her troops. It will be recalled that Russian ambition in the Far East dictated Russian sympathy with China. Already Count Cassini and Viceroy Li had been secretly conspiring at Tientsin, and Viscount Mutsu could not so easily be deceived. Mutsu, therefore, assured Hitrovo that Japan had no territorial ambition and would withdraw her troops when peace and order were restored and insured for the future, but added that Japan had lost her faith in China's promises and that, before the question of withdrawal was settled, China must either cooperate with Japan until reforms were completed in Korea or allow Japan a free hand in carrying out such measures. On June 30, Russia again informed Japan that internal disturbances in Korea were suppressed—this is an exact repetition of Wang's distorted assertion

of June 21—and that Japan should withdraw her troops or assume full responsibility for the consequences. Premier Count Ito and Foreign Minister Viscount Mutsu conferred at length, and the latter replied on July 2, refusing to recognize the situation as described in the Russian note and emphasizing that the exigency of the situation dictated the continued presence of Japanese troops in Korea. Two later Russian notes, on July 13 and again on July 21, were confined to the reservation of her right to intervene should Japan go beyond the specified realm of action and not to recognize any result which infringed upon treaty stipulations between Korea and Powers.

The Chinese Government also appealed to Great Britain, who regarded her position in China the most important in the Far East, and who was sympathetic with China's pretensions: Great Britain first tried to induce the United States to join her in a joint intervention. Both the British and Chinese Ministers at Washington called upon Secretary of State Gresham for that purpose, but the latter avoided being drawn into a joint intervention which would have been directed solely against Japan. The first project having thus failed, British Minister O'Connor at Peking used his influence upon the Chinese Premier to temporarily hold up Li's military preparations and offered to open negotiations with Japan through the British Minister at Tokyo. Accordingly, British Minister Basset informed Viscount Mutsu that China was willing to negotiate with Japan. Finally, through the good offices of O'Connor, the Tsungli Yamen and Chargé Komura conferred on July 9. But China showed no semblance of conciliation and again insisted upon the withdrawal of the Japanese troops before the initiation of negotiations. Komura was both surprised and disappointed, and left the conference. It was after this experience that the Japanese note of July 14 was presented to China. Great Britain made two more vain attempts at mediation. On the final attempt, on July 22, she proposed the Sino-Japanese joint occupation of Korea to Japanese Minister Aoki at London, saying that the proposal was acceptable to

China, but it was too late to save Sino-Japanese relations already wrecked beyond repairs.

THE DECLARATION OF WAR

The Japanese Government well knew that China was using the good offices of the Powers to settle the Sino-Japanese impasse of her own creation without conceding any of the points so important to Japan, namely, independence and reforms in Korea. When the negotiations were resumed, therefore, Japan found that there had been no change in China's attitude, and, in answer to the Chinese note of July 9, Chargé Komura delivered on July 14 a serious warning together with a résumé of the entire situation:

"The disturbances which are of frequent occurrence in Korea have their source in the derangement of internal administration of that country. Consequently, the Imperial Government believes it best to encourage the Korean Government to eradicate the cause of disturbance by introducing internal administrative reforms, and the Imperial Government considered that for the purpose of enabling Korea to accomplish the desired reforms, nothing would be better than that conjoint assurance be given to Korea. But to their surprise, the Imperial Chinese Government definitely rejected the proposal of Japan and limited themselves solely to a request for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Korea. Recently her Britannic Majesty's Minister to Peking, animated by friendship and good-will towards Japan and China, tendered his good offices and endeavored to reconcile the differences between the two countries, but the Imperial Chinese Government still continued solely to insist upon the retirement of the Japanese forces and manifested no disposition to acquiesce in the view of the Imperial Japanese Government. The only conclusion deducible from these circumstances is that the Chinese Government[¶] is disposed to precipitate complications; and in this juncture the Imperial Japanese Government find themselves relieved of all responsibility for any eventuality that may, in future, arise out of the situation."

And all negotiations were broken off once more.

Already on July 12 Viscount Mutsu had granted free-

dom of action in case of emergency to Minister Otori. Accordingly, the above clear warning to the Chinese Government was followed on July 19 by the presentation of the Japanese demands to the Korean Government. Japan asked: permission to lay an electric railway between Seoul and Fusan; immediate construction of the barracks for the Japanese troops as per the stipulations of the Treaty of 1882; expulsion of the Chinese troops from Asan; and abrogation of all the Sino-Korean treaties, commercial or otherwise, which conflicted with the sovereign rights of Korea. The reply, which was requested within three days, came, but it was vague and vacillating as ever. On the following day, Yuan Shih-kai left Seoul and returned to China. Japan was now convinced that drastic action was needed. Therefore, Japanese troops entered the capital on July 23, captured the palace, and restored the Tai Won Kun to his old position. He, in the name of the King, advised Minister Otori that the reform measures suggested by Japan would be carried out. Then followed the proclamations for political reforms and the punishment of the Min family, the announcement of the abrogation of the Sino-Korean treaties so far as China's claim of suzerainty was concerned, and a formal request to the Japanese for assistance in driving Chinese troops out of Asan.

While these negotiations were being carried on, military preparations were rapidly progressing on both sides. Commencing on July 21 and during the succeeding days, China dispatched eleven transports with some 10,000 troops from Tientsin. Upon hearing of this, Japan, in addition to some 15,000 troops already in Korea, sent out three cruisers from her naval base. The stage was thus ready for the Sino-Japanese clash. The spark was lit with the first naval encounter on July 25 off Asan when three Japanese cruisers encountered a Chinese light cruiser and a sloop and in the engagement that followed the sloop was disabled and the light cruiser barely escaped to Weihaiwei. This was followed, when the ship refused to surrender, by the capture and sinking of the *Kowshing*, a British merchant ship carry-

ing Chinese troops. On the same day, July 29, the Japanese troops in Korea marched on to Asan and decisively defeated the Chinese.

Diplomatic relations were broken off on July 31, and on August 1 the Imperial Rescript by the Mikado of Japan and the Imperial Decree by the Emperor of China were issued, declaring war between the two countries. Japan ascribed the cause of war to China's pretentious claim that Korea was her tributary state and to her equally pretentious endeavor to thwart necessary reforms in Korea. China charged Japan with the violation of treaties and international law, still maintaining her right of suzerainty over Korea. The Sino-Japanese War was thus fought in the cause of independence and reform against vassalage and conservatism.

PROBLEMS OF NEUTRALITY

When War was finally declared, Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway proclaimed neutrality, while Russia, France, and Austria-Hungary announced that they would observe neutrality without formally proclaiming it. The proclamation of neutrality by the Powers in this manner provided Japan with several annoying problems.

The British interests in China centered around Shanghai and on July 23, when the failure of British mediation became evident, Great Britain requested Japan not to spread the area of war to Shanghai. Viscount Mutsu was placed in a difficult position, as the neutrality of Shanghai could not be observed unless China also recognized it. But, as the British had tried on three separate occasions to prevent war by mediation, Mutsu accepted the request unconditionally, hoping thereby to express Japan's goodwill toward Great Britain. This action became the target of criticism, especially from the Japanese military leaders, because China was herself using Shanghai for military purposes, especially in the manufacture and importation of munitions. Mutsu in vain appealed to Great Britain to cause China to observe

the same rules of neutrality. However, it was only after a series of Japanese victories both on land and sea that Great Britain began to consider the Japanese protest sympathetically. By October, 1894, therefore, the question was a thing of the past.

Another question which involved Great Britain and Japan was the sinking of the *Kowshing*, a British transport. It will be recalled that the *Kowshing*, flying the British colors but transporting Chinese troops and contraband of war, was captured by the Japanese on July 25. The captain accepted the Japanese command to surrender, but the Chinese troops aboard the ship refused to obey and the ship was sunk in accordance with the rule of war. The incident naturally aroused the British public and Viscount Mutsu promptly promised to pay an indemnity should the investigation prove the illegality of the Japanese action. Fortunately, the captain was among the few who had been saved, and he made it known, in a signed statement, that the *Kowshing* was under contract with the Chinese Government to transport troops and contraband of war and was to be turned over to China in case of a declaration of war. This settled the question in favor of Japan although the ship had sailed before war was declared.

The problem of protecting Japanese residents in China provided Japan with another delicate question. As soon as the rupture of diplomatic relations became evident, both Japan and China each took steps to secure the good offices of the United States, for the protection of Japanese in China and Chinese in Japan, which task was approved by the State Department and willingly undertaken by the American representatives in both countries. In Japan, the Imperial Ordinance of August 4 proclaimed that all Chinese residents in Japan would be allowed to remain in Japan under condition of registration, and so the exercise of these friendly offices caused very little difficulty to the American government. In fact, there was no instance where the American officials were called upon to intervene in protecting Chinese subjects. On the other hand, this did cause considerable trouble

to the American officials in China. The cases which arose most frequently related to the capture of alleged Japanese spies, and the reasons for the difficulty were obvious. The State Department correctly insisted upon the strict application of the principles of international law, irrespective of the peculiar conditions which prevailed in China, and the American officials in China, possessing no confidence in the cruel barbarities of the Chinese criminal procedure, required strict enforcement of extraterritorial rights. Some conspicuous examples which caused difficulties were the "Tangku outrage," in which the removal of Japanese passengers, including the family of a diplomatic official, from the British ship *Chungking* at Tangku was accompanied by arrest, robbery, and unnecessary assault. A second incidence was the proclamation of the Governor of Formosa and the Director of the Kiangnan Arsenal at Shanghai, offering rewards for sinking Japanese ships and taking Japanese heads. Finally the *cas célèbre* concerning two Japanese in Chinese dress, who were arrested in the French concession at Shanghai and turned over to the Chinese authorities in spite of American Minister Denby's protests and the opposition of the French representatives, and who were decapitated at Nanking without impartial trial, thus involving the question of the neutrality of the French Settlement in Shanghai. There were also several other important cases.

Questions involving contraband of war also required the good offices of the American officials during the early stages of the War. This question was first raised when the *Tankio-Maru* was captured by the Chinese at Taku on August 5. The vessel had left Japan before the declaration of war, laden with railway materials for the Chinese Government Railway, hypothecated to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, a British firm, for about 12,000 taels. China consented to allow it to discharge the cargo and to depart, but she demanded that Japan would refrain from molesting Chinese merchant vessels. Viscount Mutsu agreed to the mutual exception of private ships from cap-

ture "except ships engaged in carrying troops" or "other contraband of war or attempting to break blockades." China accepted the proposal but requested the definition of the term "contraband of war." Mutsu declined "to define in advance the articles which will be regarded as contraband of war, since the circumstances of each case must determine what constitutes a contraband." China then agreed to the exemption without a definition but she could not consent to admit Japanese vessels to Chinese ports as that part of the Imperial Decree which prohibited it could not be revoked. Japan then withdrew from the negotiations as the Chinese reply left no hope for a satisfactory arrangement. The *Tankio-Maru*, around which the question arose, was finally permitted to return to Japan without harm or damage.

CHINA MOVES FOR PEACE

The progress of the War was rapid and decisive. After the first naval engagement and the sinking of the *Kowshing* on July 25, the Japanese forces defeated the Chinese at Asan on July 29 and drove them northward. On September 16, the Japanese scored a decisive victory at Pinyang and by the end of the month the Chinese were completely expelled from Korea across the Yalu River. On September 17, the Japanese navy crushed the Chinese fleet in the decisive battle of the Yellow Sea and thus won the mastery of the sea. Japan's first force crossed the Yalu River on October 24 and marched into Manchuria by land, while the second force landed at Pitzewo on the same day, capturing Talienwan (Dairen) on November 6 and Port Arthur on November 21. The third force landed at Yungcheng Bay in Shantung on January 20 and Weihaiwei surrendered to the combined attack from land and sea forces on February 12. Meanwhile, the Japanese forces were united on the Manchurian front, capturing Liaoyang on March 4 and Yingkow on March 7 and crossing the Liao River two days later. Now there was no obstacle between the victorious Japanese forces and

the Shanhaikwan pass, and their next objectives, Tientsin and Peking.

Before the battle of Pinyang was fought, Japan, on August 20, had concluded a Convention with Korea. Korea agreed to institute internal reforms and to open a southern port for commerce; Japan obtained the right to lay the Fusan-Seoul and Seoul-Chemulpo railways; and the two countries agreed to name a commission to further the cause of Korean independence. Six days later, a Treaty of Alliance was concluded. Count Inouye now replaced Otori Keisuke as Japanese Minister to the Seoul Court.

The turn of the war tide was as surprising to China as it was to the Powers. Before the fighting was very far advanced, therefore, Li Hung-chang asked Great Britain to institute a plea for intervention. Great Britain first approached the United States early in October and inquired whether she would be willing to join with Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and France in intervening between Japan and China on the basis of guaranteeing the independence of Korea and procuring a war indemnity for Japan. United States Minister Denby was outspokenly against such a forced termination of hostility and the State Department refused to join. Great Britain in the middle of October then approached Japan as to her willingness to accept British mediation on a similar basis. The Japanese reply on October 25 was a courteous rejection, pointing out that the War had not made sufficient progress "to insure a satisfactory result of negotiations" and that it was premature to suggest peace terms. The first move for British mediation thus failed.

How desperately China was trying to entice the Powers into intervention, thereby avoiding further disaster from Japanese arms, can be seen from the procedure which she then adopted. First of all, China asked United States Minister Denby on October 31 for American mediation on her behalf. Before Denby wired the request to Washington, however, China also turned to the Ministers of the five Great Powers—the United States, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and France—on November 3, and asked them to intervene.

The basis of negotiations remained unchanged except that the amount of indemnity was to be decided upon conjointly by the Powers friendly to China. The foreign representatives agreed to forward the proposal to their home Governments recommending mediation.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Minister at Washington was also busy and, in response to his repeated requests, Secretary of State Gresham had already offered the President's good offices to both Japan and China before any news of the Chinese appeal reached Washington. When Denby's wire concerning the proposal for a joint mediation was received, therefore, Secretary Gresham replied that the American Government preferred to act alone, although it was not unwilling to act conjointly, if Japan agreed, in determining the indemnity question. China, evidently undecided, determined to await the answers of the four European Powers.

In Japan, United States Minister Edwin Dun called upon Foreign Minister Mutsu on November 6 and presented Gresham's friendly message, pointing out the probability of European intervention against Japanese interests and offering the President's good offices for peace should Japan so desire. Mutsu was aware that the United States was the nation to whom such a task could be entrusted, but at the same time he was convinced that the first move for peace must come from China. The Cabinet council discussed the American offer on November 16, and, on the following day, Mutsu announced that Japan would welcome any direct proposal for peace made by China through the American Legation at Peking, but claimed that Japan as the victorious nation did not see the necessity of suing for peace. Also that while Japan has no desire to press her "victories beyond the limits which will guarantee to them the just and reasonable fruits of the war," she would not stop "until China finds herself in a position to approach Japan directly on the subject of peace."

Here entered another strange interlude. Before the Chinese Government had acted upon the American offer, Li Hung-chang, on November 18, dispatched Detring, a

German subject who was serving China as Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin, to Japan to effect a settlement. Detring reached Kobe eight days later, but Premier Count Ito refused even to receive him on the ground that he was not properly accredited by the Peking Government. Li's unofficial representative left Japan empty-handed three days later.

China eventually accepted the American offer and forwarded to Viscount Mutsu the Chinese terms for peace which consisted of the recognition of the independence of Korea and the payment of "reasonable war indemnity." Viscount Mutsu replied on November 25 that the Chinese terms could not be accepted "as a basis for peace," that Japan doubted China's sincerity, but that if China was "really solicitous" for peace, Japan was willing to announce her peace terms at a conference of duly appointed representatives. China still wanted to receive the Japanese terms before appointing her representatives, but Mutsu reaffirmed that it was China, not Japan, who was suing for peace and that Japan would present her terms only upon the meeting of the "Plenipotentiaries appointed from among properly qualified high officials." After a delay of eight days, China consented to appoint her representatives "with full power" and proposed Shanghai as the place of such a conference. Tokyo readily agreed on December 18 to appoint Japanese representatives, but insisted that China must inform Japan of "the name and rank of her Plenipotentiary" and that the place of the conference must be in Japan. Two days later, China notified Japan of the appointment, as Li had refused, of Chang Yin-huan and Shao Yu-lien as "Plenipotentiaries with full powers," suggested Nagasaki as the meeting place, and proposed an armistice on the day the Japanese envoys were appointed. Six days later, Japan consented to follow suit but named Hiroshima as the meeting place and suggested that the question of armistice should be dealt with after the meeting of the conference. These fundamental ideas having been agreed upon, minor difficulties were ironed out and necessary details were accordingly

arranged. The Chinese party, upon reaching Kobe, were joined by W. Foster, a former American Secretary of State, as China's adviser.

THE HIROSHIMA CONFERENCE

There was no difficulty in selecting the Japanese representatives to the Hiroshima Conference. Premier Count Ito Hirobumi and Foreign Minister Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu were naturally the best persons upon whom Japan could entrust the important task of peace-making. But public opinion differed widely as to Japan's peace terms. Count Matsukata, the Minister of Finance, suggested an indemnity of one billion taels; Aoki Shuzo, back from England, proposed the acquisition of a few provinces in Manchuria and an indemnity of one billion pound sterling; Nishi Tokujiro, a former Japanese Minister to Russia, feared Russian intervention should Japan acquire the Liaotung Peninsula or any territory adjoining Korea, and advised an indemnity as large as possible. Some, of course, insisted upon the acquisition of Formosa. On the whole, it was urged that Japan, as victor, should be uncompromising.

Premier Count Ito and Foreign Minister Mutsu considered the question seriously and sifted out from these demands a choice of two alternative stands: first, that Japan should secure the approval of the Powers for its peace terms in order to forestall all future difficulties and misunderstandings; or that Japan, fearing unnecessary foreign intervention, should keep her terms in complete secrecy until China should reveal a sincere desire for peace. Mutsu favored the former policy while Ito upheld the latter view. The Cabinet finally accepted the Ito plan, largely to avoid Western criticism and intervention before the beginning of actual negotiations with China.

As to Japan's peace terms, a conference before the Throne, which was held at the Imperial Field Headquarters at Hiroshima on January 27, had outlined the four major issues of the approaching Peace Conference as (1) the recog-

dition by China of Korean independence, (2) the cession of territory as well as the payment of an indemnity, (3) the elevation of the future Sino-Japanese relations to the level of equality with the Western Powers, and (4) the concession of further commercial privileges such as the right of river navigation and the opening of new ports. It was in that historic Conference that the Premier referred to the possible intervention of the Western Powers and empowered the Japanese envoys to deal with it according to circumstances if such intervention should become an actuality.

The first interview between the Japanese and Chinese representatives was held at Hiroshima on February 1, 1895. When credentials were exchanged, it was revealed that Chang and Shao did not possess the full powers requested by the Japanese Government, and Count Ito refused to deal with them. United States Minister Denby had provided the Chinese Government with a proper form of credentials but the Tsungli Yamen had substituted another form of their own preparation. The verbal and written statements of the Chinese representatives did not in the least improve the situation as long as their credentials remained faulty and they were compelled to retire from Hiroshima to Nagasaki on February 4. As soon as this tragic situation became known at Peking, Colonel Denby and four members of the Tsungli Yamen had a heated discussion at the United States Legation, in the course of which the Chinese offered all sorts of excuses for their breach of faith. It was after that interview that Denby characterized the Chinese as hopeless: "It is possible to guard against stupidity, but when stupidity is allied with bad faith it is impossible to prove safeguards." What he added was prophetic and true: "It is impossible to say with certainty today that China wants peace. She still has an idea that the foreign powers will intervene to save her from ruin—an idea to which some force has been given by the frantic and foolish conduct of people who ought to have known her better. If China knew today that the world would stand aside and let her fight her own battle she would instantly make peace."

While the Chinese representatives were still at Nagasaki, the Chinese Government made a frantic attempt to reinstate them with proper credentials. The Japanese Government, however, stood firm in maintaining that the Chinese representatives "must return to China at once," but that Japan would reopen peace negotiations at any time if China "should sincerely desire peace and send a Plenipotentiary or Plenipotentiaries of high rank and prestige and clothed with proper full powers" to negotiate, conclude, and sign a treaty of peace. The Chinese envoys followed the only road open and sailed for home on February 12. It is now clearly known that China at the time had not fully determined to make peace and that the sending of Chang and Shao was merely a pretence to unearth Japanese terms, still clinging to the hope of foreign intervention and cleverly trying to put Japan in the wrong before foreign eyes. Thus ended ignominiously the first page of China's effort to bluff Japan at a peace conference.

The unexpected disruption of the Hiroshima Conference naturally aroused Western apprehensions. The Powers were aware that China's procedure often departed from the traditions of international law, but, at the same time, they unjustifiably suspected some ambitious scheme on the part of the Japanese. Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia thus took steps to advise Japan that she should adopt a more lenient attitude toward China, limit her demands according to China's ability to meet them, and strive for the restoration of peace. It was at this time that the *London Times* printed the famous prophetic correspondence by Bromwitz, its Paris correspondent, that Russia in alliance with such Powers as France and England would intervene in the Sino-Japanese affairs, but that it would be done when China admitted her defeat and sincerely asked for peace, and that the European Powers would not allow Japan to acquire an inch of Chinese territory in Asia. This proved to be a true prophecy of the Triple Intervention.

THE SHIMONOSEKI PEACE CONFERENCE

In the face of such an international current of thought and suspicion, Viscount Mutsu prevailed upon Count Ito to revert to his original policy of making Japan's peace terms known to China and the Powers, thereby offsetting Western suspicion of Japan's alleged ambition to continue war and also affording China the opportunity of preparing for the peace conference. On February 17, still continuing negotiations through the good offices of the United States Legations, Viscount Mutsu advised the Chinese Government that the dispatch of another peace mission to Japan would be wholly useless unless the Chinese envoys came prepared to negotiate under full powers, not only "the payment of a war indemnity and the admission of the complete independence of Korea" but also "the cession of territory as a consequence of war and an agreement to conclude definite treaties for the regulations of future intercourse." He added that there were other questions of lesser importance which required adjustment, but that "the Japanese Government reserve to themselves any additional demands which may in their judgment be either necessary or desirable."

At Peking, the Chinese leaders were in confusion when their scheme failed of realization. However, with the victorious Japanese forces continuing their progress and the fall of Tientsin becoming imminent, they at last realized the seriousness of the situation and soon reached a decision. Li Hung-chang, whose honors had been taken from him long before, was persuaded to accept the unwelcome mission and was appointed China's sole envoy, his honors — peacock feather, yellow riding jacket, and button — being restored to him. But full powers to negotiate peace were not granted to him until after Li had canvassed the Foreign Legations and China became convinced that the Powers, especially Russia, France, and Great Britain would in no event intervene until the alleged Japanese designs were fully developed, and not even then unless their respective interests were imperiled. Colonel Denby wired the news to

Washington on February 16 but the Japanese note of February 17 reached them before he had transmitted the Chinese decision to Tokyo. Then, on February 19, Li's appointment was officially communicated to the Japanese Government.

It should be added, as illustrative of the peculiar Chinese attitude, that the Chinese Emperor had sent personal telegrams to the principal European rulers, about March 4, asking them "to devise means of earnestly persuading Japan to be just in her negotiations for peace." It should also be noted that the Powers, aside from the question of territorial demand, were secretly hoping that Japan would secure extensive commercial privileges, such as the elimination of burdensome taxes, opening of additional ports, and rights to establish banks and railways, because they, under the most-favored-nation clause, would also enjoy these privileges.

This time, Japan was extremely cautious and, in order to avoid another failure, Viscount Mutsu requested "the wording of full powers to be given to Li Hung-chang" be transmitted in official English translation to the Japanese Government. This was done and Tokyo accepted it with minor amendments. Moreover, Tokyo named Shimonoseki as the new seat of the proposed peace parley.

All preparations having been thus completed, Viceroy Li left Peking on March 5 and sailed from Taku ten days later with a retinue of about one hundred and thirty-five persons, including two American advisers, Foster and Pethick. They arrived at Shimonoseki on March 19. Premier Count Ito continued to head the Japanese delegation, in which Viscount Mutsu and Henry W. Dennison, an American adviser, were conspicuous, and the meeting of the historic Shimonoseki Conference was scheduled for March 20.

On the date appointed, Count Ito Hirobumi and Viceroy Li Hung-chang met at Shimonoseki and exchanged credentials. Li immediately presented a plan for an armistice before proceeding upon the peace negotiations. On the following day, Ito proposed a counter-plan for a conditional armistice: that Japan should occupy Shanhaikwan, Taku,

and Tientsin; that the Chinese troops at those places should be disarmed and their weapons turned over to the Japanese authorities; that the management of the railway between Tientsin and Shanhaikwan should be transferred to Japan; and that China should defray expenses incurred under the armistice arrangement. Li characterized the proposed terms as too severe and pleaded for moderation. Ito requested that the Chinese present a proposal which might be reviewed and refused to proceed with the peace negotiations until the armistice proposal was either settled or withdrawn. On March 24, Li communicated China's refusal to accept Japan's proposal and withdrew his request for an armistice. The peace negotiations were to start on the following day.

An unexpected incident temporarily marred the negotiations at this point. As Li returned to his hotel after the conference on March 24, a bullet from an assassin's gun injured the aged statesman. Expressions of regret were immediately offered and the Mikado sent his personal representatives, including the best army surgeons, to meet the emergency. Sympathy of the whole nation was now focused upon Li, who, fortunately, steadily improved. So great was the sorrow and the distress of the nation, from the Mikado to the humblest, that Premier Count Ito and Foreign Minister Viscount Mutsu decided, as an expression of Japan's profound sympathy, to propose an unconditional armistice, which was proclaimed late on March 27 and signed three days later.

Through Li's earnest request, however, the Conference was continued. On recommendation of the Japanese Government, full powers were conferred upon Li Ching-fong, the Viceroy's adopted son, and the peace negotiations were instituted. On April 1, Count Ito presented the Japanese peace terms, the main points of which were: recognition by China of the complete independence of Korea; cession to Japan of the Liaotung Peninsula and Formosa with its adjoining islands, including the Pescadores; payment of an indemnity of 300,000,000 taels in five-year instalments; conclusion of a new Sino-Japanese treaty on the basis of equal-

ity with Western Powers and application of the most-favored-nation clause until the conclusion of the said treaty; extension of commercial privileges, such as opening of five additional specified ports, granting of the right of river navigation to Japanese vessels between stated cities on the Yangtse, waving of internal levies upon Japanese goods paying required import duties, granting of the right to lease storage premises for export and import goods without duties, payment of duties in either Chinese or Japanese currency, freedom of industrial activities in China, and removal of sand bars at the mouth of the Hoang-ho; and Japanese occupation of Mukden and Weihaiwei as security for China's faithful observance of the peace terms.

Four days later, Li presented China's amendments to the Japanese terms. The recognition of the Korean independence was accepted with the understanding that Japan mutually agreed. The cession of territories was protested on the ground that it would provide a cause for future difficulties, that the Liaotung Peninsula was a part of Mukden Province which was the home of the Ching or Manchu dynasty, that the construction by Japan of military and naval bases therein would constitute a strong menace to Peking, and that it ignored the interests of the Powers. As to the payment of an indemnity, China claimed that she could not bear the burden of such a large sum. On April 6, Ito rejected the Chinese amendments and three days later Li came forward with a few concessions, the main points of which were the cession of a portion of the Liaotung Peninsula and the Pescadores but not Formosa, and the reduction of indemnity to 100,000,000 taels. China also proposed arbitration by a friendly nation for the settlement of future difficulties. After two sessions, Ito agreed to the reduction of indemnity to 200,000,000 taels, to the limitation of the Liaotung Peninsula, and withdrew some of the commercial proposals. After more interviews the Peace Conference almost reached an impasse but a spirit of conciliation saved the day and the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 17.

The terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki thus conclud-

ed generally followed Japan's original proposals with some amendments: (1) China recognized the full and complete independence of Korea, as Japan had done in 1876; (2) China ceded to Japan Formosa and the Pescadores and the Liaotung Peninsula south of the Liao River and a line from the junction of the Anping and Yalu Rivers, by Fenghwangcheng and Haicheng, to Yingkow; (3) China agreed to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels within seven years, with interests at five per cent, and to allow Japan to occupy Weihaiwei as its security; (4) China consented to open Shasi, Chungking, Soochow, and Hanchow for Japanese trade and residence, and a certain specified distance on the Yangtse for Japanese navigation, which privileges the Powers also enjoyed on the basis of the most-favored-nation clause; (5) China granted to the Japanese subjects the freedom of industrial activities in all of her treaty ports and the principle of extraterritorial rights; and (6) China promised to conclude a new commercial treaty and granted to Japanese subjects in China the enjoyment of the privileges of the most-favored-nation clause until then. Both countries agreed to a twenty-one day extension of the armistice, and the exchange of ratification of the Treaty was scheduled for May 8, the date of the expiration of the armistice.

In short, the Sino-Japanese War gave Japan everything for which she had contended, especially the independence of Korea as against Chinese claim of suzerainty and the recognition of Japan on the basis of equality with the Powers. It was Japan's first challenge to the Powers and her first bid for world recognition. However, it fell short of settling the question of internal reforms in Korea and another war was to be fought ten years later.

THE TRIPLE INTERVENTION

There was joy in the heart of every Japanese and jubilant spirits rose high as one Japanese victory followed another, and this happiness reached its height with the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. But it did not last.

Lo, a thunderbolt from the blue and the major fruit of Japanese victory quickly vanished into the thin air!

Even after the meeting of the Shimonoseki Conference, China still labored under the hallucination of foreign intervention and took every opportunity to suggest such action. As soon as Viceroy Li had wired the Japanese terms for an armistice, the Tsungli Yamen turned to the foreign representatives for advice, but China at that time received no encouragement. When the Japanese peace terms became known, the Tsungli Yamen made another round of the Legations, especially hoping that Great Britain, Russia, and France would interpose objections and intervene on China's behalf. China little realized that European intervention under such circumstances would result in further tightening of their grip over her, which in turn would hasten her own dismemberment for the benefit of the Powers.

Here entered Russia with a master play. At first she appeared to be sympathetic toward Japan. About March 1, Russian Minister Hitrovo informed Viscount Mutsu that if Japan would guarantee to Russia the independence of Korea in fact as well as in name, the Russian Government would not object to the Japanese occupation of any part of China's territory. When Japan's armistice terms became known and China approached the Powers for advice, Russia whom China was assiduously courting refused to give any assurance of intervention. Again, when Japan's peace terms were communicated to Russia on April 6, Russia raised no objection. All the while it is now well known that Russia was secretly conspiring with China. Russia was evidently waiting for the psychological moment when China's cession of the Liaotung Peninsula was beyond doubt, and Japan was completely unprepared to resist Russian intervention.

It was with such a background that Russia at last, on April 8, proposed to the great European Powers a formula for intervention. "The annexation of Port Arthur by Japan," said the Russian formula, "would be a lasting hindrance to the reestablishment of good relations between China and Japan, and a perpetual menace to the peace of Eastern Asia."

Great Britain refused to consider such a procedure and Russia, on April 17, the day when the Treaty of Shimono-seki was signed, approached Germany and France. It is now known that the Dreibund was in the course of formation from the middle of February for just such a purpose. The Three Powers were now openly united to offer "friendly advice" to Japan. A week later, on April 23, the Ministers of the Dreibund in turn visited the Foreign Office at Tokyo and presented memoranda, all advising Japan to restore the Liaotung Peninsula to China. The Russian memorandum maintained that the Japanese possession of the territory in question would menace Peking, render Korean independence an illusory phrase, and obstruct the permanent peace of the Far East, and advised Japan "as an expression of sincere friendship" to give it up. Behind that "friendly advice" was a Russian fleet of over thirty vessels, ready to go into action within twenty-four hours! The other two memoranda were similar in tone.

There was consternation in Japan. Although Ito and Mutsu both had expected the possibility of such a move, they were completely swept off their feet when they faced it in reality. A series of grave conferences were immediately instituted. The first was the conference before the Throne, held at Hiroshima on April 24. Premier Count Ito outlined the three possible roads which were then open for Japan to follow: to reject the advice even at the risk of creating new enemies thereby; to refer the question to an international conference; or to accept the advice and return the territory in question to China as a matter of favor. Forcible resistance was beyond question as Japan was already exhausted by one war, while unconditional submission was too humiliating and liable to cause internal dissention. The conference therefore favored submitting the whole question to a congress of Great Powers. Ito then hurried to Maiko, where Mutsu was recuperating from an illness, and, Matsuoka and Nomura joining them from Kyoto, the Maiko Conference was held on the following day. Mutsu vehemently opposed the decision of the Hiroshima Conference as he

feared that such a conference might, instead of merely concerning itself with the question of the Liaotung Peninsula, reopen the whole series of questions covered by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Maiko Conference thus adopted "concession to the Three Powers but non-concession to China" as the fundamental principle of negotiations. Nomura hurried to Hiroshima and obtained the Imperial sanction.

Viscount Mutsu now instructed the Japanese Ministers at the capitals of the leading Powers to feel out the attitude of the Powers on the question. In his instruction to Nishi at St. Petersburg, Mutsu proposed to guarantee the Russian interests and Korean independence; he asked Kato at London to ascertain how far Great Britain would help Japan in meeting the situation; he ordered Kurino at Washington to suggest that the United States urge Russia to reconsider her intervention and induce China to ratify the Shimonoseki Treaty. Nishi reported the immovable determination of Russia; Kato cabled back that Great Britain intended to maintain strict neutrality, although her attitude was very friendly toward Japan; Kurino replied that the United States would cooperate with Japan within the limits of neutrality and instruct the United States Minister at Peking to urge China to immediately ratify the Treaty. Italy alone had expressed her desire to join Great Britain and the United States in opposing the Dreibund. Yet such a possibility was doomed from the very beginning due to the determined British passive attitude. Japan was helpless.

When Tokyo realized the cold facts that Japan could expect neither leniency from the Dreibund nor any sympathetic interposition from the other Powers, Viscount Mutsu proposed to Russia on April 30 that Japan, in order to save her national honor and dignity, would, in an additional convention after the ratifications of the Shimonoseki Treaty had been exchanged, renounce the Liaotung Peninsula and demand in return an additional indemnity from China and that she would occupy the said territory as a security for the faithful fulfilment of the terms of the Shimonoseki Treaty. Similar messages were also sent to Germany and

France. Russia of course rejected the Japanese proposal, while simultaneous negotiations with Germany and France were also fruitless. Thus losing all hopes of a favorable settlement, Japan smiled the prettiest smile in history and acceded to the "friendly advice" of the Dreibund on May 5.

Since she had fixed her eyes on the Far East for an ice-free outlet to the sea, Russia was steadily advancing upon China and Korea. In the midst of her dreams, the Sino-Japanese War had furnished her with the supreme opportunity of ages to take the initial step in realizing that ambition. China had completely revealed her weakness, and Manchuria with its superb naval base at Port Arthur and promising commercial port at Dalienwan (Dairen) now lay within easy grasp. How could Russia stand by when the Liaotung Peninsula was about to pass from China to Japan? The Russian intervention was a natural step in continuing her traditional policy. But in taking this momentous step, Russia misunderstood the Japanese nation and little dreamed that she was heading toward a humiliating defeat at their hands ten years later.

France became Russia's ally in August, 1891, and it was a foregone conclusion that she would assist Russia. "Being in the honeymoon period of the Alliance, France was hardly in a position to restrain her other half by show of authority."

But Germany occupied a difficult position. It was the Kaiser's master strategy to keep Russia busily engaged in the Far East and thus to avoid any direct collision with her in Europe. Yet she also sought her "place in the sun" in the Far East and she found it to her best interest to keep a close check upon the growing intimacy of Russia and France. In short, Germany was trying to kill two birds with one stone by joining the Dreibund. It was therefore but the bitter irony of history that, twenty years later, Germany herself was to taste the sour fruits of defeat at the hand of Japan and to make an unexpected and unwilling exit from the Far East.

AFTERMATH OF TRIPLE INTERVENTION

The Japanese Government promptly ratified the Shimonoseki Treaty but the Chinese Government delayed its action as usual. The Triple Intervention, of course, complicated the matter and gave China an added hope that armed intervention would eventually follow. Meanwhile, Japan had decided to accede to the advice of the Dreibund but she insisted that China should ratify the Treaty as signed and that the restoration of the Liaotung Peninsula should be effected by a separate convention.

China was still hopeful of eventual armed intervention and on May 1 asked, still negotiating through the good offices of the United States Legations, for a delay in the ratification of the Treaty. The Japanese reply on May 3 saw no reason for such a delay and pointed out that the exchange of ratifications on the appointed date was "absolutely essential in order to bring about the restoration of peace" and added that, in case any modification in the Treaty was necessary due to the Triple Intervention, the changes could be arranged after the exchange of ratifications. It also advised that Ito Miyoji was already on his way to Chefoo to effect the exchange of ratifications. Japan's envoy had left Tokyo on May 2, and the representatives of the two countries were in Chefoo by May 7.

At this last moment, however, China again asked for a delay under the advice of the Dreibund and maintained that possible modifications relating to the Liaotung Peninsula could be effected more easily before the ratifications of the Treaty. On the following day, Japan replied, insisting upon the immediate ratification and the postponement of the necessary modifications to subsequent adjustment, and voluntarily extended the armistice five days. On the evening of March 7, the Dreibund advised the Tsungli Yamen that they were satisfied with the Japanese promise to restore the Liaotung Peninsula to China provided the Treaty was properly ratified and exchanged, and instructed them to effect the ratifications immediately under the penalty of the

withdrawal of further assistance. China's hope of armed intervention, to her utter disappointment, thus did not materialize. Then the Chinese representatives in vain made a last minute attempt to include an additional article on the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula and also to delete the Formosan cession on the ground that the natives were opposed to the transfer. On May 8, every art of delay having been exhausted on the part of China, the ratified copies of the Treaty of Shimonoseki were exchanged at Chefoo between Ito Miyoji and Wu Ting-fang and Lien Fang.

There still remained the question of the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula. The negotiations between Japan and the Dreibund were started on May 25 through the good offices of Spain. The Japanese stand on the question was to demand an additional indemnity of 50,000,000 taels, to withdraw her troops to the southern tip of the Peninsula when the additional indemnity and the first instalment of the war indemnity were paid, and to retire completely when the payment of the second instalment was made and the new commercial treaty was concluded and ratified in accordance with the Shimonoseki Treaty. This policy was announced in a note on July 19. By September 3 the Dreibund concurred to suggest the reduction of an additional indemnity to 30,000,000 taels and the withdrawal of the Japanese troops upon its payment and communicated this agreement to Tokyo on September 11. Viscount Mutsu, on October 7, accepted the reduction in the indemnity but proposed the withdrawal of the Japanese forces within three months after its payment. Simultaneous with this negotiation and before its final settlement, notes were exchanged on the question of the Formosan Strait. The Dreibund was anxious to get the Japanese assurance of a free passage, which was assured by Japan on July 19, but insisted that she would not cede either Formosa or the Pescadores to any other Power. Agreements were then quickly reached upon either minor points.

With these preliminaries, Hayashi Kaoru, the Japanese Minister to China, and Li Hung-chang began official negoti-

ations and the Treaty of Retrocession was signed on November 8, 1895, and the exchange of ratifications was completed on November 29. The Japanese Government had carried out its promises faithfully and thus lost the Liaotung Peninsula, the main prize of the War.

There was another interlude which directly related to the spoils of war. China was now scheming through foreign intervention to deprive Japan of Formosa. On April 20, only three days after the conclusion of the Shimonoseki Treaty, China caused certain Formosan leaders to appeal to Great Britain to take over Formosa as her protectorate on the basis that China should retain sovereignty and the land tax, but that Great Britain should control the administration, the cost of which should be borne by dues other than the land tax. Great Britain flatly refused even to consider such an offer. China then approached France with the same proposition on May 20. France also rejected the overture and informed Japan, on May 28, that unless some other Powers should interpose, she had no desire to interfere in Formosan affairs. Meanwhile, China was instigating an independence movement among the Formosans and as a result a Republic was proclaimed by them on May 24. Governor Tang Ching-sung became the President and a general assembly was called.

With the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty having been completed, however, China had to appoint a commissioner to cede the Island to Japan. Li Ching-fong was so named officially and he, accompanied by Foster, proceeded to Formosa. At Kelung, on June 2, aboard the Japanese flagship, Li formally transferred Formosa to the Japanese authorities. Three days previously, the Japanese troops landed on the Island and on June 6 captured Taihoku. President Tang and his associates escaped and in less than five months Japan had completely subjugated the Island.

Thus ended the Sino-Japanese War which spelled the complete defeat of the Celestial Empire. All her native cunning and appeals to the other Powers to fight her battles had proven useless. Also in her eagerness to induce

foreign intervention on her behalf, she had played into the hands of the Western Powers and henceforth she became an easy prey to Western aggressive diplomacy. As for Japan, not only had she emerged the victor, but she had amply demonstrated her prowess in arms and rightly won her place in China on an equal basis with the other Powers. Japan had to undergo another life-and-death struggle against the northern colossus, however, before that position received the unchallenged acclaim of the Powers.

CHAPTER VII

THE OPEN DOOR POLICY

CHINA bartered her soul to the Powers in the Sino-Japanese War. Henceforth, the Western Powers freely preyed upon the crumbling prestige of the Celestial Empire and the scene of international scrambles for concessions shifted from Africa to China. The result was two-fold. In the first place, it called forth the enunciation of the elastic doctrine of the "Open Door" which was destined to govern China's international relations thereafter. In the second place, it stimulated anti-foreignism in China anew and caused the Boxer Uprising and the accompanying international military action. And thus, for a while at least, the Korean question receded to the background of Far Eastern politics, but Japan's interest remained predominantly throughout this period in Korea instead of China.

JAPANESE ASCENDANCY IN KOREA

With the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China recognized the complete independence of Korea and one of the primary causes of the Sino-Japanese War was successfully eliminated. But the War in no way helped to solve the question of much-needed internal reforms in Korea, and this colossal task devolved upon Japan. "Perhaps no work more delicate and more liable to blunder and misunderstanding could befall a nation than that of setting another nation's house in order who would not feel its necessity." What should Japan's policy now be?

The re-orientation of Japan's Korean policy was now urgently needed and Viscount Mutsu, on August 17, 1894,

presented four possible plans for the consideration of the Cabinet; (1) hands-off policy—to leave the problem of reforms to the Koreans themselves and to secure a promise from the Powers not to interfere in the internal affairs of Korea; (2) cooperative policy—to assist the Koreans, directly or indirectly, in all of their problems, but to prevent all foreign interventions; (3) joint cooperative policy—to revive Sino-Japanese cooperation and to proceed jointly in effecting reforms; and (4) neutralization policy—to invite the Powers to guarantee Korean independence and to make Korea the Switzerland of the Far East. After an extended discussion, the second policy was generally favored, although Viscount Mutsu feared the possible suspicion and misunderstanding of the Powers.

Japan's fundamental policy having been thus adopted, Count Inouye Kaoru replaced Otori Keisuke as the Japanese Minister to the Seoul Court and assumed his new post in October, 1894. With Count Inouye's arrival at Seoul, a progressive policy was set in motion. The Reformist Ministry under the premiership of Pak Yong Hio was organized in December, and the liberals who took leading parts in the unsuccessful *coup* of 1884 were given prominent places in the Government. A Privy Council of some forty members, with a limited veto power, was entrusted with the discussion of important governmental matters, and So Jai Pil, who took a leading part in the 1884 *coup* and who became more popularly known under his American name of Dr. Philip Jaisohn, was appointed an adviser to this Council. The King now pledged that he would uphold Korean independence and address himself to the public business in consultation with his Ministers, while the Queen was forbidden to interfere in state affairs. The army was reorganized and its spirit was completely rejuvenated. The national finance was reconstructed and a careful budgeting of its revenues and expenditures was instituted. Promising youths were sent abroad for the purpose of study and observation. These reform measures, however plausible they appeared, began to collapse immediately after Count Inouye's departure to

Japan for a short visit. As long as the rival factions of the Queen and the Tai Won Kun split the Seoul Court, there was no peace and there could be no reforms.

When Count Inouye returned to Seoul, he studied the bitter intrigues and feuds anew and evolved a new policy of befriending the King and his courtiers. Accordingly, he presented three million yen to be used for internal improvements; made it possible for thirty Korean youths, drawn largely from among the Min family, to study annually in Japan; proposed to revise treaties; and suggested an investigation and reforms in the national finance. Count Inouye seems to have succeeded in winning the confidence of the nobles and leaders of the Court, but he left Korea soon afterward, without seeing the realization of his dreams.

Count Inouye resigned his post late in July, and was succeeded in September, 1895, by Lieutenant-General Viscount Miura Goro, and at once the former's liberal policy of persuasive reform projects was replaced by the stern hand of conservatism. In the national finance, national administration, and the army, the reform measures already instituted were overthrown and intrigues began to enliven the Court life. Once more the Queen asserted her power over the Seoul Court, this time backed by Russia's intriguing hand. Once more the rival factions of the Queen and the Tai Won Kun clashed, resulting in the famous *coup d'état* of October 8, 1895, when the Queen was murdered.

Contrary to all predictions, the passing of the Queen spelled the downfall of Japanese influence in the Korean Court and the signal rise of Russian power. Russian Minister Waeber now stepped into the place which was vacated by Yuan Shih-kai just before the War and instigated the organization of a Russian party under the leadership of Yi Bum Fu. Following this entering wedge, Russia landed some 127 marines at Chemulpo on February 19, 1896, and began to assume the control of affairs at Seoul against Japan. The Russian schemes blossomed forth so successfully that, on February 11, before dawn, the King, with the seal of the state as well as the Crown Prince and Princess and some

court ladies, escaped from the palace in disguise and sought refuge in the Russian Legation, whence he began to direct revenge measures, resulting in the assassination or the expulsion of several of his Ministers and the eventual fall of the Reformist Ministry.

Meanwhile, Viscount Miura was recalled and tried for his alleged complications in the *coup* of October 8, but was acquitted. In his place, however, Komura Jutaro was appointed as the Japanese Minister to Korea. In spite of his repeated advices, the King remained in the Russian Legation until February 20, 1897, when he moved into a new palace which had been constructed near the Russian Legation. Thus, with the King a virtual captive within her Legation, the Russian ascendancy in Seoul was greater than that of China under Yuan Shih-kai ten years before. And Russia lost no time in consolidating her power; on April 22, 1896, she gained a mining concession along the Tumen River; in May, she caused the dismissal of the Japanese-trained Korean forces; on August 28, she obtained a contract for a large timber concession "in the Yalu Valley" and on Uinung Island in the Japan Sea. Korea thus again became the bone of contention again between two nations, this time between Japan and Russia.

RUSSO-JAPANESE RIVALRY IN KOREA

Japan's belief that the elimination of China from Korea would bring about peace in that country and in the Far East in general was short-lived. In 1896, Japan was face to face with Russia in Korea and it appeared that the rivalry between Japan and China which ended in a war would now be repeated, this time between Japan and the northern colossus.

Whatever be the future, Japan and Russia now held the fate of Korea in their hands. In Japan, therefore, the leading statesmen, especially Marquis Ito, Marquis Yamagata, and Count Inouye, regarded it absolutely necessary to reach an understanding with Russia over Korea in order to avoid an impending Russo-Japanese struggle. Thus was concluded

the Waeber-Komura Memorandum of May 14, 1896, which was signed at Seoul, and the Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol of June 9, 1896, signed at St. Petersburg. The occasion for the negotiation and conclusion of the latter agreement was the coronation of Tzar Nicholas II.

In these two Agreements, Japan and Russia recognized the independence of Korea. The Waeber-Komura memorandum dealt with matters of more immediate interest to the two Powers, of which the most important provision related to the question of guards. Japan agreed to withdraw "as soon as possible" the Japanese guards "stationed at some places for the protection of the Japanese telegraph line between Fusan and Seoul" and to replace them by gendarmes whose number should not exceed 200 and "who will afterwards be gradually withdrawn from those places in which peace and order have been restored by the Korean Government," while Japan and Russia agreed to maintain a small number of guards for the protection, respectively of "the Japanese settlements at Seoul and the open ports" and of "the Russian Legation and Consulates" but to withdraw them when the assurance of peace and order was established.

On the other hand, the Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol dealt with more fundamental questions. The two Powers agreed to counsel the Korean Government to establish a sound financial system and to render assistance in the matter of loans if needed; they pledged themselves to abstain from participation in the organization and maintenance of Korean policy and its military forces "in so far as the financial and economic situation in that country should permit"; Japan recognized the *status quo* with regard to the Russian position in the Korean Peninsula and retained the right to "continue to administer the telegraphic lines which are actually in its possession," while Russia reserved the right to "establish a telegraphic line from Seoul to her frontier." In colorless essence, therefore, the two Agreements were merely a repetition of the Tientsin Convention of 1885 between Japan and China. Indeed, how treacherous was the

diplomatic sea in which Japan was trying to steer the boat of Russo-Japanese accord over Korea can be seen from the fact that the same coronation ceremony also gave to the world the Li-Lobanoff Secret Alliance between Russia and China which was directed against Japan!

Russia soon began to ignore the spirit, if not the letter, of the Agreements. In 1897, she introduced her soldiers and officers as military instructors in the Korean army; imposed a Russian officer as director of the arsenal; made Russian Vice-Consuls the commissioners of customs and had a pro-Russian Korean appointed as Foreign Minister. Alarmed by these events, Chargé Motono at St. Petersburg approached the Russian Government for explanation and further understanding, but he was unable to elicit "anything but vaguest assurance of goodwill."

Under such circumstances, the Japanese Government had to choose one of two possible courses: to compromise with Russia for the purpose of restraining Russia's aggressive Far Eastern policy, or to combat the Russian program unhesitatingly by forming an alliance with one of the European Powers. The second course was generally regarded as difficult of realization at the time, and, in spite of the failures of the Komura-Waeber and Yamagata-Lobanoff Agreements, definite steps were taken to pursue the first procedure. The Ito Cabinet, therefore, made overtures to Russia early in 1898 and, in response, Russia proposed, on March 17, a Russo-Japanese understanding over Korea, in which Russia pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of Korea but indicated her intention to lease Port Arthur and Talienwan. The Japanese reply, two days later, contended that Japan had vital interests in Korea, and proposed that, if Russia recognized Japan's freedom of action in Korea, Japan in return would regard Manchuria as lying outside of Japanese interest. This "Exchange Policy," as it is popularly known in Japan, constituted the heart of Marquis Ito's Russian policy in 1898, and was warmly supported by Marquis Yamagata and the leading diplomats such as Nishi, Komura, and even Hayashi. The Russian reply early in

April naturally rejected such a clearly defined commitment, but negotiations continued and resulted in the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, which was signed on April 25, 1898. Again recognizing "the independence and the perfect sovereignty of Korea," Japan and Russia agreed "to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country" and "not to take any measure regarding the nomination of military instructors and financial advisers, without having previously arrived at a mutual accord on the subject." Russia recognized Japan's peculiar commercial interest in Korea and agreed not to "obstruct the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea."

Meanwhile, rapid changes were taking place in Korea. The forces of liberalism and of conservatism were united in opposition to the growth of foreign, especially Russian, influence in the Peninsula, and, in the spring of 1896, a hitherto secret society publicly announced itself as the Independence Club under the leadership of So Jai Pil. Largely through its influence, a number of reform edicts were issued in 1896 and 1897. In October, 1897, King Yi Hyeung assumed the title of the "Emperor" and the Treaty Powers recognized him as such. In March and April, 1898, the Russian entanglement in the Chinese affairs and the anti-Russian sentiment of the Independence Club forced Russia to withdraw all her financial and military advisers and instructors from Korea, to close the Russo-Korean Bank, and to recall her aggressive Minister, M. de Speyer.

The lull in Russian activities in Korea meant the ascendancy of Japanese influence, but the change was only temporary. In 1899, Russia transferred Paul Pavloff, who had negotiated the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan and the program of railway construction in Manchuria, from Peking to Seoul as the Russian Minister, and her interest in the Peninsula State was revived, while Japan named Hayaishi Gonsuke as the Japanese Minister to the Seoul Court. From that time, the Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea became keener each year until another arbitrament of war

appeared unavoidable. Before tracing that development which will be given in the succeeding chapters, we must briefly describe the other grave results of the Sino-Japanese War upon China as well as Japan's international relations.

SCRAMBLE FOR INDEMNITY' LOANS

Next to the liberation of Korea from China's questionable claim of suzerainty over her, the main result of the Sino-Japanese War upon China's international relations was the sudden impetus which it gave to the aggressive policies of the Powers toward China. The first scramble for the domination of China was staged in connection with the forced loans for the payment of China's war indemnity to Japan—200,000,000 taels plus 30,000,000 taels for the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula. The war indemnity was to be paid up in seven years, at five per cent interest, and Japan occupied Weihaiwei in security therefor, but interest was to be remitted should the principal be cleared within three years. There was no interest on the compensatory indemnity and Japan was to withdraw her troops from the Liaotung Peninsula within three months after the completion of its payment. China naturally wanted to clear her obligations and to regain the full control of her territories as soon as possible, but her treasury was empty. Here was an opportunity for the Powers and they seized it without an apology. Russia led the way.

At the time of the Triple Intervention, Russia had promised financial aid to China. When the time for the first payment on her indemnities was approaching, China first turned to Great Britain through Sir Robert Hart, the Inspector General of Customs. Russia, however, saw no reason why the diplomatic influence gained through the Triple Intervention should be snatched away from her in this manner. Russia, therefore, persuaded France to join her and started negotiations through the Chinese Legation at Paris. An agreement was quickly reached on June 6, 1895, between the Russian Ministry of Finance and a group of six French

and four Russian banks, by which a thirty-six-year loan of 400,000,000 francs at four per cent interest was to be made to China. The loan was made under the guarantee of the Russian Government.

Great Britain protested against this loan in vain. Germany, now forgotten by her colleagues of the erstwhile Dreibund, was now forced to join hands with Great Britain. China wisely utilized the rivalry thus evolved to her advantage, and turned to Great Britain and Germany for later loans to provide for the indemnities as well as to repair other damages of the War. As a result, two joint loans were made in 1896 and 1898, respectively by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. The former was a thirty-six-year loan of £16,000,000 at five per cent interest, and the latter a forty-five-year loan of the same amount at four and a half per cent, neither being guaranteed by the Governments of the countries concerned. These loans were secured by the customs revenue, but China was obliged to pledge revenues from salt and likin in the six collectorates in the Yangtse basin for the 1898 loan. These collectorates were placed under the supervision of the Inspectorate of Customs which, in case of default, was to undertake their administration.

On the basis of these loans, China successfully cleared her indemnity responsibility and Japan withdrew from Weihaiwei and the Liaotung Peninsula in due time. In return for this assistance, the four Powers began to claim special diplomatic privileges and thus dawned a remarkable era of scramble for concessions and rights in China. Once more Russia led the way.

RUSSIA COLLECTS INTERVENTION REWARDS

Of all the Powers whose coveting eyes were focussed upon China at the close of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia was the most aggressive. The success of the Triple Intervention and the clever manipulation of the indemnity loan question gave Russia the commanding position in China.

Upon such a stage, the Sino-Russian drama, the central theme of which was the realization of Russia's grandiose dream of a Far Eastern Empire, rapidly unfolded each succeeding act.

The curtain of the first act was raised with the conclusion of the Li-Lobanoff Secret Treaty of Alliance. Already Count Cassini, the Russian Minister at Peking, was busy impressing the Chinese leaders that Russia was the one Power with whose aid China could chastise Japan, but Li Hung-chang, the pro-Russian leader, was in a difficult position due to the failure of his policy which ended so disastrously in the Sino-Japanese War and the Shimonoseki Treaty. An occasion which would save Li's face arrived with the coronation of Tzar Nicholas II. Li, through Russian advice, was appointed China's chief envoy, and, while in St. Petersburg, Serge Julevich Witte, then the Russian Minister of Finance, prevailed upon him to conclude a secret alliance. Count Witte "dwelt upon the services which he had recently done" to China, pointed out the importance of maintaining friendly relations between China and Russia, and advised him that a railway across North Manchuria toward Vladivostok would be of great mutual advantage to the two countries in presenting a united front against Japan. Li at first hesitated to consider the proposal, but because of Chinese gratitude for the Russian intervention as well as Russian assistance in placing her first large foreign loan abroad and the possible fear of Japanese aggression in Manchuria finally induced him to accept it. These preliminary negotiations being completed, the Sino-Russian Secret Treaty of Alliance was signed by Li and Prince Lobanoff-Rostoffsky, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on May 22, 1896. The provisions of the Treaty, although its existence was suspected more than once, were successfully kept secret until China was compelled to submit them in the form of an official telegraphic summary to the Washington Conference in 1922. It, however, should not be confused with the fictitious "Cassini Convention."

The Li-Lobanoff Secret Treaty of Alliance contained

sweeping provisions: Russia and China agreed "to support each other reciprocally by all the land and sea forces at any aggression directed by Japan against Russian territory in Eastern Asia, China or Korea"; no treaty of peace with an adverse party could be concluded by either of them without the consent of the other; all Chinese ports should be open to Russian vessels during military operations; the Chinese Government consented to the construction of a railway across North Manchuria toward Vladivostok, the construction and exploitation of which railway should be accorded to the Russo-Chinese Bank upon terms mutually agreeable to the Chinese Government and the said bank; Russia should have the free use of the said railway for the transportation of troops and provisions both in time of war and peace; and the agreement should become effective when the proposed railway project was consummated and should remain in force for fifteen years.

The second act in the Sino-Russian drama quickly followed the first. Russia lost no time in translating the railway provision of the Secret Treaty into actuality and an agreement between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank was concluded on September 8, 1896. It authorized the Russo-Chinese Bank, which was chartered in December, 1895, but which became the Russo-Asiatic Bank after its merger with the Banque du Nord five years later, to construct the said railway across North Manchuria. It also stipulated that the Chinese Government had the right to acquire the railway at the expiration of thirty-six years from the date of the completion of the line by refunding to the Company in full the outlay of money which the railway then represented together with accrued interest, or at the end of eighty years "free of charge." To put this Agreement into operation, the Russo-Chinese Bank organized a company since known as the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, a Russian joint-stock company which was given a charter by the Russian Government on December 4, 1896. Its capital was fixed at five million credit roubles. The Chinese Government had the right to name the president of

the Company, a nominal head, but it was, for all practical purposes, a Russian government agency. Thus, armed with the necessary legal arrangements, the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway was started early in 1897. The work was delayed by the Boxer Uprising, but it was completed by the end of 1902 with head offices at Harbin and officially opened to traffic on July 1, 1903. The line, covering 919 miles between Manchouli and Pogradichnaya, shortened the original Trans-Siberian line by some 568 miles. The total cost of construction was estimated at about 350 million roubles.

Then followed the third act in which Russia forced China to lease to her the southern tip of the Liaotung Peninsula including Port Arthur and Talienwan, the very territory which Russia forced Japan to return to China in the name of peace of the Far East. The lease which was consummated by the Convention of March 27, 1898, was to last twenty-five years and also provided for the extension of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Talienwan and Port Arthur. The formal agreement for the construction of the South Manchuria branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway was signed by the Chinese Eastern Railway Company for Russia and the Chinese Government on July 6, 1898. The provisions of the contract agreement of 1896 for the construction and operation of the main line were made applicable to the proposed southern branch. By virtue of this agreement, the Chinese Eastern Railway Company was given "the absolute and exclusive right of administration" over the lands necessary for the use of the railway. China's right of recovering this line was the same as that of the main line. On the basis of these agreements, the construction of the line, totaling 624 miles, was completed before the Russo-Japanese War broke out. So also was completed by 1904 the construction of Port Arthur as Russia's first ice-free naval base and Dalny, originally known as Talienwan and later Dairen, as her first warm-water commercial outlet to the sea.

These basic plans for Russian penetration of China having been completed, Russia only needed some pretext to

pour her army into Manchuria. That long-awaited opportunity came with the Boxer Uprising.

WESTERN ENCROACHMENT UPON CHINA

The Russian advance into Manchuria was a signal for scramble of the Western Powers for concessions in the Celestial Empire. The first Power to follow the Russian leadership was Germany.

In the eighties and early nineties, Germany both aspired for and actually attempted to obtain some footing in China. In November, 1894, the Kaiser suggested the seizure of Formosa; in April, 1895, the German Foreign Office was considering the exploitation of several points along the Chinese coast; in 1896, Germany demanded of Li Hung-chang the granting of a naval base as a reward for her part in the Triple Intervention. It was in the midst of such German machination that, in November, 1897, two German missionaries were murdered at Kiachwang in Shantung. Before long, the German fleet entered Kiaochow Bay and, under the pretext of suppressing the disorder, occupied the city. The negotiations were then launched at Peking and the German "mailed-fist" policy won for her most of the demands which she had presented. As soon as the missionary case was satisfactorily settled, Germany demanded the lease of Kiaochow. Russia and France stood aloof and China was powerless to resist the German demand. By the Treaty of March 6, 1898, twenty-one days before the Russian lease of Port Arthur, China leased Kiaochow to Germany for ninety-nine years as "a special proof of their grateful appreciation of friendship shown to them by Germany" and conceded to a Sino-German company the right to build two railways in Shantung, one from Kiaochow to Tsinan and the frontier and the other from Kiaochow to Tsinan via Ichow. Germany immediately began to improve the harbor, to construct a naval base, and to build the railways.

France, the last of the Dreibund, could not resist the

temptation when naval bases in China could be had for the asking, and demanded her share. As a result, China leased to France, by the Treaty of May 27, 1898, Kwangchow Bay for ninety-nine years. In connection with her own missionary case, France also obtained, among other things, a railway concession from Nanning to Pakhoi.

Great Britain was at first opposed to this transfer of Chinese territory, but, as soon as Russia leased Port Arthur and Germany secured Kiaochow, she also joined the parade and demanded the lease of Weihaiwei. Before making the demand, however, Great Britain consulted Tokyo and obtained Japan's approval in as much as Japanese troops still occupied the stronghold as security for China's indemnity. By the Treaty of July 1, 1898, China leased Weihaiwei to Great Britain "for as long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the possession of Russia." On May 24, the last of the Japanese troops were withdrawn and the British flag has been flying over the Bay ever since. Great Britain also obtained by the Treaty of June 9, 1898, the lease of Kowloon, a peninsula on the mainland opposite Hongkong.

The extraction of these leases from China did not satisfy the Powers concerned and the imminent "break-up of China" was also indicated in the race to mark off "Spheres of Interest." France led the way by securing promises from China, on March 15, 1897, not to cede the Island of Hainan to any Power "either as final or temporary cession or as a naval station or coaling depot," and, on April 10, 1898, not to cede away Kwantung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan. Great Britain secured, on February 11, 1898, a similar promise from China concerning the Yangtse valley. Germany already had a considerable sphere staked up in Shantung, while Russia laid her claim to everything north of the Great Wall, and on June 1, 1898, obtained the priority right to build railways north and north-eastward from Peking. These spheres of interest were further strengthened by mutual recognition. Great Britain, who had already pledged to stay away from Shantung except Weihaiwei, made an agreement with Germany on April 3, 1898, whereby interference by

capitalists of the other country in railway operations within the respective spheres were mutually prohibited, while the Anglo-Russian Agreement of April 28, 1899, regulated a similar arrangement with respect to railways in the Yangtse valley and north of the Great Wall. The march of Western aggression was temporarily halted, however, when China courageously refused Italy's request, in March, 1899, for the lease of Saumen Bay in Chekiang though this request was supported by Great Britain. All this while, Japan cautiously stood aside and contented herself by procuring a promise, on April 26, 1898, that China would not cede Fukien Province opposite Formosa, to any Power.

A further indication of the approaching "break-up of China" became evident through battles for railway concessions. Russia already had secured the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, while Germany had obtained a similar right in Shantung. Belgium, backed by Russia and France, secured, in June, 1898, a contract to build the Peking-Hankow line; France obtained a right in April, 1898, to build an extension of the Hanoi-Tongking-Laokai line to Yunnanfu; the American China Development Company secured a contract in April, 1898, to build the Hankow-Canton line; and Great Britain, in addition to the right of building the Peking-Mukden line which she already possessed, concluded, in May, 1898, the preliminary agreement whereby a British-Chinese corporation obtained the right to build the Shanghai-Nanking line. It was under such circumstances that the Anglo-Russian agreement of April, 1898, already referred to, was concluded to divide the spheres of interest in railway construction, Russia north of the Great Wall and Great Britain in the Yangtse valley. Without going further into details of China's complicated railway politics of that period, one can not fail to see the growing financial control of China by the Powers.

With all these movements Japan was deeply concerned. But Japan's deeper concern in the nineties centered around Korea rather than China, and she assumed the attitude of watchful waiting until the Russian penetration not only of

Manchuria but of Korea once more challenged her security in the Far East.

THE OPEN DOOR POLICY

The close of the nineteenth century saw the remarkable expansion of America as a Pacific Power. Following the purchase of Alaska from Russia, the United States of America not only dominated the two Americas but definitely became a Far Eastern Power through the annexation in 1898 of Hawaii and the Philippine Islands. The American colonial interests thus began to develop over two oceans. Yet the course of events in China did not forebode well for American interests, and Washington adopted a policy which would guarantee American entrance into China, already cut up by various foreign concessions into spheres of interest. Thus was born the historic proclamation by Secretary John Hay of the so-called "Open Door" policy in China.

In the face of the gradual but certain "break-up of China," United States Minister Rockhill at Peking clearly saw the unavoidable danger which American commerce was bound to face if discriminatory treatment was to be accorded to American traders in these foreign-controlled regions. He therefore drew up a report on the deplorable condition of China and recommended to the State Department certain measures for the protection of American commerce. John Hay, the Secretary of State, was in full accord with Rockhill's views and addressed notes to the United States Ambassadors in Great Britain, Germany, and Russia on September 6, 1899, and the United States Minister in Japan on November 13, and the United States Ambassadors in Italy and France, respectively, on November 17 and 21. These epochal notes directed the American representatives to obtain from the Governments to which they were accredited a "formal assurance" of the following principles:

"First. The recognition that no power will in any way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any

leased territory or within any so-called 'sphere of interest' it may have in China.

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said 'sphere of interest' (unless they be 'free ports'), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such 'spheres' than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled or operated within its 'sphere' on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such 'sphere' than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances."

It should be clear then that the original American pronouncement of the so-called "Open Door" policy concerned three things, namely, non-interference with the treaty ports, equitable administration of the Chinese treaty tariff, and avoidance of discrimination in the matter of railway charges and harbor dues—all within the "sphere of interest" claimed by the Powers in China.

Great Britain accepted the Hay proposal on November 30, as did France on December 16. United States Minister Beck presented the Hay note to the Tokyo Foreign Office on December 20. The Japanese Government was in perfect agreement with the enunciated doctrine and saw the possibility of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain in checking the impending dismemberment of China. Foreign Minister Aoki Shuzo replied, therefore, on December 26, that the Japanese Government "will have no hesitation in giving their assent to so just and fair a proposal of the United States, provided that all other powers concerned shall accept the same." Other Powers quickly followed the suit: Russia vaguely accepted it under the date of December 18; Italy acceded without any reservation on January 7, 1900; and Germany concurred on February 19. On March 20, 1900, Secretary Hay formally announced the above re-

sult to the Governments concerned. The "Open Door" policy was thus proclaimed and adopted by the five Great Powers most directly concerned with China's destinies. As we shall see later, the Hay doctrine turned out to be as elastic as the Monroe Doctrine in its later interpretations and applications. It was nevertheless the greatest legacy the nineteenth century diplomacy had given to China and the twentieth century *Magna Carta* of China's international relations.

The condition of China was far from peaceful and the Boxer Uprising gave a pretext to the Powers to pour their armies into China and to occupy their respective spheres of interest as well as their concessions and leased territories. On July 3, 1900, therefore, Secretary Hay proclaimed another and equally epochal doctrine with regard to China. On that day he issued a circular note to all Powers interested in the fate of China, and announced that the American policy would be "to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace in China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." The doctrine of China's "territorial and administrative entity" which is today associated with the "Open Door" doctrine was thus evolved independently of the original "Open Door" proclamation. Eventually, these two doctrines were to become parts of the same policy. This brings us to the Boxer Uprising which stimulated the pronouncement of the doctrine of China's "territorial and administrative entity."

THE BOXER UPRISING

In the closing years of the nineteenth century, China was facing national disaster both from within and without. The humiliating experiences and outcome of the Sino-Japanese War drove the Western Powers headlong into an international scramble for leases and concessions which fore-

boded no rosy future for the national integrity of the proud Celestial Empire. From within, the cry for the correction of official corruption and maladministration was rapidly gaining momentum, but there was little prospect of its realization as shown by the complete failure of the reform movement in 1898. Anti-foreign feeling was universal and increasing in intensity; hostility toward Christianity was blazing anew; natural catastrophes such as floods and famines continued to harass and impoverish the nation. In short, a spirit of unrest prevailed everywhere and these conditions afforded a fertile soil for the activities of secret societies. Anti-foreign and anti-Christian outbreaks were occurring in increasing numbers between 1895 and 1898. These outbreaks eventually involved China in another humiliating experience with the Powers.

From the Spring of 1899, the anti-foreign and anti-Christian feeling, so strongly felt in all the provinces, began to increase its intensity in Shantung. Already such secret societies as the Plum Blossom Band and the Great Sword Society were disturbing foreigners in general and missionaries in particular. The climax was reached with the appearance of I-ho-chuan or the Fists of Righteous Harmony, more generally known as the "Boxers." The Boxers demanded the expulsion of both foreigners and missionaries, and daily grew in influence and power while the local authorities were impotent to suppress them. Early in 1900, they entered the Province of Chihli and pressed upon Peking. By May the whole Province of Chihli was seething with Boxers who carried fire, death, and devastation in all directions, plundered and destroyed many of the foreign premises, wrecked railroads, and cut telegraphic communications. And thus the situation became extremely alarming, both for the Peking Government and the Powers.

The foreign representatives demanded the suppression of Boxer atrocities and the Chinese Government issued some decrees, but little practical result was obtained. Marines were then called in as legation guards and requests were sent to their respective Governments for military protec-

tion. From that time on events moved rapidly. By June 5, the Boxers had cut the railway and telegraphic communications between Peking and Tientsin; on June 13, they entered Peking, burning all foreign buildings outside of the three guarded areas, and on the following day entered Tientsin. They successfully checked the Seymour expedition of allied forces on its march to Peking and on June 19, the Tsungli Yamen asked the foreign representatives to leave Peking. On the following day, the Empress Dowager caused her council to take steps for the proclamation of war, and, also on the same day, the famous siege of the Peking Legations which lasted over two months was begun and the massacre of foreigners spread to various Provinces. Meanwhile, the admirals of the Powers issued an ultimatum for the surrender of the Taku forts and, upon refusal, captured it on June 17. By July 14 the allied forces completed the capture of Tientsin and by August 16, under the leadership of Japanese troops, the siege of Pehtang in Peking was raised. Thus Peking was at the mercy of allied troops.

When the foreign representatives at Peking requested military help, Japan, largely for geographical reason, was destined to bear the heaviest responsibility of the emergency call. At first, the Powers seemed to fear Japan's military actions in China, but, faced with imminent danger, they asked her to send the largest force. In answer Japan, on June 15, dispatched two divisions. Already, on June 11, Chancellor Sugimura of the Japanese Legation had been murdered by a soldier in Peking and a few days later the same fate befell German Minister Baron von Kettler. The Japanese troops joined the allied forces in time to capture Tientsin. More Japanese troops arrived in the middle of July and took a leading part in the lifting of the siege of Pehtang. In taking these actions the Japanese army, for the first time in history, participated in a concerted action with the Western Powers on the basis of equality, and won a lasting reputation for their strength and discipline.

It should be recalled that it was the allied military action in and near Peking which prompted Secretary Hay to

pronounce the principle of China's "territorial and administrative entity." Meanwhile, Russia took this opportunity to pour her troops into Manchuria and occupied the whole of South Manchuria. Her refusal to withdraw, using first one pretext and then another, added powder to the coming international explosion in Manchuria. We shall return to this story in a later chapter.

China was now in a helpless position and Li Hung-chang, who was deposed in 1898 in the course of the general mobilization for reforms, was restored to his power once more to deal with the hopeless situation. Already, the foreign representatives were formulating their policies and, after they had spent more than two months in discussions, they presented their demands to China on December 24, 1900, which were accepted by the Peking Government formally on January 16, 1901. The official negotiations, which were launched on February 5, 1901, and which dragged along for several months, chiefly concerned the punishment of rebels and the payment of indemnities. The former was easily settled, but the latter struck numerous obstacles, especially the amount due to the participating Powers. How utterly out of proportion were the contentions of the Powers in relation to their actual parts in the military actions taken will be seen by comparing the amount of indemnities they had demanded and the number of men they had actually in the field; Germany, with 200 men and no cannons, 130,000,000 taels; France, with 800 men and 12 cannons, 100,000,000 taels; Great Britain, with 3,000 men and 12 cannons, 70,000,000 taels; Japan, with 10,000 men and 54 cannons, 57,000,000 taels; the United States, with 2,000 men and 6 cannons, 45,000,000 taels; and Russia, with 4,000 men and 16 cannons, 18,000,000 taels.

An agreement was finally reached and a protocol was signed at Peking on September 7, 1901, by Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang for China and by the representatives of the eleven participating Powers. The Boxer Protocol, after dealing, in detail, with the punishment of the authors of the crimes and the reparations for the murder of Baron von

Kettler and Chancellor Sugimura, among other things, placed an embargo on arms and war materials for two years, defined the indemnity payment of 450,000,000 taels, recognized the creation of a legation quarter in Peking with permanent guard, and made China responsible for suppressing anti-foreign societies and activities. In the demand and distribution of the Boxer indemnity, the Powers had revealed a complete lack of equity, as shown by the following division in round figures expressed in taels: Russia, 130,000,000; Germany, 90,000,000; France, 70,000,000; Great Britain, 50,000,000; Japan, 34,000,000; the United States, 32,000,000; and Italy, 26,000,000. Eventually, however, most of the Powers returned the outstanding sums to China in one form or another.

Japan's share in the indemnity of the Boxer War was disappointingly small in proportion to the actual part she had willingly taken in the allied expeditions. But she was such a newcomer in the ranks of the Great Powers that her spokesman carried little weight. And yet the successful suppression of the Boxer Uprising was one of her crowning achievements in the half century of reconstruction and progress following her introduction into world intercourse. During that short period, Japan in her foreign relations had, by sheer force of determination, successfully cleared herself of the aegis of extraterritoriality and unequal treaties, surprised the world by defeating China in a war, and finally participated in an allied expedition in China on the basis of equality with the Powers. If her share in the indemnities of the Boxer War was disappointingly small, then Japan had the compensating satisfaction of regarding it as the closing paragraph in the first chapter of her effort to win a place among the Great Powers of the world.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

THE close of the nineteenth century saw Japan facing the determined aggression of Russia in the Far East. Yet Japan's diplomatic position was still completely isolated from the Powers and she was powerless to defy the Colossus of the North. It was the far-sighted statesmanship, therefore, of Count Katsura and Baron Komura which successfully steered the arranging of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and established Japan's place with the Western Powers. The story of the formation of that Alliance, however, takes us into the maze of European politics, first to St. Petersburg, then to Berlin, and finally to London.

FAILURE OF RUSSO-JAPANESE RAPPROCHEMENT

It has been already pointed out that Japan's first effort in meeting Russian aggression in the Far East after the Sino-Japanese War was directed toward the establishment of a Russo-Japanese understanding. That movement was led by Marquis Ito Hirobumi and Marshal Marquis Yamagata Aritomo, and at this time the voice of opposition was weak. It was for this reason, as we have seen in the preceding Chapter, that the Japanese Government successively concluded the Komura-Waeber Agreement and the Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol in 1896 and the Nishi-Rosen Convention in 1898. The result was hopelessly discouraging. Russia seems to have entertained no thought of respecting the Agreements and began to violate each of them before even the signatures were dry. In Russia's eyes Japan was of little importance but, in thus underestimating Japan, Russia was building her Far Eastern Empire on a bed of sand.

Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea was revived with the coming to Seoul of Russian Minister Pavloff and Japanese Minister Hayashi early in 1899. For five years thereafter, the aspirations of the two countries clashed constantly in the Peninsula State. Nearly every move made by either Power was countervailed by the other. Russia usually assumed the role of the prime-mover and Japan that of the protestant, while the feeble Korean Government was in constant trouble due to the aggressive demands and vigorous protests of the rival powers.

The growing rivalry between Russia and Japan is best illustrated by the Russian attempts to purchase a suitable naval base in Korea and the success of Japan in defeating this plan. In May, 1899, Pavloff suggested a plan to purchase a portion of Masampo near Fusan for a Russian naval base. When the final step was being taken to effect the purchase, he discovered to his disappointment that his prize lot had been already bought up by certain Japanese subjects. Pavloff protested both to the Korean Government and the Japanese Minister, even making threats, but all in vain. Eventually, Pavloff succeeded in obtaining a lease on a certain tract in Masampo, but its inferior location made it practically valueless. However, he did force the Korean Government to promise not to allow the transfer of any part of Kojedo Island near Masampo and its surrounding territories. Pavloff then nearly succeeded in purchasing Nampo, but this attempt failed because of the Japanese protest that Nampo lay outside the three-mile limit of Masampo whereas foreigners were not allowed to own land beyond the three-mile radius of any treaty port. Pavloff's next scheme was to lease Tja-pok on the inner shore of Masampo, but he again found that a Japanese subject had already leased it. Finally he leased Pankumi on the shore, but its inferior site again prevented its useful exploitation. Hayashi also countered this move between May and October, 1901, by leasing some forty acres of land within the treaty limits of Masampo. Pavloff's last effort to obtain the lease of Chinha Bay early in 1901 was refused by the Korean Government.

From then on until 1903, when the Russo-Japanese negotiations were begun, Russia desisted from making further open demands upon the Seoul Court.

In the face of this growing Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea, some even in Russia saw the wisdom of arranging for Russo-Japanese understanding and a move now came from the Russian side to that end. When Izwalsky was appointed the Russian Minister to Japan in April, 1900, Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Foreign Minister, instructed him to negotiate a Russo-Japanese agreement on the Far Eastern question. Under Izwalsky's direction, therefore, Pacrewsky carried on elaborate social contacts in Tokyo and championed the cause of Russo-Japanese friendship. The Russian overture was based upon recognition of the permanent neutrality of Korea. Though Premier Marquis Ito was inclined to favor it, Foreign Minister Kato Takaaki, backed by Hayashi Gonsuke at Seoul and Komura Jutarō at Peking, rejected the idea on the ground that it merely resulted in strengthening the Russian position in Manchuria by checking Japanese military action.

Thus ended in failure every attempt between 1896 and 1901 to reach a lasting Russo-Japanese rapprochement over Korea as well as Manchuria, while Russo-Japanese rivalry grew in its intensity during the same period. Even after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan did not abandon the hope of a possible understanding with Russia and tried in every way to cultivate friendly relations with her northern rival.

SEEDS OF ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

While the Genros preferred an understanding with Russia to an alliance with some European Power, a group of younger diplomats strongly advocated the latter course, especially an Anglo-Japanese alliance. Soon after the Triple Intervention, in May, 1895, Baron Nishi Tokujirō, then the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, suggested in his telegraphic report to Tokyo that Japan should cultivate the

friendly cooperation of Great Britain. Already Hayashi Tadasu was thinking in the same direction and, writing in the *Jiji Shimpo* in June and July, 1895, openly advocated the formation of an Anglo-Japanese alliance on the ground that "England and Japan together can control China and ensure the maintenance of peace in the Far East." Kato Takaaki, then the Japanese Minister at London, was also of the same opinion.

The argument advanced in favor of an Anglo-Japanese alliance by the statesmen of the younger generation was very persuasive but there were practical obstacles in the way of its realization. Apart from the fact that the Genros preferred a Russo-Japanese rapprochement, Great Britain at that time was not as yet ready for such an alliance. Besides, Japan was too much of a newcomer, still young and weak in military strength, and there was very little that she could offer in return for such an alliance. Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu, in August, 1896, praised the greatness of the idea but labeled it as "nothing but a sweet dream" unless Japan had sufficient military strength to protect both Japanese and British interests on the mainland of Asia. It was largely due to such a point of view, as well as the belief in the inevitability of the Russo-Japanese clash over Korea, that Japan took vigorous steps in developing her commerce and industry and used the major portion of the War indemnity in strengthening her army and navy, increasing the army from seven to thirteen divisions and the navy from 50,000 to 200,000 tons.

Meanwhile, the course of events in China moved rapidly. By 1888, an eventual dismemberment of the Celestial Empire passed from the realm of possibility to that of actuality, and Great Britain began to look upon the unfolding program of Russian aggression with deeper concern. Under such circumstances, the British were keenly watching Japan's repeated attempts during 1896-1898 to reach an understanding with Russia, and British statesmen began to give more thought to the possibility as well as necessity of an alliance with Japan. One of the first British statesmen who caught

the idea of an Anglo-Japanese alliance was Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, who advocated it as early as 1894. On March 1, 1898, he advocated the idea in the House of Commons, pointing out that "the rise of the Japanese power in the Far East has been very providential" for Great Britain, and suggesting that "by using the power of Japan they can, if they choose, control the whole Chinese question and the Northern Pacific." The *London Times* was also advocating a similar idea. In the official circles, Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Salisbury Cabinet, disclosed to Minister Kato Takaaki at a public banquet on March 17, 1898, "the readiness of Great Britain to enter into an agreement with Japan for the settlement of relations in the Far East." Strangely enough, it was on that same date that the Russian overture for a Russo-Japanese understanding on the basis of non-intervention in Korean affairs was made, and two days later Premier Marquis Ito disclosed his famous "exchange policy." Kato immediately reported the Kato-Chamberlain conversation to Foreign Minister Count Okuma and urged upon him the advisability of an Anglo-Japanese alliance in place of a pending Russo-Japanese rapprochement. On March 26, Kato drew up an elaborate memorandum in which he showed the impracticability of a Russo-Japanese understanding even if it could be reached, and made an urgent plea for an Anglo-Japanese alliance. To him the Anglo-Japanese alliance was already four years behind time. It was for this reason that Kato even suggested to Chamberlain, on March 17, an Anglo-Japanese joint naval demonstration against the Russian lease of Port Arthur. The Ito Cabinet gave little consideration to these suggestions and, as we had already seen, hastened to conclude another colorless agreement known as the Nishi-Rosen Convention.

Kato Takaaki did not give up the idea, however, and the Japanese Government did not neglect to cultivate British friendship. In the course of the negotiations for the Japanese approval of the British lease of Weihaiwei, Kato, not only helped Great Britain to lease the famed stronghold, but tried again to bring the two nations into closer relations.

And, on April 2, the Japanese Government, in giving its approval to the proposed British lease, asked for British assistance in case of the future emergency as Japan expected "sympathy and assistance" from her. In England, also, the idea for an Anglo-Japanese alliance was not given up. In his Birmingham address, on May 14, Chamberlain even proposed an Anglo-American-Japanese alliance. Four days later, in answering Lord Kimberley's question in the House of Lords as to the reported conversation for an Anglo-Japanese alliance, Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, not only did not deny the idea, but affirmed that "it is not the policy of the British Government to alienate rising Japan to whom we should express our sympathy and with whom we have many reasons to cooperate." In short, during March-May, 1898, the Salisbury Government was ready to consider an Anglo-Japanese alliance and Kato urgently pushed the idea, but the Ito Cabinet at Tokyo failed to avail itself of the opportunity.

ANGLO-GERMAN-JAPANESE RAPPROCHEMENT

By 1898 the Far Eastern question became definitely an integral part of European politics and manœuvres for a new alignment of Powers were planned at the various capitals. With the possibility of reaching an Anglo-Japanese alliance shelved at least temporarily, Great Britain faced two other alternatives, a workable understanding with Germany, with possible adherence of Japan, or a friendly agreement with Russia. The sky of friendly relations between Great Britain and Germany was clouded considerably since 1894 by several events, and the interests of the two nations were sharply conflicting in the Near East and Africa, in the Far East, and in the field of industry and commerce. On the other hand, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the British policy was determinedly opposed to the Russian policy of securing an ice-free outlet to the sea.

Under such circumstances, the British overture for an Anglo-Russian rapprochement, made in January, 1898, soon

reached an impasse, and the Chamberlain-Hatzfeldt conversations for an Anglo-German entente were opened late in February. The latter continued with intervals throughout 1898, in the course of which Germany suggested the British affiliation with the Triple Entente, with the possible addition of Japan and the United States of America. The lack of sincerity on the part of the Kaiser and Count von Bülow, however, forced Great Britain to drop the matter. The only understanding which was evolved as a result of those conversations was that relating to the actual division of the spheres of influence in China, namely, the Anglo-German Agreement of April 3, 1898, and the Anglo-Russian Agreement of April 28, 1898.

In 1900, Great Britain again approached Germany and reached an agreement on October 16, 1900. The two nations agreed to uphold the principles of the open door and territorial integrity in China and "to discuss common actions" in case another Power made use of the complications in China for the purpose of obtaining territorial advantages, and also to invite other Powers who were interested in accepting such principles. This Agreement soon turned out to be valueless. Early in 1901, when Russia was forcing a demand upon Peking to make Manchuria virtually a Russian protectorate, Lord Lansdowne, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, asked the German Government to cooperate with Great Britain and Japan in opposing this action, but Berlin was indifferent, claiming that the Anglo-German Agreement of the previous year did not include Manchuria!

Yet the need for an Anglo-German alliance was increasing and Great Britain made one more attempt to consummate it. On March 18, 1901, Lord Lansdowne suggested to Baron von Eckardstein, then the First Secretary of the German Embassy in London, the formation of an all-inclusive Anglo-German "defensive agreement." Baron von Eckardstein made a counter suggestion for an Anglo-German-Japanese agreement. When the conversations were communicated to Berlin, Holstein again suggested British participation in the Triple Entente, with the possible ad-

herence of Japan. By March 25, a general agreement was reached on the chief points, namely, that Great Britain should enter the Triple Entente, that the alliance should become effective only when attacked by more than two other Powers, that the treaty of alliance should be an open treaty approved by the Parliament, and that Japan should be invited to join the alliance. Again suspicion on both sides drove the scheme to an early natural death.

The Kaiser's real objective in playing such a diplomatic game in the interest of his Fatherland and the Triple Entente was obvious. He saw the growing cordial relationship between Great Britain and Japan, especially through the Boxer War, and he naturally wished to share the fruit of such an alliance in the Far East, at the same time, preserving the *status quo* in Europe. The proposed Anglo-German alliance also would separate Great Britain farther away from Russia and this separation would eventually alienate the former from any possible cooperation with the Franco-Russian Alliance against Germany, especially in Europe and Africa. Moreover, it was to the advantage of German interests to attract Russian attention away from Europe and to keep her as busily occupied as possible in the Far East. For this purpose, Germany should foster a Russo-Japanese collision with the British also participating. It was the irony of fate, however, that the suggestion for an Anglo-German-Japanese alliance finally culminated in the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was later used against Germany in 1914.

ANGLO-JAPANESE RAPPROCHEMENT

Early in 1901, the Foreign Minister in the Ito Cabinet at Tokyo was Kato Takaaki and the Japanese Ambassador to the Court of St. James was Baron Hayashi Tadasu, both of whom were strong supporters of an Anglo-Japanese alliance in place of a Russo-Japanese rapprochement. In Great Britain, faced with little hope of reaching an Anglo-German agreement, less of an Anglo-Russian understanding, the pen-

dulum was once more swinging back in favor of an Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Prime Minister was the same Lord Salisbury who was in favor of the project in 1898.

In addition to the failure of British attempts to establish an understanding with Russia and Germany, at least two other factors were drawing Great Britain and Japan closer together, namely, the Boxer War and the Boer War. In the Boxer War, Great Britain had to invoke Japanese help to defend her interests in China, while Japan, not only had cooperated with the British Government, but had convincingly demonstrated that her military ability was equal to that of the Western Powers. And yet neither Great Britain nor Japan single-handed would be able to meet Russian aggression with the possible revival of the Dreibund of 1895. In the Boer War, on the other hand, the early reverses of the British forces greatly prejudiced British prestige all over the world and the result was fatal to the British position in Africa and Europe, as well as in Asia. Under such circumstances, the British Government in 1901 was forced to choose an alliance with Japan alone, the only road then open which would save its position in the Far East.

Thus, on March 9, 1901, when Baron Hayashi asked the British Government, "How far may Japan rely upon the support of Great Britain in case Japan finds it necessary to approach Russia," the question received serious consideration. The Bertie memorandum which was drawn up for the British Foreign Office vividly pictured the danger of leaving Japan pitted against Russia, Germany, and France in the Far East, and clearly pointed out that an Anglo-Japanese alliance with its accompanying cooperative action was the only way to avoid such a disaster. Even King Edward VII, who at first rejected the idea of an alliance between white and yellow races, came to believe that the formation of a permanent Anglo-Japanese alliance was a thing of necessity, and believed that Great Britain should give Japan her hearty support on all occasions when it was possible to do so. Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, not only approved of the conclusion of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, but went so

far as to discuss the question of possible cooperation by the Allied Powers in case of an intervention by a third Power in a war, and expressed the fear of a possible Russo-Japanese rapprochement before the consummation of an Anglo-Japanese alliance as the latter would necessarily take time.

It was with such a background that Baron Hayashi reported the proposal of an Anglo-German-Japanese alliance to Tokyo in March, 1901. Foreign Minister Kato immediately seized the opportunity to press an inquiry for the formation of an Anglo-Japanese alliance. Not only did he obtain Premier Marquis Ito's consent, but he also consulted Komura Jutarō, who was then in Peking, and received his wholehearted endorsement. He then instructed Baron Hayashi, on April 16, 1901, to proceed in a personal capacity to ascertain the true position of the Court of St. James. On the following day, Baron Hayashi suggested to Lord Lansdowne the idea of Anglo-Japanese cooperation in China. The latter had intimated that the idea was not without interest, and suggested that a third Power might possibly be invited, thus reflecting the Anglo-German negotiations which were then in progress. Before Baron Hayashi and Foreign Minister Kato could push the matter further, the Ito Cabinet fell due to financial difficulties on May 10, and the Katsura Cabinet, after the *ad interim* Cabinet of Marquis Saionji, was organized on June 2. Viscount Sone, the Minister for Finance, replaced Kato in the Foreign Office as the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Viscount Katsura Taro, the new Premier, favored an Anglo-Japanese alliance rather than a Russo-Japanese understanding. He was firmly convinced that there was nothing to prevent Russia from dominating Manchuria and eventually penetrating into Korea; that a Russo-Japanese understanding, even if it was successfully concluded, would be a temporary measure; and that there must eventually be a decisive clash between the two nations in the Far Eastern arena. On the other hand, he was equally convinced that the British desire for an Anglo-Japanese alliance was based upon general British interest rather than her territorial am-

bition and that she was desirous of using Japan as an ally in preventing the Russian aggression in the Far East. In short, Japan stood alone in the maze of European politics in the Far East and she had reached the point where she must choose between facing Russia single-handed or with an ally. Thus gauging the complicated situation, the new Premier proceeded to take necessary measures to cope with it.

To conclude an alliance with Great Britain, then the reigning mistress of the sea was a momentous step in Japan's diplomatic history and Premier Viscount Katsura's only anxiety was Marquis Ito's possible opposition to his policy. It was Marquis Ito who had consistently championed a Russo-Japanese rapprochement and who had equally consistently discounted the possibility of realizing an Anglo-Japanese alliance. He was not opposed to the principle of the latter project, but doubted its possibility and advocated that Japan must first of all reach an understanding with Russia before negotiating with Great Britain. Viscount Katsura, on the other hand, was equally convinced that an Anglo-Japanese alliance was more vital to Japan and that a Russo-Japanese rapprochement should not interfere with the Anglo-Japanese rapprochement. And yet Marquis Ito was the President of the Privy Council and no other person, with the possible exception of Marshal Marquis Yamagata, had so powerful an influence upon Japan at the time. Thus resulted the famous Katsura-Ito conversations at the So-Ro-Kaku in Oiso on August 3, 1901, and at the Cho-Un-Kaku in Hayama on the following day, as a result of which Marquis Ito gave his approval to the Katsura policy in principle and even wrote down the principal points of the Japanese proposal. Immediately thereafter, at a meeting in his residence on August 5, Premier Viscount Katsura obtained the approval of the Genros, including Marquis Yamagata, Count Inouye, Marshal Saigo, Marquis Oyama, and Count Matsukata. Thus after her failure in reaching a workable understanding with Russia, Japan was united behind Premier Viscount Katsura in welcoming the proposal for an Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Premier Katsura then wired instructions to Baron Hayashi which reached him on August 8. In that historic message which was largely based upon the Ito plan drafted at the Cho-Un-Kaku, the Premier informed the Japanese Ambassador at London that the Japanese Government was in favor of an Anglo-Japanese alliance in principle, that the Government welcomed the expression of British opinion with regard to the nature and scope of such an alliance, that Japan would always maintain a policy of opposing all external aggression upon Korea, that Japan would regard the Russian assertion of sovereignty beyond the present treaty limit in Manchuria as an encroachment upon Korea's independence, that the extension of territorial sovereignty or the monopoly of commercial interests in North China were incompatible with the principle of the open door, and that the entire course of negotiations depended upon his own ability. Thus Baron Hayashi's contention of many years' standing was endorsed and official negotiation for an Anglo-Japanese alliance was begun at London on August 14, 1901.

BEGINNING OF OFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS

The negotiations thus launched were delayed for a time. Lord Lansdowne left London on a vacation trip, while a change had taken place in Tokyo in the Foreign Office, where Komura Jutaro, recalled from Peking, took the place of Viscount Sone on September 21. The new Foreign Minister heartily endorsed what had been done already toward the formation of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, and instructed Baron Hayashi to exchange official views on the subject with the British Government. Under this new setting, Baron Hayashi was ready to begin the negotiations.

The first meeting between Baron Hayashi and Lord Lansdowne on October 16 was concerned largely with the general scope of the proposed treaty of alliance. In the course of that first conference, Baron Hayashi, in answering Lord Lansdowne's questions, clarified Japan's position

by stating that she must safeguard her interests in Korea and prevent any external interference therein, that she desired to maintain the principle of the open door and the territorial integrity in China, and that the either party to the proposed alliance should uphold neutrality in case of a war between an ally and a third Power, but that the allied Powers should aid each other in case other Power or Powers adversely join the war. Lord Lansdowne, on the other hand, emphasized the British desire to cooperate with Japan in all of her Far Eastern dealings and to consummate an Anglo-Japanese alliance before entertaining the possibility of German entrance to the entente.

Several conversations followed and by November 6 Lord Lansdowne was ready with the first British draft of the proposed treaty. It incorporated all of the three points which Baron Hayashi proposed at the first conference except one. The Lansdowne draft spoke of "preventing the absorption of Korea by another country" but said nothing about the recognition of Japan's paramount interests in Korea, less about British assurance of Japanese action in their defence. Baron Hayashi immediately asked for instructions from Tokyo as to whether or not this important question should be dealt with in the treaty proper or separately in a secret agreement. At this important stage a difference of opinion was revealed between Premier Katsura's British policy and Marquis Ito's Russian policy, which resulted in the injection of a new element in the negotiations at London.

ITO'S VISIT TO ST. PETERSBURG

Marquis Ito was invited to attend the two-hundredth anniversary of Yale University and, with other notables, to receive an honorary degree. Count Inouye suggested that the Marquis should then proceed to Russia with a view to paving the way for an eventual Russo-Japanese agreement, thereby eliminating all possible causes of a future Russo-Japanese crisis. Of course, the Marquis welcomed the sug-

gestion. On the other hand, Premier Viscount Katsura was placed in a difficult position as the Anglo-Japanese negotiations were already proceeding at London. As a matter of courtesy, therefore, he gave his approval to the suggestion although he did not quite agree with such a procedure. Marquis Yamagata doubted the success of such a mission, especially in the light of the futility of all past efforts, and advised caution. This difference of opinion almost caused a crisis in the course of a farewell party which the Premier gave at his residence in honor of the departing Marquis. The Marquis waxed eloquent and claimed it to be the greatest pleasure of his life to visit St. Petersburg and to negotiate for a Russo-Japanese agreement. Should Russia welcome his proposals, he desired to know whether or not the Government was prepared to accept the outcome. Marquis Yamagata, seeing the embarrassing position of the Premier, suggested that as the Anglo-Japanese negotiation on the whole Far Eastern question had been already decided upon, the Marquis should first communicate with Tokyo before arriving at any definite understanding with Russia, especially concerning Korea. The Marquis was aroused, and offered to give up his Russian trip if such handicaps were to be placed upon his shoulders. It was on that occasion that the Premier insisted upon the importance of maintaining on the foreign policy of Japan one ship in the troubled diplomatic sea with the united support of the entire nation behind it. Without further clarifying the differences between these two statesmen beyond the vague Cho-Un-Kaku conversation, Marquis Ito left Tokyo on his unofficial tour of the world on September 17, and reached France early in November. As we shall see presently, Marquis Ito's departure from Japan without clarifying the differences with the Premier provided difficulties in the path of Baron Hayashi's negotiations at London and provoked in the European capitals undue suspicion of the nature of his tour.

With this complicated situation at home as a background the Tokyo Government, in reply to the Hayashi cable on the Lansdowne draft treaty of November 6, instructed Baron

Hayashi to proceed to Paris to meet Marquis Ito, to communicate to him the details of the negotiations at London, and to obtain his support. This he did on November 14. To the Marquis, the progress of the Anglo-Japanese negotiation was a surprise as well as a source of anxiety. The venerable statesman believed the realization of an Anglo-Japanese alliance as being of slight importance, and was determined to effect a Russo-Japanese agreement on his visit to St. Petersburg. Necessarily, Marquis Ito's position became ambiguous, even precarious. Baron Hayashi pleaded, on the strength of the progress already made, that Japan should consummate the Anglo-Japanese alliance first and then proceed to secure a Russo-Japanese agreement through British cooperation. At least while the Anglo-Japanese negotiations were proceeding normally, he asked the Marquis not to mention the question of Russo-Japanese rapprochement and not to give it serious attention in case Russia took the initiative. After prolonged deliberations, Baron Hayashi seems to have persuaded the Marquis to see his point of view, and the latter, after consulting Tokyo, proceeded to St. Petersburg.

Marquis Ito's procedure from Paris to St. Petersburg without visiting London aroused no small anxiety on the part of Lord Lansdowne, who did not conceal that feeling. Baron Hayashi assured him that Marquis Ito's visit was purely personal and had no official significance whatsoever. At the same time, both Baron Hayashi and Foreign Minister Kato, respectively from London and Tokyo, took pains to impress the Marquis to avoid any move which might nullify the Anglo-Japanese negotiations then proceeding at the Court of St. James and to confine his contacts at the Russian capital to the exchange of personal opinions.

At St. Petersburg, the distinguished Japanese visitor was received royally, but he was placed in a difficult position and had to proceed cautiously. In his conversations with Count Lamsdorff and Count Witte, however, the Marquis presented his views boldly and discovered that Russia, at least outwardly, was receptive and cooperative. His fun-

damental proposition was that, if Russia should recognize Japan's freedom of political, commercial, and military action in Korea, Japan would no doubt concede much to Russia in Manchuria. Count Witte agreed with the Marquis on the necessity of a Russo-Japanese understanding in the Far East and seems to have shared Marquis Ito's views as to Manchuria and Korea. Count Lamsdorff, however, maintained that such a position inferred Russia's complete abstention from Korea and consequently that it necessitated a serious consideration. No accord, even in a personal way, could be reached, therefore, and Marquis Ito left St. Petersburg for Berlin on December 4.

While Marquis Ito was in Berlin, he received Russia's definite propositions in reply to his original proposal: (1) that Japanese military expeditions to Korea on all emergency cases should be limited to a minimum force, should be withdrawn as soon as the disturbance was under control, and should not penetrate beyond certain defined areas near the Russo-Korean border; (2) that Japan should recognize Russia's preponderant influence over and the freedom of action in the Chinese territory adjoining Russia; and (3) that Japan should first obtain Russia's understanding in tendering advice to the Korean Government. The Marquis telegraphed to Tokyo the Russian views with his comments, but Premier Katsura and Foreign Minister Komura both doubted Russian sincerity and replied that the Anglo-Japanese negotiations should precede any official negotiations with Russia. Thus was terminated the unofficial negotiation with Russia, but the Marquis emphasized the importance of the Russo-Japanese relations and proposed to discuss the question in detail upon his return to Tokyo.

Ito on the one hand and Katsura and Komura on the other thus, to the last minute, differed regarding Japan's Far Eastern policy. The former's visit at St. Petersburg was a source of anxiety as much to the Tokyo Cabinet as it was to the Court of St. James. It was purely one of those unhappy coincidences in which Marquis Ito's over-confidence and bold effort nullified his own ideas and unwittingly

helped to materialize his rivals' policy. Marquis Ito's actual contact with the diplomatic offices of Europe must have fully convinced him of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of reaching a Russo-Japanese agreement, and he gracefully supported a substitute policy for Japan. Because after arriving in London from Berlin he had worked for the consummation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, he was ruthlessly criticised at St. Petersburg as if he had been deceiving Russia, while he was credited with using masterful diplomacy in speeding the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese entente.

REACHING THE FINAL DECISION

We must now return to Tokyo and see what had been transpiring at the Japanese capital. The Katsura Cabinet, at a special meeting late in November, offered several amendments to the Lansdowne draft of November 6 and, after obtaining the approval of the Mikado and the Genros, communicated them to Baron Hayashi on November 30. The amendments largely concerned the wording rather than the principle except for two fresh proposals that the alliance should continue for five years and that Great Britain should recognize "Japan's right to take the necessary steps for the protection of her interests in Korea." Hayashi was instructed to obtain Marquis Ito's approval thereupon before presenting them to the British Government. For such a purpose, Matsui Keishiro, then a Secretary of the Japanese Legation at London, was dispatched to St. Petersburg, arriving there on December 3.

Marquis Ito was about to leave for Berlin and agreed to express his opinion after a careful study at the German capital. The decision given by the Marquis at Berlin was somewhat as follows: that Japan and Russia, not Great Britain, had vital interests in Korea and consequently that Japan should negotiate with Russia, not with Great Britain, over the Korean question; that the proposal went too far in granting to Great Britain a position in Korea which she

did not now possess while Japan gained nothing therefrom; that Japan should carefully consider the positions of various European Powers, especially the alignment with Russia; and that, as long as there was a definite hope for a Russo-Japanese understanding, it was premature to approach Great Britain at the expense of Russia. In short, the Marquis was still convinced that Russia loomed more powerful than Great Britain over the Far Eastern horizon, and insisted to the last moment that a Russo-Japanese agreement should precede an Anglo-Japanese alliance. These views were cabled back to Tokyo.

Meanwhile, discussions concerning the proposed Anglo-Japanese and Russo-Japanese agreements, especially in view of Marquis Ito's visit to St. Petersburg, were raging in Japan. Necessarily, Premier Katsura was busy in establishing an understanding among the Genros and a council before the Throne was held on December 7. Besides Premier Viscount Katsura, Foreign Minister Komura, and Navy Minister Admiral Yamamoto from the Cabinet, there were present four leading Genros, Marshal Marquis Yamagata, Count Inouye, Marquis Oyama, and Count Matsukata. Komura reported in detail the course which the negotiations at London were taking, and pointed out the advisability of concluding an Anglo-Japanese alliance rather than a Russo-Japanese agreement. Count Inouye was the only person who, sharing Marquis Ito's views, was hesitant in taking such a momentous step, but, upon hearing the convincing expressions of opinions and the progress of negotiations from the Premier and the Foreign Minister, together with the report that Marquis Ito was favorable to the proposal, gave his approval. Thus the unanimous approval of the Throne as well as of the Genros was obtained in favor of an Anglo-Japanese alliance. That Count Inouye was skeptical of such a procedure, however, is shown by his cable to Marquis Ito in which he raised three points which necessitated further clarification: (1) that it was difficult to understand why Great Britain had broken her traditional policy of isolation in favor of an Anglo-Japanese alliance; (2) that she must be planning to

use Japan for her own interests; and (3) that Germany might not join the proposed alliance.

Marquis Ito's cable from Berlin, containing his renewed objections to an Anglo-Japanese alliance, reached Tokyo on December 8. The Cabinet, while giving them due consideration, saw no necessity of changing the policy already adopted as the whole question had been carefully thrashed out on the previous day. The Premier and the Foreign Minister together visited the Mikado, who cautiously advised them to consult the Genros once more. The Genros again upheld the decision of the Cabinet and the final Imperial sanction was obtained on December 10. Komura immediately instructed Baron Hayashi to present the Japanese amendments to the British Government, while Premier Katsura also informed Marquis Ito of the proceedings, including the actions of the Genros and the Imperial sanction. He explained that a satisfactory Russo-Japanese agreement could not be expected, but that a delay might wreck the Anglo-Japanese negotiations, the result of which would be detrimental to both British and Russian feeling toward Japan. Baron Hayashi referred the Japanese amendments to Lord Lansdowne on December 12, five weeks after the presentation of the first British draft to the Japanese Government. From that date, the negotiations progressed rapidly until the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance on January 30, 1902.

HIGH-LIGHTS OF NEGOTIATIONS

The most important subject of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations naturally related to Korea. Great Britain feared that the proposed Japanese freedom of action in Korea would invite a Russo-Japanese collision and eventually provoke a war involving other Powers, and he proposed a consultative action. Baron Hayashi assured Lord Lansdowne that there was no fear of a Russo-Japanese war chiefly because Japan would avoid all rash actions which were not dictated by reason and common sense; that, even if a war should break

out between the two countries in question, the proposed alliance was binding only when two or more Powers joined the war against an allied member and necessarily the fear of a war among the Powers was remote; and that the consultative clause was useless in view of the fact that emergency cases often required the quickest possible action as in the case of the Masampo lease which was consummated immediately upon learning that Russia was entertaining the idea of leasing it herself. Tokyo endorsed Baron Hayashi's stand in the note of December 18, "assured that the Japanese Government has no intention of using that freedom as a means of aggression," and emphasized the importance of an independent and prompt action to safeguard her interests in an emergency.

The result of these conversations was incorporated in the second British draft of January 14, 1902, of which Article I stated that Japan and Great Britain possessed special interests in Korea and China respectively, but that they did not entertain any aggressive desires in either country, and that "the two nations shall have the privilege of taking the necessary steps for the protection of those interests" when their special interests were "jeopardized by other nations or whenever there is danger of invasion by a foreign country." Komura objected to this draft proposal on two grounds. First, the reading of Japan's "special commercial as well as political interests in Korea" and "Great Britain's special interests in China" gave an impression that Japan had renounced her interests in China, whereas Japan's interests in China were equal to those of Great Britain, if not greater; and second, the conditional clause concerning the "danger of invasion by a foreign country" did not include the important situation resulting from internal revolution or disturbances. Japan therefore proposed two amendments, namely, to include Japan's interests in China and to insert internal disturbances as well as external aggression as justifying the intervention. This idea was incorporated in the third British draft of January 24, and the Korean question was settled.

The relationship between the British and Japanese naval strength during times of peace furnished another important question for the negotiation. The original Japanese proposal stated, as a part of an additional agreement, that the two nations would endeavor to maintain in the Far East a naval strength which should be superior to the strongest naval strength of a third Power. At that time, the combined naval strength of Great Britain and Japan in the Far East was 370,000 tons, 200,000 tons for Japan and 170,000 tons for Great Britain, while the Franco-Russian Entente controlled a total of 200,000 tons, 120,000 tons for Russia and 80,000 tons for France. The British policy in this respect was to reserve the freedom of British naval expansion after the conclusion of an Anglo-Japanese alliance in view of her far-flung dominions and world-wide interest. The compromise was finally reached by an agreement, not as a part of the treaty but in an exchange of notes, that the two countries would cooperate in maintaining their respective naval strength in peace time, and that each Government would offer coaling, repairing, and other facilities to the fleet of the other.

Another important item of discussion related to the sphere within which the proposed alliance should function. Great Britain wished to extend the scope of the alliance so as to include the protection, in case of necessity, of British interests in India. On December 6, Lord Lansdowne raised the question on the ground that the British interests in the Yangtse Valley are not comparable in importance with those of Japan in Korea. The Japanese Government maintained the importance of the British interests in China and insisted that the alliance should concern only the "Extreme East" as otherwise it would arouse the suspicion of the other Powers. On December 12, Baron Hayashi stated his fear that, should India and the Malay Settlements be included, the responsibility of the Japanese Government would be unduly expanded beyond the possibility of practical execution, while on December 19 he went so far as to claim that the Tokyo instructions made it useless to discuss the subject.

Great Britain, in view of the growing importance of the Far East and of the prevailing quietness in the Central Asia, finally agreed to accept the Japanese proposal of limiting the sphere of the alliance to the "Extreme East."

The question of inviting Germany to join the proposed alliance was also seriously considered. It will be recalled that the Anglo-Japanese negotiation was really the by-product of the futile Anglo-German rapprochement. When Baron Hayashi suggested the possible inclusion of Germany on October 16, Lord Lansdowne insisted that an Anglo-Japanese alliance be concluded without regard to Germany as the German interests in the Far East were very insignificant and that it would not be too late to invite her afterward if the nature and scope of the proposed alliance would allow it. When Marquis Ito was in Paris, however, he reminded Baron Hayashi that, should the news of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations be withheld from Germany until after the conclusion of the alliance, it would invite German displeasure. Upon his return to London, therefore, Baron Hayashi again consulted Lord Lansdowne, but the latter was still firm in his conviction that Germany should be ignored during the negotiations. Komura also held the view that the Anglo-Japanese negotiations should be kept secret from Germany until after the conclusion of the alliance and that the matter of notifying Germany should be left to the discretion of the British Government.

After the signing of the Treaty, the question of inviting Germany to join the Alliance was revived. It was at that delicate moment when Chancellor von Bülow had relentlessly attacked the British military and colonial policy in the Reichstag and added fuel to the British indignation which had been rising against Germany since the Boer War. The two Governments then informed Germany of the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance before notifying the other Powers, but the invitation to join it was carefully withheld. Germany offered no protest; nor did it appear that she entertained any suspicion of the true nature of the Alliance. It is possible to believe that, if Germany had been invited

to join, an Anglo-Japanese-German alliance would have been a certainty. It is another irony of history that, twelve years later, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which Germany had thus indirectly approved, should have been invoked against Germany herself.

There was also a careful deliberation of the question of publishing the Treaty of Alliance. Great Britain at first maintained that only a summary and not the full text of the Treaty should be announced. The Japanese Government contended that the Alliance was aimed against no country, but that it was in perfect harmony with the principle of the open door and territorial integrity in China, and that the publication in full would help to prevent possible suspicion on the part of the other Powers. Baron Hayashi conveyed this view to Lord Lansdowne on January 30, the day the Treaty was signed, and Lord Lansdowne, after a careful consideration, agreed thereto.

THE FIRST ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance thus agreed upon was signed by Lord Lansdowne and Baron Hayashi on January 30, 1902. This epochal document which terminated the traditional British policy of isolation and raised Japan to the status of a Great Power consisted only of a preamble and six articles.

It declared that Great Britain and Japan were actuated "solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the Extreme East," to uphold "the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea," and to secure "equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations."

The two Powers disclaimed any aggressive intentions, defined their respective special interests, of which those of Great Britain related principally to China while those of Japan both to China and "in a peculiar degree, politically as well as commercially and industrially," to Korea, and recognized the right of taking "such measures as may be

indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects."

In case either Great Britain or Japan, in defence of their respective interests, should become involved in war with another Power, the other "will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally"; but, should any other Power or Powers enter the war, the other "will come to its assistance, will conduct war in common, and will make peace in mutual agreement with it."

Moreover, neither party, without consulting the other, would enter into separate arrangements with other Powers to the prejudice of the interests above described and they would communicate with one another fully and frankly whenever their interests were considered to be in jeopardy.

The Alliance was to remain in force for five years, terminable at one year's notice at the end of that period.

The full text of the Treaty was made public by Great Britain on February 11 and by Japan on February 12, the Kigensetsu or Japan's national birthday. On that latter day Japan turned a new page in the history of her relations with the world.

THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN DECLARATION

In Japan the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance was generally regarded as a great diplomatic victory; it was welcomed with the utmost enthusiasm and a universal spirit of approval. It was received well also in Great Britain though not without scattering voices of criticism. Both the American people and the press hailed it as an instrument which would guarantee the open door in China without involving the United States Government in European entanglements. In Germany it was interpreted as an obstacle in the way of an Anglo-Russian understanding which

she most feared and the Kaiser himself expressed his "satisfaction."

But Russia, true to Japan's anticipation, was profoundly displeased. Viscount Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, visited Count Lamsdorff on February 13 and explained the nature of the Alliance. Germany, to whom Great Britain and Japan had first disclosed the conclusion thereof, seems to have withheld the information from Russia and it was a genuine surprise to the Russian Foreign Minister. Count Lamsdorff, reading over the text of the Treaty and observing such words as "hostilities" and "war," criticized the implications and exclaimed that he had not even dreamed of a possible war in the Far East. And yet the Russo-Japanese War broke out only two years later! He expressed similar surprise and voiced a similar view to the British Ambassador that afternoon. While there was an expression of universal surprise, there seems to have been very little, if any, ill feeling toward Japan. It appears that the Russian Government interpreted the Alliance as the result of British initiative.

And yet, to warn Japan and to maintain her prestige in the eyes of China, Russia, together with her ally, France, issued a Joint Declaration on March 16. The Declaration claimed that the object of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for "maintaining the *status quo* and the general peace in the Far East, and preserving the independence of China and Korea which are to remain open to commerce and industry of all nations" was also the basis of the Russian and French policy; affirmed that "the observance of these principles is at the same time a guarantee of their special interests in the Far East"; and reserved "to themselves the right to consult as to the means to be adopted for securing those interests" when faced with "the aggressive action of a third Power or the recurrence of disturbance in China" which might jeopardize the integrity and free development of that Power or become a menace to their own interests. A similar idea was also contained in a Russian *communiqué officiel* of March 20. In short, henceforth the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

was to be pitched against the Franco-Russian Entente in Far Eastern politics, for, "if it had any meaning," to quote André Tardieu, it "extended to the Far East the action of the Dual Alliance."

Thus the twentieth century dawned over the Far East with Great Britain and Japan allied to safeguard their respective special interests in China and Korea. And to Japan "it seemed that the Agreement safeguarded Japan's position in Korea, it greatly relieved her from working under the nightmare of a European coalition against her, it strengthened her voice with that of England at the Court of Peking, and it added to the weight of whatever Japan might undertake to do in foreign relations."

CHAPTER IX

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR : DIPLO- MATIC BACKGROUND

THE Russo-Japanese War was the inevitable outcome of Russo-Japanese rivalry for a Far Eastern hegemony. The seeds were sown by the Triple Intervention. Its growth was stimulated by the secret Sino-Russian Alliance, followed by the Russian lease of Port Arthur and the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway across North Manchuria and down through the Liaotung Peninsula. The definiteness of this trend was increased by the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and finally its unavoidability was made certain by the Russian occupation of Manchuria as well as the Russian encroachment upon Korea. In this conflict Japan wagered her national security and her right to a place of equality with the Powers, even her very existence as a nation. Its formation, however, came about more as a result of the intrigues of European politics than as simply a Far Eastern imbroglio.

RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA

Russo-Japanese rivalry in the Far East began in the middle of the nineteenth century with their rival claims to Sakhalin and the Chishima Islands and grew in its intensity because of their respective interests in China and Korea. The seed of a possible war was sown by the Triple Intervention following the Sino-Japanese War and nourished by Russia's continued effort to dominate over Far Eastern affairs. The stage of an impending storm was all set when Russia entered into a secret alliance with China in 1896,

when she leased the very territory which she demanded Japan to restore to China in the name of peace of the Far East, when she built an ice-free naval base at Port Arthur and a warm-water commercial outlet at Dalny, and when she completed the great Trans-Siberian railway which connected St. Petersburg with Vladivostok and Port Arthur across Manchuria. The Russian Far Eastern Empire was, at the turn of the century, within her easy grasp if it had not been for Japan's determined defiance.

The Boxer Uprising in China was just the opportunity for which Russia with eagle eyes was looking in order to complete the next step in her imperial program, the occupation of Manchuria. Under the pretext of participating in the joint expeditions of the allied forces, Russia poured her troops into Manchuria and succeeded, as General Groderkoff reported to the Minister of War at St. Petersburg, in "consolidating the great enterprise of annexing the whole of the Amur to Russia's dominions and making that river an integral waterway and not a frontier stream." After the suppression of the uprisings in the Peking area, Russia promptly withdrew her forces as far as Manchuria. Instead of further withdrawal, Russia increased her forces in Manchuria, this time under the pretext of protecting her railways against bandit activities, but insisted that it was only a temporary measure. To Japan, however, the Russian occupation of Manchuria was nothing short of a veiled threat upon her own national existence, and she joined Great Britain and the United States in protesting against the whole mockery, though in vain. It was in the face of such a situation that, to the utter amazement of Russian statesmen, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was consummated and proclaimed.

Meanwhile, Russia was negotiating with China over the question of evacuating Manchuria. The negotiations naturally dragged. Finally, on April 8, 1902, the celebrated Sino-Russian Convention was signed and, among other things, Russia agreed to withdraw her troops from Manchuria in three stages: to clear the southwestern portion of the Province of Mukden, up to the Liao River within the first six

months and to hand the railways back to China; to clear the remainder of the Province of Mukden and the Province of Kirin within the second six months; and to clear the Province of Hailungkiang within the third six months.

The first stage of evacuation was faithfully completed within the specified time. As April 8, 1903, the agreed date of the second stage of evacuation, drew near, however, the Russian troops showed no disposition of fulfilling the terms of the Convention. Instead, on April 28, Russia presented seven demands to China, the acceptance of which was made conditional before further evacuation would be made. The demands comprised the non-alienation of Manchuria to any other Power, the preservation of the *status quo* in Mongolia, the opening of no new ports or towns in Manchuria "without giving previous notice to the Russian Government," the preponderance of Russian advisers over all administrative affairs in the Northern Provinces of China "where Russia has the predominant interests," the maintenance of the Newchwang-Peking telegraph line as a part of the telegraph system at Newchwang, Port Arthur, and throughout the Province of Mukden, the depositing with the Russo-Chinese Bank of the customs receipts at Newchwang after the Russian evacuation, and the unaffected perpetuation of Russian and other foreign rights and enterprises in Manchuria, together with the Russian domination over the customs and sanitary affairs of the region. China, encouraged by Japanese and British protests, refused to comply with the demands and consequently there was no indication of Russian intention to evacuate Manchuria. In short, these events had revealed Russia's determined desire to occupy Manchuria permanently by proposing unacceptable conditions to China on the one hand and by capitalizing upon China's impotence to resist Russian aggression on the other hand.

When news of the Russian demands upon China reached Japan, Premier Count Katsura and Foreign Minister Baron Komura were both in Osaka. After a conference, Baron Komura immediately instructed Minister Uchida at Peking to warn Prince Ching against giving Russia any rights which

would destroy China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and injure the rights and privileges of the various Powers. At the same time the Premier and the Foreign Minister conferred at Kyoto with the two leading Genros, Marquis Ito and Marquis Yamagata, as a result of which conference the defence of Japan's position at all cost and the continuation of the Japanese policy in Korea were defined as fundamental policies of the Government.

This firm attitude was first reflected at the time of the visit in Japan of General Kuropatkin, the Russian Minister of War. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister conferred with the General several times during the latter's short stay of four days in Tokyo. General Kuropatkin outlined the importance of the railroads terminating at Vladivostok and Port Arthur, the enormous expense involved in the construction of those lines, the necessity of guaranteeing their safety, and the difficulties confronting Russia in evacuating Manchuria, and proposed a Russo-Japanese agreement. Baron Komura pointed out that the protection of railroads and the evacuation of Manchuria were two separate questions and expressed doubt as to the true objective of the Russian activities in Manchuria, incidentally raising objection to the Russian occupation of Manchuria on the ground that it was the first step towards the division of China among Western Powers and that it endangered the independence of Korea which Japan was pledged to maintain at all cost. The Premier was in full accord with the Foreign Minister. General Kuropatkin, therefore, left Japan without being able to discover any basis of a Russo-Japanese understanding over Manchuria. This happened in June, 1903.

Early in July, the famous Port Arthur Conference was held under the leadership of Admiral Alexieff and was attended by General Kuropatkin, the notorious Bezobrazoff, Minister Lesser from Peking, Minister Pavloff from Seoul, Minister Rosen from Tokyo, and others. Little was known about the nature of the deliberations at the time, but the Russian activities soon revealed an added vigorous character. On August 13, a special Vice-Regency known as the

Far East was created out of the Amur and Kwantung territories, and Admiral Alexieff was appointed the first Viceroy of the Far East. The Viceroy was not under the jurisdiction of the Ministers at St. Petersburg, but under the control of a special committee of men nominated and presided over by the Tzar. This Viceroy was vested with supreme power over the civil and military administration of all Russian territories in the Far East and with the management of diplomatic relations of the regions with the neighboring States under his jurisdiction. The statutes organizing the special committee under which the Viceroy served were promulgated on September 30.

Meanwhile, the Russian forces in Manchuria were increased, the activities along the Yalu River were pushed on, all important posts in the Antung district were placed under military supervision, the fortifications at Port Arthur were expanded and reinforced, military supplies were transported and stored, and the fleet was augmented. And thus, by October 8, the end of the third period of the promised gradual evacuation, there was every indication of Russia's intention to stay and to occupy Manchuria permanently.

This inference was made certain on September 6 when Russia presented to China new demands comprising five articles, their acceptance being again made conditional before the withdrawal of the Russian forces from Manchuria would begin. The new demands were similar in general character to the original demands and included the non-alienation of Manchuria and the further solidification of Russian railway and commercial rights and activities in Manchuria. Backed by Japan, China once more refused to comply with the Russian demands.

RUSSIAN ENCROACHMENT UPON KOREA

Manchuria, however, was merely one half of the Far Eastern question which imperilled the future of the Japanese Empire and which led to the Russo-Japanese clash. The other and more important half was Korea, and Russian ag-

gression in the Peninsula State was as unmistakable as in Manchuria.

We have traced in a previous chapter the Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea as far as the turn of the century. Having failed to obtain dominating locations for a naval base at Masampo facing the Strait of Tsushima, due largely to Japan's successful obstructionist tactics, the Russian intrigues centered around the Seoul Court in order to further her ambitions in northern Korea. Back in 1884, Russia had acquired from Korea the right of navigation over the Tumen River and the opening of Kiong-hung to her land trade. In August, 1896, while the King of Korea was a guest in the Russian Legation at Seoul, a certain Brinell from Vladivostok succeeded in securing from Korea a concession for a timber enterprise along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. By 1898, the Tzar was persuaded to favor the project of advancing the Russian interest in Korea by means of just such an industrial exploitation which in reality would act as a smoke screen for actual occupation, but little progress was made. In 1901, the concession was transferred to Captain Bezobrazoff, a leader of the aggressive party at St. Petersburg, and Minister Pavloff at Seoul succeeded in extending the concession period to twenty years. By November, 1902, the Tzar was completely won over to the project, and Captain Bezobrazoff was sent out with an enormous fund at his disposal to initiate the program of exploitation. Almost immediately a lumbering enterprise was located on the Korean side of the Yalu River, a short term concession was obtained for a similar operation on the Manchurian side, and an attempt was made to obtain a concession for a railway from Seoul to the Yalu River.

The Russian flag and army followed the enterprise. Simultaneously with the suspension of the evacuation of Manchuria, the Russian army, by May, 1903, occupied Yonampo, a Korean port near the mouth of the Yalu River. When Korea demanded the evacuation, Russia, instead of complying, formally requested a lease of Yonampo, now christened Nicolas. Immediately extensive works were

started there, including the erection of large brick buildings, the construction of roads and light railways, and a fort. By July, Russia went so far as to construct telegraphic connection between Yongampo and Antung without permission, but she was forced to remove the line as a result of strong remonstrances made by the Korean Government at the instance of the Japanese Minister. And thus the Russian activities on the northern frontier of Korea were becoming openly menacing to the Peninsula Empire. During this period, the Russians at Seoul, under the leadership of Minister Pavloff, exercised a powerful influence over both Yi Keun Thaik and Yi Yong Ik, two of the most venal politicians at the capital, and over the strong party which upheld the interests of Lady Om.

JAPAN INVITES NEGOTIATIONS

To Japan such a course of events in Manchuria and Korea bore a grave significance because the Russian occupation of Manchuria and her armed activities in northern Korea actually threatened the independence of Korea as well as the security of Japan herself, while a possible closure of Manchuria against Japanese commercial activities would seriously cripple her life and growth as a nation. Japan could neither countenance Russian control of Korea nor overlook the integrity of China and the open door policy now trampled down by Russian ambition. The only road open before her was to directly negotiate with Russia in the interest of the peace of the Far East.

A grave conference before the Throne for the purpose of deciding Japan's policy was held in Tokyo, therefore, on June 23, 1903. There were present five Genros—Marquis Ito, Marquis Yamagata, General Count Oyama, Count Matsukata, and Count Inouye—and four leading Cabinet members—Premier Count Katsura, Foreign Minister Baron Komura, Army Minister Terauchi, and Navy Minister Yamamoto. Baron Komura presented a memorandum in which he carefully outlined the advisability of instituting direct negotia-

tions with Russia and the fundamental principles which should guide such negotiations. He boldly maintained that Japan should not yield an inch to Russia on her traditional Korean policy. After careful deliberation, Baron Komura's program was unanimously accepted and then approved by the Mikado. That Baron Komura was determined to protect Japan's interests in Korea as well as in China at all cost is shown by the concluding words of his memorandum: "It must be decidedly difficult to persuade Russia to acquiesce in the Japanese proposal. Therefore, I regard it imperative that, having once proposed it, we face it with the determination of seeing it through by overcoming all obstacles and difficulties."

For the successful execution of such a determined policy, a united backing at home must first of all be secured. For this purpose, therefore, Count Katsura offered to resign the premiership in favor of a Genro. This move he took as Marquis Ito exercised a double control over the internal politics at the time, being at the same time a Genro and the leader of the Seiyukai or the opposition party. The Throne would not accept Count Katsura's resignation and instead effected a drastic change in the national political arena. Marquis Ito resigned the presidency of the Seiyukai Party in favor of Marquis Saionji and accepted the presidency of the Privy Council, which post the latter had resigned. At the same time, the two veteran statesmen, Marquis Yamagata and Count Matsukata were added to the membership of the Privy Council. While Count Inouye did not receive an appointment in the Privy Council, he pledged himself to support its policies. On the basis of such a political reconstruction, Count Katsura proceeded to reorganize his Cabinet, and by July 15 the reorganization of the Tokyo Government was complete and united, ready to face Russia.

Premier Count Katsura and Foreign Minister Baron Komura, in the second place, did not overlook the wisdom of obtaining the British understanding under the newly formed Anglo-Japanese Alliance before taking any drastic step against Russia. Thus on July 1 Baron Komura in-

structed Viscount Hayashi at London to secure this understanding. Viscount Hayashi immediately conferred with Lord Lansdowne. After a special Cabinet session, the British Government gave its approval of the proposed Japanese procedure.

Thus assured of British support, everything was ready for Baron Komura to meet this new development in the Russo-Japanese relationship in the Far East. On July 28, he dispatched a telegram to Minister Kurino at St. Petersburg. In that historic instruction, Baron Komura stated Japan's grievances in clear and unmistakable terms. He asserted that so long as Russia complied with the agreement to withdraw her forces from Manchuria, Japan would maintain "an attitude of watchful reserve," but that it appeared that Russia not only had abandoned the intention of retiring from Manchuria, but also was increasing her encroachment upon Korea. "The unconditional and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia," he continued, "would create a state of things prejudicial to the security and interest of Japan. The principle of equal opportunity would thereby be annulled, and the territorial integrity of China impaired." More serious to Japan, he pointed out, was the situation which was developing in Korea. "If Russia was established on the flank of Korea," he maintained, "it would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that Empire, or at least would make Russia the dominant Power in Korea. Korea is an important outpost in Japan's line of defence and Japan consequently considers her independence absolutely essential to her own repose and safety." Baron Komura then contended that "the political as well as commercial and industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are paramount over those of other Powers" and that Japan, having regard to her own security, could not consent to surrender those interests and influence to, or share them with, another Power. Therefore, Japan had resolved "to consult the Russian Government, in a spirit of conciliation and frankness, with a view to the conclusion of an understanding designed to compose questions which

are at this time the cause of their anxiety."

Count Lamsdorff expressed perfect agreement with the proposed negotiations and, on August 12, Minister Kurino presented Japan's proposal as the basis of an understanding between the two countries. The proposal contained the following simple matters and might readily have been accepted by Russia in its entirety:

"1. A mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires, and to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries.

2. A reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea, and of Russia to take in Manchuria, such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject, however, to the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement.

3. A reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to impede the development of those industrial and commercial activities, respectively, of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of Article 1 of this Agreement.

4. An additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Korean Railway into Southern Manchuria so as to connect with the Eastern Chinese and Shanhaikwan-Newchwang lines.

5. A reciprocal engagement that, in case it should be found necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests mentioned in Article 2 of this Agreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disorder liable to create international complications, troops so sent are in no case to exceed the actual number required, and are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished.

6. The recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance.

7. This Agreement to supercede all previous arrangements between Japan and Russia respecting Korea."

In their more essential features, these articles which comprised the Japanese proposal were not altered in the later notes from Japan, but the principles embodied therein were persistently rejected by Russia. And yet, there was nothing new in the fundamental principles of the Japanese proposal: the preservation of the territorial integrity of and the Open Door in China and Korea; the reciprocal recognition of the vested interests and the peculiar position, respectively, of Russia in Manchuria and Japan in Korea in so far as they did infringe upon the principles of the territorial integrity and the Open Door; and the consideration of Japan's sole right to advise and assist Korea in the cause of reform and good government. It was this last principle which actually turned out to be objectionable to Russia. This had always been the established principle of the Island Empire, made necessary as the penalty of Japan's geographical position.

At that time, the Russian Government was divided into two camps over the Far Eastern question. The pacific and conciliatory party was led by Witte and Lamsdorff, respectively the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, while the militaristic and aggressive group was headed by General Alexieff and notorious Captain Bezobrazoff. In this divided arena of national politics, Captain Bezobrazoff, possessing peculiar influence over the Tzar, was all powerful at the Court, and Count Lamsdorff's conciliatory advice was bound to be defeated at every point. Besides, the course of events made the Foreign Minister's work doubly difficult. On August 13, it will be recalled, the new office of the Viceroy of the Far East was created and General Alexieff was commissioned to fill the post, but the Cabinet was powerless to control its activities. When Witte became President of the Council of Ministers on August 30, therefore, he was helpless in directing the Far Eastern affairs. And thus the power to deal with Japan was lodged in the hand of the aggressive leader, General Alexieff, at Port Arthur.

It was only natural, therefore, before any beginning

could be made in the negotiations, that Count Lamsdorff should demand the transfer of the seat of negotiations from St. Petersburg to Tokyo. The proposal was made officially on August 23. The suggestion was a close reminder to Japan of the policy which Russia had pursued in China regarding the lease of Port Arthur when she declined to negotiate at the Russian capital. Japan proposed negotiations at St. Petersburg to avoid vexatious delays which would accompany negotiations at Tokyo, away both from the Foreign Office and the headquarters of the Viceroy of the Far East. Of the several reasons presented by Russia, one was the approaching absence of the Tzar in Europe and the other the need of constant consultation with Viceroy General Alexieff at Port Arthur. Japan pointed out that the proposed negotiations concerned the question of principles, not of local detail. Japan's repeated requests, however, were firmly rejected by Russia, as was the suggestion that her note of August 12 be made the basis of negotiations. Japan was getting impatient of these unnecessary delays and finally, on September 7, acquiesced in the Russian proposal. The negotiations were thus transferred to Tokyo, and Japan again requested Russia for the prompt submission of her response to the Japanese proposal.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS

Russia had accepted Japan's bid for negotiations and won her initial triumph in transferring the seat of negotiations from St. Petersburg to Tokyo. It was Russia's turn to suggest the basis of negotiations in response to Japan's. Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister at Tokyo, after a visit to General Alexieff at Port Arthur, presented the Russian counter-proposal to Baron Komura on October 3. Not only did it omit the recognition of China's sovereignty over Manchuria and the equal economic opportunity for all nations therein, but it suggested that Manchuria and its littoral should be recognized by Japan "as in all respects outside her sphere of interest." As for Korea, it reduced the Japa-

nese proposal seriously and considerably by excluding her right to render advice and assistance to Korea in the latter's military affairs and by also excluding the principle of the equal opportunity for all nations in Korea. Moreover, it proposed to impose upon Japan several impossible conditions regarding Korea: "not to use any part of the territory of Korea for strategical purposes"; not to fortify the southern coast; to consider the territory lying north of the thirty-ninth parallel or more than one-third of the entire Korean Empire as "a neutral zone" into which neither country should introduce troops. In short, the Russian counter-proposal excluded China and Manchuria from the field of discussion and considerably restricted Japan's actions in Korea; it disclosed an impossible gulf between the two Powers and revealed that Russia was uncompromisingly bent upon absorbing and closing up all of Manchuria as well as carving out Northern Korea as a part of her eventual sphere of influence, while she was unwilling to recognize Japan's growing interests in those territories.

Baron Komura and Baron Rosen began to confer on the basis of the Japanese note of August 12 and the Russian counter-note on October 6, and continued to exchange views on October 8, the very day when the third period of evacuation of Manchuria should have been completed under the Sino-Russian Convention of 1902. The Japanese statesmen conferred on October 10, and four days later Baron Komura presented to the Russian Minister Japan's first amended proposal. The Japanese statesmen were convened again on October 24 and agreed upon the "irreducible minimum" in eleven articles, which was communicated to Baron Rosen on October 30. The prevailing principle of Japan's second amended proposal was reciprocity based upon considerable concessions on the part of Japan. It conceded the special interests of Russia in Manchuria to counter-balance the preponderant interests of Japan in Korea, recognizing each other's right to take necessary measures to protect those interests; it declared that Manchuria was as far beyond the sphere of Japanese special interests as was Korea of the

Russian, and that the treaty rights of Russia in Korea and those of Japan in Manchuria were to be respected as a matter of course; it requested Russia not to impede the economic activities of Japanese subjects in Korea, and Japan agreed not to fortify the Korean coast; it proposed a neutral zone, not on the Korean side only, but "on the Korean-Manchurian frontier extending fifty kilometres on each side." The other articles were largely identical with the first note.

After repeated requests for a speedy answer, Russia replied on December 11 or more than forty days after the Japanese note had been delivered. Russia was now entirely silent on the subject of Manchuria while she repeated the restrictions which were proposed early in October upon Japanese actions in Korea, completely ignoring Japan's second and third conciliatory notes and refusing to recognize Japan's right to offer Korea anything beyond mere advice for the reform of the latter's civil affairs. In short, insincerity was written all over the note, which was as much a reduction of the former Russian concessions as was the third Japanese note an increase of Japan's, and the possibility of conciliation appeared more remote than at the beginning of the negotiation.

Another conference of the Cabinet members and the Privy Councillors was held at Tokyo on December 6, and Baron Komura made one more attempt to appeal to the friendly sentiment of the Russian Government. He conferred with Baron Rosen on December 21 and again emphasized the importance of including Manchuria in the proposed agreement, argued for the removal of restrictions for the use of Korean territory, and proposed the dropping of a Korean-Manchurian neutral zone if Russia insisted upon making it a purely Korean affair. Russia made her last reply to the Japanese proposal on January 6 and insisted upon leaving Manchuria and its coast outside the pale of Japan's sphere of interest. It made no mention of China's territorial integrity in Manchuria, while its only concession was the inclusion of a clause not to obstruct the enjoyment by Japan and the other Powers of their treaty rights in

Manchuria which they had acquired from China, with the exception of those concerning foreign settlements in the open ports. But this was only on the condition of maintaining the clauses relating to the proposed neutral zone in Korea and the non-employment by Japan of any Korean port for strategical purposes.

Baron Komura now saw no wisdom of further continuing the negotiations with Russia as long as Russia refused to take up the Manchurian question. The whole situation was carefully reviewed by the Cabinet members and the Privy Councillors on January 11, and before the Throne on the following day. As a result, on January 13, Baron Komura reminded Baron Rosen of the serious position in which the two nations found themselves and presented Japan's last amended proposal for Russian reconsideration. It insisted upon Japan's dominant position in Korea and proposed to eliminate the clause establishing a neutral zone as well as another restricting the use by Japan of any part of the Korean territory "for strategical purposes." On the other hand, Japan recognized Russia's dominant position in Manchuria with the exception of "the enjoyment by Japan and the other Powers of rights and privileges acquired by them under the existing treaties with China" upon condition, however, that Russia recognize the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria as well as Korea and her coast as lying beyond the Russian sphere of interest in Manchuria and the Russian right to take measures necessary for the protection of those interests. An early reply was urged by Minister Kurino at St. Petersburg several times but, after three weeks, Count Lamsdorff declined even to name the date on which his reply would be given.

The last Russian note was sent to General Alexieff at Port Arthur on February 4, but it did not reach Baron Rosen at Tokyo until after the termination of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It, however, did not contain an agreement recognizing the territorial integrity of China although the neutral zone in Korea was dropped.

THE INTERNATIONAL ALIGNMENT

Before recording the final outcome of the Russo-Japanese negotiations, we must briefly glance over the political complications in Europe. For the international relations in the Far East were merely a part of the European politics revolving around the rival aspirations of Germany, France, Great Britain, and Russia. The United States was vitally interested but had no direct part in the European complications.

Behind Russia moved the Kaiser's agile hand of masterful diplomacy. This was in tune with his established policy of keeping Russia busily engaged in the Far East and thereby preventing Franco-Russian intrigues in European politics. Von Bülow's interpretation of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1900, that it did not include Manchuria, and the German refusal to join in a protest against Russian aggression in the Far East in 1901 had shown conclusively that Germany was then already committed to support Russia in Manchuria. In this respect, the German leasehold at Kiaochow was to afford protection for Russia against Great Britain. Moreover, Germany initiated the move for an Anglo-German-Japanese alliance, but dropped out of the picture when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was consummated. In short, the Kaiser reasoned that Germany could gain more by pushing Russia deeper into Far Eastern affairs than by joining Great Britain and Japan to oppose her, as this would debar active Russian participation in European intrigues, and weaken the Franco-Russian Entente.

Not only was this true with regard to the Russian policy in Manchuria but also in Korea. The Kaiser did not fail to supply the needed oil of encouragement for Russian penetration into the Peninsula State. As late as January 3, 1904, the Kaiser wrote to the Tzar that Russia must have an iceless outlet for her commerce, that "it is evident to every unbiased mind that Korea must and will be Russian," that "when and how" it be effected "is nobody's affair and concerns only you and your country," and that the Russian

annexation of Korea "is a foregone conclusion here like the occupation of Manchuria." Here is the background of the Russo-Japanese War as well as the Moroccan crisis of 1905. For such a policy the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 constituted heavy blows.

France also unreservedly endorsed the Tzar's program in the Far East. This was natural for France who was Russia's ally, but her policy turned out to be ruinous to her own interests. For France, at the turn of the century, was facing Germany's rival ambitions and vigorous intrigues both on the home and colonial frontiers. It was for the purpose of protecting herself in just such a situation that the original Dual Alliance was consummated. But France, at the time when she needed the Russian assistance most and when she should have been urging Russia to conserve her strength, was encouraging instead of restraining Russian activities in the Far East, thereby pushing Russia into her ill-fated humiliation and helping Germany in a plot to injure France. Thus France was forced to seek another ally in Europe, culminating in the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 and the Moroccan crisis of 1905. In the Far East, she naturally manifested an active interest in the Russo-Japanese negotiations. Foreign Minister Delcassé actually attempted to mediate, first indirectly through the United States and then directly with Japan, but the United States would not consider the matter seriously and Japan politely rejected the offer. It is evident that Delcassé, in his conversations with Minister Motono at Paris, tried to discover how much Japan would concede and to bring about a peaceful settlement by persuading both the Tzar and Japan to make concessions. His unsolicited attempts were unappreciated and futile.

Opposed to Russia and Germany stood Great Britain. The Mistress of the Sea was being challenged in her maritime supremacy from two sources, the Russian determination to acquire an ice-free outlet to the sea and the German program of naval expansion. Great Britain followed Russia

clear around the Eurasian continent in blocking every Russian attempt to realize her ambition and finally entered into the alliance with Japan to check Russia's final determined effort. Naturally, Great Britain backed Japan in her task of opposing the Russian Bear. To meet German intrigue and to crush her program of naval expansion, Great Britain was finally forced to enter into alliance with France in April, 1904, in which she recognized as paramount the French interests in Morocco and France reciprocated the same with respect to the British interests in Egypt. In short, Great Britain faced "an indignant China, a hostile Russia, an unfriendly France, and an ambitious Germany" and was obliged to follow what appeared to be a rather paradoxical procedure: to seek an alliance with France whose ally, Russia, was the opponent of her ally, Japan. The new alignment of Powers which ultimately precipitated the World War was already in the formation on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War.

The United States occupied a unique position. On the one hand, she successfully avoided any European entanglement and followed her traditional policy of isolation. On the other hand, she found herself, at the beginning of the new century, vitally involved in the Far East. The protection of the Philippine Islands and the maintenance of the Open Door in China became the cardinal principles of her policy in the Pacific and made it impossible for her to stand aloof from Far Eastern politics. For this reason President Roosevelt realized the need of friendship with Japan. In this respect the American and British interests in the Far East were almost identical and, from the beginning, President Roosevelt gave his sympathy to Japan in her struggle against Russia.

Russia, encouraged by Germany and backed by France, minimized the possibility of Japanese resistance; Japan, allied with Great Britain and with the sympathy of the United States, was determined to resist the Northern Colossus. In January, 1904, thus the Russo-Japanese negotiations had reached an impasse. Baron Komura thus also was studi-

ously careful to keep Great Britain and the United States properly informed of each detail of the succeeding stages of the negotiations.

THE IMPENDING STORM

Under such circumstances, while the Russo-Japanese negotiations were being unnecessarily delayed, Russia was openly completing her military and naval preparations in the Far East. Beginning in April, 1903, nineteen vessels, totalling 82,415 tons, were added to the Russian Far Eastern Fleet and, in addition, fifteen vessels, aggregating 37,000 tons, were sent to the Far East. Beginning also in June, 1903, she transported troops to Manchuria, until there were, by February, 1904, more than 40,000, while she was prepared to send, in case of necessity, over 200,000 more soldiers. At the same time, she was hastening day and night her work of building new forts at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, repairing the fortifications at Kungchuling, Liaoyang, and other strategic points, and sending by land and sea a large quantity of arms and ammunitions. As early as the middle of October, 1903, fourteen trains hurriedly left Russia, carrying field-hospital equipment.

On January 21, the activities of the Russian forces in Manchuria and Korea were considerably accelerated when two battalions of infantry and some artillery were dispatched from Port Arthur to the northern frontiers of Korea; on January 28, Admiral Alexieff ordered the Russian troops near the River Yalu on a war footing; on February 1, the Governor of Vladivostok asked the Japanese commercial agent at the port to prepare to withdraw Japanese subjects residing there to Habarovsk as he had received instructions from his Government to get ready for the proclamation of martial law at any time; and on February 3, all the usable war-vessels were gathered at Port Arthur and, excepting one under repair, steamed out to sea. Evidently Russia, consistently resorting to prolonged delay in the negotiations for the purpose of completing her military preparations, had

not the slightest desire for conciliation and sought to coerce Japan by a show of arms.

In this move, Russia completely misunderstood Japan, just as China had ten years before. Japan was perfectly aware of the Russian insincerity and she too was rushing preparations to meet an emergency. As early as December 28, 1903, the Cabinet, backed by the Privy Council, approved various special measures, including Imperial Orders for emergency expenditures, for the establishment of a war-time general headquarters and a special military council, and for speeding the completion of the Seoul-Fusan railway line. On the same day, an agreement was completed at London for the purchase from Argentine of two cruisers, the *Nisshin* and the *Kasuga*. By January 13, 1904, Baron Komura, after presenting Japan's last amended proposal and observing the Russian reaction thereto, became convinced of the lack of sincerity on the part of Russia in the pending negotiations, and on the following day the High Military Council was organized with Field Marshals General Yamagata and General Oyama, Army Minister Terauchi, Navy Minister Yamamoto, Generals Nodzu and Oku, Admiral Inouye, and Chief of Naval Staff Ito. An Imperial Order for the sea defence was issued on January 22, followed by another two days later for the military use of the railways. And by the end of January there was every indication of another impending storm.

The inevitable course of action then followed. The Cabinet members and the Privy Councillors held an important conference on February 3, and again before the Throne on the following day. On the latter date, the Japanese Government had reached the decision to break off the negotiations with Russia which had proven utterly useless, to notify Russia that Japan would reserve to herself the right to pursue an independent course of action in order to safeguard her acquired rights and legitimate interests and to resort to military action to protect her position. Accordingly, on February 5, Minister Kurino at St. Petersburg was instructed to present two notes to the Russian Government, the one

containing the above decision and the other stating that Japan had been obliged to sever her now valueless diplomatic relations with the Russian Government. The notes were handed to Count Lamsdorff on February 6, Baron Rosen at Tokyo having been already informed by Baron Komura of the unfortunate course of events. The first naval engagement occurred off Chemulpo two days later, followed by the great naval battle off Port Arthur on February 8 and 9. And the war was formally declared by the Mikado and the Tzar on February 10.

The Japanese Imperial Rescript which comprised the declaration of war, after expressing regret "that We have unhappily come to open hostilities against Russia," summarized the causes of the war as follows :

"The integrity of Corea is a matter of constant concern to this Empire, not only because of Our traditional relations with that country, but because the separate existence of Corea is essential to the safety of Our realm. Nevertheless, Russia, in disregard of her solemn treaty pledges to China and her repeated assurances to other Powers, is still in occupation of Manchuria, has consolidated and strengthened her hold upon those provinces, and is bent upon their final annexation. And since the absorption of Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain the integrity of Corea, and would, in addition, compel the abandonment of all hope for peace in the Extreme East, We determined in those circumstances to settle the question by negotiation, and to secure thereby permanent peace. With that object in view, Our competent authorities by Our order made proposals to Russia, and frequent conferences were held during the course of six months. Russia, however, never met such proposals in a spirit of conciliation, but by her wanton delays put off the settlement of the question, and by ostensibly advocating peace on the one hand, while she was on the other extending her naval and military preparations, sought to accomplish her own selfish designs.

We cannot in the least admit that Russia had from the first any serious or genuine desire for peace. She has rejected the proposals of Our Government; the safety of Corea is in danger; the vital interests of Our Empire are menaced. The guarantees for the future which We have failed to secure by peaceful negotiations We can now only seek by Our appeal to arms."

THE QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY

At the time when Japan severed diplomatic relations with Russia, she was entirely unaware of the existence of the secret alliance between China and Russia which was concluded in 1896 and which was directed against Japan. What attitude China should assume, therefore, was a matter of prime importance to the Tokyo authorities. After a careful consideration of the question, the Japanese Government advised the Chinese Government to observe a strict neutrality during hostilities and notified Great Britain, the United States of America, France, Austria-Hungary, and Italy to that effect on February 9.

The reasons for taking this step were obvious. "The conflict between Japan and Russia would affect the interests of China at least to the same extent that it would those of Japan, and the Imperial Government also fully recognize the advantage of utilizing for their aims the resources of China, so immense in population and material," read Baron Komura's identical notes to the Japanese representatives at the capitals of those five Powers. But Japan was apprehensive of the fact that China's participation in favor of Japan would probably plunge the finances of China into a still greater confusion than at present, rendering it difficult for her to meet her obligations, and, graver still, would again arouse an anti-foreign feeling in China, repeating the disastrous experiences of 1900. "For these reasons," the note continued, "the Imperial Government have advised the Chinese Government that, in case Japan and Russia should go to war, they should observe neutrality, and should take all possible measures to maintain order and peace within their Empire."

Simultaneous with this move on the part of the Japanese Government to establish China's neutrality, the Kaiser approached President Roosevelt to issue a circular note, calling upon the Powers interested in China to urge Japan and Russia to "respect the neutrality of China outside the sphere of military operations." John Hay, the Secretary of State

in the Roosevelt Administration, addressed at President Roosevelt's direction such a circular note to the belligerents and to China, urging the advisability of respecting the neutrality and administrative integrity of China and of limiting the zone of hostilities. The Hay note, however, omitted the clause referring to the sphere of military operations.

The Hay note reached the Tokyo Foreign Office on February 12 and Baron Komura replied on the following day. He declared that the Japanese Government was in perfect accord with the United States Government in the desires expressed in the Hay note, and that it would, so long as Russia made the same pledge and faithfully observed it, promise to respect the neutrality and administrative entity of China "beyond regions actually in Russian occupation." The Hay note, however, turned out to be a different proposition from that which the Kaiser desired and after consulting the Tzar, Germany accepted it with some reservations, while Russia specifically excepted Manchuria from the area of its operation and the Kaiser obtained through the Russian declaration what he originally proposed. The other Powers also confirmed the Japanese view in replying to the Hay note.

On February 13, the same day that Baron Komura replied to the Hay note, China issued a declaration proclaiming her neutrality. In reply, on February 17, Baron Komura pledged the Japanese Government to respect the neutrality of the Chinese Empire "in all the dominion outside the territory under Russian occupation, and so long as Russia acts likewise." Then he affirmed that "Japan's hostilities against Russia having been actuated, not by a desire for conquest, but solely by the necessity of defending her just rights and interests, the Imperial Government have not the slightest intention of acquiring territory, as a result of the war, at the expense of China," and asked her to regard the measures to be taken by Japan in the field of action within the Chinese territory "arising, as they will, purely from military necessities, will not be of a nature to infringe the sovereign rights of the Chinese Empire."

Had Japan known at that time of the existence of the Sino-Russian secret alliance directed against her, how different the course of the War might have been!

As to the question of neutrality on the part of the other Powers, Japan had little anxiety. Great Britain, through the medium of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, promised that she would not permit a third Power to intervene on the side of Japan's opponent. The United States openly took a similar stand. As soon as the War was declared, President Roosevelt notified Germany and France "that in event of a combination against Japan to do what Russia, Germany, and France did to her in 1894, I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf." Japan could not have wished to secure better assurances; in fact, the British and American stand delayed the World War for ten years by preventing the other Powers from participating in the Russo-Japanese War although the complications of European politics justified such an action. And thus the proclamation of neutrality by the Powers followed in due time. The only breach of that international obligation occurred when France offered the facilities of her colonial outposts to aid the Russian Baltic Fleet in its hurried voyage from Europe to the Far East.

Another question of prime importance related to the status of Korea as the Russo-Japanese War concerned the Russian encroachment upon that country as well as Manchuria. For this purpose, the Korean-Japanese Protocol was concluded on February 23, 1904, whereby Japan pledged herself to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Peninsula Empire and undertook to institute internal reforms therein. One half of the Russo-Japanese negotiations during 1903-04 related to Japan's desire for a free hand in Korea and thus, with the Russian withdrawal from the peninsula, the great historical problem of the Korean-Japanese relations found its logical solution. To this Protocol, however, we shall return and discuss its significance in detail in a later chapter.

CHAPTER X

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: THE PORTSMOUTH CONFERENCE

THE Russo-Japanese War was one of the great decisive wars in world history. For Japan it was an adventure of the first magnitude, a veritable life-and-death struggle, but she emerged from it with an unbroken record of victories. It crushed the Russian dream of a Far Eastern Empire and established Japan's undisputed position among the Powers in the Far East; it gave President Roosevelt the exalted role of a great peace-maker; it rewarded Japan with her first foothold on the Asiatic continent and ushered in a new age in Japan's relations with the world, especially with Korea and Manchuria.

THE COURSE OF THE WAR

For Japan the Russo-Japanese War was a "people's war." The whole nation was united in an effort to defend her national security as well as the territorial integrity of China and Korea against the rushing tide of Russian aggression. The result was an amazing revelation of Japan's naval and military strength and Japan won an unbroken series of victories both on land and sea.

Beginning with the naval victories off Chemulpo on February 8 and off Port Arthur on February 8-9, Japan adopted a program of offensive warfare which required four major operations against the Northern Colossus: (1) to drive the Russians out of Korea; (2) to capture the Russian naval base at Port Arthur; (3) to destroy the Russian fleet; and (4) to defeat the Russian Grand Army in Manchuria.

The first objective was easily attained, without much resistance, and by May 1 the First Army under the command of General Kuroki crossed the Yalu River.

The second objective was more difficult to achieve. The Second, Third, and Fourth Armies, respectively under the command of General Oku, General Nogi, and General Nodzu, were landed on the Liaotung Peninsula. The Second Army cut the Russian line between Port Arthur and other Manchurian points in a fierce but victorious battle of Nanshan and, together with the First and the Fourth, began their operations against the Russian Grand Army in Manchuria. The Third Army then took the place of the Second and began the historic siege of Port Arthur on July 31. It was a slow and tedious process and, after a series of the bloodiest engagements of the entire War, General Stoessel surrendered Port Arthur on January 2, 1905.

The third objective was gained by sealing the Russian Far Eastern Fleet within Port Arthur and by completely annihilating the Baltic fleet, which was sent clear around from Europe, in the world's most decisive naval battle at the Strait of Tsushima on May 28. Only two of the formidable Russian armada escaped while all the others were sunk and Admiral Rozhdestvenski was rescued and made captive by Japanese seamen. With only three Japanese torpedo-boats lost, it immortalized the name of Admiral Togo.

The fourth and last objective of the War was also difficult to accomplish. After a great Japanese victory at Liaoyang, August 23 to September 4, the Russian Grand Army was gradually driven northward, and the decisive land battle of the War was fought near Mukden on March 10, as a result of which the Russians were driven further north of Mukden. While the two rival armies of 700,000 men were manoeuvring on an eighty-mile battle line on the expansive plains to the north of Mukden, the treaty of peace was signed at Portsmouth and the curtain fell over the grim battlefield of Central Manchuria.

Another section of the War, it should not be forgotten, was proceeding in Sakhalin. The Japanese forces were

landed there on July 7, 1905, the Russian army capitulated on August 1, and the whole Island was occupied by August 30. The occupation of Sakhalin was destined to contribute an important problem at the Peace Conference although its military operations were minor as compared with those in Manchuria.

ENVOYS TO GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA

The first diplomatic action of the Japanese Government after the declaration of war was the sending of special envoys to Great Britain and the United States. Baron Komura adopted this policy for the purpose of explaining Japan's actions and objectives, and, after consulting Premier Count Katsura and President Marquis Ito of the Privy Council, appointed Baron Suyematsu Kencho for Great Britain and Kaneko Kentaro for the United States.

In dispatching these two special envoys abroad, Baron Komura emphasized the need of clarifying four points which were hopelessly misunderstood: (1) that Japan was forced to declare war against Russia on account of the latter's insincere and uncompromising attitude; (2) that the vicious propaganda of "Yellow Peril" had no real basis and should be suppressed; (3) that the chief reason for requesting China's strict neutrality was to prevent the repercussion of the "Yellow Peril" fever and to delimit the field of military operations so as not to disturb general peace and trade relationship in that country; and (4) that Japan's desire to educate the Chinese people was due, not to the hope of stirring up a "Yellow Peril" storm, but to the need of maintaining peace and order in the Far East which could be assured only after the Chinese people were properly educated.

The special envoys remained in their respectively assigned countries throughout the war period and became instrumental and indispensable in maintaining the splendid understanding which existed between Japan and those two countries. Especially deserving were Kaneko's services at Washington. There grew up a most intimate friendship

between him and President Roosevelt which became priceless as a liaison factor during the Portsmouth Peace Conference.

UNSUCCESSFUL PEACE MOVES

France was deeply concerned over the unexpected development of the War which was altogether unfavorable toward her ally, Russia. It was France who made unwelcome and unsuccessful attempts to mediate in the course of the Russo-Japanese negotiations and it was again France who first tried to consummate peace between the two belligerent nations. As early as December 14, 1904, Bompar, the French Ambassador to Russia, visited Minister Motono at Paris and offered his good offices in initiating peace negotiations, but Japan politely rejected the offer on the ground that Japan did not desire the intervention of a third Power and that Russia, if she sincerely aspired for peace, could best negotiate with Japan directly.

Meanwhile, Port Arthur capitulated and the surrender of that famous stronghold was interpreted generally as a death blow to the Russian interests and ambitions in the Far East. Naturally peace proposals were suggested in many countries, but no nation desired to act as mediator. The most interesting of such talks was one held at Berlin, proposing that Germany, France, and the United States unite in an effort to force peace upon Japan, to separate Japan from Great Britain, to effect a new alliance between Russia and Japan, and thus to isolate Great Britain. When the news reached London, the British Government hastened to send to Washington Cecil Spring-Rice, then at St. Petersburg, in order to prevent the United States from joining in such a foolish project. President Roosevelt and Spring-Rice had known each other for over twenty years and the former completely trusted the latter. It is entirely possible that President Roosevelt invited Spring-Rice to Washington. At any rate, Spring-Rice's visit, not only accomplished the mission for which he was sent, but also clarified in the Presi-

dent's mind the European political complications at the time. It was after that memorable visit that President Roosevelt began to take a direct interest in effecting peace between Japan and Russia.

President Roosevelt enjoyed the advantage of having stood aloof from European politics, but was vitally concerned nevertheless with Far Eastern developments. And he soon emerged as a leader in the interest of peace. He first conceived the wisdom of approaching Russia before Japan and suggested through French Ambassador Dousseran at Washington the advantage of the Russian appeal for peace. In his personal capacity, he also transmitted the same idea to the Tzar through the President of the French Republic. Russia, through a similar channel, rejected the friendly advice by conveying her determination to continue the War as she possessed complete confidence in her Baltic Fleet which was already on its way to the Far East and in her re-organized army in North Manchuria. President Roosevelt was immediately suspected by Germany as being the tool of Japan, which he quickly denied. He was convinced, however, that it was wise to wait for the outcome of the Mukden battle and the fate of the Baltic Fleet before proceeding further, and dropped the matter for the time being.

The Japanese victory at Mukden on March 10 marked one more step toward peace. Public opinion throughout the world read in the Mukden battle the last hope of Russia on land crushed beyond repair and even the pro-Russian papers began to advise an immediate termination of the War as the only way to save Russia. Even in Russia a desire for peace was rising rapidly and on March 14 Finance Minister Witte, in a memorial to the Tzar, pointed out the financial difficulty of continuing the War and pleaded the wisdom of suing for peace before Russia was completely crushed on the Manchurian battlefield. French Ambassador Dousseran at Washington called upon President Roosevelt to learn Japan's terms of peace. On the other hand, the German Ambassador at Washington tried to convince Minister Takahira as well as President Roosevelt that Russia was

prepared to continue the War easily for another year, but that Japan would not be able to endure for that period.

Thus, President Roosevelt once more set out on the trail of mediation. He met Minister Takahira several times and not only urged Japan to take advantage of the favorable position of the Japanese army in Manchuria to conclude peace, but tried confidentially to learn Japan's terms, especially her intention to exact any indemnity. Baron Komura of course insisted that, while Japan was grateful for the President's gesture of friendship, it was impossible to offer Japan's terms before the peace conference was actually organized, much less to clarify Japan's position with regard to the indemnity question although she was justified in demanding an indemnity in the light of the victorious trend of the War and numerous precedents in similar cases.

At this juncture, President Roosevelt revealed a proposal, mainly supported in France and Russia, for an international conference to decide the fate of the Russo-Japanese War, but he rejected the idea on the ground that the issues should be decided by the two belligerent nations and that such an international conference might do more harm than help to China's territorial integrity. Germany and Great Britain supported the President's views and the fantastic suggestion was dropped. Baron Komura was also in complete agreement with the President and insisted upon direct negotiations with Russia.

One more attempt to help Russia was made by France. Delcassé communicated to Minister Motono on April 5 that he had reliable information concerning the Russian desire for peace and that he was willing, should Japan waive such humiliating demands as territorial cession or indemnity payment, to bring Japan and Russia together for a peace parley. Baron Komura's position remained unshaken and the French overtures failed once more.

JAPAN TAKES DECISIVE ACTION

In the light of such an attitude on the part of the Powers,

it became necessary for Japan to decide upon a fundamental policy in facing the issues of war and peace. Accordingly, an important Cabinet meeting on April 8 adopted the line of procedure as follows: that the plans should be formulated on the basis of the further prolongation of the War; that Japan's military position should be strengthened by solidifying the places already occupied and by exerting every effort toward the assured attainment of a predominant position; and that necessary steps should be taken diplomatically to bring about a satisfactory peace in so far as circumstances permit.

When Baron Komura confidentially communicated the above decision to Great Britain and the United States, President Roosevelt wrote to Secretary of War Taft that peace should be directly negotiated between Japan and Russia, and expressed his confidence that Japan was prepared to uphold the Open Door in Manchuria and to return Manchuria to China. Baron Komura assured President Roosevelt that Japan was in perfect agreement with his ideas. Thereupon the President proposed a preliminary meeting between Ambassador Cassini and Minister Takahira at Washington. Baron Komura, however, instructed the Japanese Minister to point out that the course of events at the moment was most favorable to Japan both from the financial and military points of view, even in the face of the approaching Baltic Fleet in the Far East, and to answer his proposal indirectly by assuring the President of Japan's desire to meet Russia should the latter express her intention to effect peace, but by pointing out that the success of such a move depended solely upon the sincerity of the Russian desire for peace and by asking him whether or not he believed that the time was ripe for peace negotiations and that Russia was ready to take such a step. There was no room for doubt that Russia's entire hope was then wrapped up in the fate of her Baltic Fleet, and President Roosevelt was convinced that Russia would not consider peace until after the destiny of her fleet became known, but that it would be to the best interest of Japan to negotiate for peace before the fated meeting of the

Baltic Fleet and the Japanese Navy, the outcome of which he seems to have regarded with anxiety.

The fate of the Baltic Fleet in the Far East thus became the focal point of the whole world. But what a fate! The complete annihilation of the Baltic Fleet at the end of its long voyage was more decisive than the destruction of the Spanish Armada or the fate of the French fleet at the battle of Trafalgar.

Premier Count Katsura and Foreign Minister Baron Komura were both aware of the fact that Japan then faced a diplomatic opportunity to attain satisfactory peace and decided, after a careful deliberation of the whole situation, to take the first step in that direction. On May 31, Baron Komura instructed Minister Takahira to approach President Roosevelt on the question of peace, suggesting that the President "directly and entirely of his own motion and initiative" invite the two belligerents to come together for the purpose of direct negotiation and that, if the President was disposed to undertake the service, the Japanese Government would leave to his discretion the course of procedure and the matter of consulting the other Powers. President Roosevelt gladly accepted the invitation which was presented to him on June 1.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S GOOD OFFICES

Japan having thus taken the initiative, President Roosevelt now assumed the leadership as peace-maker. On June 2, he proposed to Russia through Ambassador Cassini the wisdom of concluding a peace with Japan. He made it doubly certain that his views were properly conveyed to the Tzar by instructing Ambassador Meyer at St. Petersburg on June 5 to communicate a similar message directly to the Tzar. He also cautiously transmitted his intentions on June 4 to the Kaiser, who was in complete accord with him on the question. On June 6, Ambassador Cassini presented the Tzar's reply to the President that Russia neither asked for peace nor invited mediation of another Power but

that she hoped the President would use his influence in finding out the exact nature of the Japanese terms for peace. Naturally, in the face of such a paradoxical Russian attitude, the President was both puzzled and disappointed, and he did not conceal the fact from Kaneko.

At St. Petersburg, Ambassador Meyer called upon the Tzar, on June 6, and, after a conference extending over one hour, obtained the Tzar's assurance of the Russian desire for peace as well as his suggestions for the procedure. When Meyer's cable reached the White House late on June 7, therefore, President Roosevelt was overjoyed. He immediately invited Minister Takahira to a conference, and disclosed to him the Tzar's willingness to name his representative to discuss peace if Japan would name hers. The Japanese Minister assured the President that, should Russia sincerely ask for peace, Japan would be glad to name her representative, which course was later approved by Baron Komura himself. Thereupon President Roosevelt proceeded on June 9 to forward identical notes to Japan and Russia through the United States representatives at St. Petersburg and Tokyo. The notes urged Japan and Russia to begin direct negotiations for peace without mediation of a third Power, and offered his good offices, if necessary, in exchanging preliminary views with regard to the date and places of the conference. Japan accepted the proposal on June 10, as did Russia, and thus President Roosevelt succeeded where others failed in bringing the two belligerent nations together.

In taking this step, President Roosevelt repeatedly but vainly tried to ascertain the British attitude. Japan was careful in consulting her ally before taking any important step and the two allied nations moved together for peace as well as for war. Naturally, Great Britain welcomed the proposal for peace negotiations. However, Lord Lansdowne appears to have shared with King Edward the opinion that Japan should wait for peace until the occupation of Vladivostok and should assume a lenient position by restoring Vladivostok to Russia and settling other issues in return therefor. "The object of England was," as Spring-Rice

paraphrased Lord Lansdowne's statement, "to see peace established and above all a durable peace—a peace which would be satisfactory to both Russia and Japan and create a state of things in Asia which would preclude the outbreak of another war whether in the East, the South, or the West. The sooner peace is established, the better for us—provided that the peace in question has the guarantee of stability—i. e. leaves no intolerable wrong behind it, demanding revenge." Lord Lansdowne also reminded President Roosevelt of the fact that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, "which is now in force and remains in force as long as the war lasts, binds England not to allow a hostile combination against Japan. England must not only observe the letter but the spirit of this treaty."

The peace parley having been thus assured, the next important questions related to the selection of the representatives of the two belligerent Powers and the place of meeting. Japan's views on these questions were outlined in Baron Komura's note to President Roosevelt, dated June 11: that the conference be held at Chefoo; that it should meet at the earliest possible date; and that the Russian representatives, both in personality and rank, be those in whom Japan could place her full confidence. In place of Chefoo, Russia suggested Paris, and President Roosevelt proposed The Hague, while London, Berlin, Mukden, and Harbin were quickly ruled out. Japan objected to any European city but readily agreed with President Roosevelt when he suggested Washington. The meeting place was finally settled at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, due largely to the summer heat at the American capital.

As to the representatives, Japan was most concerned with the possibility of Russian representatives possessing merely a limited power to negotiate peace, and President Roosevelt decided to remind Russia of the importance of appointing representatives with full powers, but the question was dropped when Russia clearly assured the same in her note of June 13. Accordingly, the Japanese Government appointed, officially on July 3, Baron Komura Jutaro, the

Foreign Minister, and Takahira Kogoro, the Japanese Minister at Washington, respectively as the first and the second plenipotentiary. Although Marquis Ito Hirobumi and Baron Komura were originally named, the former declined the appointment, largely because he entertained different political opinions from those of Premier Count Katsura.

The Tzar, on the other hand, faced a serious difficulty in selecting representatives for this altogether unwelcome mission. He first named Nelidorff, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, who declined the nomination on the ground of ill health, lack of knowledge of Far Eastern affairs, and inability to use the English language. The Tzar next turned to Muravieff, the Russian Ambassador at Rome, who, when he discovered that the Russian public was critical of his appointment and when his demand for 100,000 roubles for expenses was declined, also pleaded ill health. Izwalsky, who was in Denmark at the time, was then considered, but he recommended Witte in his place. The unwelcome mission thus fell upon the shoulders of Witte, whom Count Lamsdorff first nominated but the Tzar had rejected on the ground that Witte was formerly critical of the Russian policy in the Far East. Baron Rosen, then at Washington but formerly at Tokyo, was named the second plenipotentiary. The representatives were to meet at Washington early in August.

As to the question of armistice which was proposed by Russia, Japan deferred the discussion until the meeting of the conference at Portsmouth. Japan rightly suspected Russian intentions, as did President Roosevelt, and feared that Russia might utilize the armistice in gaining time and augmenting her fighting forces in Manchuria.

PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE

Baron Komura was an extremely cautious diplomat. As early as March, 1905, he was convinced that the peace parley was approaching in the near future and he had shown Premier Count Katsura a draft of his views on Japan's pos-

sible peace terms. When a sentiment for peace arose over the world as a result of the Japanese victory at Mukden, the Cabinet began to give more serious thought to the question and discussed the subject on April 21, but no decision was reached. Now that the peace parley had been definitely set, the Cabinet meeting on June 31 adopted Japan's peace terms and the Imperial sanction thereupon was obtained on July 7. The draft peace terms thus approved contained three groups. The "Absolutely Indispensable Articles" included: recognition of Japan's free hand in Korea; withdrawal of all the Russian forces from Manchuria within a specified period; and cession to Japan of the Russian leases to the Liaotung Peninsula and the railways south of Harbin. The "Relatively Important Articles," to be secured as far as circumstances permitted, included: payment of an indemnity for Japan's military expenses; transfer to Japan of all the Russian war vessels which found refuge in neutral harbors; cession to Japan of Sakhalin and adjoining islands; and granting to Japan of fishery rights along the Russian coast provinces in the Far East. The "Additional Articles," to be left entirely to the discretion of the representatives, included: limitation of the Russian naval strength in the Far East, and conversion of Vladivostok into a purely commercial port by levelling all fortifications there.

Already the Japanese army occupied Manchuria south of Mukden and the occupation of Sakhalin was assured while the Japanese navy ruled Far Eastern waters. Yet Count Katsura and Baron Komura were aware of the fact that peace on terms desired by Japan could not be secured, and Baron Komura proposed, in order to assure a dominant diplomatic position, the execution of what he termed the four major prerequisites to satisfactory peace negotiations: to defeat the Russian Grand Army under its new commander, General Linevitch, and to crush all Russian hope of an eventual military come-back in Manchuria; to raise a new foreign war loan amounting to three hundred million yen; to drive out the remaining Russians completely from Northern Korea; and to complete the occupation of Sakhalin. The oc-

cupation of Sakhalin was an accomplished fact while Korea was practically clear of Russian army when the Portsmouth Conference was organized. But Japan was facing the difficulty of raising a new foreign loan while the Japanese army was still unable to crush the reorganized Russian army in Manchuria. It was this last situation which gave Russia a pretext that she was not as yet a defeated nation and placed Baron Komura in a most unfavorable diplomatic position at Portsmouth.

Moreover, in order to strengthen Japan's diplomatic position in the Far East and to assure Japan's free hand in Korea, Baron Komura was pursuing a shrewd diplomatic policy. In the first place, he instituted in May, 1905, negotiations for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which was to expire in 1907. The conclusion of the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance on August 22, to which we shall return in the following Chapter, therefore, gave Japan a complete understanding with Great Britain to face the issues of peace at Portsmouth, although the negotiations at London and Portsmouth proceeded simultaneously a part of the time. In the second place, Baron Komura was establishing an understanding over Korea with the United States as we shall see also in the following Chapter. In short, Japan was assured of British and American support for her Korean policy, which was enough to offset her unfavorable position at the Portsmouth parley.

Baron Komura and his party received a tremendous send-off from the people of Japan who were exceedingly exultant on account of succeeding victories but who knew nothing about the delicacy of diplomacy, especially that faced by Japan at that time. One needs to go no further to understand why aged Count Inouye in tears said to Baron Komura that he was in a most difficult position and that his past honor and achievements might be completely lost at the approaching Portsmouth Conference, and why Marquis Ito expressed his sympathy by affirming that he, if no one else, would be at the pier to receive him back to Japan after the Portsmouth Conference. Baron Komura departed amid

tremendous popular acclaim, unprecedented in Japanese history, with grim determination to face the worst which he seems to have clearly foreseen when he remarked to Premier Count Katsura that the "people's reaction will be completely changed when I return" and that "they are glad as their relatives will soon return from the battlefield."

Before the official reception of the Japanese and Russian peace envoys, President Roosevelt informally received them separately at his summer home at Oyster Bay. The meeting between President Roosevelt and Baron Komura was marked by a feeling of intimate acquaintance. The President discussed the whole situation with the Japanese envoy and frankly advised him that this was an opportunity which would never return if missed, that the peace parley must not be wrecked on the rock of indemnity, and that he should present important demands first, leaving minor demands for later revelation. Baron Komura thanked the President for his friendly considerations and confidentially showed him a list of Japanese demands, with which President Roosevelt expressed his entire satisfaction. However, he saw the difficulty of obtaining any amount of indemnity, especially after Witte's appointment, and cautioned Baron Komura that he should discuss the matter in principle before presenting the actual amount.

When President Roosevelt received Witte, again informally, the Russian envoy made it clear that Russia was not a defeated nation, that she would not accept any humiliating demands, and that she would not pay an indemnity in any form. The President carefully reminded Witte that peace was beneficial to both Russia and Japan and that Russia must consent to a reasonable amount of indemnity if it became a condition of peace.

How concerned President Roosevelt was over the interests of the Japanese is shown by the fact that, in the course of the official reception aboard the *Mayflower*, while they were still waiting for the Russian party, he confidentially disclosed Witte's ideas to Baron Komura. The Portsmouth Conference was thus held under the sympathetic

guidance of the President whose mediating hand brought it together. But the hand of fate did not favor Japan and her representatives.

THE PORTSMOUTH PEACE CONFERENCE

The historic Portsmouth Peace Conference got under way on August 9. On the following day Baron Komura presented Japan's terms of peace on the basis of the policy already adopted with two minor modifications. The Japanese demands comprised twelve articles as follows:

I. Russia to acknowledge that Japan possesses in Corea paramount political, military, and economical interests and Russia to engage not to obstruct or interfere with any measures of guidance, protection, and control which Japan finds it necessary to take in Corea.

II. Russia to evacuate Manchuria within a specified period and to relinquish all territorial advantages and all rights of occupation and all preferential and exclusive concessions and franchises in that region in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

III. Japan to restore to China Manchuria with the exception of the Leased Territory subject to the guarantee of reform and improved administration.

IV. Japan and Russia reciprocally to engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industries of Manchuria.

V. Russia to cede to Japan Sakhalin and adjacent islands and all public works and properties thereon.

VI. Russia to transfer and assign to Japan the lease of Port Arthur, Talien, and adjacent territory and territorial waters, and all rights, privileges, and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease, together with all public works and properties.

VII. Russia to transfer and assign to Japan the railway between Harbin and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, privileges, and properties appertaining thereto, as well as coal mines belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.

VIII. Russia may retain and work the Trans-Manchurian railway subject to the condition that the same is to be employed exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes.

IX. Russia to reimburse to Japan the actual expenses of war, the amount of which and the time and method of payment to be agreed upon mutually.

X. Russia to surrender to Japan as lawful prizes all vessels of war which sought asylum in neutral ports in consequence of injuries received in battle and were there interned.

XI. Russia to agree to limit her naval strength in the Far East.

XII. Russia to grant to Japanese subjects full fishery rights along the coasts and the bays, harbors, inlets, and rivers of her possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Bering Seas.

It will be recalled that another item on the dismantlement of all fortifications in Vladivostok was included in the original draft which was adopted on June 30 and sanctioned by the Throne on July 7. This was dropped by Baron Komura, partly because President Roosevelt advised him that it was humiliating to the Russian national dignity and partly because it was covered under Article X. Again through President Roosevelt's advice, the "indemnity" of war was changed to the "reimbursement" of war expenses.

The Russian reaction to the Japanese terms was true to expectation. Witte accepted with some modifications eight of Japan's twelve Articles, but vehemently objected to four, namely, the cession of Sakhalin, the payment of an indemnity of war, the transfer of war vessels detained in neutral ports, and the limitation of the Russian Far Eastern Navy. The Russian objection to the first two items was clearly stated when the Tzar instructed Witte not to cede an inch of Russian territory nor pay a rouble of indemnity. The basis of the Japanese claim to Sakhalin was its actual occupation by the Japanese army and its necessity for Japan's national defence, while the Russian objection was based upon the derogatory bearing which the cession had upon Russian dignity. As to the war indemnity, Japan rightfully demanded it as the victor of the War, but Russia refused it

on the ground that she was not yet a defeated nation and that, therefore, it was humiliating to the Russian honor. Witte objected to the Japanese demand concerning the Russian war vessels in neutral ports on the ground that they were properly dismantled under the international law of procedure and that they would remain there in that condition until after the War. To the question of the limitation of the Russian navy in the Far East, Witte objected again on the ground that it was derogatory to the Russian dignity, and suggested instead that Russia promise in a public statement not to maintain a large naval force in the Pacific. In short, the Russian objection was based largely upon the Russian contention that she was not yet a defeated nation. "There are no victors here," in Witte's own language, "and therefore no defeated."

With these wide gaps between the contentions of the two nations before them, Baron Komura and Witte held several sessions. Witte seems to have realized the ultimate necessity of Russia's yielding on the cession of Sakhalin, the transfer of war vessels in neutral ports, and the limitation of the Russian navy. But the Tzar was immovable in his original stand of the non-cession of territory and the non-payment of indemnity.

Meanwhile, the war party and the sentiment for the continuation of the War were gaining ground at St. Petersburg and there was forthcoming no indication of a compromise. Baron Komura, therefore, at the eleventh session on August 18 suggested that, if the Russian Government would favorably consider the questions of Sakhalin and indemnity, the Japanese Government would be willing to withdraw its demands concerning the war vessels in neutral ports and the limitation of the Russian navy in the Far East. In an unofficial session which followed, Witte reiterated that there would be no possibility of Russian acquiescence upon the two questions, but that he personally considered the division of Sakhalin between Russia and Japan a possibility. To the latter opinion Baron Komura first objected from an historical point of view and in the face of the accomplished

fact, but later he was willing to compromise. Thus arose Baron Komura's unofficial proposal that Japan restore to Russia the northern half of Sakhalin and that Russia in return pay to Japan 120 million yen as the Island was then actually under the Japanese occupation. The memorable session ended, each agreeing to ask for instruction from his government upon the Komura compromise proposal. The Tokyo Government approved of the compromise proposal, even instructing Komura to reduce the amount of indemnity in case it was necessary, but the Tzar, giving deaf ear to President Roosevelt's persuasive advice, stood firm and hope for the projected compromise became very faint.

Here entered the mystery of diplomacy. When Ambassador Meyer saw the Tzar on June 23, the latter was firm in insisting upon the non-payment of an indemnity, but intimated that he was willing to sanction a peace on the basis of the division of Sakhalin provided Japan would waive the questions of the Russian war vessels in neutral ports and of the limitation of the Russian navy in the Far East. This conversation was immediately transmitted to Washington. President Roosevelt communicated with Kaneko several times, emphasizing that Japan should not insist upon continuing the War on account of the indemnity question, and suggested to the Kaiser and the President of the French Republic that they also urge the Tzar to conclude peace. Finally he wired to the Tzar himself, but he said nothing about the Tzar's willingness to acquiesce in the division of Sakhalin. Not only did President Roosevelt conceal the information from Japan, but earnestly advised Japan to give up the idea of demanding an indemnity. Here is a puzzle to which no answer has yet been given. Eventually, however, the Tokyo Foreign Office solved the puzzle at a most critical moment as we shall see presently.

Thus the Portsmouth Peace Conference faced the final deadlock on August 26, and the last session was set for August 28. Meanwhile, an opinion was conceived at Tokyo that, as long as the questions concerning Korea and Manchuria were satisfactorily settled, the questions of an in-

demnity and Sakhalin should be sacrificed in favor of peace. The idea was approved on August 28 at an important conference before the Throne and immediately transmitted to Baron Komura. At this juncture, the Tokyo Foreign Office, through the instrumentality of Ishii Kikujiro, then in the Bureau of Communication, obtained from a certain source the information concerning the Tzar's expressed opinion as it was transmitted by Ambassador Meyer from St. Petersburg, and the news was rushed to Portsmouth.

The last session was delayed one day through Baron Komura's plea and was held on August 29, both sides attending it without finding a solution to the deadlock. Baron Komura first of all withdrew the Japanese demand for a war indemnity, but Witte stood firm on the question of Sakhalin. Baron Komura then played his last trump, the return of the northern half of Sakhalin to Russia without indemnity. This Witte accepted and the impasse was cleared. The Portsmouth Treaty ending the War was signed on September 5. Baron Komura, facing the gloomy reality of the War, the continuation of which would doubtlessly be ruinous for Japan, was forced to give way to Russia's blind determination. But the events which followed amply vindicated his position and epitomized the Portsmouth Treaty as a treaty of equality between two great Powers. And Japan rose one more step on the ladder of International Equality.

THE PORTSMOUTH TREATY

By the Portsmouth Treaty, Japan secured the terms most important and vital to her: the recognition of her "paramount political, military, and economical interests" in Korea and the Russian evacuation of Manchuria. She succeeded to the Russian leases of the Leased Territory of Kwantung, wherein are situated Port Arthur and Dairen, and to the railways south of Changchun with rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, provided China's consent thereupon was first obtained. She also obtained the south-

ern half of Sakhalin, the fishing rights in the Russian Far Eastern waters, and the payment of expenses for the care of Russian prisoners during the War. Russia and Japan recognized the sovereignty of China over Manchuria and also the policy of the "Open Door" in that territory and agreed to evacuate the district; they also engaged to develop their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and in no wise for strategic ends. By a Supplementary Agreement, the evacuation of Manchuria was to be completed within eighteen months after the Treaty was in effect, but both Russia and Japan retained the right to maintain railway guards to the maximum number of fifteen for each kilometer. A later Evacuation Agreement stipulated that the Russian railways would be turned over to Japan by August 1, 1906, and that all the troops in Manchuria which were then stationed outside the Railway Zones would be withdrawn by April 15, 1907.

The Portsmouth Treaty, thus ending the Russo-Japanese War, was unanimously approved by the Privy Council and sanctioned by the Throne on October 4. There was also no difficulty of ratification at St. Petersburg, and the ratified copies were exchanged at Washington on November 25 by the representatives of the two nations.

The transfer of the Russian leases in Manchuria, however, was subject to China's consent. Immediately after the Portsmouth Conference, therefore, the Japanese Government took steps to initiate negotiations with China. The Sino-Japanese conference was thus opened at Peking on November 17, 1905. Baron Komura, assisted by Minister Uchida Yasuya, then at the Peking Court, again headed the Japanese delegation, while Prince Ching and Yuan Shi-kai represented the Celestial Empire. After twenty sessions, the Sino-Japanese Treaty was agreed upon on December 18, signed on December 22, and exchanged and proclaimed on January 6, 1906. By this Peking Treaty China approved the Russo-Japanese transactions as contained in the Portsmouth Treaty. In the Protocol attached to the Peking Treaty, China affixed her signature upon this important agree-

ment which, however, contained elements of future Sino-Japanese difficulties over their respective railway policies in Manchuria. "The Chinese Government engage, for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchuria Railway," read that celebrated Protocol, "not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any branch line in the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which would be prejudicial to the interests of the above-mentioned railway."

So passed into history the Russo-Japanese War. In it Japan had sacrificed 120,000 lives and had expended over two billion yen, but her demand for an indemnity was in vain and almost wrecked the Portsmouth Conference. For checking the Russian aggression in the Far East and for saving China's sovereign right over Manchuria, her only rewards of any real value were the recognition of Japan's free hand in Korea and the acquisition of a foothold on the Asiatic continent. Here then is the background for Japan's eventual annexation of Korea and the reason for the semi-sacred sentiment with which the Japanese nation have since regarded Manchuria.

PART III

TRIAL OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER XI

JAPAN AND KOREA

THE maintenance of Japan's national security, one of the fundamental aspirations of the Island Empire, necessitated the elimination of all foreign control, especially Russian domination, in Korea and Manchuria. Here was the basic *casus belli* of the Russo-Japanese War. Necessarily, Korea and Manchuria became the two leading problems of Japan's foreign policy during the period immediately following the War. We shall deal with the Korean question in this Chapter and the Manchurian affairs in the following Chapter.

THE JAPANESE-KOREAN AGREEMENTS

On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, while Japan was still carrying on negotiations with Russia over the independence of Korea and China's territorial integrity in Manchuria, Korea remained weak and corrupt, both in the administration of internal affairs and in the management of foreign relations. Besides, the Emperor was dominated by Yi Yong Ik, a powerful courtier, whose foreign affiliations were wholly Russian, and the palace coterie was almost entirely pro-Russian. Consequently Japan's difficult task was being traitorously blocked in the very heart of the country which she was trying to save.

Under such circumstances and because of the possibility of war between Japan and Russia it was necessary that Japan should reach an understanding with Korea. The negotiations were started at Seoul and an agreement was concluded

on February 23, 1904, less than two weeks after the declaration of war. By this Protocol, which was drawn up "for the purpose of maintaining a permanent and solid friendship between Japan and Korea, and of firmly establishing peace in the Far East," Korea expressed her desire to "place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improvements in administration." In return, Japan promised, "in a spirit of firm friendship," to ensure "the safety and repose of the Imperial House of Korea" and to guarantee "the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire." The important fourth Article empowered Japan to take "such necessary measures as the circumstances require" in case "the welfare of the Imperial House or the territorial integrity of Korea is endangered by aggression of a third Power or internal disturbances," while Korea promised "to give full facilities" to promote such action which Japan might take and to place at Japan's disposal "such places as may be necessary from a strategical point of view." The two nations further agreed not to conclude "without mutual consent" any arrangement with "a third Power" which might be contrary to the principle of the Protocol. In short, it established a sort of modified protectorate over Korea.

Premier Count Katsura then dispatched Marquis Ito Hirobumi to the Seoul Court in March as Japan's special envoy. The Marquis remained in Seoul some ten days. However, conditions in Korea remained as chaotic and corrupt as ever, seemingly indifferent toward Japan's proffered hand of assistance, and Japan's attempts at reform were either met with passive resistance or openly opposed. The Premier found it imperative, therefore, to take further steps in insuring Japan's interests in the Peninsula Empire, especially in the face of the war with Russia. As early as May, the Katsura Cabinet discussed the Korean question at length, largely as a result of Marquis Ito's visit in Korea, and reached two important decisions: that Korea should be made Japan's protectorate at a proper time and that, until the arrival of such an opportunity, Japan should strive to

obtain practical results in giving political, diplomatic, and military protection and in developing Japan's economic interests in Korea. Both Count Katsura and Baron Komura feared the objection of the Powers should Japan announce these decisions at once, especially in the face of the declared purpose of the war against Russia, and so adopted a plan of more gradual procedure.

The next step in the Korean-Japanese rapprochement was taken in July, 1904, when Minister Hayashi at Seoul was instructed to approach the Seoul Court with a definite reform proposition. It resulted in the conclusion of another agreement on August 22, 1904. By this Supplementary Protocol, Korea agreed to engage a Japanese subject as "Financial Adviser to the Korean Government" and a foreigner as "diplomatic adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs" both to be recommended by the Japanese Government, and to consult them in all matters in the respective fields. Korea also agreed to consult Japan "in concluding treaties and conventions with foreign Powers and in dealing with other important diplomatic affairs, such as the grant of concessions to or contracts with foreigners." Accordingly, Megata Tanetaro became the Financial Adviser while Durham White Stevens, an American, was recommended and named as the diplomatic adviser.

And thus Korea came under Japanese control during the critical years of the Russo-Japanese War. Of the numerous reform measures which were carried out under the Megata regime the most noteworthy was the reform in the currency system, especially the introduction of a new system of coinage to end the flood of counterfeit coins.

THE SECOND ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

In concluding the arrangements for the establishment of a modified form of protectorate over Korea, the Japanese Government was again careful to reach an understanding with Great Britain and the United States of America. The first eventually resulted in the renewal of the Anglo-Japa-

nese Alliance two years before the expiration of its term, while the second took the form of an exchange of notes.

During the War, due largely to an unbroken series of victories both on land and sea, the immediate extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance became an absorbing subject of discussion in Japan and England, although the Alliance was to expire in February, 1907. The Japanese Government was keenly interested as new developments in Korea and the possible elimination of Russia as a Far Eastern Power necessitated revisions in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902. Thus, Baron Komura, on the occasion of the celebration of the third anniversary of the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was held on February 12, 1905, praised the priceless value of the Alliance in war and peace as shown in the experiences of the first three years of its existence and publicly expressed his hope that it should continue to strengthen the existing close understanding between the two countries. The British reaction to his declaration was most favorable, while the Japanese public opinion unanimously supported his position.

As the British feeling for the extension of the Alliance intensified and the British Government began to show definite interest in the question, Baron Hayashi Tadasu, the Japanese Minister at the Court of St. James, who had successfully consummated the First Alliance in 1902, reported the favorable atmosphere and urged the Japanese Government to take an immediate step in opening negotiations for the extension of the Alliance. He pointed out that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be revised and made defensive as well as offensive, especially in view of unmistakable Russian intrigues for revenge after the War, and that the renewal should be hastened in view of possible interference and obstruction by some of the European Powers who regarded the Alliance with animosity. Premier Count Katsura and Foreign Minister Baron Komura were in perfect accord with Hayashi's proposal, as were the other Cabinet members. Baron Komura thereupon instructed Baron Hayashi to open conversations with the British Government if the

latter entertained a similar desire. Baron Hayashi accordingly approached the British Government.

The first stage of the conversations revealed not only the British desire to continue the Alliance, but also a definite idea for its revision. The British Government wanted to make the Alliance more effective by making it binding upon either member to aid the other when attacked by a third Power, Great Britain with her navy to help Japan in the Far East and Japan with her army to assist Great Britain in India. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in short, was to become a two-fold check upon a future Russian policy of naval expansion and designs upon the Indian frontier. The Japanese Government saw the wisdom of expanding the effective sphere of the Alliance in a like manner and ordered Baron Hayashi to begin the negotiations officially. Baron Komura, in his draft plans for the revision, proposed, among other things, the exemption of Korea from the scope of the renewed Alliance.

The negotiations thus begun were concerned largely with four major propositions: (1) the Chinese question; (2) the defensive nature of the Alliance; (3) Japan's special position in Korea; and (4) Great Britain's special position in India. The Chinese question provoked no important discussion, and the general principles as embodied in the First Alliance were readily agreed upon. The defensive nature of the Alliance also had easy sailing, making the Alliance binding for a defensive purpose when either member was attacked without provocation by a third Power. The British Government also promptly recognized Japan's special position in Korea, but attempted to include a guarantee of the treaty rights of the Powers in Korea. To the latter proposition the Japanese Government objected on the ground that the treaty relations concerned various Powers separately and that the question could and should be handled more satisfactorily with the Powers individually without reference to the Alliance. As to the Indian question, the Japanese Government proposed its exclusion from the scope of the Alliance on the ground that Japan had no relations with the

Powers whose interests were vitally interwoven along the Indian frontier, that she had no concern over the British policy in those regions, and that its inclusion, unlike the Korean question, would result in incorporating an altogether foreign and unrelated element into the Alliance. The British Government acquiesced in the Japanese contention over the Korean question, but insisted upon the extension of the Alliance to cover India. The Japanese Government finally accepted the British proposal, and the Treaty for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed on August 12, 1905.

The Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance expanded the general scope of the First Alliance as follows: (1) "The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India"; (2) "the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China"; and (3) "the maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions." It should be noted that the specific reference to Korea had been eliminated from the Preamble. In place of the neutrality clause of the First Alliance, the Second Alliance substituted the principle of a defensive alliance, the contracting parties agreeing, in case of war, to come to the assistance of its ally, to conduct the war in common, and to make peace only in mutual agreement. Whereas China and Korea were treated alike in the First Alliance, Great Britain now specifically recognized, "Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations." In return, although the First Alliance was exclusively a Far

Eastern affair, Japan recognized, "Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier," the British rights "to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions." The First Alliance was to last for five years; the Second Alliance extended the term to ten years.

It will be recalled that the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance was consummated in the midst of the Portsmouth Peace Conference between Japan and Russia. Lord Lansdowne feared its injurious effect upon the peace negotiations, and proposed the postponement of its announcement. Baron Komura agreed with the Lansdowne proposal in general but from a different point of view. He believed in the wisdom of withholding its announcement in case the peace negotiations proceeded smoothly, but of immediate proclamation should the failure of the parley become certain. Thus the negotiations for the proclamation of the Second Alliance were started anew after the successful conclusion of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, and the new Treaty was announced simultaneously at Tokyo and London on September 27, 1905.

It is now clear that Japan's chief motive in proposing to revise the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905, two years before it was due, was her desire to come to a new understanding with Great Britain over Korea before the balance sheet of the Russo-Japanese War was completed. It was without doubt a master-stroke of diplomacy for Japan in facing the Portsmouth Peace Conference.

ROOSEVELT AND KOREA

Japan's Korean policy necessitated an understanding with the United States of America as well as Great Britain, her ally. This brings us to a dramatic page in the American-Japanese relations in the Far East, directly involving the future of Korea.

The unexpected disclosure of Japan's military prowess

both on land and sea during the Russo-Japanese War amazed the American public. President Theodore Roosevelt, being sympathetic with Japan from the very beginning, was naturally gratified. This gratification, however, had a peculiar effect upon the American interests in the Far East, especially in the Philippine Islands. The energetic President of the United States was one of the very first to grasp the imperative need of reaching an understanding with Japan for the protection of the Philippines. In order to realize such an idea, he wisely conceded the importance of the Japanese policy in Korea, where, in his opinion, the internal conditions were hopelessly corrupt, and he believed it would be possible to bargain over the Korean and Philippine questions.

Thus, as early as January, 1905, President Roosevelt had definitely made up his mind with regard to the American attitude toward the Japanese policy in Korea. In his letter to John Hay, the Secretary of State, dated January 28, 1905, he added in a postscript: "We can not possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan. They could not strike one blow in their own defence." That he believed it wisest for Korea to fall under the control and tutelage of Japan is more convincingly shown by a recorded conversation between Premier Count Katsura and William Howard Taft, the Secretary of War in the Roosevelt Administration and the President's personal representative, dated July 29, 1905. In that memorable document, Count Katsura positively stated that "Japan does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines," while Taft expressed his opinion, to which he believed "the President would concur," that "the establishment by Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea to the extent of requiring that Korea enter into no foreign treaties without the consent of Japan was the logical result of the present [Russo-Japanese] war and would directly contribute to permanent peace in the East."

In 1905, then, even before the Russo-Japanese War came to an end, Japan and the United States reached an understanding over Korea and the Philippines. In return for a statement of the American policy not to interfere with

Japanese actions in Korea, the Japanese Government registered an explicit official disclaimer of any aggressive designs on the Philippines. This understanding was bound to beget far-reaching effects. It partly explains why Japan, at the last minute, acquiesced in the rather unfavorable result of the Portsmouth Peace Conference. It is the reason why President Roosevelt later gave a deaf ear to the Korean appeal. In other words, President Roosevelt, as much as the Japanese Statesmen, was responsible for what followed in Korea after the Russo-Japanese War.

THE PROTOCOL OF 1905

One of Japan's basic reasons for going to war with Russia was to safeguard Japan's interests in Korea. This fundamental point was settled, as far as Japan and Russia were concerned, by the Portsmouth Treaty which recognized Japan's "paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea." In order to further assure this position, Japan had reached an understanding with Great Britain through the consummation of the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and with the United States through the Katsura-Taft conversations. And thus the Japanese-Korean relations faced a new era late in 1905, and the stage was all set for further reforms in the Peninsula State.

In view of the grave nature of the task, the Japanese Government sent Marquis Ito Hirobumi, the President of the Privy Council, as its special envoy to the Seoul Court to conclude a new understanding with Korea. The Marquis reached Seoul early in November, 1905. After due ceremonies, he received a private audience with the Emperor on November 15, explained the object of his mission, and discussed the need of a new Korean-Japanese agreement, especially in view of the new international situation resulting from the Russo-Japanese War. The Mikado's letter to the Korean Emperor clearly pointed out the urgency of guarding against future dangers arising from the defenceless condition of Korea and sympathetically suggested the

necessity of added cooperation between the two countries. Marquis Ito explained that Japan, since 1885, had earnestly endeavored to maintain the independence of Korea and the peace of the Far East, even to the extent of fighting two costly wars, but that Korea continued to remain internally disrupted and had borne but a small, if any, portion of the burden created by defending her security. He dwelt upon the imperative necessity of closer cooperation in the future, and suggested the conclusion of a new agreement which would preserve the internal autonomy of the Korean Empire, but which would entrust in the Japanese Government the right to control and direct her foreign relations. The negotiations were carried on in the midst of the hopelessly divided Korean Court, but the new Protocol was successfully concluded and signed on November 17. It was approved by the Privy Council on November 22, and promulgated by the Mikado on the following day.

The new Protocol established Japan's virtual protectorate over Korea by granting to Japan the control and direction of Korea's foreign relations and by providing for the appointment of a Japanese Resident-General in Korea "primarily for the purpose of taking charge of and directing matters relating to diplomatic affairs." It specifically provided that Japanese diplomatic and consular officers should have charge of the subjects and interests of Korea in foreign countries, that Japan should assume responsibility for the execution of treaties already in existence between Korea and other Powers, and that the Government of Korea should not in future enter into any act or engagement of an international character except through the medium of the Japanese Government. In return, Japan again undertook to maintain the welfare and dignity of the Imperial House of Korea. The Protocol was to last "until the moment arrives when it is recognized that Korea has attained national strength."

In launching this momentous policy, the Japanese Government issued a statement to the Powers on November 22, summarizing the circumstances which led to its adoption

and outlining the general scope of its meaning. "The relation of propinquity has made it necessary," it declared, "for Japan to take and exercise, for reasons closely connected with her own safety and repose, a paramount interest and influence in the political and military affairs of Korea. The measures hitherto taken have been purely advisory, but the experience of recent years has demonstrated the insufficiency of such measures of guidance alone." Then, after relating that the Japanese Government "has resolved to assume a more intimate and direct influence and responsibility than heretofore in the external relations of the Peninsula," it explained "in assuming charge of the foreign relations of Korea and in undertaking the duty of watching over the execution of the existing treaties of that country," the Japanese Government "will see that those treaties are maintained and respected, and also engages not to prejudice in any way the legitimate commercial and industrial interests of those powers in Korea."

In the face of such sweeping changes, the United States, as well as Great Britain and Russia, had come to realize the practical necessity and wisdom of Japan's procedure and their legations at Seoul were closed. Other nations followed suit in due time. An attempt to appeal to President Roosevelt to intervene was completely ignored by him and thus the control of Korea's foreign relations quietly passed into the hand of the Tokyo authorities.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROTECTORATE

The Protocol of November, 1905, was perhaps the most far-reaching immediate result of the Russo-Japanese War. However, to help reform a nation which was older than herself and which was so corrupt was in itself a task of no small magnitude. The Japanese Government accordingly appointed her ablest and most experienced administrator-diplomat as the first Resident-General at Seoul. Marquis Ito Hirobumi, after resigning the presidency of the Privy Council, took up this responsible post in February, 1906.

Megata remained as Financial Adviser and Stevens as General Counsellor.

Marquis Ito immediately set in motion numerous reforms unprecedented in the history of the Peninsula State. His program of reforms included, among other things, reconstruction of roads, inauguration of water works, extension of the educational system, building of hospitals, reorganization of police administration, purification of the Imperial Court, reshaping of local administration, systematization of mining, protection of emigrants, and, above all, encouragement of industries.

As the work of reforms progressed, however, the Marquis and his staff of Japanese experts began to face numerous obstacles. One was the dual nature of the administration under the partial protectorate system. The Emperor still acted through his Ministers and provincial governors and the Japanese directors and advisers lacked the power of execution. Naturally the Korean officials resented what appeared to them as Japanese interference, and blocked the reform measures whenever possible.

The growing discontentment among the Korean officials reached its climax in June, 1909. The Emperor secretly sent a mission of three Koreans, headed by Yi Sung Sol, a former Cabinet Councillor, and accompanied by Homer B. Hulbert, an American, to the Second World Peace Congress at The Hague. The unofficial delegation protested against the failure of the Congress to notify Korea of the meeting on the ground that the Japanese-Korean Agreement of 1905, which entrusted the control of Korean foreign relations to Japan, was obtained under duress and was therefore null and void. This ill-advised act met a deaf ear at The Hague and ended in failure. When the news reached the Far East early in July, it aroused great resentment in Japan, and a sentiment for the immediate annexation of Korea began to spread.

Prince Ito, whose rank was raised in September, 1906, was thoroughly perturbed by the Korean Emperor's treacherous action and immediately asked Premier Prince Saionji

for instruction, suggesting that the only possible way to prevent the future recurrence of a similar act would be to secure further control of the internal administration through another treaty. The special Cabinet meeting on July 10 in the presence of the Genros decided in favor of Ito's proposal, leaving the method of procedure entirely to the Resident-General. Accordingly, the Premier wired instructions to Prince Ito on the following day, and dispatched Count Hayashi Tadasu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to confer with him. Count Hayashi reached Seoul late in the afternoon of July 18.

Meanwhile, a storm was brewing among the Korean officials in the Seoul Court. The Korean Cabinet which had been only recently installed was composed of the Ministers who clearly saw that unless the Emperor and his Court should cease their pernicious interference with the conduct of the Government it would be impossible to save the Imperial House from the most serious consequences. The Hague crisis was an irrefutable illustration of that idea and furnished them an opportunity to demand immediate action. Besides, they were alarmed when they heard of Count Hayashi's proposed visit to Seoul, and read therein an ill omen for the country as a price of the Emperor's folly. They therefore advised the Emperor to abdicate the throne before Count Hayashi's arrival in Korea. Stubbornly rejecting the suggestion at first, Emperor Yi Hyeung came to realize the serious consequences of his foolish and treacherous move and, in order to avert a crisis, finally decided to abdicate the throne in favor of the Crown Prince. This was done on July 18 and proclaimed on the following day. The simple official coronation of the new Emperor took place at the palace on July 20.

This, however, did not end the crisis. Prince Ito, under instruction from Tokyo and assisted by Count Hayashi, pressed for a more effective control of the internal affairs to forestall all future difficulties, and secured another important Japanese-Korean agreement on July 24, 1907. Under this new instrument, which was concluded "with a view to

the early attainment of the prosperity and strength of Korea and to the speedy promotion of the welfare of the people," the Korean Government promised to "follow the directions of the Resident-General in connection with the reform of the administration." It placed the administration of all important state affairs, the official appointment and dismissal, and the enactment of all laws and ordinances in the hand of the Japanese Resident-General. It made a distinction between judicial affairs and ordinary administrative affairs; it authorized the appointment to official positions of "such Japanese as may be recommended by the Resident-General," but forbade the engagement of "any foreigner without the consent of the Resident-General"; and it cancelled the appointment of the financial and diplomatic advisers established under the 1904 Agreement. In short, it established a complete Japanese protectorate over Korea.

THE ANNEXATION, 1910

The Convention of 1907 opened a new leaf in the Japanese-Korean relations. Prince Ito Hirobumi continued in the office of the Resident-General, but the actual work of administration was entrusted to Viscount Sone Arasuke, who became Lieutenant Resident-General. The first step in the establishment of the complete Japanese protectorate over Korea was the disbandment of the Korean army on August 1 under a Korean imperial proclamation dated July 31. By the end of the summer, Japan was firmly in control of the internal administration of the Peninsula State.

Then came suddenly a new chapter. For thirty years Japan had successfully championed Korea's cause, independence from external aggression and reforms for internal corruption, even fighting two costly wars on the latter's account. And yet the Korean question continued to furnish Japan with incessant troubles and anxieties and the establishment of a protectorate in 1907 did not end Japan's perplexities in this respect. Crown Prince Yoshihito's visit in Korea in October, 1907, to strengthen the tie of friendship

between the two Imperial Houses did not help the situation materially. Indeed, for the two following years Prince Ito and Viscount Sone assiduously pursued the task of reforms, but their difficulties were annually mounting instead of lessening. The disbanded soldiers became the instigators and mainsprings of local riots and uprisings, while the nation wallowed in the mire of chaos and corruption. A strong hand was needed if order was to be restored out of chaos.

Prince Ito at first steadfastly opposed the idea of annexing Korea to Japan. But his experiences as the Resident-General brought him face to face with almost hopeless problems of internal corruption and finally modified his stand. By July, 1909, he became convinced that the complete control of the administrative machinery of the government alone would guarantee needed reforms and consistent progress. He then resigned his position as the Resident-General in favor of Viscount Sone and began to devote more time and energy for the final annexation of Korea to Japan. Needless to add, Viscount Sone was even less successful than his illustrious predecessor in the impossible task which he faced.

Meanwhile, the unrest in Korea continued to grow. The self-assuming patriots began to agitate anew and to write their protest in blood and violence, both within and without their home frontiers. The first tragedy of international nature was enacted on the American soil in March, 1908, when Durham White Stevens, the former Foreign Adviser at the Seoul Court, who was on his way to Washington on a furlough, was assassinated by a Korean in San Francisco. The second disaster which shocked the world occurred in October, 1909, when Prince Ito, on an important mission to confer with the Russian Finance Minister, was shot to death by another Korean fanatic as he emerged from the station at Harbin in North Manchuria. And thus one of Japan's greatest statesmen and Korea's real friend sacrificed his life for the sake of Korea with his task still unaccomplished. In the following December, an unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate Yi Wan Yong, the Premier of the Korean Government.

The Harbin incident, more than any other, became the tragic prelude to the last act in the drama of Japanese-Korean relations. Abroad, the impression that the Koreans were unable and incapable of self-government now received wider confirmation. In Korea, certain liberal leaders saw in Japanese annexation the only salvation of the country and began to petition the Emperor and the Resident-General for annexation. In Japan, from the waves of sorrow and indignation which swept the country arose an irrefutable conviction that annexation was the only means now left to preserve the peace of the Far East. Viscount Sone, having promised Prince Ito and Count Katsura at the time when he became Resident-General not to entertain any such move for the time being, encountered this rising sentiment for annexation and resigned his office in May, 1910. By this time, the Cabinet Ministers and the Genros were practically agreed upon the procedure. With this background, Viscount Terauchi Masakata, the Minister of Army, while retaining that portfolio, accepted the appointment as Resident-General at Seoul with Yamagata Isaburo as Lieutenant Resident-General, and they commenced their delicate task. With Viscount Terauchi's arrival at Seoul in July, 1910, the negotiations with the Korean Government were started at once, and the Treaty of Annexation was speedily concluded and signed on August 22, 1910. It was duly approved by the Privy Council and promulgated on August 29.

By this historic document, the Korean Emperor surrendered his right of sovereignty to the Mikado and Korea ceased to exist as an independent State. The Mikado accepted the cession and agreed to accord appropriate honor and treatment to the royal family, with peerage, titles, and monetary grants to the Koreans deserving such special recognition. The Japanese Government assumed "the entire government and administration" of Korea and promised "full protection for the persons and property of Koreans obeying the laws there in force" and the promotion of "the welfare of all such Koreans." The Japanese Government also promised, "so far as circumstances permit," to employ

in the public service in Korea "those Koreans who accept the new regime loyally and in good faith and who are duly qualified for such service."

In a subsequent declaration to the Powers, the Japanese Government announced that the Korean treaties would no longer exist and that the Japanese treaties would be applied in Korea as far as possible. Extraterritoriality was abolished, but the existing tariff and the coastwise trade were to continue for ten years. Then followed the organization of the machinery of administration, and with the appointment of the Governor-General Korea passed into history and Chosen became the official name for the peninsula. And thus "the dagger pointed at Japan's heart" became a part of the Japanese Empire, no longer a source of external menace but an integral part of its national life.

CHAPTER XII

JAPAN AND MANCHURIA

THE Russo-Japanese War was not only the turning point in Japan's continental policy but also in international politics as a whole in the Far East. Japan had vainly demanded a war indemnity and, in its place, succeeded to the Russian interests in South Manchuria. The economic interests thus acquired in Manchuria naturally became a trust to the Japanese nation and henceforth, in addition to Korea, Manchuria became a vital factor in Japan's foreign policy. On the other hand, the check upon the Russian advance automatically heightened the desire of the other Powers to exploit the virgin field of Manchuria. So began fresh international rivalries for the economic control of Manchuria in which Japan and the United States of America were bound to take the leading but, unfortunately, opposing roles.

THE DAWN OF JAPAN'S MANCHURIAN POLICY

Before the Russo-Japanese War, Japan's vital interests on the Asiatic continent were located in Korea and not in Manchuria. Many Japanese leaders, including Marquis Ito, were even willing to concede Manchuria as a Russian sphere of interest in exchange for the security of Japanese interests in the Peninsula State. Japan was perfectly content as long as the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire and the Open Door policy were assured. The sudden acquisition of a foothold in Manchuria found Japan, naturally, without a fixed policy with regard to that area.

The birth of Japan's Manchurian policy was as romantic as it was sudden. And again the American stimulus was

all-powerful. Edward H. Harriman, an American railway king, was then in the Far East and, in planning a round-the-world transportation system, wished to acquire the railway interests in Manchuria as well as trackage right over the Trans-Siberian line. Before he left Japan for America, he had secured the famous Katsura-Harriman memorandum, dated October 12, 1905. It was a provisional understanding between himself and an American syndicate to be organized by him on the one hand and Premier Count Katsura on the other. The syndicate was to share equally with the Japanese Government in the ownership of the railways and their appurtenant rights and privileges as well as in the operation of mines in Manchuria. Tokyo's expressed willingness to share with an American-financed syndicate a major fruit of the Russo-Japanese War attests to the ironically naive, almost childish, character of Japanese diplomacy of the time and proves conclusively the lack of a definite Manchurian policy. Of course, alert Foreign Minister Baron Komura was still away and did not participate in the conversations which culminated in the consummation of the provisional memorandum. The Foreign Minister returned after Harriman had left the Japanese shores.

The bitter experiences of the Portsmouth Peace Conference nourished in Japan's Foreign Minister new aspirations for Japan's future on the Asiatic continent. When Baron Komura reached Japan, he naturally objected to the Katsura-Harriman provisional memorandum. The whole nation was dissatisfied and disappointed with what was then regarded as unfavorable peace terms without indemnity, and Baron Komura rightly maintained that Japan should not give away so easily the only valuable asset gained in the War. As a result, the importance of the newly acquired Manchurian rights was clearly recognized and appreciated for the first time. Moreover, Baron Komura insisted that China must first agree to the transfer of the Russian rights to Japan before Japan could bargain them away to any syndicate. Premier Count Katsura and his Cabinet, upon second thought, accepted Baron Komura's contention and decided

to retain and develop Japan's acquired rights in Manchuria, entirely independent of American interests. Harriman was accordingly notified.

This decision not only ended Harriman's gigantic scheme but also laid the foundation of Japan's Manchurian policy. Henceforth the cardinal points in Japan's Manchurian policy became the protection of China's territorial integrity and the Open Door policy, and the maintenance and development of her legitimate economic rights and interests, secured so inadvertently at the Portsmouth Peace Conference, yet at the sacrifice of two billion yen and one hundred twenty thousand lives. Behind those two aspirations stood a more fundamental need, the defence of Japan's security against any possible revival of Russian aggressive policy in the Far East.

THE SINO-JAPANESE TREATY OF PEKING

The rights which Japan had obtained from Russia at Portsmouth were subject to China's approval. Besides, the changed situation following the War required a new Sino-Japanese understanding on the whole Far Eastern question. Thus, early in November, 1905, Baron Komura again, accompanied by Dennison, proceeded to Peking, where Uchida Yasuya, the Japanese Minister to China, assisted him in the negotiations with Yuan Shi-kai, China's chief representative. Japan rightfully believed that she had been compelled to stake all against Russia on account of China's weakness, not knowing even then of the treachery of the Li-Lobanoff Secret Treaty, that she was entitled to compensation for evicting Russia from Manchuria at a considerable sacrifice of treasure and blood; and that, at the very least, China should grant to Japan the same privileges which she had previously granted to Russia. But China, while she did not conceal her gratitude for Japan's heroic and sacrificial deeds in her defence, tried to evade the issue by ignoring Japan's proposal and by demanding Japan's immediate withdrawal from Manchuria. After twenty-two prolonged sessions, however, a Treaty

with three short articles was signed on December 22, 1905. It was accompanied by an Additional Agreement with twelve articles and a Secret Protocol with sixteen articles, both of the same date.

The Peking Treaty proper contained China's approval of "all the transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan" by the Portsmouth Treaty, and Japan's promise to conform to the original agreements concluded between China and Russia "so far as circumstances permit."

By the Additional Agreement Japan secured certain additional rights which strengthened her special position in Manchuria. Among them may be mentioned the opening of sixteen new cities and towns for "international residence and trade," the reconstruction of the military railway between Mukden and Antung, and the organization of a Sino-Japanese joint stock company for the purpose of developing the lumber interest along the Yalu River. Article II of that historic document dealt with the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops and railway guards, in which Japan consented "to take similar steps" with Russia "in the event of Russia agreeing to the withdrawal of her railway guards or in case other proper measures are agreed to between China and Russia," however, with a now-famous proviso: "When tranquillity shall have been reestablished in Manchuria and China shall have become herself capable of affording full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, Japan will withdraw her railway guards simultaneously with Russia." This provision later became the basis of the Japanese right to continue to maintain railway guards in Manchuria. It should be remembered that the Evacuation Protocol of October 30, 1905, authorized the employment by Japan of railway guards in Manchuria, the number being fixed at 15 per kilometer "on the average."

The most far-reaching stipulation in the Protocol was the one in which China agreed, "for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchuria Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any branch line in the neighborhood of and parallel to that

railway, or any branch line which would be prejudicial to the business of the above-mentioned railway." This apparently innocent admission on the part of China was destined to cause much trouble for her in the future. In addition to this important stipulation, China agreed to build a railway from Changchun to Kirin and to buying material from Japan and to reconstruct the Hsinmintun-Mukden military line, both using Sino-Japanese capital. Arrangements with regard to mines, telegraph lines, and cables, as well as the question of reparation for public or private property destroyed or used by the Japanese army during the occupation were to be decided upon at a later conference. It is a matter of historic importance to remember that the entire provisions of the Secret Protocol were communicated by the Japanese Government to Great Britain and the United States shortly afterward.

The Peking Treaty with its Additional Agreement and Secret Protocol, together with the Portsmouth Treaty, thus laid the foundation of Japanese rights in Manchuria and, consequently, Japan's continental policy.

DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN'S MANCHURIAN POLICY

Now that Japan had come to possess extensive rights and interests in Manchuria, the general development of that area became a matter of utmost importance and concern to Tokyo. The new outlook necessitated a complete reorientation of Japan's continental policy and the establishment of a Manchurian program.

On November 16, 1905, soon after Baron Komura left for Peking, therefore, a Manchurian Post-Bellum Enterprise Commission was created. It consisted of the heads of various governmental departments concerned, in addition to Premier Marquis Saionji, and undertook the responsible task of making a special study of the whole situation and of drawing up recommendations. It immediately instituted a thorough investigation of Manchuria afield and recommended three fundamental principles to be carefully followed: to

respect China's sovereignty and maintain equal commercial opportunity; to encourage Sino-Japanese joint enterprises; and to supercede the Japanese military administration with a civil administration at an early date. These fundamental principles were carefully weighed and adopted at a council of Cabinet Ministers and the Genros before the Imperial Throne on May 22, 1906.

Then followed two important developments. The first important step taken was the organization of Japan's newly acquired railway and other economic interests under a corporation known as the Minami-Manshu Tetsudo Kabushiki Kaisha or the South Manchuria Railway Company. This was done in accordance with an Imperial Ordinance which was promulgated on June 7, 1906. The Government Order of August 1, 1906, entrusted the Company with complete control over seven railways in Manchuria, of which the principal ones were the Dairen-Changchun and Mukden-Antung lines. The articles of incorporation which were simultaneously published fixed the capital of the Company at 200,000,000 yen, of which 100,000,000 yen were furnished by the Government in turning over to the Company all its property in railways, mines and other appurtenances. The other half were offered for subscription to the Chinese Government and the Japanese and Chinese public. When the first issue was floated in September, 1906, the Chinese refused to subscribe but the Japanese public over-subscribed the issue no less than 1,066 times as it was regarded as a patriotic enterprise. In March, 1920, the Company increased its capitalization to 440,000,000 yen, of which the Government again subscribed 120,000,000 yen or one-half of the increased capital. The Company was organized under the presidency of Baron Goto Shinpei, and commenced its operations in April, 1907.

The other important step taken was the establishment of a Japanese administrative system for the Leased Territory of Kwantung. This was done by an Imperial Ordinance, which was promulgated on July 30, 1906, and which authorized the organization of the Kwanto Totoku Fu or

the Kwantung Government-General. The Totoku or Governor-General was entrusted with usual civil and administrative powers within the Leased Territory and authority to protect and supervise the Japanese railway lines in South Manchuria. He was empowered to issue ordinances, including penal regulations of a limited character, and, in exceptional cases of emergency, special ordinances and regulations subject to the Imperial sanction or disapproval. He was also made the commander of the Kwantung Garrison charged with the defence of the area, subject in this respect to the Minister of Army and the Chief of General Staff. This fusion of military and civil functions under one office was abolished in 1919, when an Imperial Ordinance of April 12 established the Kwanto-Cho or the Kwantung Government with a civilian governor with powers over the civil jurisdiction within the Leased Territory as well as authority to police the railway lines in South Manchuria and "to supervise the business" of the South Manchuria Railway. At the same time, the military power was vested in the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, commanding Japanese Garrisons and the railway guards under the direct control of the Mikado, but in military administration and personnel subordinate to the Minister of Army. Thus the civil and military authorities were separated. General Oshima became the first Kwanto Totoku.

There remained the final process of restoring Manchuria outside of the Leased Territory and the Railway Zone to the Chinese administration. For this purpose, a special mission headed by Yamaza Yenjiro, the Director of the Political Bureau of the Foreign Office, was sent to Peking in the middle of June, 1906. The preliminary agreement relating to the restoration of Newchwang was signed on October 2, and the final agreement was effected on December 5. The Japanese military administration was promptly restored to the Chinese authorities. Previous to that the Japanese Government proclaimed Dairen, formerly Dalny, as a free port on September 1, while a Chinese customs office to handle the merchandise passing through the Japanese frontier of

the Leased Territory into the interior of Manchuria was established at Dairen on July 1 of the following year in accordance with an agreement reached at Peking on May 30, 1907.

NEW ALIGNMENT OF POWERS

The sudden acquisition of vast interests in Manchuria again thrust upon the Island Empire the task of establishing a new understanding with the Powers. Fortunately the Russo-Japanese War marked a new alignment of Powers in the Far East, and victorious Japan naturally reaped the benefit. For the key to the new alignment of Powers and the new international background of Japanese activities in Manchuria, however, we must again turn to Europe.

Immediately preceding and during the Russo-Japanese War, a diplomatic revolution was rapidly shaping itself over the European horizon. Russia was no longer a direct threat to Great Britain while she was practically impotent to help France, her ally. This situation boosted Germany to a preponderant position in European politics, a serious rival of Great Britain and a standing threat to France. Necessarily Great Britain and Germany were drifting further apart and in 1904, much to the surprise of the latter, the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale was consummated, postponing for a decade a serious Anglo-German or Franco-German clash.

It was under such circumstances that Germany, following the collapse of Russian manoeuvres in Manchuria, was looming large as a threat over the Far Eastern firmament. Here the close inter-relationship of Asiatic and European politics asserted itself again, and Japan played her part accordingly. Indeed, Japan was already allied with Great Britain and the next logical step for Japan to take was the establishment of an understanding with France, England's ally in Europe.

The Saionji Cabinet, which succeeded the Katsura Cabinet in January, 1906, took stock of the situation carefully and started diplomatic *pourparlers* to reach an understand-

ing with France. The project was realized under the direction of Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu in 1907, when the representatives of the two Governments signed a Franco-Japanese Agreement at Paris on June 10. By that pact the two nations, "having agreed to respect the independence and integrity of China as well as the principle of equal treatment in that country for the commerce and subjects (i.e. *ressortissants*) of all nations, and having a special interest in having order and pacific state of things guaranteed especially in the regions of the Chinese Empire adjacent to the territories where they have the rights of sovereignty, protection or occupation," agreed "to support each other for assuring the peace and security in those regions, with a view to maintaining the respective situation and the territorial rights of the two Contracting Powers in the continent of Asia." In a separate note, the two Governments also agreed upon a mutual most-favored-nation arrangement in French Indo-China.

It now remained for Japan and Russia as well as Great Britain and Russia to cement the bonds of amity in order to encircle Germany both in Europe and Asia. Foreign Minister Hayashi also pushed this project energetically and another master-stroke of Far Eastern diplomatic revolution was successfully consummated in 1907, when the two warring rivals of yesteryears affixed their signatures upon the first Motono-Iswalsky Agreement at St. Petersburg on July 30. In this open Agreement, Japan and Russia, "desiring to consolidate the relations of peace and good neighborhood which have happily been re-established between Japan and Russia, and wishing to remove for the future every cause of misunderstanding in the relations of the two Empire," agreed "to respect the actual territorial integrity of the other and all the rights accruing to one and the other Party from the treaties, conventions and contracts in force between them and China" in so far as these rights were not incompatible with the principle of equal opportunity, recognized "the independence and the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the principle of equal opportunity in

whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire," and engaged "to sustain and defend the maintenance of the *status quo* and respect for this principle by all the pacific means within their reach."

One month after the signing of the Russo-Japanese understanding, the link was completed on August 31, 1907, when Great Britain and Russia reached an agreement upon their respective Asiatic policies. By that understanding Great Britain and Russia (1) delimited their spheres of influence in Persia, (2) defined a mutually acceptable policy in Afghanistan, including the British control of the latter's foreign relations, and (3) recognized the "suzerain rights of China in Thibet" but the *status quo* in the external relations of the latter.

In the face of such a new and formidable alignment of Powers in the Far East, the Kaiser naturally directed his energies during 1907-1908 in trying to effect a German-Chinese-American entente which should eventually attract Russia. The idea, however, met a cool reception both at Peking and Washington, and the whole plan met defeat at the hands of Japanese diplomats through the so-called Root-Takahira Agreement.

THE ROOT-TAKAHIRA AGREEMENT

It was a peculiar irony of fate that the Russo-Japanese War should have cemented American-Japanese accord. An unreserved expression of American sympathy was shown Japan throughout the War. The famous Katsura-Taft conversation of July 29, 1905, not only endorsed the Japanese interest in Korea and the American interest in the Philippines, but assured Japan "that without any agreement at all the people of the United States was so fully in accord with the people of Japan and Great Britain in the maintenance of peace in the Far East that whatever occasion arose, appropriate action of the Government of the United States, in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain, for such a purpose could be counted upon by them quite as confidently as

if the United States were under treaty obligations to take [it]."

It was also noteworthy that Japan's emergence from the War as the victor and her acquisition of vast interests in Manchuria should have marked the beginning of serious American-Japanese rivalry on the Asiatic continent. The first question which stirred ripples on the otherwise calm surface of American-Japanese Far Eastern accord related to the enforcement of the Open Door in Manchuria.

With the sudden rise of Japanese influence in Manchuria, it was only natural that the Japanese commercial interests there should also rise rapidly. This was largely due to Japan's geographical proximity to Manchuria and Japanese people's increased interest which was aroused during the War. However, the rapid expansion of Japanese commercial activities stirred up Western, especially American, jealousy, followed by suspicions, and frequent charges were made in 1906 and 1907 that Japan had been taking advantage of her political supremacy to violate the principle of the Open Door in Manchuria and to foster the commercial interests of her nationals. The charges also included such matters as failure to pay the Chinese customs duties, rebates on Japanese railway, and interference with the collection of local taxes. The Japanese Government maintained that Japan was scrupulously observing the Open Door pledge, and made counter-protests, on many occasions, against undue foreign criticisms and interferences.

The situation called for an international investigation, which, when made, substantiated the Japanese contention. A group of three American merchants, representing American commercial interests at Shanghai made an investigation of the charges during June, 1906, for the purpose of reporting to the United States Minister at Peking and through him to the State Department, and reported that "no interference on the part of the Japanese with the ordinary course of trade was discovered." Augier, an English publicist who visited Manchuria in 1908, reported: "The charge made against Japan that she was not playing the

game has not been brought home. It has produced the Scotch verdict of not proven." He pointed out also that the Japanese were wise enough to see that the more South Manchuria was developed by foreign capital, the greater would be Japan's share in the trade. All of which went to show that the Open Door had become an accepted principle of international activities in Manchuria as well as in China proper and that Japan had been the defender, not the destroyer, of that policy. The reason for this was that the Open Door policy afforded more advantage to Japan than to other Powers because of her geographical position.

It was an aftermath of this criticism which finally led the second Katsura Cabinet to attempt to reach an understanding with the United States. Baron Komura, again back in the Foreign Office, instructed Baron Takahira Kogoro, the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, to proceed to do so. The result was an agreement in the form of exchange of notes between Baron Takahira and Elihu Root, the Secretary of State, dated November 30, 1908. The notes, commonly known as the Root-Takahira Agreement, constituted "a frank avowal" of "a common aim, policy, and intention" in "the regions of the Pacific Ocean" between Japan and the United States which not only would tend "to strengthen the relations of friendship and good neighborhood, which have immemorially existed between Japan and the United States, but would materially contribute to the preservation of the general peace." The "aim, policy, and intention" of the two governments were specifically defined in five articles: to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce in the Pacific; to maintain, "uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies," the *status quo* in that region and to defend the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China; to restrict reciprocally the territorial possessions belonging to each other in that region; to preserve, by all pacific means at their disposal, the independence and integrity of China and the Open Door principle; and to exchange views, "should any events occur threatening the *status quo* as above described or the prin-

ciple of equal opportunity as above defined," in order "to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take."

This exchange of notes, of course, did not constitute a treaty, nor did it imply an alliance; Japan merely resorted to that particular form in announcing to the United States and the world that her policy in the Far East, even in the face of a new situation arising from the Russo-Japanese War, was in perfect consonance with the Hay doctrine of the Open Door and equal opportunity and preservation of China's territorial integrity. On the other hand, however, the American suspicion of Japanese intentions still remained, and the two nations were destined to clash again.

EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF JAPANESE RIGHTS

Between the Russo-Japanese War and the World War, Japan not only organized her interests in Manchuria under the Kwantung Government-General and the South Manchuria Railway Company, but steadily expanded her railway rights through a series of Sino-Japanese agreements. Among those important railway agreements may be mentioned the following four:

1. Japan transferred the Hsinmintun-Mukden Railway back to China in accordance with the Sino-Japanese Convention of April 15, 1907, for a sum of 1,660,000 yen. The transfer was effected in fulfilment of a provision contained in the Protocol of 1905, and the details of the loan agreement were settled by a Supplementary Agreement of November 12, 1908, and the Loan Contract of August 18, 1909.

2. China agreed, under the provisions of the same Convention of April 15, 1907, to borrow from the South Manchuria Railway Company one-half of the fund necessary for the construction of a railway line between Changchun and Kirin. The details of the agreement were consummated also by the two instruments relating to the Hsinmintun-Mukden Railway above mentioned.

3. The reconstruction work on the Antung-Mukden line, which was authorized by the Additional Agreement of 1905, was delayed for various reasons and a Memorandum of August 6, 1909, placed the reconstruction work on a new basis. The line was completed by Japan in 1911 at a total estimated cost of about 22,000,000 yen.

4. More important and far-reaching in result was an exchange of notes, dated October 15, 1913, known as the "Five Manchurian and Mongolian Railways Loan Agreement." By virtue of those notes, the Japanese Government obtained from China a provisional agreement with regard to the Japanese right of financing the construction of three projected connecting lines of the South Manchuria Railway, namely, the Ssuningkai-Chengchiatun-Taonan Railway, the Kaiyuan-Hailungcheng Railway, and the Changchun-Taonan Railway, and two additional lines, namely, the Taonan-Jehol Railway and the Kirin-Hailungcheng Railway.

In short, Japan followed the policy of acquiring rights to build feeders to the South Manchuria Railway in order to help stimulate the development of the interior of Manchuria. The Sino-Japanese agreements thus consummated, however, later became the sources of conflicting claim between China and Japan. The "parallel line" clause of the Protocol of 1905 furnished added difficulties to the growing railway problems of Manchuria in the years to come.

Side by side with the expansion of her railway interests, Japan had steadily consolidated her economic position in Manchuria through another series of Sino-Japanese agreements.

1. The first set of agreements related to the Japanese mining rights. The Agreement of September 4, 1909, defined the terms under which the coal mines at Fushun and Yentai were to be operated, for which detailed regulations were adopted on May 12, 1911. The concession for the Penhsihu collieries was given to Okura and Company, which had invested large sums thereon after 1905, by the Agreement of May 22, 1910. The general agreements for the operation of mines in Manchuria in general, especially those

along the Antung-Mukden Railway line, were consummated during 1907 and 1908, the exploitation to be carried on as joint Sino-Japanese enterprises.

2. The second set of agreements related to the lumbering rights which Japan had acquired under the Additional Agreement of 1905. The Agreements signed on May 14 and September 11, 1908, defined the details of the Sino-Japanese joint stock company which was to be organized for the purpose of exploiting the forests along the Yalu River.

3. The third set of agreements concerned cables and telegraphs. By the Submarine Cable Convention of October 12, 1908, Japan transferred to China all land telegraphs in Manchuria outside of the Leased Territory and the Railway Zone, subject to the payment of 50,000 yen, and acquired, supplemented by the Convention of November 7, 1908, the right to use for a period of fifteen years two special telegraph lines from Antung, Yingkow, Liaoyang, Mukden, Tiehling, and Changchun to the Railway Zone, China controlling the lines to the latter point. Those two Conventions also defined the details of the Sino-Japanese joint enterprise to relay a submarine cable between the Kwantung Leased Territory and Chefoo.

4. The fourth set of agreements related to the customs administration in South Manchuria. The Customs Agreement of May 30, 1907, established the Chinese Maritime Customs Office in Dairen and regulated the customs administration there. It allowed goods brought by sea to Dairen and destined to the Leased Territory to pass without duty and required goods so arriving but destined to points beyond the Leased Territory and those coming from the interior of Manchuria into the Leased Territory but shipped from Dairen "to other places," as also goods manufactured in the Leased Territory from materials brought there from the interior, to pay the prevailing Chinese customs duties. The Conventions of November 2, 1911, and March 31, 1912, regulated the customs on goods entering Manchuria at Antung, while the Convention of May 29, 1913, assigned to Japan a reduction of one-third from the customs tariff on

all dutiable goods transported to Manchuria from Chosen over the South Manchuria Railway and the Chosen Government Railway, and vice versa on export duties.

5. Another Agreement, signed on September 4, 1909, recognized the Tumen River as a part of the boundary line between China and Korea, and China agreed to open four cities in the Chientao district to residence and trade, thus permitting the Japanese Government to establish consulates or "branch offices of consulates" in those places and granting to the Koreans the right of residing for agricultural purpose and of owning lands which were already under their possession.

The above named diverse rights, not to mention numerous others, must be projected on the general background of the all-inclusive jurisdictional rights which Japan enjoyed in the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Manchuria Railway Zone by virtue of the Portsmouth and Peking Treaties of 1905 and the Sino-Russian Lease Contract of 1898. Japan was always careful in obtaining a legal basis for each and every additional enterprise so that the network of Sino-Japanese treaties and agreements over Manchuria accumulated as the Japanese activities expanded.

INTERNATIONAL RAILWAY RIVALRIES

During this period, two railway projects in Manchuria called forth the careful attention of the Tokyo Government. The first was the British attempt to build the Hsinmintun-Fakumen line and the second the revival of American railway interest in Manchuria.

Ostensibly to checkmate Japan and Russia in their railway enterprises in Manchuria, China tried to interest other Powers, and in 1907 secretly assigned to Pauling and Company, a British concern, a concession for constructing a short line between Hsinmintun and Fakumen, some 47 miles in length, a continuation of the Imperial Railway of North China. Its eventual extension to Tsitsihar, 400 miles north, was understood. When the negotiations were secretly

started in the spring of 1907, Japan of course had no intimation thereof. When the news leaked out in August, therefore, Tokyo was profoundly shocked and immediately warned Peking, pointing out that the Hsinmintun-Fakumen project was unacceptable to Japan as it violated the parallel line clause of the Protocol of 1905. China paid no attention to the Japanese protest and continued to give evasive replies to the latter's repeated vigorous warnings during October and November. The secret contract was signed in November, and T'ang Shao-yi was appointed the Viceroy of Manchuria to carry out China's defiant policy against Japan.

In February, 1908, Tokyo adopted a more compromising attitude and proposed to endorse the project if China would promise to extend the line to Tiehling or some other suitable point on the South Manchuria Railway. China refused this proposal and suggested that the whole question be referred to the international tribunal at The Hague. Japan declined to proceed upon this suggestion and the matter came to a deadlock until China abandoned the project toward the summer of 1909. The controversy was finally settled by the Sino-Japanese Agreement of September 4, 1909, by which China agreed to make preliminary arrangement first with Japan should she decide upon building the Hsinmintun-Fakumen extension in the future. Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons on March 3, 1908, endorsed Japan's position under the Protocol of 1905, and placed the burden of responsibility on the contractors to prove that the proposed extension did not violate its parallel line clause.

Meanwhile, Harriman continued his effort to realize his world-chain of transportation. Here entered the dollar diplomacy of American financial interests to play a leading part in the Manchurian international railway rivalry. Willard Straight, the United States Consul-General at Mukden, who was closely in touch with Harriman and the New York financial group, drew up a plan in August, 1907, by which the American financial interests were to get a contract from China for a loan of \$20,000,000, carrying with it the right

to establish a Manchurian bank in cooperation with the Manchurian Government. The bank was to become the financial agent of the Mukden authorities in the development of mining, lumbering, and agricultural industries and in the construction of certain railways. The plan was communicated to Harriman in September, 1907, but financial conditions prevented any immediate action upon it. Early in 1908, Straight signed a preliminary memorandum for such a loan agreement and returned to America, but again its consummation was delayed, this time on account of the political changes which took place in China after Straight's departure.

At this time, the American financiers decided to revert to Harriman's original railway scheme. Accordingly, Willard Straight, together with Pauling and Company, representing the British interests, secured at Mukden on October 2, 1909, a preliminary concession for a railway from Chinchow on the Gulf of Pechihli to Aigun on the Amur River. The line was to be financed by the American financial interests while the construction work was assigned to Pauling and Company. But Harriman, the moving genius of the scheme, suddenly died in September, 1909, previous to the signing of the said preliminary agreement, and the project, fortunately for Japan, was discontinued. The Chinese Imperial Decree, approving the preliminary agreement, was issued on January 21, 1910, but Japan and Russia formally protested against the project and the final agreement was never signed. Straight even went to St. Petersburg in the summer of 1910 and made a frantic attempt to reach an understanding with the Russian authorities, but all in vain. The British Government adopted an attitude which was decidedly favorable to the claims of Japan and Russia, and the whole scheme was given up.

The American interest in Manchuria took another turn in 1909, when Philander C. Knox, the Secretary of State in the Taft Administration, proposed what since became known as the Knox Neutralization Plan for the Manchurian railways. Largely with a view to protecting the American

interest in the Chinchow-Aigun railway concession then under negotiation, Knox suggested two proposals in a memorandum addressed to the British Government, dated November 6, 1909. The first of these proposed that the Powers pledged to the Open Door in China, namely, the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan, should advance money to China so that the latter could buy back the Japanese and Russian railways in Manchuria or else finance the Chinchow-Aigun line, and that the railways should then be operated by an international syndicate of the participating Powers during the term of the loan. The second alternative proposal provided that, in case the first suggestion should meet disapproval, the United States and British Governments might support diplomatically the Chinchow-Aigun arrangements and invite interested Powers to participate in the financing and construction of that railway. Sir Edward Grey replied on November 25, expressing the British approval of the principle contained in the first proposal, but suggesting the postponement of its consideration as the negotiations were already under way for a large loan to China, and proposing, with regard to the second proposal, the inclusion of Japan as an interested Power to participate in the Chinchow-Aigun road. Knox then dispatched notes to Tokyo, Peking, Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg on December 4. It is amusing to recall that only the substance of the memorandum which had been sent to the British Foreign Office was communicated to the Tokyo Foreign Office and Ambassador O'Brien was instructed to say that the British Government had signified its approval of the general principle involved, completely ignoring Sir Edward Grey's suggestions. This could not be considered a frank statement of the British position and, when this became known later, it created considerable suspicion of the motives of the United States Government.

The Japanese Government was now facing a delicate situation, and it could not see why Japan's rights and privileges in Manchuria which she had acquired at a tremendous sacrifice of blood and treasures should be thrown away so

easily. In a sharp note, dated January 21, 1910, therefore, Baron Komura wrote to Ambassador O'Brien and presented Japan's objections to the proposal. He maintained that the Japanese railway rights were based upon the Portsmouth and Peking Treaties, and that the proposal completely ignored this background; that the Japanese railways in Manchuria were used exclusively for commercial purposes as stipulated in the Portsmouth Treaty and in no way violated the Open Door principle; that the Japanese Government could not see a just reason for adopting in Manchuria a system of railway administration quite different from that existing in other parts of China; that the replacement of a national railway administration by an international syndicate was merely the substitution of political expediency for economy and efficiency; that the efficient protection of various commercial and industrial interests along the railways in South Manchuria against the ever-raiding bandit hordes was largely due to the Japanese presence, which acted as an effective stabilizing influence; and that an enormous amount of Japanese investments and a large number of Japanese employees were involved and the Japanese abandonment was a breach of trust and responsibility which the Government had assumed. Baron Komura, however, expressed his approval in principle of the Chinchow-Aigun proposal, but reserved final judgment until necessary details were known. Russia used almost identical reasons in opposing the proposal. The purpose of the Knox Neutralization Proposal was commendable, but it flatly failed as it ignored inseparable sentimental and practical considerations which Knox altogether underestimated.

The American thrust upon the Manchurian railway enterprise had at least two important effects. In the first place, it brought Japan and Russia, already professing a common purpose as expressed in the first Motono-Iswalsky Agreement of 1907, closer together, and the second Motono-Iswalsky Agreement was signed on July 4, 1910, "with a view to the improvement of their respective lines of railroad in Manchuria and to the perfecting of the connecting

service of the said railways and to refrain from all competition unfavorable to the attainment of their result." Under that instrument, the two nations agreed "to maintain and to respect the *status quo* in Manchuria as is stipulated in all the treaties, conventions, or other arrangements hitherto concluded, either between Russia and Japan or between these two Powers and China" and to consult each other "in case any event of such a nature as to menace the above-mentioned *status quo* should be brought about" for the purpose of adopting appropriate measures. In the second place, it seemed to substantiate the Japanese suspicion that the United States was trying to deprive her of the prized fruit of the Russo-Japanese War. From that time to the Washington Conference in 1921, the most serious menace to American-Japanese cooperation in the Far East was found, rightly or wrongly, in the apparent conflict of policies of the two nations in China, each suspecting the true intent of the other to a large extent. Indeed that suspicious attitude seems to have never disappeared.

THE CHINA CONSORTIUM, 1911-1912

The first organized effort for the international loan operations in China was that of Harriman's futile proposal of 1907 for a Manchurian loan of \$20,000,000. The Chinese effort to float a loan of \$30,000,000 in the United States in 1908 was equally fruitless. During 1908-1909, British, French, and German banking groups also had taken an interest in possible Manchurian loans, while President Taft in 1909 urged the formation of an American banking syndicate to undertake Chinese loans. The combined interest of these European and American bankers resulted in the formation of the so-called "Four Power Banking Group" or the Quadruple Agreement of November 10, 1910. During 1910, moreover, the movements for a loan agreement for Chinese currency reform and for a "Manchurian Industrial Development Loan" were combined, and the first definite loan agreement between the Peking Government and the

"Four Power Banking Group" was signed on April 15, 1911. The "Four Power Banking Group" included the Banque l'Indo-Chine (French), the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank (German), the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. (British), and an American group of banks, namely, J. P. Morgan and Company, Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, the First National Bank, and the National City Bank of New York.

The Chinese Currency Reform and Manchurian Industrial Development Loan Agreement thus signed specified a loan, the amount of which was not to exceed £10,000,000 at 5 per cent interest, the bond to be sold at 95. Aside from the currency reform feature, a possible £1,000,000 might be obtained "for the promotion and extension of industrial enterprises in the three Manchurian provinces," namely, in connection with the promotion of immigration, reclamation, and pastoral enterprises, for forestry and other agricultural enterprises in the Hailungkiang Province, and for mining enterprises. It is understood that the several banks thus affiliated advanced the sum of £400,000 to the Chinese Government for its use in Manchuria.

Immediately, Japan, together with Russia, began to press various Foreign Offices for the admission of her financial groups into the Four Power Consortium. The exclusion of Japanese and Russian banking interests did not appeal to their sense of fairness, and the Japanese protests were vigorous. Tokyo interpreted, for instance, Article XVI of the Four Power Agreement of April 15, 1911, to mean that a preference in loan operations, especially in Manchuria, would be given to the participating banking groups. This position of the Japanese Government was made clear in a *note verbale* to the French Government on June 25, 1911, in which Japan asserted that this Article was interpreted to mean that "in the whole of the three Manchurian provinces the four powers' financial group is accorded priority over all other foreigners and foreign institutions, not only as regards enterprises contemplated by the agreement, but in the matter of any other activities

which may hereafter be associated with such enterprises." The note went on to make a significant assertion: "Japan possesses in the region of Southern Manchuria special rights and interests, and while she is fully prepared in the future as in the past to respect the rights of others, she is unable to view with indifference measures which tend not only to menace those special rights and interests but to place her subjects and industries at a disadvantage as compared with the subjects and industries of any other country." Accordingly, Japan urged the suppression of Article XVI. A similar protest was also sent to the British Government. Meanwhile, Japan freely conferred with Russia, and the latter likewise objected to the same Article, claiming that "it seems that the syndicate pretends to a monopoly of financial and industrial enterprises in the regions in which Russia possesses important special interests." Furthermore, Japan and Russia persistently contended that Manchurian revenues should not be hypothecated by the Four Power Consortium group, even though it had been made clear that the Manchurian allotment of the loan should be but a part of the general currency loan for all China.

That the four Powers were placed in an embarrassing position need not be elaborated. The insistence of Japan and Russia to be allowed to participate in the consortium and in the future loans for China, including Manchuria, resulted in a series of negotiations. Finally, in a general multi-power agreement, signed at Paris on June 18, 1912, a reorganization loan to the Chinese Government was arranged through the Six Power Consortium, adding Japan (the Yokohama Specie Bank) and Russia (the Russo-Asiatic Bank) to the Four Power Consortium of 1911. In the negotiations the Japanese and Russian banking groups asserted what amounted to a reservation to protect their special interests in parts of China including Manchuria, the reservation being included in a modified form in the minutes of the Paris meetings, dated June 19, 1912, and declaring their right to withdraw from the Consortium in case it undertook to offer a loan or loans "contrary to the interests of Russia and Japan."

It is significant that complications immediately arose in the way the Consortium was to function. The proposed reorganization loan became a means whereby several Ministers at Peking sought to dictate the appointment of financial advisers and otherwise to obtain an effective means of control over the Chinese revenue administration. China objected to the foreign supervision of the revenue administration, while the foreign bankers insisted that without it there could be no assurance of security for the requested loan or for the use of the funds for the purpose for which they were advanced. This complication went from bad to worse and eventually the official support of the United States for her bankers was withdrawn in 1913, while the outbreak of the World War prevented German and Russian participation. Nevertheless, the Six Power Consortium, except for the American group, signed on April 26, 1913, the "Chinese Government Five Per Cent Reorganization Gold Loan Agreement." The World War practically closed the activity, however, until the Consortium was revived in 1929 in another form.

CHAPTER XIII

JAPAN IN THE WORLD WAR

THE decade between the Russo-Japanese War and the World War had increased the intimacy of the inter-relations of Asiatic and European politics. Japan's policy of entering into agreements with Great Britain and France, and finally with Russia, to strengthen her position in the Far East gradually drew her closer into the entangling maelstrom of politics in Europe. When at last the long-expected war broke out in 1914, therefore, Japan found herself compelled to fall in line with the allied forces. It gave Japan, however, an opportunity to avenge herself upon Germany for her participation in the Triple Intervention of 1895 and to assert again her claim of equality with the Powers. Japan was completely successful in her first objective, but bitter disappointment awaited her in the second although she was recognized as one of the "Big Five" at the Paris and Versailles Conferences.

THE THIRD ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

At the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century, the international outlook in the Far East was quite different from what it was ten years before. The elimination of Russia as an aggressive Far Eastern Power, the annexation of Korea to Japan, and the consolidation and expansion of Japan's newly acquired interests in Manchuria were the leading factors in this changed situation which eventually led to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for a third term, again a few years before its stipulated time of expiration. The immediate impetus for the earlier revi-

sion of the Alliance, however, was supplied quite unintentionally by the United States.

Early in the summer of 1910, the United States and Great Britain, through the former's initiative, were contemplating the advisability of concluding a general arbitration treaty. The proposal, among other things, raised the question of its probable effect upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and in September Lord Grey solicited the reaction of the Tokyo Government upon two alternative propositions: (1) to reserve the Anglo-Japanese Alliance from the effective sphere of the proposed arbitration treaty and to revise the Treaty of Alliance at the time of its expiration so as to conform to the general principle of the arbitration treaty, or (2) to suggest to the United States the participation of Japan in the proposed arbitration treaty.

The second Katsura Cabinet then in power decided in favor of the first proposition and went a step farther. It feared that, in case the proposed arbitration treaty should fail, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be regarded as its chief obstacle and that its future continuation would be jeopardized unnecessarily. Such a result would be quite disastrous for international relations in the Far East. Thus Marquis Komura, again directing the foreign relations of the nation, decided to take this opportunity to complete the revision and renewal of the Alliance. He communicated the decision to Lord Grey and proposed (1) to clarify the inapplicability of the Treaty of Alliance upon matters involving the United States, thus eliminating the fear of possible British participation in case of an American-Japanese dispute, (2) to revise the Treaty of Alliance in accordance with the changed situations, including the annexation of Korea, and (3) to extend the Alliance for another ten years. Lord Grey agreed on the general principles thus suggested, and the negotiations were immediately started through Baron Kato Takaaki, the Japanese Ambassador to the Court of St. James.

The draft treaty which Baron Kato presented to Lord Grey as a basis for discussions was similar to the existing

Treaty of Alliance with two notable exceptions. In the first place, it eliminated all references to Korea, now Chosen. More important still, in the second place, it proposed in Article V that in case either of the Allied Powers conclude a treaty of arbitration with a third Power, no obligation would be imposed upon that Power to go to war with the Power with whom such an arbitration treaty was in force. An important proviso ruled, however, that this stipulation did not cover the cases in which such a third Power joined a war between one of the Allies and another Power, or in which another Power joined a war between one of the Allies and such a third Power.

At the time, Japanese public opinion was solidly in favor of the renewal of the Alliance while British sentiment was divided on the subject. There were several obvious reasons for the latter situation. There had been a reaction to the feverish pro-Japanese feeling of the Russo-Japanese War days; there developed a noticeable conflict of interests in China, especially in Manchuria, as a result of Japanese commercial and industrial expansion there; the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 eliminated the necessity of the Alliance which was primarily aimed at Russia; the difficult question of the revision of the Commercial Treaty of 1894, especially of the tariff, still remained unsettled; and, above all, there was a fear that Great Britain might be drawn into a possible American-Japanese conflict on account of the Alliance. On the other hand, the British officials, led by Lord Grey, attached much importance to the Alliance as the guardian of the *status quo* in the Far East, especially *vis-à-vis* Germany. This opinion was shared by many, including the Imperial Conference in 1911.

The negotiations on the basis of the Japanese draft proposal proceeded with such a background. The first British amendment proposed the elimination of an article on the British special interests in India as well as the proviso to Article V. Japan readily accepted the first amendment, but insisted upon the inclusion of a proviso or an exchange of notes which would establish an understanding as to the

principles contained in the proviso in question. Lord Grey insisted upon the elimination of the proviso, and even suggested the inclusion in the treaty of a clear statement that the Alliance did not impose an obligation upon either Great Britain or Japan to go to war with the United States. After careful consideration Tokyo acquiesced in striking out the proviso without specific mention of the United States. And the new Treaty of Alliance was signed on July 13, 1911, four years before the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance expired.

The preamble and the main provisions of the Treaty of 1911 are similar to those of 1905. The Articles III and IV of the Treaty of 1905, relating to the special interests respectively of Japan in Korea and of Great Britain in India, were eliminated, as was Article VI with reference to the Russo-Japanese War. The most important addition in the 1911 Treaty was Article IV which read: "Should either of the High Contracting Parties conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall impose on such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such an arbitration treaty is in force."

It should be added that the Anglo-American arbitration treaty was signed at Washington soon afterward, on August 3, 1911, but the United States Senate failed to ratify it and the Article IV above quoted remained an idle provision, entirely without its original significance.

THE WORLD WAR AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

In 1914, the international rivalries in Europe reached their inevitable climax and the world was at once transformed into the field of the greatest armageddon of history. In meeting this grave situation, Japan found herself facing a choice of three possible roads: (1) to maintain strict neutrality; (2) to join Great Britain and the allied forces against Germany in faithful observance of the implications of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; or (3) to assist Germany against

the allied forces on the assumption that the German superiority in arms would eventually end the conflict in favor of the Central Empire. Baron Kato Takaaki, at that critical period, appears to have been convinced from the very beginning that neutrality was impossible and that Japan would be eventually drawn into the War on account of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but he moved with extreme caution.

Great Britain declared war against Germany on August 5, 1914, and Japan at once became involved through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. At first Great Britain tried to avoid drawing Japan into the War in reciprocal recognition of Japan's refusal to involve Great Britain in the Russo-Japanese War even after French assistance was openly given to the Russian fleet. But the British interests in the Far East and the Pacific were extensive and far-flung and the German naval base at Kiaochow constituted an obvious menace to them. Following a preliminary conversation on August 4, therefore, British Ambassador Greene at Tokyo made a formal request on August 7 that "the Japanese fleet should, if possible, hunt out and destroy the armed German merchant cruisers who are now attacking our [British] commerce," and added that such a course "means an act of war against Germany but this is, in our opinion, unavoidable." The challenge was thus laid before the Tokyo Government.

That evening, August 7, an extraordinary session of the Cabinet was held at the home of Premier Count Okuma, and Baron Kato presented a memorandum in which he voiced the impossibility of maintaining neutrality although its result would be favorable to Japan and pointed out the wisdom of Japan's entrance into the War for two reasons: first, to comply with the British request although at the moment the conditions in the Far East were not as yet dangerous enough to obligate Japan under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and, second, to utilize the opportunity to eliminate the German naval base in the Far East. After a prolonged deliberation, the Cabinet decided in favor of the fundamental question of entering the War. Needless to add, the two decisive factors which helped to bring about that decision

were Japan's obligation under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the memory of the German hand which robbed Japan of the Liaotung Peninsula in 1895.

The major question having been thus settled, the course of events followed in a remarkably quick succession. The Cabinet session ended at 2 a. m. on August 8, and Baron Kato was aboard the train bound for Nikko at 5:30 a. m. in order to get the Imperial sanction from the Mikado. At 6:30 p.m. on the same day, Baron Kato was back in Tokyo, attending the joint conference of the Genros and the Cabinet members, which, after carefully reviewing the whole situation, unanimously approved the government policy already adopted. Thus, within thirty-six hours after the formal British request had been placed in Baron Kato's hand, Japan had taken all the necessary steps in reaching the momentous decision and immediately British Ambassador Greene was notified that Japan was prepared to accept the obligation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by entering the War as her Ally.

Baron Kato then began negotiations with Great Britain as to the official reasons for the declaration of war against Germany. In his conversations with Ambassador Greene on August 8 and 9, he pointed out that the destruction of German merchant cruisers in the Chinese waters alone was a feeble reason for such a grave action and proposed to make a clear statement to the effect that the War had penetrated the Far East, thereby endangering the purpose for which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was created, and that Japan had decided to declare war against Germany "in compliance with the British request." To his complete surprise, the British Government requested on August 9 that the Japanese activities should be confined to the protection of the merchant marine in order to avoid the implication of spreading the War on to the Asiatic continent and that Japan's declaration of war be reconsidered. Baron Kato replied in a long memorandum, pointing out that Japan's declaration of war involved the protection of merchant marine and the elimination of the German naval base from China and did

not involve the whole of China in the War, and that he was willing to change the proposed clause, "in compliance with the British request" to "as a result of mutual agreement." The British reply of August 11 did not alter her position and Baron Kato was placed in a quandary, for he had urged Japan's entrance into the War in compliance with the official British request of August 7 and now, after the decision had been reached, he was asked to reconsider the whole procedure. On the same day, therefore, Baron Kato wrote that the declaration of war had been decided upon as a result of the British request, that military preparation was already under way and was only awaiting the declaration of war, that the recantation of Japan's decision which was made in compliance with the British request would endanger the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, that it was now impossible to change the public opinion which was in favor of the policy already approved, and that the British Government should carefully weigh the peculiarly difficult position into which it was driving Japan by reversing its original request. This strong and logical remonstrance drew forth the British approval of Japan's declaration of war on August 13 on one condition, namely, that Japan should confine her activities to the German leasehold on land and to the Far East and the Pacific on sea. Baron Kato naturally insisted that such a limitation would be merely fictional because Japan as a belligerent Power must protect her merchant marine all over the world. On the following day, Great Britain agreed to drop the idea of limiting the area of operation but refused to withdraw the proposal, and the conflicting views became the cause of future difficulties.

JAPAN'S DECLARATION OF WAR

After the declaration of war was decided on August 8, Baron Kato was faced with the even more delicate question of the form of procedure. The cautious Foreign Minister invited three of his intimate friends, Wakatsuki Reijiro, Yatsushiro Rokuro, and Koike Chozo, to his Bancho residence

on August 9 and held a secret session to deliberate upon the best method of procedure which would most benefit and strengthen the Japanese position. It was in that memorable session that Baron Kato reached the carefully considered decision to send an ultimatum to Germany, to allow an unusually long period of seven days for the German reply, to divide the ultimatum into two parts—the elimination of the German fleet from the Far East in compliance with the British request as an obligation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the transfer of Kiaochow to Japan before returning it to China, and to send the ultimatum through eight different channels in view of the confusion existing throughout the world. Concerning the German leasehold at Kiaochow, it was suspected that, should Japan merely demand its return to China, Germany might enter into a secret agreement with China for the eventual return of the leasehold and, therefore, Baron Kato decided to request the transfer to Japan first to make the German relinquishment certain. Baron Kato submitted the plan of procedure thus evolved first to the Cabinet, which approved it, and then to the conference before the Throne on August 14, when the Imperial sanction was obtained. That evening Japan issued the ultimatum to Germany, which was delivered through eight channels, German Ambassador Rex at Tokyo, Japanese Ambassador Funakoshi at Berlin, the Japanese Ambassadors to Great Britain, Russia, and Italy, and the Japanese Ministers to the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.

The Japanese ultimatum, which was formally handed to the German Chancellor on August 18, was in the form of an "advice" which recalls German "advice" to Japan in 1895:

"Considering it highly important and necessary, in the present situation, to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain, in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely

believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions: (1) withdraw their men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds from the Japanese and Chinese waters, and disarm at once all that cannot be withdrawn; (2) deliver up to the Japanese authorities by September 15, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China."

August 23 was fixed for the unconditional acceptance of this advice. When Germany refused to reply, Japan formally declared war against her on the day the ultimatum expired.

JAPANESE MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. *Capture of Tsingtao.* Japan's first problem after the declaration of war against Germany concerned the capture of the German naval base at Tsingtao. General plans were already carefully worked out and a naval bombardment upon the Shangtung stronghold was launched immediately, on August 23. It was also evident that a land force would be necessary to effect the final capitulation. Accordingly, Japan notified China, as early as August 20, of her contemplated land campaign against Tsingtao as it was unavoidable to use the Chinese territory as at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, and landed her troops at Lungkow on September 2. On the following day China proclaimed a war zone and the Japanese troops marched across Shantung with the permission of China, then as yet a neutral nation. The Japanese forces conducted their operations with extreme care to avoid needless loss of life and property, and forced the surrender of the German fortress early on November 7. The official transfer of the city was made on November 10, and six days later the Japanese and British forces effected a triumphant entry into the city.

Meanwhile, the Japanese forces were also busy annihilating all vestiges of German interests in Shangtung, such as coal mines, iron works, and railroads. For this purpose, they proceeded to capture Tsinan, the terminus of the Tsi-

nan-Tsingtao Railway. China protested on the ground (1) that the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railway was a Sino-German joint enterprise and not a German railway, and (2) that Tsinan was outside of the war zone. Japan insisted, however, (1) that the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railway was a German enterprise in reality and a Sino-German railway in name only, and (2) that, therefore, Tsinan was within the proclaimed war zone. Tsinan was captured in October and the downfall of German interests in Shangtung was completed with the capitulation of Tsingtao as above noted. The Sino-Japanese controversy concerning the railway was temporarily settled on November 25 by an agreement between General Kamio and the Chinese representatives.

2. *Naval Operations.* While the siege of Tsingtao was in progress, the Australian forces had occupied the German islands south of the equator, and the Japanese naval unit had captured the German possessions, the Caroline, Marshall, and Marianne Islands, north of the equator. The Japanese navy then cooperated with the British fleet in patrolling the Pacific and Indian Oceans until all traces of the German naval forces were destroyed. The Japanese navy, moreover, gave priceless aid to the Allies in acting as convoy to the Australian and New Zealand troops to Europe. When Germany launched her ruthless and unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917, and when Japanese merchant ships fell its victim, Japan dispatched Rear-Admiral Sato with the *Akashi*, a cruiser, and three destroyer divisions to the Mediterranean Sea, where they aided the convoy of allied troops and performed other valuable services until the end of the War.

One episode of the Japanese naval operations had an important bearing upon the future international relations in the Pacific, namely, the capture of the Island of Yap. Great Britain approved Japan's claim to the Island as an indemnity of war and a secret Anglo-Japanese agreement recognized the Japanese request. Later the Island figured conspicuously in the American-Japanese relations over the question of a cable connection.

3. *Japan Refuses European Participation.* Immediately upon Japan's declaration of war against Germany, the question of Japan's possible participation in the European war front was seriously considered by the Tokyo Government. Late in August, Russia and France through Great Britain asked for three divisions of the Japanese army to be dispatched to Europe, but Japan rejected the request. Again in October, when Turkey joined Germany, the same three Powers, Great Britain again acting as their spokesman, requested Japanese military divisions in Europe, but Japan again rejected the request. One more attempt was made, but the Japanese determination was firm. In a long communications, Baron Kato explained Japan's stand that the Japanese army was organized on the basis of national defence and could not be used except for that purpose; that the Japanese army, to be effective and efficient on the European front, must consist of at least ten divisions which would leave the Island Empire almost defenceless; and that the project was next to impossible due to the distance between Japan and the war zone. The request for the presence of the Japanese army forces in Europe was made several times afterward, but Japan stood firm on the basis of the declaration already made.

THE LONDON PROCLAMATION

One of the earliest diplomatic results of the World War was the London Declaration of September 4, 1914, jointly made by Great Britain, France, and Russia. It was an agreement which bound the participating Powers not to enter into separate peace and to consult each other upon peace plans before the discussion of peace terms.

Ishii Kikujiro, then the Japanese Ambassador to France, was the first to urge the Tokyo Government to join the three Powers. He argued that, while such an alliance was not necessary between Great Britain and Japan due to the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it was necessary to clarify Japan's legitimate interests in the War with France

and Russia, with whom she had no definite agreement, especially in insuring her position against a possible secret agreement between those two Powers and the enemy nations. Baron Kato, however, rejected the proposal on the ground that the Japanese interests were well protected by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and that through it she shared the benefit of the London Declaration with France and Russia. Great Britain also tried in vain to use pressure to secure the Japanese participation. The final British attempts in this direction were made on August 1 and 3, 1915, at the time when Baron Kato was seriously weighing the wisdom of consummating the Russo-Japanese rapprochement through Japanese participation in the London Declaration, but he had to resign his post on August 10.

Premier Count Okuma recalled Ishii from Paris to succeed Baron Kato, and the procedure was at once reversed. Ishii, before his departure for Japan, reached, with Premier Okuma's approval, a preliminary understanding with Delcassé at Paris and Lord Grey at London with regard to Japanese participation in the London Declaration. Accordingly a formal invitation was issued in the name of the British Government on August 19, and Japan became a member of the London Declaration on October 19. Italy soon followed suit and made it a five-Power pact. The Revolution of 1917 eliminated Russia from the entente, but the United States came in her place and these five Powers constituted the "Big Five" of the Peace Conferences at Paris and Versailles.

Japan's participation in the London Declaration was widely criticized in Japan, especially in the Diet and the Privy Council, but the criticism was largely party politics and the Okuma Cabinet successfully upheld its position.

MISCARRIED ALLIANCES AND AGREEMENTS

The outbreak of the World War gave an impetus both to France and Russia to conclude an alliance with Japan. All these efforts failed, but a brief survey of the manoeuvres reveals the position which Japan occupied in the early days

of the War, almost as though all the Allied Powers in Europe were looking to Tokyo for salvation.

The first Power to act was France. The French Ambassador at Tokyo visited the Foreign Office on August 4, 1914, and abruptly proposed, though in a personal capacity, the formation of a Franco-Japanese alliance, but Baron Kato did not consider the proposal seriously. When Great Britain declared war against Germany on August 7, the French Ambassador again called upon Baron Kato and inquired, now officially, the Japanese reaction to the inclusion of France in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, explaining that the addition of France was not intended to induce Japan to enter the War. The proposal having thus become an official one, Baron Kato requested that the proposal be made in a written form and asked the Ambassador also to state the real reason for such a sudden proposal. Thereupon the French Ambassador disclosed that the protection of French Indo-China was the purpose of the proposal. The written French memorandum reached the Foreign Office on the following day and another conference was held on August 12. Baron Kato then learned that Russia also contemplated a similar proposal, and promised an early reply after consulting Great Britain on the subject.

Russia was as eager as France to join the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Early in June, 1914, Russia proposed an Anglo-Russian alliance relative to their respective interests in Asia and, as soon as she had declared war against Germany, she suggested to Great Britain the inclusion of Russia in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In the Far East, the official proposal for a Russo-Japanese alliance was made by Foreign Minister Sazonoff to Ambassador Motono at St. Petersburg early in August. Its purpose was stated to be the maintenance of the peace in the Far East and preservation of the permanent interests of Russia and Japan, and Russia specifically requested that Japan enter the War on the basis of such an alliance. Baron Kato saw no reason for taking immediate action on the matter, especially after Japan's official entrance into the War on the basis of the Anglo-Japanese

Alliance, but instructed Ambassador Inouye at London on September 15, to ascertain the British attitude on the question. Baron Kato personally believed that it would weaken the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and that the action should be indefinitely postponed. On January 2, 1915, the Russian Foreign Minister proposed an Anglo-Russian-Japanese alliance, but Baron Kato quickly rejected the idea on the ground that Great Britain had not taken the initiative for such a proposal.

From September, 1914, the idea of combining the Anglo-Japanese and Franco-Russian Alliances, in case the Franco-Japanese and Russo-Japanese ententes did not materialize, had been seriously discussed. Baron Kato and Lord Grey were agreed, however, that there was no need of such a new alliance and that the matter should be dropped from all diplomatic pourparlers until after the War. But France and Russia insisted upon continuing the discussions, and their Ambassadors at London called upon Lord Grey on January 8, 1915, proposing to form an Anglo-French-Russian-Japanese alliance on a permanent basis and, if the alliance could not be formed soon, to invite Japan to join the London Declaration of September 4.

These diplomatic manœuvres brought one result, at least in name. To Japan, Russia was still a menace in the Far East and Japan's experiences with Russia were such as to arouse her suspicion of the latter's possible action in concluding peace in spite of the London Declaration. After joining the London Declaration, therefore, it was Foreign Minister Ishii's difficult task to protect Japan against such a possible action on the part of Russia. When Ishii took the matter up with Lord Grey, the latter was very optimistic as to Russia's intentions and his proposal met a deaf ear. But Ishii did not acquiesce in Lord Grey's optimism. First of all, he encouraged the policy of supplying Russia with necessary arms and ammunitions of war so that Russia might not be forced at any time to take an independent action for peace. Japan's supply of arms to Russia thus rose to the value of over 300,000,000 yen. On the other hand, Foreign Minister Ishii began negotiations with Russia in

order to prevent Russia from concluding independent peace which would be antagonistic to Japan's vital interests. The result was an agreement which was concluded by Ambassador Motono at St. Petersburg on July 3, 1916. Among other things, it agreed that both Russia and Japan would not enter into any agreement or alliance which would be antagonistic to each other's political interests. Foreign Minister Ishii's cautious labor came to naught, however, when the Revolution of 1917 overthrew the Romanoffs and the Soviet regime entered into a separate peace at Brest-Litovsk with Germany and Austria on March 13, 1918.

THE AGREEMENTS OF 1917

Japan's participation in the London Declaration automatically made her a member of the "Big Five" of the eventual peace parley. As a newcomer to the international bargain counter, however, Japan did not completely trust the natural development of events and she wisely adopted a policy of cautious procedure in protecting her share of the fruits of War. Her special concern included the disposition of the German interests in Shantung and the German possessions in the Pacific. The question of the disposition of the German interests in Shantung was discussed by Japan and Great Britain soon after Japan's declaration of war against Germany, but nothing resulted therefrom.

As the War progressed, especially as Japan became the actual captor of the German interests in Shantung and in the Pacific, Japan felt the increasing need for reaching an understanding with the Allies. Before she agreed to launch a naval campaign against German submarine warfare in the Mediterranean, therefore, Japan again approached Great Britain and succeeded in obtaining from her an assurance, in an exchange of notes on February 16, 1917, that she would support at the peace conference Japan's claims to Shantung and the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. In an exchange of notes dated March 1, 1917, France also pledged to support Japan in a similar way, while

Japan promised to use her influence in urging China to break with Germany although Japan was opposed to China's participation in the War up to that time. Russia followed the suit in an exchange of notes four days later. Subsequently, the Italian Foreign Minister orally agreed that his Government "had no objection regarding the matter." The United States who entered the War in April was the only one of the future "Big Five" with whom Japan did not reach a similar agreement, but with the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November, 1917, Japan obtained in general principle the assurance of the United States for Japan's "special interests" in the Far East. Even China, by the agreements of 1915 and 1918, approved in advance whatever decision the peace conference might reach concerning the German rights in Shantung.

THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE RACE EQUALITY ISSUE

The World War ended, in a military sense, on November 11, 1918, with the signing of the Armistice. In January, 1919, the delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers met in Paris to formulate peace terms. The formal Peace Conference at Versailles began on May 7, and the Treaty of Peace was signed on June 28.

To these Conferences Japan sent Marquis Saionji Kinmochi, a powerful Genro who had twice held the premiership, as the chief representative, while Viscount Chinda Sute-mi, the Japanese Ambassador at London, Baron Makino Shinken, sometime the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Matsui Keishiro, the Japanese Ambassador to France, and Ijuin Kanetomo, the Japanese Ambassador to Italy, assisted him. The fundamental policy of the Japanese representatives at Paris and Versailles was to refrain from purely European matters but to obtain unreserved recognition of Japan's position in the Far East. Throughout that memorable diplomatic struggle, they concentrated their best efforts in pressing three things: (1) adoption by the Western Powers of the

principle of race equality as an integral part of the Covenant of the League of Nations; (2) transfer to Japan of all holdings with appurtenant rights and privileges formerly enjoyed by Germany in Shantung; and (3) transfer to Japan of the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. Except when these and other questions of immediate interest to Japan were discussed, the Japanese representatives were "silent partners" of the Conferences.

Japan's reaction to the proposed League of Nations was exceedingly favorable from the very beginning. It was in connection with the organization of this new organ of international cooperation that Japan stunned the seasoned diplomats by naively proposing the recognition of race equality. In order to strengthen the fundamental principle of the equality of nations upon which the League was to be built, Japan proposed on February 7 an amendment to the Covenant of the League of Nations in the following language:

"The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of states, members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality."

When the religious liberty clause was discussed on February 13, Baron Makino pressed the same amendment by pointing out the fact that "racial and religious animosities constituted a fruitful source of trouble and warfare among different peoples throughout history, often leading to deploable excesses." He admitted that "the question of race prejudice is a very delicate and complicated matter, involving play of human passion, and therefore requiring careful management," and he made it clear that he was not proposing "an immediate realization of the ideal equality of treatment between peoples" but that it was "an invitation to the Governments and peoples concerned to examine the question more closely and seriously, and to devise some acceptable means to meet a deadlock which at present con-

fronts different peoples." Then, referring to the noble record of the War in which different races fought side by side against their common enemies and to the proposal that under the Covenant a nation is obliged to defend others against external aggression, he emphasized that "each national would like to feel and in fact demand that he should be placed on an equal footing with people he undertakes to defend even with his life." Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo of China was in deep sympathy with the spirit of the proposed amendment but reserved his views as he was uninstructed by his Government on the subject, while Lord Cecil of Great Britain voiced the postponement of the discussion as the question was one of highly controversial character. Other members were equally unprepared to examine the question further, and both the race equality and religious liberty clauses were dropped from the discussion.

The question of race equality was an exceedingly ticklish subject, especially for the American and Australian statesmen, but Japan naively believed that, in ushering in a new age of international cooperation, there was a definite place for a clear statement of the fundamental principle of human equality. It was immediately assumed, however, that its specific recognition in the Covenant would be tantamount to the removal of the bars against Asiatic immigration throughout the world. Naturally enough, the British and American representatives were uncompromisingly hostile to such a proposal. Sensing the true motive of the opposition and hoping to avoid misunderstanding, the Japanese spokesman expressly stated that the principle was not to serve as a premise for demanding the free immigration of Japanese laborers into other countries. Japan, in fact, had no such ulterior motive; she was motivated largely by a sense of pride as a nation which in seventy years had come all the way from a hermit kingdom to membership in the world's "Big Five" at the end of the World War.

Nothing was done officially in connection with the Japanese proposal for two months, and another opportunity to press the inclusion of the race equality amendment did not

come until April 11, when Baron Makino once more presented a carefully prepared statement on the subject. He now suggested that the Japanese proposal be simplified by introducing a phrase in the preamble of the Covenant which would endorse "the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals." Among other nations, China, France, Italy, Greece, Czechoslovakia, and Poland supported the Japanese proposal, but the British and American delegates stood firmly against it. Lord Cecil went so far as to say that "the British Government realized the importance of the racial equality," but that "its solution could not be attempted by the Commission without encroaching upon the sovereignty of state members of the League," and that its effective application would open "the door to serious controversy and interference in the domestic affairs" of the member states, while President Wilson felt that "the greatest difficulty lay in the controversies which would be bound to take place outside the Commission over the Japanese proposal," and that "in order to avoid these discussions it would perhaps be wise not to insert such a provision in the Preamble." Baron Makino then moved to ascertain the pleasure of the Commission upon his amendment, stating that the League, if the amendment were defeated, would be most unpopular in Japan. As a result of voting, Japan won the majority of eleven out of seventeen votes (Japan, France, and Italy two each, and Brazil, China, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia), but it was rejected by the chairman, no other than President Woodrow Wilson, who ruled that so important a resolution must have the unanimous assent of all members. In spite of the Japanese protest, therefore, the draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted on April 28 without the race equality amendment, and Baron Makino critically declared: "I feel it my duty to declare clearly on this occasion that the Japanese Government and people feel poignant regret at the failure of the Commission to approve their just demand for laying down a principle aiming at the adjustment of this long-standing grievance, a demand that is based upon a deep-

rooted national conviction. They will continue in their insistence for the adoption of this principle by the League in the future."

It was a noble and gallant fight, truly worthy of Japan's name, but it was a losing fight from the beginning. The world had not progressed enough to obliterate the color-line in international relations, and the odium of race prejudice and discrimination still continued to hinder Japan's relations with some of the leading Western Powers. This bitter experience, with which the name of Woodrow Wilson is indelibly associated, and the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations left the profoundest impression upon the Japanese mind.

SHANTUNG AT VERSAILLES

By far the most important claim which Japan had advanced at Paris and Versailles and which provided the Peace Conferences with many dramatic and subterranean controversies related to Shantung. On January 27, Baron Makino presented Japan's claims to the Council of Ten. He briefly described how Japan had entered the War after "consultation with the British Government conformably with the Agreement of 1911," and concluded that Japan felt "justified in claiming from the German government the unconditional cession of (a) the leased territory of Kiaochow together with the railways and other rights possessed by Germany in respect of Shantung province; (b) all the islands in German possession in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator, together with the rights and properties in connection therewith." In presenting this request, Japan was fortified by the Treaties and Agreements of 1915, 1917, and 1918 with various Powers including China.

On the following day, Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo presented China's claims, requesting the restoration to China of all German holdings in Shantung. Baron Makino lost no time in challenging the Chinese contentions and in pointing out that the territory in question had been taken by con-

quest and that it was then actually in the Japanese possession, but that the consent of Germany to the free right of disposal was necessary for its ultimate disposition. Baron Makino then read pertinent extracts from previously unpublished agreements, notably those of September 24, 1918, which revealed that Japan and China had already arrived at an amicable settlement regarding the matters relating to Shantung. Dr. Koo eloquently maintained that China's participation in the War "had completely altered her status," that the declaration of war abrogated all existing treaties with Germany so that Germany no longer possessed any rights or interests in Shantung which might be transferred to Japan, and that, therefore, the agreements with Japan concerning Shantung were no longer binding. Thus was begun at Paris the Shantung controversy which was eventually extended to the Washington Conference.

But Japan's claim was founded upon too solid a foundation to be evaded. In the Council of Foreign Ministers on April 15 and 17, in which Japan but not China was represented, Robert Lansing, backed by President Woodrow Wilson, cleverly suggested that the former German rights in China be ceded in trust to the Allied and Associated Powers, which should effect an eventual restoration to China at a later date. Lloyd George at first proposed a League mandate over Shantung, but later announced the adherence of his Government to the Agreement of 1917, thus endorsing the Japanese claim. Georges Clemenceau also supported this position. The Japanese representative of course opposed the Lansing proposal unqualifiedly.

The issues were thus boiled down to the moral force of the Agreements of 1917 and the validity of the Sino-Japanese Agreements of 1915 and 1918. The first issue was decided in Japan's favor by Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau. As to the second issue, Baron Makino answered the Chinese nullification arguments on April 22 and pointed out that the treaties signed as a result of force were not invalid, that China had made no protest at the time of the negotiation of the additional agreements in 1918, and

that, in actual practice, China had since received no less than twenty million yen in accordance with the terms of those agreements. When China further claimed that the restoration by Germany of her former rights would "comport to her [China's] national dignity" and "serve to illustrate further the principle of right and justice for which the Allies and Associated Powers have fought the common enemy," Baron Makino sarcastically retorted that "the impression derived from the examination of the Chinese memorandum is that Japan must bear the burden of all sacrifices whilst China reaps all the benefits."

When there was an added indication of delay, Viscount Chinda warned against any further postponement of a solution, and played the last card by announcing that the Japanese representatives "had a duty to perform to China in this matter and they could not carry out their obligation to China unless Kiaochow was handed over to them" and that they "were under an express instruction from their Government that unless they were placed in a position to carry out their obligation to China they were not allowed to sign the treaty."

This strong position of the Japanese representatives was fortunately helped by two other factors. The one was the dramatic rejection of the Japanese demand to write a race equality clause into the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the other was the sudden withdrawal from the Conference of the Italian representatives as a result of meeting opposition in presenting the claims of Italy in the Adriatic, also based upon secret treaties. They strengthened the feeling that Japan might follow Italy's suit in withdrawing from the Peace Conference in case two of her major claims were denied her. Thus the final Chinese effort to nullify the Japanese claim on the afternoon of April 24 encountered a different atmosphere. President Wilson reminded China that her declaration of war against Germany had not cancelled the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915, while Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau reiterated their determination to uphold the secret agreements of

1917. Thereupon, Marquis Saionji urged a "definite settlement of the question . . . with the least possible delay." The whole question was then referred to the British, French, and American experts on the Far East with a specific instruction to report on the question as to whether it would be less injurious to China's interests to transfer Kiaochow directly to Japan or to require the execution of the Sino-Japanese agreements of 1915 and 1918. The "Big Three" met on April 25 to consider the recommendations of the Far East experts. The report recommended that it would be less disadvantageous to China if Japan merely inherited the German rights in Shantung than if the settlement were based entirely upon the 1915 and 1918 agreements.

In the discussion which followed Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau upheld their position against Wilson's persuasive eloquence. Wilson even suggested that Japan was willing to discuss the renunciation by all Powers of their rights in China, but the British Premier could not agree to such a step, for that raised graver and more complicated issues than the transfer of German rights in Shantung to Japan. Five days later, therefore, the "Big Three" agreed to satisfy Japan's claim and by Articles 156, 157, and 158 of the Treaty of Versailles all German rights in Shantung were transferred to Japan. In exchange, the Japanese spokesman stated that "the policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao," that "the owners of the Railway (Kiaochow-Tsinan) will use special police only to ensure security for traffic" and "for no other purpose," and that "the Police Force will be composed of Chinese and such Japanese instructors as the Directors of the Railway may select and will be appointed by the Chinese Government."

THE PACIFIC MANDATES

Japan's third major claim at the Peace Conferences re-

lated to the former German possessions in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator. On the basis of various 1917 agreements, Japan was confident that there would be no difficulty in the path of this claim. Here again Japan had to face the treacherous reality of Western diplomatic dealings.

Unmindful of such thought, however, Baron Makino presented this request to the Council of Ten on January 27 together with her Shantung claim as we have already seen. To Japan's utter surprise and disappointment, however, Lloyd George proposed that all German islands in the Pacific should be "ceded to the League of Nations" to be ruled under the League's mandate and President Woodrow Wilson supported him, agreeing to grant the mandate to Japan but making a reservation in the case of the Island of Yap which he considered should be "international." Japan in vain insisted upon her right under the 1917 agreements. On January 29, it was decided that the German colonies in the Pacific should be transferred to the Allied and Associated Powers which would entrust them to different Powers as mandatories of the League of Nations, and on May 6 all German islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator were assigned to Japan under the newly adopted mandate system of the League of Nations. One exception related to the Island of Yap, the disposition of which was not settled until the meeting of the Washington Conference. And thus Japan lost her last desiderata although the "unconditional cession" was substituted by a "mandatory" power over the Pacific islands.

THE SIBERIAN EXPEDITION

The Russian Revolution of March, 1917, followed by the Bolsheviki triumph in November, led to the conclusion of a separate peace at Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, and changed the whole scope of the war situation on the European front. The Russo-German cooperation to strengthen the German western front was imminent and in April the Japanese, British, and American landing forces took the of-

fensive by capturing Vladivostok, the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway, together with all the ammunition stored there. At the time, a large number of Czechoslovak troops, escaping from the Austro-Hungarian army and making their way across Siberia so that they might be brought back to Europe and join the Allied forces, were facing a dangerous situation due to Russo-German peace and the disorganized conditions in Russia. Thus arose the question of the ill-omened allied intervention in Siberia.

The United States led the way in proposing that the Allied and Associated Powers should plan a military intervention in order to assist the Czechoslovak troops in making good their escape from Siberia and to steady the efforts toward self-government which the Russians themselves might make, but that they should respect the territorial integrity of Russia and abstain from all interference in their internal politics, and that they should withdraw their troops as soon as these objectives were gained. The proposal was welcomed and an international expeditionary force was organized. On August 2, 1918, the Terauchi Cabinet at Tokyo proclaimed the Japanese adherence to the proposed plan. The allied expeditionary force took the field immediately, captured Habarovsk by September 5, and occupied Siberia east of Lake Baikal by the middle of October. The Czechoslovak troops were successfully rescued and the last detachment sailed for Europe from Vladivostok in September, 1920.

It became soon evident, however, that Japan and the United States differed slightly in their respective policies. Japan regarded the new Bolshevik rulers of Russia, who had concluded a separate treaty of peace with Germany in disregard of the London Declaration, as the enemies of the Allies, while the United States wished to refrain from any interference in the domestic affairs of Russia. As a result, the United States withdrew her troops early in 1920 and the Japanese troops were left alone to check the rising tide of red menace. As a next-door neighbor of Russia, Japan felt the force of this grave situation far more than the United

States. Also there occurred, in March, 1920, the famous massacre of Nikolaievsk in which 350 Japanese were massacred and, pending reparation, Japan occupied the northern half of Sakhalin. The whole question was ironed out at the Washington Conference, all Japanese troops were withdrawn from the mainland of Russia by October, 1922, and the Japanese forces were ordered home from northern Sakhalin as soon as the Soviet-Japanese Agreement was reached in 1925. The ill-fated Siberian expedition drew severe criticism both at home and abroad, but Japan had kept her promise.

CHAPTER XIV

JAPAN AND CHINA

CHINA'S defeat at the hand of Japan in 1894-95 and Japan's acquisition of vast economic interests in Manchuria in 1905 became indelible in China's memory. Those two factors helped to arouse both China's conscious and subconscious animosity toward Japan and the sea of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relationship became rougher during the ten years following the Russo-Japanese War. Japan set out, therefore, to reach an understanding with the various Powers, first with China and then with Russia and the United States, on the fundamental principles of Japan's Asiatic policy. Because those negotiations took place during the stormy years of the World War, Japan was unjustly accused of taking advantage of the disrupted condition of international affairs. In fact, however, we shall see that those negotiations, especially the Sino-Japanese negotiations of 1915, were not hastily planned projects, but were the logical sequences of the Sino-Japanese relations during the ten years preceding the World War.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION, 1911

Fathered by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary forces in China overthrew the Manchus from the imperial throne in 1911 and the Republic of China became a reality with the proclamation of a provisional constitution on March 10, 1912, and the inauguration of Yuan Shi-kai as its President on the same day. Years before the actual outbreak of the revolution, Dr. Sun and his revolutionary colleagues were refugees in Japan and used Japanese and Chinese financial

contributions in mobilizing their forces against the Manchus. As soon as a revolutionary uprising broke out in Szechwan, however, Japan proclaimed her neutrality and sent observers, including General Saito, the Japanese army authority on China, in order to keep a close watch over the progress of the revolution.

Japan was astir, even before the actual outbreak of the revolution. Some of the Genros and other national leaders feared that the overthrow of the Manchus in favor of a republican form of government in China would cast unfavorable shadows over Japan's national polity and there even appeared a strong sentiment that the Japanese Government should aid the Peking Court in suppressing the revolutionary movement. Japan's first concern was, naturally, that a monarchical form of government would survive in China. Accordingly, Minister Ijuin at Peking was instructed to use his influence in inducing Yuan Shi-kai, with a promise of Japanese assistance, to retain the form of a constitutional monarchy. Japan even proposed to Great Britain that they should cooperate in helping China to maintain such a form of government. But Great Britain, due largely to the pressure brought upon her by the British commercial interests in China which feared anti-British movement, hesitated to take any positive step.

As the revolution progressed, Japan became impatient. Premier Prince Katsura announced, on December 18, that the time had come for Japanese intervention "for the sake of the peace of the Far East" and, five days later, Minister Ijuin formally notified Yuan Shi-kai that Japan would not recognize a Chinese republic. But active Japanese intervention was withheld, largely because Great Britain hesitated to cooperate with her ally in the Far East. Meanwhile, a compromise was effected between Yuan and the revolutionary forces and a peace conference was held at Shanghai under the auspices of British Minister Jordan, at which were present both British and Japanese Consul-Generals. This eventually led to the abdication of Emperor Hsuan Tung, since known as Henry Pu Yi, on February 12, 1912,

and the election of Yuan Shi-kai as the new Republic's Provisional President three days later. Yuan took the oath of office on March 10 and promulgated the Provisional Constitution, while the National Advisory Council met on April 29, 1912, and the first Parliament was convened on April 8, 1913.

Then followed a crucial struggle between Yuan and the Parliament over the question of raising a foreign loan. Yuan emerged the victor by successfully obtaining a "Reorganization Loan" of £ 25,000,000 in April, 1913, after the American withdrawal from the Five-Power Consortium. This provoked a storm of criticism both from Parliament and the Kuomintang leaders and resulted in the outbreak of the so-called Second or Summer Revolution, but in reality a civil war between the North and the South, in the Yangtse Valley in July, 1913. At the time, public opinion in Japan generally supported the Southern cause and criticized the Tokyo Government as unreasonably sympathetic to Yuan. It was upon this occasion that the Japanese Government, for the first time in its history, issued an official statement and explained the neutral position it had assumed in the Chinese civil war.

The Southern rebels were crushed within two short months, and Yuan's supremacy was reestablished. It was during this period of civil wars that the outrageous activities of military brigandage raged over a wide area, damaging Japanese interests at Nanking, Hankow, and Wuchang, even resulting in the massacre of innocent Japanese residents. Once more public opinion in Japan rose to a high pitch and, it was even proposed that the Japanese invade the Yangtse Valley, South Manchuria, and Eastern Mongolia. However, the Tokyo Government thought otherwise. Negotiations were begun immediately and on September 13, Japan and China concluded three separate agreements concerning the Nanking, Hankow, and Wuchang incidents. Under these Agreements the responsible Chinese leaders who were involved in the outrageous expeditions were severely punished, and the incidents were closed.

THE TREATIES AND NOTES OF 1915

The Treaties and Notes of 1915 stirred up more derogatory criticism of Japan's diplomacy than perhaps any other issue, either before or afterward, until the Manchurian incident of 1931. A close study of the Sino-Japanese relations before 1915, however, clearly indicates that the whole affair was the inevitable outcome of the events and circumstances resulting from the conflicting interests of the two countries and an unavoidable by-product of the World War.

(1) The Kato-Grey Understanding of 1913

Late in December, 1912, the third Katsura Cabinet was formed and Baron Kato Takaaki, then representing Japan at the Court of St. James, was recalled to become Minister for Foreign Affairs. Before he left London, Baron Kato twice conferred with Lord Edward Grey, on January 3 and 10, and reached an understanding, though in a personal capacity, with regard to the Japanese interests in Manchuria. At his first conference, Baron Kato explained to the British Foreign Secretary that the twenty-five-year lease of the Kwantung Territory expired in 1923, but that the Territory had a particular historical and sentimental background in the Japanese mind, and that consequently Japan desired to extend the lease for a longer period, even making it a permanent one. At the second conference, he explained the state of the railway concessions in Manchuria and expressed Japan's desire to extend the leases on the Dairen-Changchun main line and the Mukden-Antung branch line for a longer period when they expired, respectively in 1928 and 1931. Baron Kato intimated, however, that Japan should wait until the proper "psychological moment" for such a negotiation with China, and added that Japan entertained no idea of violating the principle of the Open Door and an equal commercial opportunity. While Lord Grey did not express any official opinion, he assured the retiring Japanese Ambassador that he understood the Japanese position in Manchuria

which was "planted with blood" and that the other Powers should not interfere with such negotiations as the question related solely to Japan and China. Though unofficial, the establishment of a personal understanding between two great diplomats of Great Britain and Japan was significant at a later date. It also shows that Baron Kato was ever watchful to strengthen Japan's position in Manchuria and that he was largely concerned with the extension of the leases of the Kwantung Territory and the South Manchuria Railway.

On his way home from London, Baron Kato met at Changchun Minister Ijuin, then stationed at Peking, and conferred with him at length aboard the train concerning his conversations with Lord Grey and the whole field of Sino-Japanese relations. Ijuin was of the opinion that the time was not yet ripe for such action and the Foreign Minister-elect suggested that he would strive to pave the foundation for such a possible negotiation between Japan and China.

At his first conference with Premier Prince Katsura soon after his arrival in Tokyo, Baron Kato again outlined his understanding with Lord Grey, and the Premier not only agreed with him, but exclaimed: "That is precisely the most important policy worthy of my Cabinet!" Unfortunately, however, the Katsura Cabinet resigned in February and was succeeded by the Yamamoto Cabinet. The only course which Baron Kato could then take was to confer with Count Yamamoto and Foreign Minister Baron Makino, not only to inform them of the Kato-Grey understanding, but to emphasize the importance of grasping the first opportunity to negotiate with China for the extension of Japanese leases in Manchuria as well as for the clarification of various vague rights.

(2) *The Sino-Japanese Relations in 1915*

For the fourth time, Baron Kato became the Minister for Foreign Affairs in April, 1914, this time in the Okuma Cabinet. The Sino-Japanese questions had remained un-

touched after he left the Foreign Office in February, 1913, and his first thought in resuming the important duties of his office was to effect a solution to the various pending Sino-Japanese problems. Baron Kato's determination, therefore, was not made on the spur of the moment; it was an idea for which he had been preparing for some time. For Sino-Japanese relations had been growing from bad to worse after the Russo-Japanese War: in 1907 arose the question of the Mukden-Shinmintun Railway; in 1909 occurred the controversy over the reconstruction of the Mukden-Antung Railway; in 1910 bubbled up the Chinchow-Aigun Railway issue again; 1911 witnessed the consummation of the discriminatory Four-Power Consortium; and in 1913 came the Nanking and Hankow affairs. In everything which China proposed, there was an attempt to intimidate Japan and to jeopardize Japanese interests in China. In this connection may be mentioned the proposal to transform the Han-Yeh-Ping Company into a government institution, thereby nullifying the Japanese interest therein; an attempt to establish a naval base in Fukien Province with American capital; and the proposed lease of the Chushan group of islands at the mouth of the Yangtse River to Germany. In short, China was using her old policy of using the conflicting interests of various Powers to gain her end. In the background, moreover, Russia completely dominated Outer Mongolia, and the British interests monopolized Tibet. It was with such a panorama of provocative events behind and before him that Baron Kato took office in 1914. And to him the fundamental difficulty appeared to emanate from the imperfection of the Sino-Japanese treaties.

To these factors in 1914 was added the ticklish question of Shantung. No sooner had Japan completed the capture of the German interests in Shantung than China began to demand their immediate return. Japan was not disposed to acquiesce in such a demand after so much sacrifice until after the peace conference, and the Sino-Japanese relations added one more delicate question which required careful handling.

With added interest and determination, therefore, Baron Kato once more began to study the whole situation.

(3) *The "Twenty-one Demands"*

The opportunity for which Baron Kato was waiting came, in his opinion, with the World War. Even then, the seasoned Foreign Minister was extremely cautious in his procedure. On August 21, 1914, Baron Kato instructed Minister Hioki at the Peking Court to endeavor to increase the closer relationship and trust between China and Japan, and to pave the way for a peaceful and permanent solution of all the pending Sino-Japanese questions. With Japan's declaration of War against Germany on August 23, Minister Hioki was ready to take immediate steps for negotiations, but Baron Kato considered it still too early. Meanwhile, Baron Kato was formulating certain fundamental demands for the recognition and strengthening of Japan's special position and interest in China, especially in Manchuria and Mongolia, and the Genros and Ministers in conference approved of his proposals early in September. Everything was thus ready, but the shrewd Foreign Minister postponed the negotiations until after the fall of Kiaochow.

The capitulation of Kiaochow on November 7 and China's demand for its immediate return to her constituted the signal for Baron Kato to act. On November 12 he recalled Minister Hioki to Tokyo for an important conference, and on December 3 he entrusted in Hioki's hand the important task of Sino-Japanese negotiations. Meanwhile, China was demanding Japan's evacuation of Shantung and, on January 7, 1915, she withdrew her war-zone proclamation, implying thereby that Japan should at least retire within the original German leasehold. This act caused widespread resentment in Japan, for the war with Germany was by no means over, and the subsequent negotiations resulted in the presentation by Minister Hioki of the now famous "Twenty-one Demands," or more correctly fourteen "demands" and seven "wishes" contained in five groups, di-

rectly to President Yuan Shih-kai at Peking on January 18, 1915.

Group I, consisting of four articles, concerned the disposition of German economic rights in Shantung: to assent to all agreements which might be reached between Japan and Germany as to the transfer of the former German rights and privileges to Japan; to promise not to cede or lease any part of Shantung to any third Power; to grant to Japan the right of building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to a point on the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway; and to open certain principal cities in Shantung for foreign trade. Baron Kato intimated that Japan was willing to negotiate for the return of German rights and privileges in Shantung to China should China agree to other demands.

Group II, containing seven articles, was directed toward strengthening Japan's position in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia: to extend the leases of Port Arthur and Dairen, and of the South Manchuria Railway to ninety-nine years; to allow Japanese subjects to own or lease land for agricultural, industrial, and commercial purposes in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; to permit Japanese subjects to travel and reside there; to grant mining privileges; not to grant to a third Power or its subjects any railway concession or loan for railway construction there or to mortgage to a third Power local taxes of those regions for foreign loans, without the consent of Japan; to consult Japan before employing advisers in political, economic, and military matters there; and to hand over to Japan the management of the Kirin-Changchun railway for ninety-nine years.

Group III, involving two articles, was intended to secure mining and railway concessions in Central China: to transform the Han-Yeh-Ping Company into a Sino-Japanese joint enterprise and not to dispose of the rights and property of the Company without Japan's consent; also not to permit without the Han-Yeh-Ping Company's consent the exploitation by any person not connected with the Company of any other mine in the neighborhood of the Company's mines.

Group IV, with one article, was designed to prevent China from ceding or leasing to any third Power any harbor, bay, or island along the Chinese coast.

Group V, containing seven articles of "wishes," was drawn up to cover miscellaneous items: the Chinese Government to employ Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers; to grant the right of owning land in the interior of China by Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools; the police department in certain large Chinese cities where Japanese resided in large numbers to be jointly administered by Chinese and Japanese or to employ Japanese in the police force to avoid complications; China to buy from Japan a certain per cent of munitions used by her or to establish a Sino-Japanese arsenal; China to permit Japan to build the Wuchang-Nanchang and Nanchang-Hangchow railways; China to consult Japan before raising foreign loans for mining and railway and harbor construction in Fukien Province; and China to permit Japanese subjects the freedom of religious propagation in China.

While the first four Groups may be properly considered as "demands," Group V was regarded from the beginning merely as wishes or suggestions, and Baron Kato described its peculiar character in his instruction to Minister Hioki on December 3 as follows: "As regards the proposals contained in the fifth group, they are presented as the 'wishes' of the Imperial Government. The matters which are dealt with under this category are entirely different in character from those which are included in the first four Groups. An adjustment, at this time, of these matters, some of which had been pending between the two countries, being nevertheless highly desirable for the advancement of friendly relations between Japan and China as well as for safeguarding their common interests, you are also requested to exercise your best efforts to have our wishes carried out." Incidentally, this Group was not made public at first. Baron Kato explained this procedure before the Diet on May 22 and said that the Government considered it unnecessary to inform other Powers concerning the fifth Group as it did not contain

demands to be enforced but merely miscellaneous wishes or suggestions which would strengthen Japanese interests if accepted but which Japan did not desire to enforce, the items which, "if China refuses, can not by their very nature be pressed for acceptance."

(4) *The Negotiations*

In the negotiations which followed, President Yuan adopted China's usual policy of delay and, to make that policy effective, suggested article-by-article discussion, while Japan insisted upon immediate action and *en bloc* discussion. Yuan, moreover, used various other methods in his effort to counteract the Japanese demands: (1) mobilization of governors and military commanders to protest against the Japanese demands; (2) vehement anti-Japanese press propaganda, especially by exaggerating the Japanese demands and even, against the usual diplomatic custom, disclosing Group V which was to be kept secret; and (3) persuasion of the Genros to withdraw the Japanese demands by sending Dr. Ariga Nagao, then an adviser to the Peking Government.

At last, the first session of the negotiations was held on February 2, when the representatives of the two nations, Minister Hioki Eki for Japan and Foreign Minister Lou Cheng-ching for China, found themselves far apart in their ideas. Ten days later China offered her counter proposals, in which she agreed to the extension of leases to ninety-nine years and to recognize Japan's succession to the former German rights in Shantung, but rejected everything else. Especially strong was China's objection toward the Group V, while, in connection with Shantung, she maintained that the war against Germany was fought on Chinese soil, and demanded damages from Japan. Baron Kato's procedure was marked by extreme patience and leniency, and Minister Hioki presented Japan's revised demands on February 16. The chief difficulty which Japan had to confront from time to time was China's policy of delay and her attitude of insincerity, accepting a point one day but rejecting it on the

next. Moreover, the delay in the negotiations was aided by the rising tide of anti-Japanese sentiment in China, while the Peking Government left no stone unturned in stirring up hostile public opinion against Japan throughout the world, especially in the United States. And, moreover, China confidently expected foreign intervention on her behalf.

While the negotiations see-sawed back and forth, the election on March 25, 1915, resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Okuma Cabinet, and Baron Kato faced the tedious problems of negotiations with more confidence. Heavy pressure was being brought to bear upon him to use strong measures, but he firmly pleaded for patience and time. Accordingly, Japan virtually withdrew the Group V "wishes" on April 15, and made further concessions in other respects so that, by April 17, all the essential points had been agreed upon between the two Governments. And on April 26 Japan presented a revised list of demands on the basis of the agreements which had been reached in the preceding twenty-five sessions, postponing all of those in Group V except one article which related to loans in Fukien Province and offering as a *quid pro quo* the restoration of the Kiaochow leasehold to China on condition that the city be opened as a commercial port, that a Japanese settlement be established there in an area designated by Japan, and that an international settlement be set up if the Powers so desired. To this China again made what she called her "last" counter proposal which not only refused to accept some of Japanese terms, but also proposed to reopen for discussion some points which had been already agreed upon. This was indeed the last straw.

At the end of the twenty-fourth session on April 27, therefore, Minister Hioki, in the light of China's virtual rejection of the Japanese demands concerning Eastern Inner Mongolia, cabled to Baron Kato and suggested the use of an ultimatum as the only effective weapon. He reasoned that there was absolutely no hope for further progress in the negotiations due to China's insincerity; that the Chinese attitude had become worse since the disclosure of the British

and American communications concerning Group V, China interpreting them as the first step toward intervention; that the anti-Japanese sentiment in China had decidedly increased; and that the harsh criticisms of British and American residents in China directed against Japan might bring serious results in their relationship with the Japanese residents. Baron Kato still insisted upon using peaceful methods but, following the Chinese proposal of May 1, the Kasumigaseki leaders were almost unanimously in favor of an ultimatum. On May 3, an all-day session of the Cabinet reached the same conclusion. It was at this juncture that President Yuan suggested the use of an ultimatum to save his face if he was to sign the agreements already practically accepted.

Baron Kato now reached the end of his trail. At last he came to realize that his dream of a peaceful settlement could not materialize and reached the conclusion that, after all, duress, the method which the Western Powers invariably used so effectively against China in obtaining concession in the past, was the only method before which China would bow. But on the question of reviving Group V Baron Kato was firm. He insisted that the demands, if an ultimatum were to be used at all, should be something which was absolute, which permitted no room for suspicion of the Powers; that the items in the Group V from the very beginning were regarded as "wishes," not essential demands, which did not require any ultimatum to enforce; that the difficulty in the Sino-Japanese negotiations was not centered in Group V but on the questions relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia; and that Group V must of necessity either be withdrawn or indefinitely postponed in order to make the essential demands based upon an ultimatum stand out as rational and reasonable. All of which goes to prove that Baron Kato was chiefly concerned with Manchuria and Mongolia and that China steadfastly refused to accept most of his demands relating to those regions.

Once convinced of the necessity of resorting to an ultimatum, Baron Kato proceeded firmly. On May 4 was held

the conference of the Genros at which Prince Yamagata and Prince Matsukata hesitated to approve the procedure, and the conference of the Ministers and the Genros before the Throne on May 6 again faced a similar situation. However, the Mikado's approval was obtained at the latter conference, and on May 7 Japan's ultimatum was presented to China. That memorable document gave China twenty-seven hours within which to accept the revised demands or "the Imperial Government will take such independent action as they deem necessary to meet the situation." China accepted the demands early on May 9 and the treaties and notes were duly signed and exchanged by Minister Hioki for Japan and Foreign Minister Lou Cheng-ching for China on May 25, some one hundred and twenty-eight days after the presentation of the original demands on January 18.

(5) *The Treaties and Notes of 1915*

The negotiations in 1915 resulted in the signing of two Treaties and the exchange of thirteen Notes. By the Shantung Treaty, the Chinese Government agreed (1) to recognize all agreements which might be reached between Japan and Germany concerning the transfer to Japan of former German rights and privileges in Shantung; (2) to grant to Japan the right to finance a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to the Tsinan-Kiaochow line in case China decided to build it; and (3) to open leading towns in Shantung for the residence and trade of foreigners. In the Notes exchanged, China affirmed never to lease or alienate "to any foreign power under any pretext" any territory within or along the coast of Shantung, and promised to consult the Japanese Minister when China was ready to open the new treaty towns in Shantung, while Japan declared her intention to restore Kiaochow to China on condition that China agree to open the city as a commercial port, to allow the establishment of Japanese and international concessions therein, and to settle the disposition of German property at Kiaochow by the joint agreement between Japan and China.

By the second Treaty relating to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Chinese Government agreed (1) to recognize the extension of the leases of Port Arthur and Dairen and of the South Manchuria Railway lines to ninety-nine years (the exchanged Notes fixed the dates of the Port Arthur-Dairen lease as 1997 and the leases of the Dairen-Changchun main line and the Mukden-Antung branch line, respectively, as 2002 and 2007); (2) to permit Japanese subjects to lease land for commercial and industrial or agricultural purposes (by the exchanged Notes, the term of such leases was conceded to extend over a thirty-year period, unconditionally renewable); (3) to allow Japanese subjects the liberty to enter, travel, and reside in South Manchuria and to carry on business activities; (4) to allow Sino-Japanese joint undertakings in agriculture and industries in Eastern Inner Mongolia; (5) to grant the rights of extraterritoriality to Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria; (6) to open to international residence and trade suitable cities and towns in Eastern Inner Mongolia (by the exchanged Notes, China agreed to consult the Japanese Minister in Peking in deciding upon those cities); and (7) to revise the Kirin-Changchun railway agreements "in accordance with a standard set by previous and similar arrangements between China and other powers." In the accompanying Notes exchanged, China, besides the two items which were already parenthetically noted above, (1) conceded to Japanese subjects the right to prospect for and work certain coal and iron mines in ten designated regions in Fengtien and Kirin Provinces, including new areas such as Penhsihu, Hailung, Tunghua, and Anshan in Fengtien Province; (2) agreed to consult Japanese capitalists for a loan in case China decided to build railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia with foreign capital; and (3) promised to give preference to Japanese in case China desired to employ foreign advisers and instructors on "political, financial, military, and police affairs in South Manchuria."

By the Additional Notes exchanged, China furthermore (1) agreed to approve any future agreement between Japa-

nese capitalists and the Han-Yeh-Ping Company and not to confiscate or nationalize it without the consent of the former nor to permit it to contract any foreign loan other than Japanese, and (2) declared that she had given no permission to foreign nations to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, dock yards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or any other military establishment, and that she did not entertain any intention of borrowing foreign capital for similar purposes. It should be added that Group V, except the clause relating to Fukien, had been indefinitely reserved by Japan and dropped from the Treaties and Notes.

(6) *The Attitude of Powers*

The Sino-Japanese negotiation of 1915 provoked such a storm of criticism all over the world as had no other question rising out of Japanese diplomacy to that date. Necessarily, the leading Powers were much concerned with Japan's possible motives. Such a situation offered a superb field for China's policy of inducing foreign intervention in her behalf. Baron Kato was extremely cautious in avoiding such a result and, on the whole, he was successful in his task. While France and Russia desisted from writing diplomatic notes and merely looked on, both Great Britain and the United States repeatedly interpolated or presented light protests, which increased the tense atmosphere at Peking. Especially outspoken was the attitude of the United States where the Chinese propaganda was most effective.

Respecting the spirit of the Kato-Grey understanding of 1913, Baron Kato felt the friendly responsibility of informing the British Government of the nature of the pending Sino-Japanese negotiations, which was done. The contents of the Japanese demands, with the exception of seven "wishes" in Group V, were cabled to Minister Inouye on January 8 and formally presented to Lord Grey on January 22. On the same day, Ambassador Greene called upon Baron Kato and expressed the British desire that Japan would consult her in case Tokyo intended to present de-

mands which might concern the acquired rights of British subjects in China and that Japan would desist from presenting upon China any demand which might infringe upon the latter's independence and territorial integrity. Baron Kato believed that there was no demand which should provoke any British protest, and requested that the British Government would abstain from interfering in the approaching negotiations.

As Japan's ally under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Great Britain followed the negotiations closely. From time to time, she offered advice and issued warnings, all characterized with friendly considerations. Thus on March 8, she expressed her concern over the possible political complications which might result from the negotiations; on March 10, she warned against possible infringement upon the British railway interests in South China; and on April 28, she expressed the hope that Japan would avoid the breaking of diplomatic relations with China and that, in case it was unavoidable, the whole procedure would not conflict with the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Again on May 4, she expressed her fear that, should the various items in Group V cause disruption of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, public opinion in Great Britain would consider it as disregarding the spirit of the Alliance. On his part, in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding, Baron Kato carefully informed the British Government of the progress of the negotiations both through Ambassadors Inouye and Greene. On the whole, the British concern was a friendly one, emanating from the responsibility of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

The attitude of the United States, on the other hand, was distinctly hostile. This was to be expected when the United States and Japan appeared to be at variance on every turn of the Chinese question. It was more so in 1915 when Chinese propaganda was widely spread in America to arouse public resentment of Japan's Chinese policy and, perhaps more important, as one of the Japanese "wishes" concerned Fukien where the United States was secretly manœuvring its diplomatic forces to establish an American naval and

commercial base. At first the United States was merely a silent observer but, no sooner than the so-called "secret demands" appeared in the press reports, the State Department, on February 19, took steps to verify the existence of Group V. The Kasumigaseki explained the nature of the seven "requests or 'wishes' of which friendly consideration was desired," and on March 13 Secretary Bryan wrote a lengthy protest and warning in the name of his country.

Bryan raised no objection with regard to Japan's "special position" in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to the proposed extension of leases to ninety-nine years, and specifically stated that "the United States frankly recognizes that territorial contiguity creates special relations between Japan and these districts." The American Secretary's chief objection concerned Groups IV and V, especially those articles forbidding the alienation or lease of any port, harbor, or island on the coast of China, requiring Chinese to employ Japanese subjects as China's political, military, and financial advisers, and suggesting Sino-Japanese joint policing in certain cities of China, which "are clearly derogatory to the political independence and administrative entity" of China. "The United States, therefore," wrote Bryan, "could not regard with indifference the assumption of political, military, and economic domination over China by a foreign Power, and hopes that your excellency's Government will find it consonant with their interests to refrain from pressing upon China an acceptance of proposals which would, if accepted, exclude Americans from equal participation in the economic and industrial development of China and would limit the political independence of that country."

Baron Kato then presented to the State Department through Ambassador Chinda a still more lengthy memorandum, assuring Bryan that his fear was altogether unfounded. At the same time, the keen Foreign Minister took this opportunity to clear a question which had been puzzling the Tokyo Government. Baron Kato pointed to Secretary Hay's suggestion that the United States desired to improve

a harbor in Fukien for a naval coaling station and to the reports that an American firm was actually negotiating with China for a contract for the improvement of that harbor, and stated that, because of its proximity to Taiwan, such an attempt would be detrimental to Japan and would be regarded as "unfriendly and inimical to Japan." Bryan disclaimed such purpose or desire on the part of the United States and expressed his willingness to approve a Sino-Japanese agreement "looking toward the withholding of any concession to any foreign Power which contemplates the improvement of any harbor on the coast of Fukien or the establishment of a coaling station or naval base along the said coast by any foreign Power." Baron Kato lost no time to propose that, if such was the desire of the United States, China should know it. The State Department agreed to the Japanese proposal, and Baron Kato conveyed the American desire to China. Thus was buried, as a by-product of the 1915 Sino-Japanese negotiations, the American plan to establish a naval base at Fukien.

Meanwhile, the public opinion in America was growing more hostile, sympathizing with China as a sister republic and criticizing Japan as the military aggressor. On April 14, therefore, Bryan proposed that the United States was willing to act as mediator in connection with the question of arms, but Ambassador Chinda objected and the proposal was dropped. Friendly intervention was later suggested more than once, but Japan rejected the move each time. Finally, when the news of a possible ultimatum reached Washington, Bryan immediately cabled to Premier Count Okuma, persuading him to adopt peaceful methods and, at the same time, suggested to Great Britain, France, and Russia to take joint action in the interest of a peaceful solution of the Sino-Japanese negotiations. The three Powers refused to adopt such a procedure and, in the face of Ambassador Chinda's repeated protests, Bryan withdrew the proposal for intervention.

When, however, Japan did present an ultimatum as the last resort to check delay and evasion, the climax of the

American scene was reached. Writing on May 11, Bryan sent an identic note both to Japan and China and insisted that the United States "cannot recognize any agreement or understanding which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy." Yet, four days later, Bryan claimed that the rights of residence and of leasing land conferred upon Japanese subjects in Manchuria would, by the most-favored-nation clause, accrue to the nationals of all treaty Powers! Thus was closed the American-Japanese drama, a by-play of the Sino-Japanese negotiations in 1915.

THE MANCHURIAN RAILWAY LOAN AGREEMENTS

The Manchurian question, at bottom, is often rightly described as a railway question. Japan adopted the policy of safeguarding the interests of the South Manchuria Railway and accordingly several important railway agreements had already been concluded between Japan and China. The second decade of the century saw further consolidation of Japanese railway interests in Manchuria through the conclusion of several additional railway loan agreements.

1. *The Ssuningkai-Chengchiatun Railway Loan Agreement.* It will be recalled that Japan had obtained from China in 1913, the right to finance the construction of five railways in Manchuria and Mongolia. The final loan agreement for one of them, from Ssuningkai on the South Manchuria Railway to Chengchiatun, was signed on December 27, 1915, between the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Chinese Government. By virtue of this Agreement, the Yokohama Specie Bank agreed to advance 5,000,000 yen at five per cent interest for the construction of the line. The term of the loan which was secured on the property and revenues

of the line was fixed at forty years, payable semi-annually. While the building and the management of the line were to be in the hand of the Chinese Government, the actual construction work was to be under a Japanese chief engineer with a mixed Sino-Japanese staff, the Japanese chief engineer being responsible for purchasing construction materials. The right to police and guard the line was to be the prerogative of the Chinese authorities, but the traffic manager, until the loan was paid in full, was to be a Japanese. The Agreement gave Japan the further right to finance the construction of an extension or a branch line in case such were projected in the future and in case foreign capital were to be required. In accordance with this additional provision, Japan later financed the construction of an extension to Taonan, together with a branch line from Chengchiatun to Tungliao. The construction of the Ssuping kai-Chengchiatun line was started in 1916 and the entire line to Taonan was opened to traffic in 1924.

2. *The Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement.* In a series of railway loan agreements which were concluded in 1905, 1907, and 1908, Japan obtained the right to finance the Kirin-Changchun Railway, which branches off eastward from the South Manchuria Railway at Changchun. By the Treaty of 1915 relating to Manchuria and Mongolia, China agreed to a fundamental revision of the last loan agreement of 1908. The negotiations for this purpose were concluded in 1917, when on October 12 the South Manchuria Railway Company entered into an agreement with the Chinese Government. By this Agreement, the Kirin-Changchun Railway remained a part of the Chinese Government Railways but the management of the line was transferred to the South Manchuria Railway Company during the period of the new loan agreement. In return, the South Manchuria Railway Company was to advance a new loan of 6,500,000 yen, deducting about 2,000,000 yen then in arrears, running for thirty years at five per cent interest. The Chinese Government guaranteed the payment of the principal and interest by placing the property and receipts of the line as

security, thirty per cent of the annual profit of the line being reserved for the payment of the loan. The "rights of policing, administrative jurisdiction, and taxation on the Railway and land used by the Railway," however, were again vested in the Chinese Government. The construction work on the line was started in 1919 and completed in 1922.

3. *The Kirin-Kainei Railway Loan Agreement.* Under the terms of the Sino-Japanese Convention of 1907, the Japanese financiers obtained the right to participate in the financing of a line from Kirin to Chosen in case foreign capital was needed. In 1909, by the Sino-Japanese Agreement of September 4 relating to the Chientao region, a more specific reference to this projected line was agreed upon, namely, from the Kirin-Changchun Railway to Kainei ("Hoiryong" or Huining). One of the Notes exchanged in 1915 strengthened the Japanese priority claim to finance such railway projects in Manchuria "if foreign capital is required" in the construction. Accordingly in 1918, by a Preliminary Loan Agreement, signed on January 18, three Japanese banks (the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Bank of Chosen, and the Bank of Taiwan) obtained the contract for the construction of the Kirin-Kainei line. While this Preliminary Agreement looked forward to a formal loan agreement in which specific amount of loan would be indicated, of which the detailed agreement was to be signed within six months, it undertook to fix the interest and to provide for the redemption of the loan after a forty-year period. An advance payment of 10,000,000 yen was then made to the Chinese Government on June 19, 1918. The first section of this line, from Kirin to Tunhua, was completed in 1927 under the separate and detailed Agreement of 1925, but the Tunhua-Kainei line remained unfinished, constituting another diplomatic problem between Japan and China until the Manchurian explosion of 1931.

4. *The Four Manchurian and Mongolian Railways Loan Agreement.* Another important railway loan agreement of this period was a preliminary agreement commonly known as the "Four Manchurian and Mongolian Railways Loan

Agreement" of 1918 which replaced the "Five Manchurian and Mongolian Railways Loan Agreement" of 1913. It was concluded on September 28 between the Chinese Government and the Industrial Bank of Japan, representing a syndicate composed also of the Bank of Chosen and the Bank of Taiwan, by which the Chinese Government agreed that the Japanese banks named would have the right to finance the construction of the following four railways: the Taonan-Jehol Railway; the Changchun-Taonan Railway; the Kirin-Kaiyuan Railway; and a railway from a point on the Taonan-Jehol Railway to a certain seaport on the Gulf of Pechihli to be decided upon by the Chinese Government and the banks. The general provisions of the Agreement included the term of the loan which was to be forty years and the security of the loan which was to be the property and revenues of the lines. Thus the original "Five Railways" now became the "Four Railways" due to the conclusion of the separate agreement relating to the Ssupingkai-Chengchiatun line in 1915. By virtue of this preliminary agreement of 1918, the Japanese banks advanced 20,000,000 yen to the Chinese Government. None of the above-mentioned railways, however, had been built before the Sino-Japanese crisis of 1931.

While thus the Japanese railway interests in Manchuria were growing and expanding, the Chinese animosity toward the Japanese economic expansion in Manchuria was also solidifying. In fact, the railway loan agreements of this period caused nothing but discord rather than friendship between the two neighbors in the Far East.

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT

In 1917 two factors led to the American-Japanese agreement on Japanese interests in China. The one was the activities of the Six Power Consortium. During January, 1917, the British and Japanese Governments indicated their willingness to allow the American bankers to renew their active participation in offering loans to China with other Powers through the Six Power Consortium. The rumor

that the American bankers desired to do so, especially in offering loans for railway construction in Manchuria, led Ambassador Chinda at Washington to inquire of Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State, on January 25, 1917, if such were contemplated. Lansing replied that "the Ambassador must be aware that the American Government recognized that Japan had special interests in Manchuria" and that "although no declaration to that effect had been made by the United States, yet this Government had repeatedly shown a practical recognition of the fact that it did not desire to do anything there to interfere with Japan's interests." On the same date Lansing explained, in response to the American Minister at Peking, that "in using the phrase 'special interests' I had reference only to such specific concessions as the lease of the Kwantung Peninsula and the lease of the South Manchuria Railway and other railways with right to maintain railway guards, *et cetera*. . . ." Such declaration spurred the Tokyo Foreign Office to reach, at an opportune time, a special understanding with the United States concerning the Japanese interests in China, especially in Manchuria. Such an opportunity came with the American entrance into the World War. Japan was an Allied Power after 1914 and already possessed an understanding with the other leading Allied Powers of Europe with regard to Japan's interests in China which the War had entrusted to her, and an American-Japanese understanding was needed to complete the chain, if not on the results of the War, at least on the general principle of Sino-Japanese relationship in the Far East.

When, therefore, Great Britain and France appointed Lord Balfour and Viviani, respectively, as a special war mission to Washington to express the gratitude which the Allied Powers owed to the American participation in the War, Japan also appointed Ishii Kikujiro to join them on a similar mission. This was an opportunity for which Japan was waiting and Ishii was instructed in a general way to "attempt an exchange of frank opinions" with the Washington authorities and "to make some headway toward an

understanding" with regard to outstanding international questions bearing upon American-Japanese relations in the Far East, especially with reference to China. He reached Washington early in September and, after preliminary conversations and exchange of views with President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing, he signed the so-called "Lansing-Ishii Agreement" on November 2, 1917. It was more specifically an exchange of notes and in no sense a treaty, less an alliance.

"The Government of Japan and the United States recognize," affirmed the Notes, "that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." The Japanese Government in return assured the United States Government that "while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers." Then followed the reaffirmation of "the independence or territorial integrity of China" and "the principle of the so-called 'open door' or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China."

The chief importance of the "Agreement" is in the fact that the United States had recognized Japan's "special interests" in China, especially in Manchuria. Yet, ever since the phrase has become a subject of conflicting interpretations. Lansing maintained that "special interests" only referred to economic interests and had no political or other significance, while Viscount Ishii insisted that the "Agreement" was significant in recognizing Japan's political as well as economic "special interests" or else there was no need of a new understanding as the Root-Takahira Agreement already upheld the Open Door policy and China's territorial integrity. Necessarily, the "Agreement" served no specific purpose until it was formally terminated by an exchange of notes on April 14, 1923, between Ambassador

Hanihara and Secretary of States Hughes as an aftermath of the Washington Conference.

THE "NISHIHARA LOANS"

Toward the closing years of the World War, the Sino-Japanese relations took a dramatic turn with the conclusion of a series of loans, known generally as the "Nishihara Loans." Nishihara Kamezo, with an understanding of the Terauchi Cabinet, went to Peking and acted as promoter for a syndicate of Japanese bankers and the Chinese Government at Peking. The result was a series of eight loans, totalling an enormous sum of 145,000,000 yen, all concluded within a short period of one year. The feat startled the world as an amazing accomplishment of a single individual in the arena of international finance. Their importance, however, is in the fact that it left another problem for Japanese diplomacy to settle largely because China refused to acknowledge them.

The "Nishihara Loans," summarized, consist of the following loans:

NISHIHARA LOANS

Date	Designation of Loans	Amount	Rate of Int.	Outstanding Close of 1928
Sept. 28, 1917	Bank of Communication	20,000,000	8.5 %	29,794,000
Nov. 2, 1917	Chihli Province Food Relief	5,000,000	0	
Apr. 30, 1918	Telegraph	20,000,000	8 %	38,724,000
Jun. 18, 1918	Kirin-Kainei Railway— Advance	10,000,000	7.5 %	12,625,000
Aug. 2, 1918	Kirin-Hailungkiang Mine and Forest	30,000,000	7.5 %	58,234,000
Sept. 28, 1918	Four Manchurian-Mongolian Railways	20,000,000	8 %	50,362,000
"	Tsinan-Kaohsu Railway	20,000,000	8 %	25,600,000
"	World War Participation	20,000,000	8 %	38,895,000

The chief characteristics of these loans were the vagueness of the purposes for which they were contracted and absence of any security for the money advanced. And yet, by the end of 1920, the total sum had been transferred to the Chinese governmental authorities and, apparently, only fattened their own pockets for the purposes for which the loans were made never materialized. It is this phase of the "Nishihara Loans" which later vexed the Tokyo Foreign Office. Even at the present writing, the Chinese Government maintains that those loans were made to enrich the private fortunes of Tuan Chi-jui, the Dictator, and his aides, Tsao Julin, the Minister of Finance, and Lu Chung-yu, the President of the Sino-Japanese Exchange Bank, and that, therefore, the Government can take no official responsibility for them. On the other hand, the Japanese Government has maintained that they were all officially concluded and that China is officially responsible for them until principal and interest are paid in full.

Leaving aside these controversial interpretations, the chief significance of the "Nishihara Loans" is in the fact that they best illustrate the increasing interest which Japan as a whole began to take and the rather aggressive policy which the Terauchi Cabinet followed in continental affairs. In this respect, the peculiar place in which the "Nishihara Loans" were later placed was due largely to the policy of non-intervention which was adopted by the Hara Cabinet when the Terauchi Cabinet fell. They were the product of an abnormal war age and the chaotic condition of Chinese politics no less than Japan's aggressive China policy.

THE NEW CHINA CONSORTIUM, 1920-1921

The American participation in the Six Power Consortium came to an end in 1913, when the government support was withdrawn and the Consortium itself remained almost in name only during the World War. Yet requests for loans from China continued to follow one after another and, ironical as it may appear, a plan for the formation of a new in-

ternational banking consortium to undertake loans to China was broached in America. Secretary of State Lansing suggested to President Wilson, in a memorandum dated June 20, 1918, that all prior options of American banking firms in the Chinese field be pooled in a newly formed banking group which would be widely representative of the financial interests of the country, and proposed that this group and the Japanese banking group similarly organized cooperate in advancing a loan to China. President Wilson pledged his support to the proposal, but various American bankers favored the inclusion of the British and French banking groups also. This suggestion was accepted by the State Department and the proposal for a new international banking consortium for China, to include the American, Japanese, British, and French financial groups, was communicated *mutatis mutandis* to the Japanese, British, and French Ambassadors at Washington on July 10, 1918.

The move thus initiated received prompt support from the bankers of the four nations, who met in a conference at Paris on May 11-12, 1919, and organized the so-called International Banking Consortium. On the basis of that action and the draft agreement drawn up at the meeting, the United States Department of State sent identic notes to the Japanese, British, and French Ambassadors at Washington on May 31 and invited the approval of their home Governments.

Great Britain promptly accepted the plan while France proposed a slight amendment in pledging each Government to the support of its respective national group rather than to the Consortium itself. Japan went deeper into the problem of Far Eastern realism and proposed a certain reservation as illustrated by the Odagiri-Lamont communications. Odagiri Masanosuke, writing from the London office of the Yokohama Specie Bank on June 18 to Thomas W. Lamont, proposed that "all the rights and options held by Japan in the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia, where Japan has special interests, should be excluded from the arrangements for pooling provided for in the proposed agreement." He explained that this claim was based upon "the very special

relations which Japan enjoys geographically, and historically, with the regions referred to, and which have been recognized by Great Britain, the United States, France, and Russia on many occasions," referring especially to the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. He then recalled the Japanese reservation which was written into the minutes of the Paris meeting which organized the Six Power Consortium in 1912 to the effect that the Japanese participation was promised on condition that "nothing connected with the projected loan should operate to the prejudice of the special rights and interests of Japan in the regions of South Manchuria and of the eastern portion of Inner Mongolia adjacent to South Manchuria." Thus, from the very outset, Japan undertook to safeguard her interests in Manchuria and Mongolia and to exclude those regions from the scope of the consortium activities. In this desire, however, she would not be pushed beyond the point of friendly compromise with such Powers as the United States and Great Britain. The attempt failed.

Japan next sought to obtain a definite commitment from the three Powers that Japan had the right to take such actions in those regions as she deemed necessary to guarantee her national welfare. This claim was finally replaced by a more general understanding that the foreign Powers concerned would not support their bankers in the projects which were clearly inimical to Japan's "vital interests" and national security there.

Another important point which Japan vigorously pushed was that she be given the right to veto the construction of a railway running north from the proposed Taonan-Jehol railway. After prolonged negotiations, an understanding was reached with regard to the status of specific railway enterprises already contemplated or actually begun in Manchuria and Mongolia. Such an understanding as contained in Thomas W. Lamont's letter to Odagiri, dated May 11, 1920, but not written into the Consortium Agreement which was reached later, was as follows: "(1) that the South Manchuria Railway and its present branches, together with

the mines which are subsidiary to the railway, did not come within the scope of the Consortium; (2) that the projected Taonanfu-Jehol Railway and the projected railway connecting a point on the Taonanfu-Jehol Railway with a seaport are to be included within the terms of the Consortium Agreement; (3) that the Kirin-Huining, the Chengchiatun-Taonanfu, the Changchun-Taonanfu, the Kaiyuan-Kirin (via Hailung), the Kirin-Changchun, the Shinminfu-Mukden, and the Ssuping kai-Chengchiatun Railways are outside the scope of the joint activities of the Consortium." Thus, while no specific clause to that effect was included in the final Consortium Agreement, Japan had the practical assurance of the United States, Great Britain, and France that they would not countenance operations which were inimical to the Japanese interests in Manchuria and Mongolia.

Having reached these general understandings, the way was cleared for the final Consortium Agreement, which was signed at Paris on October 15, 1920, in order to eliminate undesirable competition, "to assist China in the establishment of her great public utilities and to these ends to welcome the cooperation of Chinese capital." The scope of the operations was defined in these words: "This Agreement relates to existing and future loan agreements which involve the issue for subscription by the public of loans to the Chinese Government or to Chinese Government Departments or to Provinces of China or to companies or corporations owned or controlled by or on behalf of the Chinese Government or any Chinese Provincial Government or to any party if the transaction in question is guaranteed by the Chinese Government or Chinese Provincial Government but does not relate to agreements for loans to be floated in China. Existing agreements relating to industrial undertakings upon which it can be shown that substantial progress has been made may be omitted from the scope of this Agreement." The Consortium operations were to be run "on the principle of complete equality." The Consortium Agreement was to continue in force for five years, during which time the Consortium undertook to float no more loans

on behalf of China. The Four Power Consortium of 1920 thus died a natural death without contributing anything definite to China's welfare during its life time.

PART IV

RE-ORIENTATION OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER XV

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

THE greatest result of the World War was, without doubt, the strengthening of the urge for a warless world. The League of Nations was created to provide the world with machinery for the realization of that new international urge, while the Washington Conference actually initiated the movement for a practical limitation of naval armaments which was to play a conspicuous part in international politics during the third decade of the current century. Japan clearly saw the changing signs of the time, and wholeheartedly supported all new movements which promised a new era in international relations. Necessarily, as far as Japan was concerned, the Washington Conference constituted the first step in the re-orientation of Japan's foreign policy in the Pacific area, especially in the Far East.

CALLING OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

The evil of competitive armament had been recognized for centuries and the desire to stop it gained momentum in the post-war period. This desire was more keenly felt because the victorious Powers, especially Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, entered into a new and mad naval race. The newly organized League of Nations created special machinery for armament limitation under Article VIII of the Covenant and eagerly endeavored to attain definite results. And yet, by 1921, nothing substantial had been accomplished in the field of armament reduction.

In the face of such a condition, the idea for a conference on the limitation of naval armaments was steadily gaining

favor both in Great Britain and the United States, as well as in Japan, but the initiative for calling such a conference was finally taken by Washington. On February 24, 1921, Senator Borah offered in the Senate an amendment to the Naval Bill then pending, authorizing the President to invite Great Britain and Japan to a tripartite conference with a view to limiting naval armaments for five years. The Bill so amended was passed by the Senate in May and by the House of Representatives in June, receiving the President's approval on July 12. Already the State Department had taken steps to ascertain the attitude of Great Britain and Japan, as well as France and Italy, concerning the proposal. Through a British suggestion, the scope of the conference was later broadened to include questions relating to the Far East as well as the Pacific area in general. President Harding then issued the formal invitation to those Powers on August 13 and proposed: first, a conference on the limitation of naval armaments; and second, the simultaneous consideration of closely related Pacific and Far Eastern problems by the interested Powers for the purpose of reaching a common understanding with respect to the principles and policies in the Far East. For the latter purpose, China, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal were also invited. The historic conference met at Washington on the Armistice Day, 1921, and lasted until February 6, 1922.

JAPAN'S REACTIONS

The desire for the limitation of naval armaments was rapidly gaining ground in Japan and as early as March, 1921, Admiral Baron Kato Tomosaburo, the Minister of Navy, well summarized the Japanese attitude on the question when he stated in an interview given to the Tokyo correspondent of the Associated Press that, if the naval Powers of the world agree to stop the construction of war vessels, Japan would willingly give up her "Eight-Eight Fleet" program. The whole subject was regarded in Japan as a common problem of the world. On the other hand,

Japan did possess perhaps greater and more vital concern in Pacific and Far Eastern affairs than any other Power. So much so that she was already conscious that her activities in the Pacific region, especially those in China, were being observed by the other Powers with suspicion and that undue pressure was being brought to bear upon her for the purpose of limiting her legitimate activities there. It was a most complicated and exceedingly delicate situation.

When the American communiqué of July 10 on the proposed conference reached Tokyo, therefore, the Japanese public considered the combination of the naval armament question and the Pacific and Far Eastern problems as quite illogical, and received the suggestion with both surprise and suspicion. The Japanese Government also shared this feeling. Thus, in its first official reply on July 13, Tokyo accepted the invitation "to participate in a conference of the five Powers looking to the discussion of the question of disarmament," but withheld its views on the proposed discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern problems until "the character and scope of these problems" were more clearly defined. Accordingly, a series of informal notes were exchanged between Secretary of State Hughes and Ambassador Baron Shidehara together with British Ambassador Geddes at Washington, and between Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, Ambassador Hayashi, and American Ambassador Harvey at London. As a result, the American reply on July 23 conceded "that the Government of the United States is willing to proceed with exchanges of opinion regarding the agenda prior to the meeting of the conference." On that understanding, the Japanese Government, in its note of July 26, signified its willingness to accept the American invitation to "a conference which shall embrace the discussion of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions." It then expressed its belief "that the proposition of the American Government to discuss Pacific and Far Eastern problems is based on the close bearing they have on the question of the limitation of armaments which is the original and principal aim of the conference, and that therefore the main object

of discussing these problems is to reach a common understanding in regard to the general principles and policies in the Pacific and the Far East," and ventured to suggest "that the agenda thereof should be arranged in accordance with the main object of the discussions as above defined, and that introduction there of problems such as are of sole concern to certain particular Powers or such matters that may be regarded as accomplished facts should be scrupulously avoided." If Japan was at all hesitant in accepting the American invitation containing a blanket proposal for discussing Pacific and Far Eastern problems, she, due to her unique geographical position, was not anxious to "jump at the chance to discuss matters vital to her with nations to which they were not in the same sense vital." After these preliminaries, Japan officially accepted the proposal on August 23.

The Japanese delegation to the Washington Conference was headed by Admiral Baron Kato Tomosaburo, the Minister of Navy, and included Prince Tokugawa Iyesato, the President of the House of Peers, Baron Shidehara Kijuro, the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, and Hanihara Masanao, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs. The American delegation was headed by Charles Evans Hughes, the Secretary of State; the British by Lord Balfour, the President of the Privy Council; the French by Aristide Briand, the Premier; the Italian by Schanzer, a former Minister of Finance; and the Chinese by Dr. Alfred Sze, the Chinese Minister to Washington.

THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS

On November 12, Secretary of State Hughes proposed the general principles for a sweeping reduction of naval armaments: "(1) that all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned; (2) that further reduction should be made through the scrapping of certain of the older ships; (3) that, in general, regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the powers concerned; (4) that the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measure-

ment of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed." In the detailed draft proposal based upon the above general principles, Mr. Hughes electrified the Conference by proposing, among other things, the scrapping by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan of sixty-six battleships in existence and in the course of construction, aggregating 1,876,000 tons. He also proposed that the replacement be limited to a maximum capital-ship tonnage at the ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75, respectively for the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. In addition, he suggested a "naval holiday" for ten years, and the limitation of the maximum size of individual capital ships to be built to 35,000 tons.

With this proposal, though unexpectedly drastic in character, all the delegations agreed "in principle" and accepted it for the basis of discussion. Baron Kato for Japan accepted "the proposal in principle" and assured the Conference that "Japan is ready to proceed with determination to a sweeping reduction of her naval armament," but significantly added that "certain modifications will be proposed with regard to the tonnage basis for replacement of the various classes of vessels" on the basis of the requirement for armaments as were essential to Japan's national security.

In the discussions which followed in the sub-committee of experts a deadlock was reached between the Japanese and American naval experts on the most important phase of the whole naval question, namely, the ratio of capital ships of the three great navies of the world. On November 28, Vice-Admiral Kato explained the Japanese objection to the American proposal in a public statement as follows: "Owing to her geographical situation and to her peculiar national conditions, the imperative need of a navy is recognized by Japan in no less degree than any other country; but Japan has resolved to possess armaments in excess of the minimum strength only for the purpose of insuring her national security. Japan is unable to accept the ratio of 60 per cent because she considers it impossible to provide for her security and defence with any force less than 70 per cent. She

desires to have the proposed ratio modified so that the relative strength of the three navies will be 10:10:7."

It thus became the task of the "Big Three," Mr. Hughes, Lord Balfour, and Baron Kato, to find a solution of the deadlock. Through Lord Balfour's intercession, Baron Kato agreed to concede the 5:5:3 ratio on two conditions: first, the maintenance of the *status quo* on the fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific, and, second, the retention of the "Mutsu" and the scrapping of the "Settsu" in its place. The first condition was accepted by Mr. Hughes and Lord Balfour after excluding the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, New Zealand, the islands along the coast of the United States and Canada, and the islands comprising Japan proper. The second compromise condition was accepted after effecting the readjustment of the application of the ratio by which Japan would retain the "Mutsu" and scrap the "Settsu" in its place, the United States would retain the "Colorado" and the "Washington" and scrap the "North Dakota" and the "Delaware," while Great Britain would proceed to build two new "Super Hoods" as planned and scrap four ships of the "King George V" class. A naval holiday for ten years, 35,000 tons as the maximum tonnage of individual capital ships to be built, and 525,000 tons each for Great Britain and the United States and 315,000 tons for Japan as the total replacement tonnage of capital ships completed the agreements which later became the basis of the Five-Power Naval Treaty. The above arrangement, however, did not affect the French and Italian navies as they failed to reach an agreement at the Conference.

An attempt to effect limitation of submarines and auxiliary crafts failed, but the Conference sent forth to the world a treaty embodying the rules governing the use of submarines as well as the prohibition of poisonous gases in future wars. It may be added that the question of limiting land armaments was injected into the Conference by Mr. Hughes, but nothing resulted therefrom, largely because France, the greatest military power, took the stand that she was not in a position to reduce her army. Japan ex-

pressed her willingness to reduce her army, but at the same time pointed out the difficulty of laying down a general scheme for this purpose, while the British Empire concluded that there was no hope in this field due principally to the French position.

THE PACIFIC TREATY AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

Chronologically the Four-Power Pacific Treaty preceded the Five-Power Naval Treaty. It was the first great achievement of the Conference and the necessary preliminary to the drastic steps taken toward the limitation of naval armaments. However, when the Conference met there was nothing relating to the subject on the agenda, and its announcement on December 10 swept the Conference as well as the world with complete surprise.

The origin of the Pacific Treaty is still veiled in darkness, but it is generally believed that Great Britain paved the way for it and, in its evolution, it was inseparably related to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It will be recalled that the desirability of a tripartite treaty in place of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was seriously considered at the Imperial Conference of the British Empire, June-August, 1921, and that Pacific and Far Eastern problems were included in the Washington Conference agenda through the British initiative, presumably prompted by the same motive. Therefore, it was the newspaper discussions of a possible Anglo-American-Japanese alliance to replace the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which led the Japanese delegation to discuss the question for the first time and to sound the opinion of the British delegation. Lord Balfour at once intimated that he was considering the desirability of a tripartite treaty to replace the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and "incidentally" revealed that he had already given to Mr. Hughes a memorandum outlining his tentative suggestions for a triple or quadruple entente. But the news was, to say the least, a complete surprise to the Japanese delegation, for they little dreamed

of such a treatment at the hands of the British delegates.

Once the ice was broken, the development took a rapid course. The negotiations for the proposed treaty was afoot as early as December 1, and the "Big Three" had reached a practical agreement by December 7. France was then invited to join the group; the pact in the final form was agreed upon on the night of December 9; and the Four-Power Pacific Treaty was announced by Senator Lodge at the conference on December 10.

The contracting four Powers pledged themselves "to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean" and, in case of any controversy arising among them out of any Pacific question which could not be solved by diplomacy and which might affect the existing harmonious relations between the contracting parties, to invite the other parties "to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment." If their rights were "threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power," they agreed to "communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately." The Treaty was to remain in force for ten years, and to continue in force, subject to termination upon one-year notice. As soon as it was ratified, Article IV affirmed, "the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate."

The Japanese public later objected to the Anglo-American interpretation to include Japan proper within the words "insular possessions and insular dominions" and led to the conclusion of a supplementary treaty, defining the Japanese insular possessions as including only the southern portion of Sakhalin, Formosa, the Pescadores, and the mandated islands in the Pacific.

Thus ended the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and in its place emerged a Quadruple Pacific Entente. Public opinion both in England and Japan was divided on the termination of the historic Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Lord Balfour, in

accepting the Four-Power Pacific Treaty, voiced the British sentiment when he referred to the objects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as having "served a great purpose in two great wars" and "stood the strain of common sacrifice, common anxieties, common effort, common triumphs" but as no longer requiring international attention. Prince Tokugawa unqualifiedly endorsed this view for Japan. Secretary of State Hughes frankly admitted that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a source of "deep concern" to the American people, and stated that its termination was naturally "a matter of great gratification." Senator Lodge later went so far as to claim that "the removal or the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was necessary to the successful conclusion of the naval treaty."

The official Japanese attitude on this question was well summarized by Count Uchida, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his speech before the Diet on January 21, 1922: "You will recollect that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has not only been a powerful instrument promoting and strengthening the relations of friendship and goodwill between Great Britain and Japan for the past twenty years, but it has also rendered an incalculable service in the interest of the maintenance and consolidation of general peace in the Far East. We can, therefore, hardly permit ourselves to see its termination without recalling to our minds the invaluable service it has rendered in the past; yet the conclusion of the new treaty [the Four-Power Pacific Treaty] being a clear index of the progress of the times, it is to be taken as a manifestation of the spirit of international friendship and goodwill on an enlarged scale and I consider it a matter of profound gratification to the Japanese Government that by virtue of the treaty in question, the general peace of the region of the Pacific Ocean is to be assured conjointly by the Four Powers."

THE PROBLEMS OF CHINA

Second in importance to the question of armament limi-

tation at the Washington Conference was the problem of China. Chaotic and divided as China was at the time, the Chinese delegation, headed by Dr. Alfred Sze and assisted by Dr. Wellington Koo and Dr. C. T. Wang, went to Washington as if it were the opportunity of ages for China to obtain the removal of limitations placed upon her sovereignty and to voice various alleged grievances against Japan. The fruits of the Pacific and Far Eastern Conference, more properly the "Conference on China," were two treaties and ten resolutions, while the pending question of Shantung was settled by a Sino-Japanese treaty, which was concluded simultaneously but outside of the Conference, and the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was terminated by an exchange of notes soon after the adjournment of the Conference. The Washington Conference, in other words, gave a new hope to China in her struggling journey through the roads of international relations and marked the first step in the re-orientation of Japan's foreign policy.

(1) The Japanese Attitude

Japan was more vitally involved in the problems of China than any other Power represented at Washington except China herself. As soon as China had presented her ten points, therefore, the Japanese delegation presented a memorandum to the Far Eastern Committee on November 20, outlining the fundamental principles of Japan's Chinese policy. In that memorandum, Japan suggested: that "existing difficulties in China lie no less in her domestic situation than in her external relations" and that the Conference should confine itself to adjusting China's foreign relations, leaving her domestic situation to be worked out by the Chinese themselves; that Japan was "solicitous of making whatever contributions" she was capable of "toward China's realization of her just and legitimate aspirations," as Japan was "entirely uninfluenced by any policy of territorial aggrandizement in any part of China," adhered "without condition or reservation to the principle of 'the open door and

equal opportunity' in China," looked to China in particular for the supply of raw materials essential for her industrial life and for foodstuffs as well, and did not claim in her trade relations with China any special rights or privileges but welcomed fair and honest competition with all nations; that Japan was ready to cooperate with other Powers in an endeavor to arrive at an arrangement with regard to extra-territoriality in China in a manner which was fair and satisfactory to all parties concerned; and that Japan was participating in the Conference, "not to advance her own selfish interests," but "to cooperate with all nations interested for the purpose of assuring peace in the Far East and friendship among nations." In the same memorandum, the Japanese delegation warned against "undue protraction of the discussions by detailed examination of innumerable minor matters" as Japan believed that "the principal object of the Conference is to establish in common accord policies and principles which are to guide the future actions of the nations represented."

(2) *The Root Principles*

On November 16, Dr. Sze presented China's "ten points" which were considered to be too general and too far-reaching for detailed consideration. In order to determine the fundamental principles in dealing with the problems of China, therefore, Mr. Elihu Root of the American delegation offered, on November 21, what later came to be known as the "Root Principles." After an exchange of views as to the meaning of certain words and phrases, the resolution was adopted and later incorporated into the Nine-Power Treaty as follows:

"(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectively es-

tablishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states."

It should be added that the Japanese delegation, before the Root Principles were adopted, made it certain that the resolution did not apply to the already acquired rights of various Powers in China.

(3) *The Open Door*

The question of the Open Door was injected into the discussion on January 16, when Mr. Hughes presented a draft resolution for the purpose of "applying more effectively the principle of the Open Door or equal opportunity for the trade and industry of all nations" in China. After a brief discussion, Mr. Hughes submitted a revised draft of the resolution on the following day:

"1. With a view to applying more effectively the principle of the open door, or equality of opportunity, in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the powers other than China represented at this conference agree:

a) Not to seek or to support their nationals in seeking any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region in China.

b) Not to seek or support their nationals in seeking any such monopoly or preference as would deprive other nationals of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China or of participating with the Chinese Government or with any provincial government in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration, or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

—It is understood that this agreement is not to be so constructed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or

rights as may be necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial, or financial undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and research.

2. The Chinese Government takes note of the above agreement and declares its intention of being guided by the same principles in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from governments and nationals of all foreign countries whether parties to that agreement or not.

3. The powers, including China, represented at this conference agree in principle to the establishment in China of a board of reference to which any question arising on the above agreement and declaration may be referred for investigation and report.

(A detailed scheme for the constitution of the board shall be framed by the special conference referred to in Article I of the convention on Chinese customs duties.)

4. The powers, including China, represented at this conference agree that any provisions of an existing concession which appear inconsistent with those of another concession or with the principles of the above agreement or declaration may be submitted by the parties concerned to the board of reference when established for the purpose of endeavoring to arrive at a satisfactory adjustment on equitable terms."

The objections of various delegates were focused upon the fourth article. It was in this connection that Baron Shidehara declared that the principles formulated in the draft resolution were of an entirely different scope from the policy of the "Open Door" as Secretary Hay had enunciated it in 1898-99 and that the draft resolution gave, in a certain sense, a new definition of that policy. It seemed natural, therefore, he maintained, that this new definition should not have any retroactive force, and he offered an amendment to Article IV to that effect, thus moving to protect Japan's vital acquired rights, as it appeared as if the concessions already granted by China would be subject to examination in the light of this new agreement. Mr. Hughes was evidently embarrassed but replied that it was not a new statement and that he rather regarded it as a more definite and precise statement of the principle that had long been admitted and to which the Powers concerned had given

their unqualified adherence for twenty years. As to Article IV, it was eventually struck out in the discussions which followed, and the Hughes Resolution so amended was adopted. Articles I and II were incorporated in the Nine-Power Treaty, forming Article III, the back bone of that Pact, while Article III was incorporated in a resolution attached to Article VII of the same Pact. And thus the so-called policy of the "Open Door" with respect to China received "a more precise and, at once, more binding international legal status than it had ever possessed previously."

(4) *The Nine-Power Treaty*

The Nine-Power Treaty which defined the principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China was signed on February 6. As it has been noted already, the most important provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty are the Root Principles and the Hughes Open Door Resolution. The Powers concerned agreed not to enter into any treaty, agreement, or understanding which would impair the Root Principles as they were incorporated in Article I, and further agreed "not to support any agreement by their representative nationals with each other, designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory." China for the first time agreed to respect the Open Door and specifically that "she will not exercise or permit unfair discrimination of any kind" on her railways, while the other Powers also assumed a similar obligation in respect to their railways in China. The Powers furthermore agreed to respect the rights of China as a neutral nation in time of war, and China, on her part, declared that she would observe the obligations of neutrality. Provisions were also made for a "full and frank communication between the contracting powers" when any situation might arise which involved the application of the treaty stipulations, and for an invitation to be extended to other Powers to adhere to the Treaty.

In conformity with the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty and as an aftermath of the Washington Conference, it should be added here, the United States and Japan reached an agreement to renounce the Lansing-Ishii Agreement by an exchange of notes on April 14, 1923, between Secretary of State Hughes and Ambassador Hanihara at Washington.

(5) *Miscellaneous Concessions to China*

Of the other miscellaneous concessions made by the Powers at the Washington Conference, most important were a treaty relating to China's tariff autonomy and a resolution relating to extraterritoriality in China.

In accordance with the Root Principles adopted, a special commission was created on the financial condition in China. Through its initiative, the Chinese delegation invited the Powers to restore to China the full tariff autonomy after a certain period and, meanwhile, to allow her to raise the import tariff to 12½ per cent from January 1, 1922. After a prolonged discussion, a resolution was finally adopted on January 20, recommending the conversion of the current virtual rate of 5 per cent *ad valorem* into an effective 5 per cent rate by revising the price schedule of the imports, thus giving China a new revenue of about \$46,000,000 a year, and a levy of additional 2½ per cent upon the abolition of *likin*, making an eventual total rate of 7½ per cent. These provisions were later incorporated in the Nine-Power Customs Convention, which was signed on February 6. After affirming these general principles, the Convention called for two tariff conferences, one to revise the rate of duty as stipulated in the Convention and the other to prepare the way for the speedy abolition of *likin* and for the fulfilment of conditions for the levying of surtaxes as prescribed in the British, American, and Japanese Treaties with China of 1902-03. On the other hand, the Convention guaranteed to the signatory Powers an equality of treatment in all matters relating to customs duties and recognized uniformity in duties at all the land and maritime frontiers of China, how-

ever, authorizing the special conference to make equitable adjustments in cases where a customs privilege was granted in return for some local economic advantage. The Revision Commission under this Convention met at Shanghai in March, 1922, and the Tariff Conference was convened at Peking in October, 1925.

As to the question of extraterritoriality in China, the Chinese delegation requested that the Powers should prepare for a gradual abolition to be fully effected on a fixed date. The Chinese plea brought forth expressions of sympathetic views from all the delegation, but none of them was willing to promise a blanket abolition of extraterritoriality in China as requested. A sub-committee of inquiry was then appointed and its recommendations, in the form of a resolution, were adopted without further discussion. The Resolution thus adopted provided for a commission to be created within three months after the adjournment of the Washington Conference to inquire into "the present practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China and into the laws and the judicial systems and the methods of judicial administration in China," with a view to reporting their findings and recommendations. Each of the participating Powers, however, was to be free "to accept or to reject all or any portion of the recommendations of the commission."

Among other concessions made by the Powers including Japan in the form of nine resolutions at the Washington Conference were the withdrawal of foreign postal agencies from China as soon as an efficient Chinese postal administration was established and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from China "whenever China shall assure the protection of the lives and property of foreigners in China." On the other hand, the Powers recorded the hope in one of the resolutions that China would effect the unification of railways under their control; expressed the "earnest hope" in other resolutions that China would take immediate and effective steps to reduce her military forces and expenditures; called for the better management of the Chinese Eastern Railway in another resolution; and insisted upon China's

responsibility for the performance or non-performance of the obligations toward the stockholders, bondholders, and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway. One resolution required the deposition with the Secretary General of the Conference of all treaties, exchange of notes, or other international engagements made with China or in relation to China which they deemed to be in force or upon which they might desire to rely, together with all contracts between their nationals and any political authority in China. It was in answer to this last requirement that China was forced to reveal the authenticity of the secret Sino-Russian Alliance of 1896 by communicating to the Conference the telegraphic summary of the Li-Lobanoff Treaty.

CHINA CHALLENGES JAPAN

When the Pacific and Far Eastern problems were injected into the agenda of the Washington Conference, Japan proceeded rather cautiously lest the whole field of Sino-Japanese relations might become the subject of review before the Conference. The Kasumigaseki saw no cause for singling out the Sino-Japanese problems for the purpose of general discussion at such an international conference. Japan had accepted the invitation, therefore, as we have seen already, on condition that "the introduction therein of the problems such as are of sole concern to certain particular Powers or such matters that may be regarded as accomplished facts should be scrupulously avoided." So far as the problems of China were concerned, the Powers shared and endorsed the Japanese attitude. For China, however, the Washington Conference offered too good an opportunity to miss for voicing her alleged grievances against Japan, and accordingly she took every possible opening to disgrace Japan before the bar of the Conference and the world. In this task, however, China played a lone role.

1. *The 1915 Treaty.* China's first challenge to Japan was voiced in her effort to place the question of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 before the Conference. In the

course of the discussion of the "spheres of influence" in China, Dr. Wang, on December 14, laid before the Far Eastern Committee a list of so-called "restrictive stipulations," consisting of fourteen treaties and five non-alienation agreements. Dr. Wang inadvertently singled out the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915 and urged that, in the common interest of the Powers as well as of China and in conformity with the principles relating to China already adopted by the Committee, the said Treaties and Notes be reconsidered and cancelled. Hanihara Masanao assured the Chinese delegation of the Japanese reply after a careful study of the subject, but indicated Japan's strong determination that, if there was a question of making the validity, the change, or abrogation of the Treaties and Notes of 1915 the subject of discussion at the Conference, the Japanese delegation could not agree to such a course and that this question was one to be taken up by Japan and China alone, and not by the Powers, if it were to be taken up at all. The matter was then dropped.

The promised Japanese reply was made by Baron Shidehara before the Far Eastern Committee on February 2 in a carefully prepared statement. "The insistence by China on the cancellation of those instruments in itself indicates," claimed Baron Shidehara, "that she shares the view that the compacts actually remain in force and will continue to be effective, unless and until they are cancelled." He then made the now famous declaration: "If it should once be recognized that rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be established, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe, and everywhere." He followed it with another ironic remark with reference to the Chinese declaration that China accepted the Japanese demands in 1915 with a hope of bringing them up at some future time for reconsideration and cancellation: "It cannot be the intention of the Chinese delegation to intimate that China

may conclude a treaty with any thought of breaking it at the first opportunity." After pointing out that those treaties were in harmony with the principles adopted by the Conference with regard to China's sovereignty and independence for the reason that the Conference held "that concessions made by China *ex contractu*, in the exercise of her own sovereign rights, cannot be regarded as inconsistent with her sovereignty and independence," and clarifying in detail the "inaccurate and grossly misleading" nature of the characterization of the 1915 Treaties and Notes by the use of the term "Twenty-One Demands," he warned that "no useful purpose will be served by research and re-examination at this Conference of old grievances which one of the nations represented here may have against another" and that "it will be more in line with the high aim of the Conference to look forward to the future with hope and with confidence." Then Baron Shidehara executed a diplomatic coup in the form of an unexpected statement. He announced that Japan, "in view of the changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915," was ready to make the following concessions in the interest of international amity: (1) to throw open to the common activity of the International Financial Consortium recently organized the right of operation obtained by Japanese capitalists with regard to certain Manchurian and Eastern Inner Mongolian railway loans and loans to be secured upon local taxes in South Manchuria; (2) not to insist upon the preferential right obtained by Japan in 1915 concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisers on political, financial, military, and judicial matters in South Manchuria; (3) to give up definitely and with no reservation Group V of the original proposals of the Japanese Government in 1915. He briefly added that all matters relating to Shantung which were contained in those Treaties and Notes had now been definitely adjusted.

On the following day, Dr. Wang presented a lengthy communication, describing in detail the Chinese contention

and reserving the right to seek a solution of the general question "on all future appropriate occasions." The other Powers represented at the Conference were merely the interested onlookers in this Sino-Japanese interlude except the United States. Mr. Hughes, however, merely restated the stand taken by the Wilson administration in 1915. And thus China's effort failed to bear any results except airing her grievances, and the Washington Conference did not affect the status of the Sino-Japanese Treaty and Notes of 1915 relating to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

2. *The Leased Territory of Kwantung.* Another of China's challenges to Japan was delivered, though not so bluntly as in the case of the 1915 Treaties and Notes, on December 3, when China demanded the abolition of leased territories before the Far Eastern Committee. In reply to the Chinese challenge, M. Viviani responded that France would give up Kwangchow Bay, and Lord Balfour announced that Great Britain might relinquish her claim to Weihaiwei but could not abandon the Kowloon Peninsula. Hanihara, in a brief statement, announced that Japan would give up Kiaochow in accordance with her repeated declarations but that she was not in a position to consider the surrender of the Kwantung Territory in South Manchuria. "The territory in question forms a part of Manchuria," he declared, "a region where, by reason of its close propinquity to Japan's territory more than anything else, she has vital interests which relate to her economic life and national safety." He also pointed out that 65,000 Japanese resided there and that "the commercial and industrial interests they have established there are of such importance and magnitude to Japan that they are regarded as an essential part of her economic life." The matter of the legal status of the Leased Territory of Kwantung was left untouched by the Conference as the Chinese delegation had no desire to press the question after the Japanese statement. With this the whole question of leased territories faded out of the Conference.

3. *Japanese Railway Guards in Manchuria.* The third

challenge to Japan was made when the Chinese delegation publicly questioned the Japanese right to station railway guards and police forces in Manchuria. On November 28, Dr. Sze in a general way demanded before the Far Eastern Committee the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops and police which were stationed or maintained "without China's express consent." On the following day, the Chinese delegation presented a detailed statement of the number and character of the Japanese troops and police in Manchuria, and asserted that the Chinese Government had not sanctioned the provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth by which Japan and Russia agreed to limit the number of troops in the form of "railway guards" for the purpose of patrolling their respective railways in Manchuria. The Chinese delegation also charged that "since 1905 police stations and branch stations have been established along the South Manchuria Railway in violation of both law and treaty." To these grave charges, Hanihara replied with a lengthy statement. After briefly explaining the reasons for the stationing of railway guards in Shantung, he showed in detail how the Japanese right to maintain railway guards along the South Manchuria Railway was conceded by China in 1905 under the Treaty of Peking (The Additional Agreement, Article II) and how it was a measure of "absolute necessity under the existing state of affairs in Manchuria—a region which has been made notorious by the activity of mounted bandits." He also stated that the stationing of Japanese troops along the Chinese Eastern Railway since 1919 was in accordance with the Inter-Allied Agreement concluded at Vladivostok in 1919 and that those troops had the duty of maintaining communications between the Japanese contingents in Siberia and South Manchuria. He then described the legal basis and the general character of the Japanese police in Manchuria.

At a later meeting of the Far Eastern Committee on December 2, the Chinese delegation questioned the Japanese interpretation of the Sino-Japanese Treaty and the Additional Agreement of December 22, 1905, asserting that

under the Portsmouth Treaty Japan agreed to evacuate Manchuria simultaneously with Russia and that, inasmuch as Russia had withdrawn her troops, Japan ought now to do the same thing. Significantly enough, however, the Chinese delegation did not question the Japanese interpretation of the particular clause to which Hanihara referred as a legal justification for the presence of Japanese troops along the South Manchuria Railway. Five days later, the Japanese delegation answered the Chinese contention that China should be given an opportunity of proving her ability to maintain peace and order in Manchuria by declaring that the "Japanese interests and Japanese security are matters of such importance that she can not afford to take obvious risks" or "pander to a sentimental idea at the risk of creating grave international difficulties in a region which has already seen a life-and-death struggle on the part of Japan."

The only concrete result of these extended discussions was the resolution adopted to appoint representatives to form a commission of inquiry for the purpose of investigating the whole matter of foreign armed forces in China, including the railway guards and police, the same to be appointed "whenever China shall so request" and the Powers to be "free to accept or reject all or any of the findings" of the said commission. Except for the general airing of the issue again, therefore, the Conference made no alteration in the status or jurisdiction governing the Japanese railway guards and police in South Manchuria.

THE SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT

After the Versailles Conference, Japan on several occasions approached China to open direct negotiations with a view to restoring Shantung. China either turned a deaf ear to the Japanese advances or replied with derogatory expressions contrary to the practices of international courtesy and blocking all Japanese advances. Yet China was as anxious to settle the Shantung question as was Japan and, when the Washington Conference was convened, it was persistently

rumored that China would present the question to the Conference. If China really intended to take such a step, it would have spelled disaster to her as seven of the nine participating Powers were signatories of the Versailles Treaty and they could not and would not dare to rescramble the complicated and delicate issues merely to satisfy China's national pride. Happily, through the good offices of Mr. Hughes and Lord Balfour and in the presence of the British and American referees, the Sino-Japanese "conversations" were launched outside of the Conference on December 1. After laboring through no less than thirty-six heated sessions and leaving for posterity a record of nearly four hundred closely printed pages, the whole issue was finally settled by a lengthy treaty of twenty-seven articles and an appendix of six articles. The Shantung Treaty was duly signed by the Japanese and Chinese representatives on February 4, 1922.

By virtue of this Treaty, Japan restored to China the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow and transferred to China, without compensation except a refund for a proportion of the expenses incurred by Japan, all public properties in the Territory which the Germans possessed and which the Japanese had purchased or constructed. Japan was to retain, however, such properties as were required for the Japanese consulate while public schools, shrines, and cemeteries were to be left in the hands of the Japanese community. Japan also transferred to China the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railway with its branches, including wharves, warehouses, and other appurtenant properties, for which China agreed to pay to Japan within six months 53,401,141 gold marks, being the assessed valuation of the properties left behind by the Germans. The payment was to be made in Chinese treasury notes, secured on the properties and revenues of the Railway and running for fifteen years but redeemable at the end of five years. Pending the redemption of the notes, a Japanese traffic manager and a Japanese auditor with a Chinese colleague were to be sanctioned by China. The Japanese troops and gendarmes sta-

tioned along the Railway were to be withdrawn within six months and the Japanese garrison at Tsingtao within thirty days. Japan also restored to China for a fair compensation the submarine cables between Tsingtao and Chefoo and between Tsingtao and Shanghai except that which connected Tsingtao and Saseho and the Japanese wireless stations at Tsingtao and Tsinan. Among other things, China agreed to open the entire territory to foreign residence and trade, to make mining in Shantung a Sino-Japanese enterprise, and to buy the Japanese interests in the salt industry at a fair valuation. Moreover, the two concessions for the Tsingtao-Shenteh and Kaomi-Hsuchow Railways were to be thrown open to the common activity of the international financial group.

Under the general principles thus laid down, an agreement for the withdrawal of Japanese troops along the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railway was signed at Peking on March 28. The Sino-Japanese commissions provided for in the Shantung Treaty to arrange for the details of the transfer met at Peking on June 26 and completed their task on December 10. Among other things, China agreed to pay to Japan 16,000,000 yen for the public properties and the salt interests, 5,000,000 yen for the former German mines, and 40,000,000 yen for the railway. Thus, Shantung was restored in good faith to China, but Japan has yet to receive the promised payments.

THE YAP SETTLEMENT

Another delicate issue which had been pending after the Versailles Conference was the American-Japanese controversy over the Island of Yap, one of the islands in Japan's mandate area in the Pacific. The whole question revolved around the American insistence that the Island of Yap be excluded from the Japanese mandate on the basis of Wilson's alleged reservation to that effect. On the other hand, Japan insisted that the Japanese mandate included the Island of Yap, but that she was willing to extend to the United States such rights and privileges as were granted to the members

of the League. A conference of the Allied and Associated Powers on communication which met at Washington in the fall of 1920 broke up without reaching any agreement on the subject and the Supreme Council of the League, in December, supported the Japanese contention. Then followed the American protest to the Supreme Council on the whole subject of the mandates, to which the League suggested that the differences relative to the mandates might be settled between the United States and the individual mandatory Powers. Finally, the United States proposed to conclude an American-Japanese treaty to settle the question, but the issue was still pending when the Washington Conference was convened.

While the "mandated islands" in the Pacific formed a part of the agenda of the Washington Conference, the subject was not taken up in the Conference proper and the negotiations on the Yap question were carried on outside of the Conference between the American and Japanese delegates. The result was the Yap Treaty which was signed on February 11, 1922. In this Treaty, the United States formally recognized the Japanese mandate over all former German islands in the Pacific north of the equator and secured from Japan all the rights and privileges granted to the members of the League of Nations. The United States also secured free access for American citizens to the Island of Yap on an equal footing with Japanese subjects or any other nationals "in all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable, or of any cable which may hereafter be laid or operated by the United States or by its nationals connecting with the Island of Yap." The same rights and privileges were secured with respect to the radio-telegraphic communications, the same to be suspended so long as Japan maintained an adequate station. The remainder of the Treaty was devoted to the detailed description of various rights and privileges which the United States and its citizens should enjoy in the Island of Yap. So was clarified another source of misunderstanding between the United States and Japan.

THE SIBERIAN EXPEDITION

After the announcement of the American decision to withdraw her expeditionary forces from Siberia, which was reached suddenly without consulting Japan in January, 1920, and the withdrawal actually completed by March, Japan's Siberian venture became a subject of international criticism. At the Washington Conference, therefore, Japan took the initiative in clarifying the Japanese motive before any other Power ventured to bring up the question before the Conference. Accordingly, on January 23, Baron Shidehara enunciated the Japanese case in Siberia in a lengthy statement. He recapitulated the history of the allied military actions in Siberia and claimed that no part of Siberia was under Japanese "military occupation" at the time. Although Japanese troops were still stationed in the southern portion of Maritime Province, he explained, "they have not set up any civil or military administration to displace local authorities" and their activity was confined to "measures of self-protection against the menace to their own safety and to the safety of their country and nationals." He assured the members of the Conference that the Japanese troops would be detained, pending the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese negotiations which were then going on at Dairen for "the conclusion of provisional arrangements, the removal of the existing menace to the security of Japan and to the lives and property of Japanese residents in eastern Siberia, the provision of guarantees for the freedom of lawful undertakings in that region, and the prohibition of Bolshevist propaganda over the Siberian border." As to Sakhalin, Baron Shidehara made an exception and declared that Japan would occupy certain points in that Island pending the "establishment of a responsible authority with whom Japan can communicate for the purpose of obtaining due satisfaction" for the massacre of 700 Japanese by the Russians at Nikolaievsk in the spring of 1920. He concluded by affirming "that it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia and to observe the principle of non-intervention in

the internal affairs of the country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions."

In an equally lengthy statement, Mr. Hughes, on the following day, accepted Baron Shidehara's assurances, but revealed the American suspicion when he asserted that those "assurances were taken to mean that Japan does not seek, through her military operation in Siberia, to impair the rights of the Russian people in any respect, or to obtain any unfair commercial advantages, or to absorb for her own use the Siberian fisheries, or to set up an exclusive exploitation either of the resources of Sakhalin or of Maritime Province." What the Conference did, thus, was merely to spread the statements of the Japanese and American spokesmen upon its records and the question of the Siberian expedition was disposed of without further discussion, neither setting the date of the Japanese withdrawal nor passing any resolution defining the attitude of the Powers toward Russia.

JAPANESE APPRAISAL AND RATIFICATION

At the final plenary session on February 4, Baron Shidehara made a candid statement, summarizing and defining Japan's attitude toward China. He said in part:

"No one denies to China her sacred right to govern herself. No one stands in the way of China working out her own great national destiny. No one has come to the Conference with any plan of seeking anything at the expense of China. On the contrary, every participating nation has shown readiness at all times to help China out of her present difficulties.

Japan believes that she has made to China every possible concession, consistent with the sense of reason, fairness, and honor. She does not regret it. She rejoices in the thought that the sacrifice which she has offered will not be in vain, in the greater cause of international friendship and goodwill."

Then he outlined the intimate and vital relationship between Japan and China and avowed that what Japan sought was not "an inch of territory in China," but "a field of economic

activity, beneficial as much to China as to Japan, based always on the principle of the open door and equal opportunity." He then praised "the relief from tension" which the Conference had provided for the world by reaching a definite agreement "for the limitation of naval armaments, for the suppression of brutal practices in warfare, and for the definition of a policy on matters relating to China," the conclusion of the Pacific Treaty, the adjustment of "the difficult question of the Pacific mandates," and the solution of "the still more difficult question of Shantung." He concluded: "Freed from suspicion by frankness, assured of peace by goodwill, we may devoutly give thanks for the opportunity given by the Washington Conference, which, we believe, ushers into a troubled world a new spirit of international friendship and good understanding." Such, in truth, was the spirit which guided the Japanese delegation throughout settlement of the various Chinese questions at the Washington Conference. The same spirit, we shall soon see, continued to guide Baron Shidehara in further re-orienting Japan's Chinese policy for the next ten years.

Japan acclaimed the fruits of the Washington Conference with raised hands and shouting voices. The five Treaties and twelve Resolutions were duly signed and ratified by H.I.H. Hirohito, the Prince Regent, on August 5, 1921. It is of signal importance to record that Japan was the first of the signatory Powers to effect the formal ratification while it took France three and one-half years. In a statement issued on August 7, announcing the ratification, the Japanese Government assured the world that it would use its "utmost endeavors" for the fulfilment of its avowed policies "in strict adherence to the spirit as well as the letter of the treaties and resolutions agreed upon at Washington." In speaking of the Conference before the Diet on January 23, 1923, Count Uchida, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had guided the Japanese participation from Tokyo, said: "The Washington Conference gave emphatic testimony to the fact that the policy of the Powers is one of peace. The Government places the greatest importance

upon this Conference not only because of its concrete results, but because it lessens the burdens and dissipates any anxiety that existed among the people, and because of its achievements in developing understanding and friendship among the nations. Most notable is our relationships with Great Britain and the United States, which, through the Conference, have been put upon a still closer and surer foundation."

CHAPTER XVI

JAPAN AND CHINA, 1921-1931

THE Washington Conference ushered in a new era of international relations in the Far East. It marked the first step in the re-orientation of Japan's foreign policy, especially with regard to China. For ten years following the Washington Conference, therefore, the keynote of Japan's Chinese policy on the whole became the quest for friendship and co-operation. China, however, not only did not appreciate this friendship policy toward her, but took advantage of it and began to lay obstacles across Japan's path in China, markedly in Manchuria, ignoring Japan's acquired rights and eventually leading up to the tragic disaster of 1931.

THE "SHIDEHARA POLICY"

The re-orientation of Japan's Chinese policy was prompted largely by economic necessity and was based upon an urge for making the Far East safe for international trade. It became popularly known as the "Shidehara Policy" as Baron Shidehara guided the destiny of Japan's foreign relations during 1924-1927, and 1928-1931.

The clearest enunciation of the so-called "Shidehara Policy" with respect to China was made by Baron Shidehara himself. In an address before the Diet on January 18, 1927, he presented a detailed account of his dealings with China and summarized Japan's "policy concerning all questions in the relations between Japan and China" in the following language:

"1. To respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, and scrupulously avoid all interference in her domestic strife.

2. To promote solidarity and economic rapprochement between the two nations.

3. To entertain sympathetically and helpfully the just aspirations of the Chinese people, and to cooperate in the efforts for the realization of such aspirations.

4. To maintain an attitude of patience and toleration in the present situation of China, and, at the same time, to protect Japan's legitimate and essential rights and interests by all reasonable means at the disposal of the Government."

The "Shidehara Policy" was characterized by the consistent use of conciliatory methods and the avoidance of the use of force. During Baron Shidehara's first term in the Foreign Office from 1924 to 1927, for example, there were but two occasions when resort to force had to be made for the protection of Japanese interests in China, as we shall presently see. Thus Baron Shidehara was able to assure the Diet that Japan's policy as above defined "has already been firmly established and has constantly guided our action in all cases that have presented themselves" and that he was "resolved to follow the same path of justice in the future as in the past."

We shall examine in the following pages, then, how far the "Shidehara Policy" helped to re-orient Sino-Japanese relations and in what ways it was rebuffed by China herself.

CIVIL WARS IN CHINA

The chief characteristic of China throughout the third decade of this century, as during the preceding decade, was chaos, one civil war after another continuously shaking the stability of the central authority and disturbing peace and order throughout the country. This state of affairs crippled the good work which was started at the Washington Conference, and seriously affected China's international relations. Yet various factions in China continually used China's foreign relations as a means to rally the people around their respective causes. Anti-foreignism, including anti-foreign education in schools, and boycotts, though often without

unified national authority, became the instruments which were used in an attempt to impose China's will upon the offending Powers. As a result, numerous serious international complications arose. Japan as China's next-door neighbor was unavoidably affected by those complications.

1. *The Shidehara Policy at Work.* In facing such a situation, Baron Shidehara steadfastly upheld the principle of non-interference in China's domestic affairs, relied upon conciliatory methods in safeguarding Japan's rights and interests, and very seldom resorted to the use of force. His cautious policy successfully kept Japan outside of the orbit of the anti-foreign movements. His predecessor, Count Uchida, also followed a similar policy. Although labor difficulties in a Japanese cotton mill at Shanghai were the source of the famous "May Thirty Affair" of 1925, Japan promptly took steps to appease the Chinese by quietly paying an indemnity to the family affected and thereby the Japanese in China escaped the worst effects of the general strike and serious anti-foreign demonstrations which were directed against other foreigners. More notable was the Nanking incident of March 24, 1927, when the Japanese fleet anchored off Nanking refrained from participating in the bombardment which was carried out by the British and the American fleet for the protection of foreign lives and property, although the Japanese Consulate was actually fired upon and several Japanese nationals were wounded. During Baron Shidehara's first term in the Foreign Office, from June, 1924, to April, 1927, there were but two occasions when he was forced to resort to the use of troops for the protection of Japanese interests in China. The one was the revolt of Kuo Sung-ling against Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria in November-December, 1925, during which a number of Japanese troops were sent into the vicinity of Mukden to protect Japanese lives and property there. The other was the use of Japanese marines to drive out the Chinese mobs when they attacked the Japanese concession at Hankow on April 3, 1927.

2. *The Tsinan Incident.* In contrast with Baron Shide-

hara stood Baron Tanaka, who held the offices of both the Premier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs from April, 1927, to July, 1929. Baron Tanaka's name became associated with the so-called "positive policy." It became famous through the Tsinan incident.

In the spring of 1927 and again in 1928, the nationalist forces under General Chiang Kai-shek twice invaded Shantung in their effort to advance upon Peking. On both occasions, Baron Tanaka quickly dispatched a defence force to Shantung to protect Japanese lives and property. In May, 1928, the Japanese and the Chinese forces clashed at Tsinan and the trouble continued over several days, causing a heavy loss of lives and property, in the course of which the Japanese commander declared and enforced a neutral zone seven miles wide on the both sides of the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railway from which all Chinese troops were excluded. Although the Nationalist forces soon withdrew southward, the Japanese troops remained there nearly a year, while negotiations for a settlement slowly dragged along. In April and May, 1928, both the Peking and Nanking Governments repeatedly protested against the Japanese action in Shantung as a violation of China's sovereign right, but Baron Tanaka insisted that the measures taken were dictated by the necessity of protecting Japanese lives and property. Nanking's appeal to the League of Nations was in vain, largely because its government was as yet unrecognized and, therefore, not a member of the League. The Chinese then directed the powerful weapon of boycott against Japan, the method which was successfully used against Great Britain in 1925 and 1927. Meanwhile, the Japanese merchant groups filed vigorous protests against the continuation of the intervention, and the supporters of a conciliatory policy toward China hurled sharp criticisms at the Tanaka Cabinet, and an agreement settling the Tsinan incident was ultimately signed on March 28, 1929. It contained mutual expressions of regret for the incident and provided for the withdrawal of Japanese troops within two months from the date of the signature, and authorized a Sino-Japanese joint commission

to adjudicate the losses sustained by both countries. In accordance with this Agreement, Japan was ready to withdraw her troops in April but, at the request of none other than the Nanking Government itself which feared the occupation of Shantung by the forces of General Feng Yuxiang, Japan postponed the evacuation until May 20, 1929, when the last of her troops was withdrawn. The anti-Japanese boycott, however, continued.

It may be added that an exchange of notes on May 2, 1929, also settled the Nanking incident of March 24, 1927, and the Hankow incident of April 3, 1927.

3. *The Recognition of Nanking.* The victory of the Nationalist armies in the spring of 1928 at last made the Nationalist Government, then with its headquarters at Hankow, the *de facto* government of China and the Powers dealt with it as such in settling the Nanking affair of March 24, 1927. The settlement of the Nanking affair was naturally followed by the formal recognition of the Nationalist Government as the *de jure* government of China. This recognition was made first by the United States by affixing her signature on the new tariff treaty on July 25, 1928, and, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the State Department, on September 27, declared that the signing of the tariff treaty marked the complete recognition of the Nationalist Government by the United States. Other Powers followed suit and by the close of 1928 all the treaty Powers except Japan recognized the Nationalist Government by signing tariff treaties. Japan also signed such a treaty in January, 1929, and, in June, the Japanese Minister formally presented his credentials to General Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking, the new capital of China. Yet the question of the removal of the legation quarters from Peking to Nanking still remains unsolved.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

One of the very first and most interesting expressions of Japan's new policy of cooperation with China was the in-

ception of cultural work in China for the preservation and development of Chinese culture through the use of the proceeds of the Boxer indemnity fund. The negotiations for this work were started late in 1923, and the understandings between the representatives of the two nations were completed by May, 1925.

This new departure in the Sino-Japanese relations proposed to establish (1) a Cultural Research Institute and a Library at Peking, (2) a Natural Science Research Institute at Shanghai, and (3) fellowships and scholarships for the benefit of Chinese students in studying abroad. For this purpose Sino-Japanese Commissions were organized both at Peking and Shanghai, while the Chinese Government agreed to donate the site for the erection of the Cultural Research Institute and the Library at Peking. The actual work was started in 1926.

As an illustration of the kind of activities sponsored by the Commissions above mentioned, one may cite the programs for the year 1928 which were adopted by the Sino-Japanese Commission at Shanghai, for the Natural Science Research Institute there. The general expenses took up 34,932 yuan while the research fund received 80,000 yuan; seven students were to be sent to Japan and three to Europe and America as research fellows; the Institute was to carry on research activities in the following seven fields: study of medical herbs, determination of gravity, biological study of fish in the Yangtse River, geological survey, investigations of natural inorganic compound, study of Chinese fermentation bacilli and their manufacture, and investigation and study of epidemic and local diseases. The work thus begun, however, had to be temporarily discontinued later on account of the 1931 crisis.

THE PEKING TARIFF CONFERENCE

The Tariff Revision Commission which was provided for in the Nine-Power Tariff Treaty of the Washington Conference met at Shanghai in March, 1922, twelve Powers and

China participating. A new tariff schedule to obtain an effective five per cent tariff was adopted in September and put into operation in January, 1923. But the Special Tariff Conference to deal with surtaxes and *likin*, also provided for in the same Treaty, was delayed due to the French refusal to ratify the Nine-Power Tariff Treaty on account of the differences which arose over the question of the payment of the Boxer indemnity in paper instead of gold francs as agreed. France and Italy did not ratify the Treaty until that question was settled and the Treaty accordingly did not go into effect until August 5, 1925. China immediately issued invitations for a Special Tariff Conference to meet at Peking on October 26, 1925. Besides the signatory Powers, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Spain, having signified their adherence to the Nine-Power Tariff Treaty, were also invited to attend the proposed gathering.

After the Washington Conference, Japan was ready and willing to cooperate with China in putting the latter's national finance on a stable and sound basis. Naturally she welcomed the opportunity to participate in a tariff conference and the Tokyo Government, in accepting the invitation, affirmed its willingness "to consider and discuss, in common with the other Powers interested, any reasonable proposals which the Chinese Government may submit on the subject of customs tariff." When the Conference actually met and organized, it revealed unmistakably Japan's conciliatory policy toward China, and Japan for the first time took an immediate leadership in the proceedings.

At the opening of the Conference, China demanded that tariff autonomy be granted to her by January 1, 1929, and promised, in return, the abolition of *likin* not later than the same date. The Japanese delegation assured China of Japan's sympathetic attitude in facing the question of China's tariff autonomy, especially in the light of her own bitter experiences, and proposed that the Powers recognize China's "inherent right" to enjoy "full autonomy with respect to customs tariff." They further proposed that China enforce a national tariff law within a period of three years "upon

the abolition of *likin*" and that, in the interim period during which China might levy a surtax on imports as authorized by the Washington Treaty, China conclude with the interested Powers new treaties which would supercede the existing ones and would take effect simultaneously with the enforcement of the national tariff law. Great Britain was opposed to China's demand, and both she and the United States insisted upon the conditional abolition of *likin* before granting tariff autonomy to China. The manifold difficulties which stood in the way of unanimous action were successfully overcome through Japanese interpositions and on November 19 a resolution was adopted by which the Powers agreed to "recognize China's right to enjoy tariff autonomy," "to remove tariff restrictions which are contained in existing treaties between themselves, respectively, and China," and to the enforcement of China's national tariff law on January 1, 1929, while China promised the abolition of *likin* by the same date.

Then followed discussions of the more difficult questions of levying a surtax and of the use of the revenues arising therefrom. While opinion among the Powers differed widely, more unfortunate was the disintegration of the Peking Government in April, 1926, due to the prevailing civil wars and the consequent withdrawal from the Conference of most of the Chinese delegates. Necessarily the Conference adjourned *sine die* on July 3, 1926, without arriving at any definite agreement whatsoever. Even the resolution of November 19 was not binding as the Conference failed to formulate a treaty of which the resolution was to become the principal part. On the other hand, in spite of such a disappointing and futile collapse, various factions in China assumed the right to levy and collect a surtax conditionally made in the Washington Treaty and other unauthorized duties, thus adding another series of diplomatic complications.

In his annual address before the Diet on January 18, 1927, Baron Shidehara regretfully referred to the failure of the Peking Conference which was caused by "the domestic

disturbances," and summarized the Japanese effort and its result thus: "The Japanese delegates, conscious of this nation's own experience in the past, and mindful of the trend of public sentiments in China, exerted themselves loyally and unflinchingly to help China in concert with other Powers interested, in order that the Chinese national aspirations may be realized with the friendly understanding of the whole world. These efforts of our Delegation have now been, it is believed, widely appreciated and have undoubtedly conduced in a large measure to the promotion of mutual confidence and goodwill between Japan and China."

THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY COMMISSION

Intimately related to the question of tariff autonomy was the question of extraterritoriality in China. The Washington Extraterritoriality Treaty provided for a commission to inquire fully into the whole question of extraterritoriality in China to be appointed within three months of the adjournment of the Conference. In April, 1922, China requested its postponement for one year because of the existing internal disturbances, while the gold franc question further delayed the appointment of such a commission. Finally a commission, representing the same Powers as those participating in the Tariff Conference, assembled at Peking on January 12, 1926. The Extraterritoriality Commission thus organized held twenty-one full sessions, while a travelling committee toured over a considerable part of the country for the purpose of observation and investigation, and its long report was made public in November.

The Extraterritoriality Report, which is an exhaustive study of the subject so far as China is concerned, consisted of four parts, each being unanimously approved by the Commission, describing the existing practices of extraterritoriality in China, the laws, courts, and prisons, the administration of justice, and the recommendations. The recommendations to the Chinese Government included, among other things, entrusting the administration of justice to "a

judiciary which shall be effectively protected against any unwarranted interference by the executive or other branches of Government, whether civil or military"; completion and enforcement of various codes and laws, including civil and commercial codes, revised criminal codes, and banking law; establishment and maintenance of "a uniform system for the regular enactment, promulgation, and rescission of laws" to prevent any uncertainty as to the laws of China; and extension of the system of modern courts, modern prisons, and modern detention houses as well as providing them with adequate financial stability. The Report expressed the opinion that, when these recommendations should have been reasonably complied with, the Powers would be warranted in relinquishing their respective rights of extraterritoriality in China. Pending the complete relinquishment, it recommended certain modifications to minimize the difficulty attending the system, showing sympathy and willingness to cooperate with China to prepare for the ultimate abolition of extraterritoriality.

The Extraterritoriality Report, as provided for in the Washington Treaty, had no binding force upon any Power, and its chief importance consisted in clarifying the subject for future negotiations.

PROGRESS OF TREATY REVISION

1. *Tariff*. The questions of tariff and extraterritoriality in China are closely related to the moot question of treaty revision or China's desire to revise all unequal treaties. Japan's rights to enjoy a limited Chinese tariff, extraterritoriality, inland navigation, and others were concerned in the Treaty and Protocol of 1898 and the Supplementary Treaty of 1903, the first one of which stipulating that either party might demand a revision of its tariff and commercial articles at the end of successive decennial periods. At the end of one of these periods, on October 20, 1926, the Peking Government requested a fundamental revision of the two Treaties and the Protocol on the basis of equality and reci-

procuity. Baron Shidehara replied on November 10 in conciliatory terms. He frankly pointed out that Article XXVI of the Treaty of 1896 referred only to a revision of the tariff and commercial articles and not to a fundamental and comprehensive revision as requested; at the same time, he disclaimed any desire to limit the scope of negotiations, and declared his willingness to consider sympathetically, without prejudice to Japan's legal position, the desire of the Chinese Government, assuring the latter that it is Japan's "settled intention of extending every reasonable assistance to China toward the attainment of her legitimate national aspirations." The formal negotiations were opened at Peking on January 12, 1927.

Before the negotiations proceeded very far, the political change at home forced Baron Shidehara to resign with the other Cabinet members, and Baron Tanaka Giichi, who became the new Premier, also assumed the duties of the Foreign Office. Meanwhile, the Nanking Government emerged as the recognized authority in China, the Sino-Japanese relations became strained almost to the breaking point over the Tsinan incident and the Manchurian situation, and the treaty revision negotiations entered upon a critical stage. On July 19, 1928, the Nanking Government notified Tokyo that the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1896 expired as of July 20, and that the *ad interim* regulations, proclaimed on July 7, 1928, would apply also to the Japanese subjects in China pending the conclusion of a new treaty. The Japanese reply, dated July 31, challenged the validity of the Chinese stand that the Treaty in question had expired, and assailed the attempt to place the Japanese subjects in China under the unilateral *ad interim* regulations as "an outrageous act" in which Japan was "absolutely unable to acquiesce." On the other hand, Japan assured China that she would continue to negotiate for the revision of the 1896 Treaty if China recognized the continued validity of that Treaty and withdrew the *ad interim* regulations. Nanking's counter reply of August 14 requested a prompt renewal of the parleys for the treaty revision but neither renounced its con-

tention that the Treaty in question had expired nor withdrew the *ad interim* regulations. In actual practice, however, the Nanking Government did not attempt to apply the *ad interim* regulations to the Japanese subjects in China.

The renewal of the negotiations was further made difficult on account of the Sino-Japanese deadlock over the Tsinan incident. However, a partial accord was reached on January 30, 1929, when a Sino-Japanese Agreement was signed, permitting China to enforce her new tariff schedule which had been already accepted by several of the treaty Powers. The Tsinan incident was settled in March, but, in the renewed exchange of notes, Baron Tanaka reiterated Japan's stand that the negotiations for a new treaty must be based upon the recognition of the continued validity of the old Treaty, while China expressed her desire for the immediate resumption of the negotiations without further discussion of the validity question.

When Baron Shidehara resumed the control of the Foreign Office in July, 1929, he found the negotiations he had started thus hopelessly deadlocked. Further delay was caused by the sudden death of Mr. Saburi, who was a recognized friend of China's liberal aspirations and who had successfully resumed the negotiations as Japan's new Minister to China, and also by the ensuing diplomatic impasse over China's refusal to accept the appointment of Mr. Obata to succeed Mr. Saburi as Japanese Minister to China. Finally, Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires at Shanghai, took up the negotiations with Dr. C. T. Wang, and, on March 12, 1930, they were successful in concluding a Sino-Japanese Tariff Agreement, which was formally signed on May 6 and became effective ten days later.

The Sino-Japanese Tariff Agreement of 1930 and its four Annexes provided for Chinese tariff autonomy, the mutual most-favored-nation treatment, and its incorporation in a new treaty to be concluded as soon as possible; the right to levy reciprocal conventional duties on practically all important articles of Japanese exports to China; the abolition of certain reduced customs rates on the Sino-Japa-

nese land frontiers at the expiration of four months and the application of the Chinese statutory tariff in those districts thereafter. On the other hand, China agreed to abolish *likin*, transit dues, and other like charges "as soon and as far as possible," and stated that a mandate had been issued, ordering their abolition as from October 10, 1930. The Chinese Government also declared that it had commenced to set aside an annual sum of 5,000,000 Mexican dollars from the customs revenues for the consolidation of China's domestic and foreign obligations, and that on or before October 1, 1930, it intended to call a conference of creditors to devise adequate plans for such consolidation.

In the face of such sympathetic attitude on the part of Japan, however, China again failed to do her part. The date for the abolition of *likin* was subsequently postponed until January 1, 1931, and again until January 1, 1932, but the order still remains unenforced. The conference of creditors actually met at Shanghai in November, 1930, and considerable progress was made, when China's double-edged tactics of calling the League of Nations into the deliberation brought the mistrust of the Powers, causing the ultimate break up of the otherwise promising conference.

2. *Extraterritoriality.* After the issuance of the voluminous Report of the Extraterritoriality Commission in 1926, the extraterritoriality issue dragged along without a promise of settlement. China's continued internal chaos was largely responsible for this delay while Japan as well as Great Britain, the United States, and France all stood firm in their stand, and in 1929 China in vain brought the question up before the League of Nations Assembly at Geneva. Then followed China's unilateral declaration, issued on December 28, 1929, that extraterritoriality would be abolished as of January 1, 1930, which declaration the Powers completely ignored. Throughout this period, Japan insisted upon the following general principles: (1) that the Chinese Government should agree to a gradual abolition of the system; (2) that the Japanese should be granted most-favored-nation privileges; (3) that comprehensive measures for the

protection and guarantee of Japanese lives and property should be outlined by China; and (4) that the interior of China should be opened to the residence of Japanese subjects. In short, Japan went farther than any other great Powers in her concessions toward China.

Finally, in March, 1931, the Sino-Japanese negotiations were started at Shanghai and Mr. Shigemitsu presented the Japanese proposals which were to become the basis of the negotiations: (1) that, upon the establishment of modern courts in Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin, Peking and Canton, Japan was willing to relinquish her rights in all civil and light criminal cases in those cities and that all civil and criminal cases involving Japanese subjects in other cities should be transferred to the courts in those five cities, however reserving the participation of the Japanese consul or the right of transfer in grave criminal cases; (2) that China should employ Japanese jurists as specialists on foreign cases and grant the appearance of Japanese attorneys in the Chinese courts; (3) that, in the districts where the extraterritorial rights were abolished, China should not enforce any discriminatory measures in the collection of taxes, the leasing of lands, and the establishment of factories; and (4) that China should enforce the Japanese treaty right to lease land in the Three Eastern Provinces. In other words, Japan proposed an immediate, not a gradual, abolition with a few conditions. China's reaction was cold and she insisted upon an immediate and unconditional abolition, thus blocking the progress of negotiations. Under such circumstances, the Sino-Japanese negotiations as well as those with the other Powers reached a deadlock in May. China once more resorted to a unilateral declaration of the unconditional abolition of all extraterritorial rights in China, effective from January 1, 1932. The Powers including Japan protested against such a procedure, and the deadlock which was thus reached in the negotiations has never been lifted.

3. *Miscellaneous Matters.* Of the other questions which became the subjects of readjustment in the course of the treaty revision negotiations, the more important related

to the concessions and settlements and the navigation of the inland waters. The negotiations over the question of extraterritoriality having reached an impasse, however, those questions were not taken up. One possible exception was China's categorical request, on November 24, 1930, for the immediate return of the Japanese concession at Hankow, which request also included the French concession there. The Japanese Government equally categorically refused to surrender the concession without negotiations, and the matter was dropped from further discussions.

In short, the question of the Sino-Japanese treaty revision still awaits a sincere desire to negotiate on the part of China. Japan most sympathetically faced the issues from the very beginning and made drastic concessions in the interest of China, far more drastic than those made by other Powers, but her goodwill and labor produced no results. Other great Powers experienced a similar disappointment. China's ultra-idealistic demands, often completely ignoring the prevailing conditions, and her non-compromising attitude were largely responsible for this result, while the disorganized internal situation contributed much toward interfering with any negotiations. Moreover, in its effort to secure popular acclaim, the Nanking Government often resorted to the unilateral denunciation of the existing treaties, which only delayed the otherwise promising progress of treaty revision.

GROWING TENSION IN MANCHURIA

1. *Status of the Kwantung Leased Territory.* At the Washington Conference China challenged the legality of the 1915 Treaty and Notes relating to Manchuria and Mongolia but, Japan objecting, could not obtain the sympathetic cooperation of the Powers, and finally reserved the right to revive the question "on all future occasions." In the absence of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915, which extended the lease of Kwantung from twenty-five to ninety-nine years, the original lease of 1898 would have run its twenty-five-

year period on March 27, 1923. On March 10, therefore, the Chinese Government addressed a note to the Japanese Government and, after quoting the Chinese statements at the Paris and Washington Conferences, urged that the balance of the 1915 Sino-Japanese Treaty and Notes "should forthwith be abrogated." Count Uchida, then the Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied on March 14 and maintained that "the Japanese Government are unable to conceal a sense of surprise and regret at the communication." He reasserted the unquestionable validity of the 1915 Treaty and Notes and made a categorical refusal by declaring that China's attempt "to abrogate, of its own accord, treaties and notes which are perfectly valid will not only fail to contribute to the advancement of friendship between our two countries, but should be regarded as contrary to the accepted principles of international intercourse."

Later especially after the establishment of the Nationalist Government at Nanking in 1928, the agitation for the recovery of Dairen and Port Arthur was revived in China more than once and much time and energy was wasted therefor. However, Japan insisted upon her impregnable legal rights.

2. *The Taonan-Angangchi Railway.* The Taonan-Angangchi Railway is an extension of the Ssuningkai-Chengchiatun-Taonan Railway, connecting the South Manchuria Railway with the Chinese Eastern Railway at Angangchi. The Ssuningkai-Chengchiatun and the Chengchiatun-Taonan lines were constructed with Japanese capital under the Railway Loan Agreement of 1915, the latter line being completed and opened to traffic in November, 1923. For the construction of the Taonan-Angangchi extension, a Sino-Japanese loan contract agreement was signed at Mukden on September 3, 1924, between the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Mukden Government. Under this Contract Agreement, the Japanese contractors were to advance 12,920,000 yen to cover the construction cost. This entire sum was to be repaid to the Japanese contractors within six months after the completion and transference of

the entire line, but, should payment fail to be made within that period, it might be converted into a formal loan secured by the line in question and its profits with 9 per cent interest payable annually. The redemption of the loan was to take place through annuity payments over a period of thirty years beginning at the eleventh year after the transference of the line, although the payment of the loan might be made at an earlier date. The line was to be built by Japanese engineers under a chief engineer, who must also be a Japanese.

The construction of the Taonan-Angangchi extension, covering 139 miles, was begun in May, 1925, and was approved by the Communication Department at Nanking on August 15, 1925. It was completed and turned over to China in December, 1926, and was opened to traffic in January, 1927. The line has since been extended across the Chinese Eastern Railway at Tsitsiharchan to Tsitsihar, the provincial capital of Hailungkiang. After the expiration of the six-month period as specified in the 1924 Agreement, Japan tried to convert the contract money advanced into a formal loan as agreed upon, but this request was refused by China; in fact, it has never yet been converted into any formal agreement, although, in 1931, the principal and interests in arrears were estimated to have reached nearly twenty-five million yen. It was with this background that the Nonni River incident occurred in 1931.

3. *The Kirin-Tunhua Extension.* The second important Chinese railway which the South Manchuria Railway Company had financed and constructed for China in Manchuria after the Washington Conference was the extension of the Kirin-Changchun Railway from Kirin to Tunhua. By a series of Sino-Japanese railway agreements between 1907 and 1918 Japanese financiers obtained from China the right to construct a railway line connecting the South Manchuria Railway at Changchun with Kainei in Korea. Of this project, a line between Changchun and Kirin was completed in 1922 under the Sino-Japanese Agreement of 1917. The construction of the remainder of the line was arranged under

the Kirin-Kainei Railway Loan Agreement of 1918 and Japan immediately advanced 10,000,000 yen to China for that purpose, but nothing was done before 1925. On October 24, 1925, therefore, the final and detailed contract agreement for financing the Kirin-Tunhua extension was signed at Peking between the Chinese Government and the South Manchuria Railway Company. The original rights of the three Japanese banks which signed the preliminary agreement of 1918 for the construction of the entire line projected from Kirin to Kainei were absorbed by the South Manchuria Railway Company, and the latter agreed to advance 18,000,000 yen (later increased to 24,000,000 yen) for the construction of the line under terms similar to those of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway Loan Agreement of 1924. The line, approximately 130 miles, which was started in June, 1926, was completed in October, 1928, and opened to traffic in January, 1929. As in the cases of the Taonan-Angangchi and other lines which were constructed with Japanese capital, the Kirin-Tunhua line was still in arrears both in principal and interests in 1931. Japan's repeated diplomatic requests to China to assume responsibility for the principal and interests which were in arrears produced no result.

4. *The Tunhua-Kainei Extension.* There still remained the construction of the line between Tunhua and Kainei to complete the original agreement, and this project later became one of the most entangled Sino-Japanese railway issues in Manchuria. In order to complete this line under the Preliminary Agreement of 1918, the Japanese authorities approached the Mukden Government several times, but all efforts were futile. Finally, the South Manchuria Railway Company reached an agreement with Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian War Lord, at Peking in May, 1928, for the construction of the Tunhua-Kainei extension, together with the Changchun-Talai line. Chang Tso-lin, however, met a sudden and tragic death in June, 1928, on his way back to Mukden from Peking, and Chang Hsueh-liang, his son and successor to the Manchurian power, cleverly evaded the issue. Therefore, the line was not even started before 1931.

5. *China's New Railway Policy.* Not only had China refused to cooperate with Japan in the matter of railway construction in Manchuria, but she had launched her own program of extensive railway construction with Chinese capital and management with the idea of choking the South Manchuria Railway. Under this program, over five hundred miles of new railways were completed between 1925 and 1931.

For some years China had a trunk line between Peking and Mukden although it was financed to a considerable part by Great Britain, and this line became the basis of the new projected railways in Manchuria. The projected eastern trunk line extended from Mukden north-eastward to Hailungcheng, then northward to Kirin and Wuchang, and across the Chinese Eastern Railway to Sanhsing and Tungkiang. Of this line, the distance between Mukden and Hailungcheng was constructed during 1925-1927, and between Hailungcheng and Kirin during 1927-1929. The second projected central trunk line was to run from Takushan on the Peking-Mukden Railway northward to Heiho on the Amur through Tungliao, Taonan, Tsitsihar, and Mergen. Of this line, the distance between Takushan and Tungliao was completed during 1921-1927 and the construction of the Tsitsihar-Mergen line was started in 1930, while the Japanese financed lines connected Tungliao, Chengchiatun, Taonan, and Angangchi. A third and diagonal trunk line was proposed from Jehol City to Harbin through Taonan, with an extension from Harbin northward through Hailun to Mergen, and another extension from Jehol City southward to the Gulf of Pechihli. Of this line, the distance between Harbin (Hulan on the other side of the river) and Hailun was completed by 1931 while a short line connected Chinchow with Peipiao in the south. Of the numerous other projected lines, the more important ones were a line from Taonan through Solun to Manchuli and a line from Changchun northward to Fuyu, across the Chinese Eastern Railway at Anda, and then to Koshan, which was already being joined with Tsitsihar in 1931. Of these projected railways,

Hulutao on the Gulf of Pechihli was to become the converging outlet to the sea and the harbor work was started in 1930 by a Dutch company as the contractor.

Japan, with her vital rights and interests in South Manchuria, would have welcomed this comprehensive scheme of railroad construction for the development of interior Manchuria if only China had consulted Japan in a friendly manner and observed the various Sino-Japanese agreements concerning the several railroad projects in Manchuria. Rather, China completely ignored her treaty obligations and the repeated Japanese protests, and thus forced the issue of "parallel lines" between Japan and China. It will be recalled that, in December, 1905, the Chinese Government, in a Protocol annexed to the Peking Treaty, agreed "for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchuria Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any branch line in the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which would be prejudicial to the interests of the above-mentioned railway." On the basis of this agreement, Japan rightly claimed that the Mukden-Hailungcheng-Kirin line and the Takushan-Tungliao line, both already completed and operating, constitute "parallel lines" prejudicial to the interests of the South Manchuria Railway and therefore violations of the 1905 Protocol. Moreover, Japan possessed the treaty right to build the Kirin-Hailungcheng line herself under the Agreements of 1913 and 1918. On the other hand, China's refusal to permit the Japanese construction of the Tunhua-Kainei extension of the Changchun-Tunhua line, which meant China's refusal to recognize the Agreements of 1918 and 1929, added additional fuel to the Sino-Japanese railroad controversies in Manchuria. In addition, China adopted a deliberate policy of obstructing the activities of the South Manchuria Railway Company by completely ignoring her treaty obligations, as for example, by the imposition of illegal taxes and duties, the discriminatory handling of freight, and the refusal to allow the construction of the Changchun-Taonan line under the Agreement of 1918.

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In the face of such circumstances, the repeated Japanese protests went unheeded and the unsolved diplomatic cases began to mount in numbers. Finally, the Mukden Government under the personal dictatorship of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and the South Manchuria Railway Company instituted in February, 1931, what appeared to be an auspicious beginning in the much needed negotiations through direct conferences. For this purpose both sides appointed special railway commissions. That there was no thought of sincerity on the part of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, however, was shown by the fact that actual parleys were evaded and delayed, and no progress was made before the September-eighteenth affair.

6. *Law and Order.* The Japanese interests in Manchuria grew by leaps and bounds after the close of the Russo Japanese War and the Japanese investments in Manchuria rose above two billion yen by the end of the third decade of this century. In a more practical language, this meant an intimate inter-relationship between Japan and Manchuria. With the phenomenal rise of industrialism in Japan, the Japanese interests in Manchuria became part and parcel of Japan's economic structure at home largely as a source of raw materials for her expanding industries and of food stuffs for her increasing population and as a potential market for her manufactured goods. And thus the question of law and order in Manchuria came to be regarded with added concern by the Japanese statesmen while the question of the maintenance of law and order became increasingly delicate.

It was this necessity of guarding the Japanese interests and activities in Manchuria against continued disturbances due to civil wars and banditry which led the Japanese delegation to present a detailed statement of facts relating to the question of law and order in Manchuria at the Washington Conference and clarified the treaty basis of Japanese railway guards stationed within the South Manchuria Railway Zone. Under the circumstances, Baron Shidehara, during both of his terms in the Foreign Office, made it unmistakably clear that his conciliatory policy had in view the

"absolute non-interference in China's domestic affairs" but the "safeguarding of Japan's rights and interests by all legitimate means at our disposal." He wisely disclaimed and avoided the task and responsibility of maintaining peace and order in Manchuria or China at large, as this was China's duty. Baron Shidehara was also exceedingly cautious in putting this policy into action. Even at the time of the Kuo Sung-ling revolt, Japan repeatedly made it clear that the increase in the number of Japanese troops in Manchuria were emergency measures for the protection of the Japanese rights and interests and not for the maintenance of law and order in Manchuria, and she promptly withdrew all the supplementary troops "with the restoration of general peace."

The question of law and order in Manchuria, however, took a dramatic turn during the brief period between 1927-1929, when Baron Tanaka guided Japan's international relations. The notable occasion which caused Baron Tanaka to shift the so-called Shidehara policy to that of "positive policy" was the imminent danger of involving Manchuria in China's continuous civil war after Chang Tso-lin's futile expedition south of the Great Wall in 1928. When there was every indication that the Nationalist army would invade Manchuria, Baron Tanaka sent a memorandum to both Peking and Nanking on May 18, 1928, stating that "the Japanese Government attach the utmost importance to the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, and are prepared to do all they can in order to prevent the occurrence of any such state of affairs as may disturb that peace and order or constitute a probable cause of such disturbance"; that, for that reason, should "the situation become so menacing as to threaten the peace and order in Manchuria, the Japanese Government, on their part, may possibly be constrained to take appropriate and effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria"; but that the policy of the Japanese Government "remains unchanged" in "maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality toward the contending forces" in China and that, "should the course of events be such as to render the above-men-

tioned measure imperative," they would "exercise due care to provide against any unfair consequences arising to either of the two opposed parties." Needless to add, the pronouncement of Baron Tanaka's "positive policy," the name under which it came to be known, brought forth strong protests from both Peking and Nanking, as well as in Japan. Fortunately, however, the retreat of Chang Tso-lin's army into Manchuria was orderly, unaccompanied by pursuing troops, and it was not necessary for Baron Tanaka to mobilize the Japanese troops. The whole affair, thus, faded into history with a mere pronouncement of Baron Tanaka's "positive policy" and without causing a necessity of translating it into action.

7. "*Revolutionary Diplomacy*" in Manchuria. China's anti-foreignism, directed against Japan's treaty rights and interests in Manchuria, became increasingly damaging toward the latter part of the third decade of this century. This attitude also became more noticeable after Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang accepted the rule of the Nanking Government over Manchuria. A few of the deliberate violations by the Mukden Government of China's treaty obligations may be mentioned here in this connection. In violation of the 1915 Treaty, China steadfastly refused to lease or sell land to Japanese subjects; she placed obstacles in the way of the operation of the Japanese mining properties in South Manchuria and levied illegal taxes on Japanese-mined coal; she unilaterally abolished drawbacks at the port of Dairen and placed that port under unjust political pressure; she collected discriminatory import duties on tobacco at the port of Dairen; she levied illegal taxes both in the South Manchuria Railway Zone and in the interior; she oppressed and persecuted Chosenese in Manchuria through the breaking of contract, eviction, robbery, illegal taxation, violence, etc.; she disregarded the Japanese treaty rights relating to mines, railroad construction, lumbering, travel, communication, joint enterprises, consular courts, as well as in many other cases. Necessarily, open insults directed against Japanese residents in Manchuria and outbreaks of systematically

conducted anti-Japanese demonstrations began to increase in number, culminating in the Wampaoshan incident of May-June, 1931, and the murder of Captain Nakamura near the Mongolian border late in June, 1931. And yet Baron Shidehara was almost powerless to make any progress in diplomatic negotiations over these treaty violations, especially in the face of China's consistent policy of equivocation and procrastination. By the middle of 1931, therefore, more than 300 cases were awaiting diplomatic settlement. Such was the result of the "Shidehara policy" as China rebuffed Baron Shidehara's conciliatory moves, and the Manchurian firmament of the Sino-Japanese relations was already dangerously dark before an unheralded explosion in the outskirts of Mukden on the night of September 18, 1931, startled the world at large by rekindling the open controversy between the two neighbors in the Far East.

CHAPTER XVII

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1921-1931

THE close of the Washington Conference saw the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia, with its capital at Chita, still holding its ground against the Soviet Government at Moscow. This government lasted until its final fall in November, 1922, while the Japanese troops had all withdrawn from Siberia except in Maritime Province, the evacuation of which was effected in October, 1922. The Japanese troops also occupied Northern Sakhalin, pending the solution of the Nikolaievsk massacre question. Up to the spring of 1921, Japan was uncompromisingly opposed to the Bolsheviki regime, but her determination to drive the Bolsheviki from Eastern Siberia for her own protection underwent a change by the summer of the same year, yielding to the milder policy of recognizing certain radical elements in Siberia and attaching no small degree of hope in the possible future of the "pink" government at Chita. It was with this broad background that the Dairen Conference met in 1921.

THE DAIREN CONFERENCE

Since the meeting of the constitutional assembly in February, 1921, and the declaration of intention to adopt a democratic and anti-communistic form of government, the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia on more than one occasion approached the Japanese Government with a view to opening up diplomatic and commercial relations. These overtures resulted in the meeting of the Dairen Conference on August 26, 1921. Tokyo was represented by Mr. Matsu-

shima Hajime, a Japanese agent at Vladivostok, and the Chita Government by M. Yourin, its Minister for Foreign Affairs. Moscow also maintained its own unofficial observer at the Conference.

Japan's principal object, apart from the discussion of questions relating to general commerce, was to secure assurances from the Chita Government for the protection of Japanese lives and property and the security of general traffic, the removal of all forms of menace to Japan's national existence, and the freedom of industrial pursuits. M. Yourin from the beginning proposed that the questions relating to the Russo-Japanese commercial relations and the evacuation of Japanese troops be simultaneously discussed, while Mr. Matsushima insisted upon the discussion of the former and the exclusion of the latter. This Japanese stand appeared to cause unnecessary delay and Japan finally acquiesced in the Russian proposal. At the same time, Japan demanded the simultaneous solution of the fundamental principles relating to commercial and military agreements, the fundamental revision of the fishery agreement with the participation of the Soviet representatives, and the settlement of the Nikolaievsk affair. As to the revision of commercial relations, Japan insisted that the Chita Government, among other things, should observe the principle of equality of opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in Eastern Siberia, abolish various harmful administrative practices which had been prevailing at Vladivostok and which had proven to be a great obstacle to the trade of that port, guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property in Eastern Siberia, and desist from carrying communist propaganda into Chosen or the Japanese Railway Zone in South Manchuria.

The negotiations continued without much progress being made. In April, 1922, M. Petrov replaced M. Yourin and abruptly requested Japan to announce a definite date for the withdrawal of her troops and to allow the Chita troops to enter Vladivostok. Japan showed a conciliatory attitude by accepting the first proposal and announced that

the Japanese troops would be completely withdrawn within three months, but rejected the second demand. The Japanese concessions were rewarded by further demands from the Chita representative, and finally the Conference broke up on April 16 without reaching any agreement.

THE CHANGCHUN CONFERENCE

The chief cause of the failure of the Dairen Conference was the Russian doubt as to the Japanese intention of withdrawing her troops from Maritime Province. To remove such doubt, and in recognition of the gradual improvement of political conditions in the Far Eastern Republic, the Japanese Government issued a statement to the interested Powers on June 24, 1922, that it had "decided to withdraw all the Japanese troops from Maritime Province of Siberia by the end of October, 1922," and that "suitable measures will be taken for the protection of resident Japanese subjects." On the other hand, the international conference which was held at Geneva in April and May having failed to meet the Russian question and consequently the possibility of the Powers recognizing the Soviet Union having faded away, the Soviet Union decided to open negotiations with Japan. In July, 1922, therefore, both the Chita and Moscow Governments approached Japan to reopen the negotiations which were adjourned at Dairen the previous year. The result was the meeting of the Changchun Conference on September 4. The Japanese Government was represented by Mr. Matsudaira Tsuneo this time and Chita by M. R. R. Joffe, the Soviet Union having been invited to participate in the settlement of the Nikolaievsk affair and the fishery question.

The Japanese Government decided to present and discuss, first of all, a proposal for a basic agreement between the two countries and then to proceed to the discussion of other problems, such as captured arms, the Nikolaievsk affair, the fishery question, and recognition of the Chita Government. The Japanese proposal for a basic agreement contained, among other things, (1) a guarantee by both the

Moscow and Chita Governments of the safety of foreign lives and property, (2) a pledge by the Chita Government not to carry on propaganda to the detriment of peace on the frontier, (3) opening of Vladivostok as a free port, (4) recognition and respect by the Chita Government of several agreements which Japan had concluded with various countries in the Far East, (5) an agreement by the Chita Government to grant to the foreign residents the right to lease land for thirty-six years for the purpose of carrying on business enterprises, (6) recognition of the right of foreigners to invest in and to carry on lumber enterprises, (7) recognition of the right of mining under the Russo-Japanese joint management, (8) recognition of the right of free navigation of the Amur River, (9) revision of tariff schedules and permission to export gold and furs, and (10) protection of commercial relations.

The Conference once more revealed several deep gaps between the Japanese and Russian attitudes and finally reached another impasse when Russia insisted upon the separate discussion of the Nikolaievsk affair and the evacuation of Northern Sakhalin, while Japan maintained rightfully that the two questions were inseparable. The conferees never overcame the impasse and the Conference adjourned on September 25, again without results.

THE TOKYO CONFERENCE

After the unsuccessful meeting of the Changchun Conference, Japan faithfully carried out her promise to withdraw all Japanese troops from Maritime Province of Siberia, while the Chita Government was dissolved on November 14, thereby permitting the Soviet Government at Moscow to claim administration over entire Siberia. Meanwhile, desires for reaching a friendly agreement were growing both in Japan and Russia and a third attempt at preliminary negotiations was started at Tokyo on June 28, 1923, between Mr. Kawakami Toshihiko, the Japanese Minister to Poland, and M. R. R. Joffe, through the good offices of

Baron Goto, the Mayor of Tokyo and a professed friend of Russia.

The Kawakami-Joffe conversations went into all the pending fundamental issues and again revealed a deep gap still separating the two countries. The first subject of differences related to Northern Sakhalin, in connection with which Japan proposed to buy the Russian half of the Island for 150,000,000 yen, but Russia demanded ten times that sum, and then Japan proposed long-term leases for the purpose of exploiting oil, coal, and lumber, but could not reach any agreement. The second subject, namely, the Nikolaievsk affair, again revealed Japan's insistence that Russia should apologize and pay an indemnity, which Russia at first refused but later agreed to compromise by eliminating the question of indemnity. Thereupon Japan proposed to waive the question of indemnity if Russia was willing to settle the Northern Sakhalin question in Japan's favor, but Russia stood firm against it. Russia readily agreed to Japan's third proposal for obtaining lumbering and mining rights in the Russian territories in the Far East. Japan's fourth proposal concerned Russia's international responsibility, namely, that the Soviet Union should (1) recognize the continued effectiveness of all the Russo-Japanese agreements which were concluded under the Tzarist regime, and (2) recognize all war loans, and either return or indemnify all private properties which were confiscated by the Soviet regime, all of which Russia disclaimed. Japan's next suggestion that Russia, upon the conclusion of a new commercial treaty, should guarantee the safety of Japanese lives, respect the right of private property, and permit the freedom of commercial and industrial activities in its broadest sense Russia accepted upon condition that the Soviet laws were obeyed. The last of the Japanese proposal related to the effective checking of all Soviet propaganda activities, which Russia agreed to uphold on the basis of reciprocity. Thus there reappeared more disagreements than agreements and the conversations came to naught by July 31.

THE SOVIET-JAPANESE TREATY, 1925

Although the three attempts which were made thus far to reach an agreement had failed, Japan desired the economic benefits of normal trade relations and the Soviet Union desired to secure Japanese recognition. With the arrival at Peking early in September, 1923, of M. Karakhan as the Far Eastern representative of the Soviet Union, M. Karakhan took the initiative in approaching Minister Yoshizawa at Peking to resume the Russo-Japanese conversations and the preliminary conference between the two representatives was opened at Peking on May 14, 1924. By May 23, after eight sessions, they were successful in formulating the basic principles for an agreement, but the attitude of the two Governments remained still uncompromising on some of the pending questions, especially the Nikolaievsk question and the Northern Sakhalin issue, and the negotiations once more reached a critical stage.

At this juncture, a political crisis in Japan caused the downfall of the short-lived Kiyoura Cabinet and the formation of the Kato Cabinet, bringing Baron Shidehara to the head of the Foreign Office. The Sino-Soviet agreement had already been concluded in March, while Great Britain and Italy had officially recognized the Moscow Government. Minister Yoshizawa was immediately recalled to Tokyo for an important conference and the Kato Cabinet, on July 24, formulated its new Soviet policy in line with Baron Shidehara's general policy of conciliation. As a matter of general principle, it decided to continue the Peking conversations and to reach a Soviet-Japanese agreement by offering solutions to pending questions within a reasonable limit, to withdraw the Japanese troops from Northern Sakhalin, and to recognize the Moscow Government. More specifically, the Japanese proposals were to include the following fundamental principles: (1) the Japanese interests in Sakhalin—to give up the idea of acquiring long-term leases for forest, coal, oil, and fishery rights in North Sakhalin as compensations for the Nikolaievsk affair and secure the endorsement

of oil fields already in operation through the use of Japanese capital at least for a period of fifty years with the understanding that the profits would be distributed to Russians ; (2) the Nikolaievsk affair—to settle it on the basis of the Soviet expression of apology ; (3) the old treaties—to preserve the Portsmouth Treaty, but to revise the fishery and other agreements without sacrificing Japan's acquired rights ; (4) the old loan obligations—not to press the question for the time being with the understanding that the Japanese war loans (the Government loans amounting to 300,000,000 yen and the private loans totalling 69,000,000 yen) should receive the same treatment as those contracted from other Powers when, in the future, the Soviet Union undertook to repay them ; (5) the right of claiming national and private damages—to be left for future action ; (6) the commercial treaty—to be left for future action except to secure the freedom of trade and the inviolability of private property ; (7) the communist propaganda—both countries to prohibit propaganda and other movements which might endanger the peace of either country ; and (8) the evacuation of North Sakhalin—not to evacuate until the negotiations ended in an agreement, but to hasten the evacuation within two months after the conclusion of an agreement. On the basis of these guiding principles, Minister Yoshizawa resumed negotiations with M. Karakhan at Peking on August 4.

As a result of forty-four sessions, a complete accord was reached and the Soviet-Japanese Treaty was concluded on January 20, 1925. It provided for the mutual *de jure* recognition and the exchange of diplomatic and consular representatives. The Soviet Union recognized the validity of the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, but Japan agreed to a re-examination at a subsequent conference of all other treaties and agreements which were concluded between Japan and Russia before 1917. The Fishery Convention of 1907 was to be revised and, pending the revision, Japan was to enjoy the practices established in 1924 with regard to the lease of fishing areas. A treaty of commerce and navigation was to be concluded shortly and, pending the conclusion of this

treaty, the nationals of each country were to enjoy the usual rights granted by such treaties. A mutual pledge was exchanged for restraining all persons in official capacity and all organizations receiving Government financial assistance from engaging in any propaganda likely "to endanger the order and security" of either country. Realizing "the needs of Japan with regard to natural resources," the Soviet Union declared its willingness to grant to Japanese subjects and companies concessions "for the exploitation of minerals, forests, and other natural resources" throughout the Soviet Union. By a Protocol signed on the same day, the two countries agreed to adjust at subsequent negotiations the debts due to Japan from the Tzarist regime, the Soviet Union allowing Japan as favorable terms as those allowed to other Powers, while Japan agreed to withdraw her troops from North Sakhalin by May 15 following. Another Protocol and other Notes of the same date defined in detail the various oil, coal, lumber, and other concessions granted to Japan in North Sakhalin. In a separate "Declaration," the Soviet Union disclaimed "political responsibility" for the Tzarist Government in the conclusion of the Portsmouth Treaty, and by an "Annexed Note" the Soviet Union tendered to Japan "an expression of sincere regret for the Nikolaievsk incident of 1920."

In accordance with the Treaty thus concluded, the evacuation of the Japanese troops from North Sakhalin and the official transfer of the territory to the Soviet Union were duly completed on May 15, 1925. On the other hand, the contracts for the promised concessions of oil and coal fields in North Sakhalin were signed by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Japanese industrial concerns on December 14, 1925. The Kita Karafuto Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha (North Sakhalin Petroleum Company) was established in December, 1925, with a capital of 10,000,000 yen, and the Kita Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (North Sakhalin Mining Company) with a capital of 10,000,000 yen, to exploit these concessions. Japan also obtained a timber concession covering 2,250,000 acres in Maritime Province of Siberia in

1926, in which year ten Japanese companies organized the Roryo Ringyo Kumiai (Association for Forestry Enterprise in Russian Territory), which in turn established a company in August, 1927, with a capital of 5,000,000 yen. Baron Shidehara characterized these results as an expression of the Soviet interest "in the promotion of Russo-Japanese economic cooperation" and "as a fitting testimony to the sentiments of good neighborhood uniting the two nations." The Sakhalin enterprises thrived, but the lumber enterprise in Maritime Province was disbanded in June, 1930, due largely to the Soviet oppression.

FISHERY IN THE NORTHERN SEAS

The Japanese fishery right in the northern waters was recognized by Russia for the first time in the Treaty of 1875 which effected the exchange of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands between Russia and Japan. After that time the Japanese fishery activities in that section of the world grew with years and the Portsmouth Treaty paved the way for the first Russo-Japanese Fishery Convention of July 27, 1907. By this Convention, Russia agreed to grant to Japanese subjects "the right to capture, gather, and manufacture marine products along the Russian coast facing the Japan Sea, the Okhotsk Sea, and the Bering Sea." The Convention was to be in force for twelve years, but in 1919 the Russo-Japanese diplomatic relationship was severed following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the question of the revision of the Convention was left untouched. Then followed Japan's ill-fated Siberian expedition and the formal recognition of the Soviet Union was further delayed. The conclusion of the 1925 Treaty meant the recognition of the Soviet Union, and the two Governments agreed to revise the 1907 Convention, "taking into consideration such changes as may have taken place in the general conditions since the conclusion of the said Fishery Convention" and, pending the revision, the Soviet Union agreed "to maintain the practices established in 1924 relating to the lease of fishery lots to Japanese subjects."

The task of revising the 1907 Convention was officially started in December, 1925, and required over two years of protracted negotiations before the final accord was reached. Japan was guided in her negotiations by her desire to remedy all inconveniences and disadvantages bearing upon Japanese enterprises, to clarify and amend vague regulations, and to revise regulations which were made void by the changed conditions, especially by the improvement in fishery devices. The negotiations were closed at Moscow by the signing of a new Fishery Convention on January 23, 1928, and by its ratification at Tokyo in May. The 1928 Convention reaffirmed the Japanese rights to exploit the waters of the Soviet Far East with the exception of some thirty-seven Bays and Inlets specifically enumerated. Certain of the fishery lots adjacent to Japanese canneries were reserved to Japanese bidders and approximately 63.7 per cent of the fishery lots were allotted to Japan. An attempt to fix minimum labor conditions was made and successfully concluded. The Convention was to be effective for eight years, renewable at twelve-year intervals thereafter.

In 1928, the first season of fishing after the conclusion of the new Convention, the Japanese leased 80 per cent of the fishery lots, which dropped to 65 per cent in 1929, 54 per cent in 1930, and 50 per cent in 1931. In 1932, the Japanese regained 58 per cent of the convention waters. This result was largely due to two factors. The most important was the so-called "Ten-Year Plan for Far Eastern Fishery" of the Soviet Union which was evolved in 1927. This Plan contemplated the expansion of Russian fishery districts, the improvement of fishing methods, an increase in the number of canneries, the solidification of administrative machinery, and the strengthening of finance. Under the Plan, a large modern cannery was completed in Kamchatka, small groups of fishermen were organized into larger groups, and a large sum was expended for various improvements. In addition to this aggressive policy directly challenging Japanese fishing enterprises in the northern waters, the Japanese enterprises had to surmount a second factor, namely, the unfavorable

rate of rouble exchange. Thus continued disputes arose over the method of paying for the annual leases. These annual disputes culminated in the closure by the Soviet authorities of a branch of the Bank of Chosen at Vladivostok on December 17, 1930, in defiance of Japan's vigorous protests, charging the Bank with speculation in rouble exchange. The Soviet Union then demanded payment for the fishery leases in roubles at their own gold parity value of \$.5145, which Japan formally rejected, and the question furnished the subject for a protracted diplomatic discussion in the spring of 1931. Finally a compromise was reached on April 16, assigning the rouble a valuation of 32.5 sen. This compromise, however, failed to settle the disputes and Japan's attempts to reach a fundamental settlement of the various phases of the Soviet-Japanese fishery disputes under the Convention of 1928 failed, while the disputes continued, jeopardizing the Japanese fishery enterprises in no small degree. These disputes constituted one of the difficult subjects of diplomatic negotiations between the two countries after 1931.

THE SINO-RUSSIAN CRISIS, 1929

In 1927 the Nationalist Government of China definitely abandoned the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union which had continued since 1924, and began to take drastic measures in suppressing communism in China. On April 6, 1927, the Chinese authorities raided the Russian Embassy in Peking on the ground that it was being used as the headquarters for active communist propaganda, but the Soviet Union was unable to obtain a satisfactory explanation of the incident in spite of vigorous protests. This resulted in the recall of the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires from Peking. The "experiment" logically led to the fulfilment of the Nationalist policy of encroaching upon the Russian interests in North Manchuria through the 1929 crisis, culminating in the raiding by the Chinese authorities of the Soviet Consulate General at Harbin on May 27, the arresting of over

one hundred Soviet officials and employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway on July 10, the taking over of the Chinese Eastern Railway and other Russian interests and the severance of the few remaining diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries on July 19. While the partial *status quo ante* was restored by the Khabarovsk Agreement of December 22, the whole issue still remained unsettled and became the forerunner of the Sino-Japanese crisis of 1931.

The Sino-Soviet struggle over the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway naturally alarmed Japan as she had extensive interests in South Manchuria. But the Japanese Government studiously maintained a neutral attitude. First of all, Baron Shidehara, as soon as the Soviet Ambassador in person informed him on July 19 of the severance of the Sino-Soviet relations, called the attention of both Soviet and Chinese representatives in Tokyo to the provision of the Pact of Paris, and expressed "a strong hope for the settlement of the controversy by all peaceful means." He was convinced "that direct negotiations alone between the parties in dispute could lead to a satisfactory adjustment" of the difficulty, and endeavored to bring the two disputing nations together, though consistently maintaining "an attitude of absolute impartiality and disinterestedness." Late in November, as the military situation around Manchouli assumed a threatening aspect, the United States addressed a formal communication to the countries in dispute, calling their serious attention to the Pact of Paris and, at the same time, suggesting to the signatory Powers that they also issue a similar warning. The Japanese Government "did not feel at liberty to act at once upon the American suggestion." Baron Shidehara explained this attitude before the Diet by saying that "the time was not ripe for a formal *démarche* of the nature proposed," that because of normal diplomatic relations existing with the Soviet Union as well as with China "we might find ourselves unavoidably drawn into a discussion with the Russian and Chinese Governments on the merits and demerits of the issues raised and we might

thus be eventually constrained to further action . . . in order to make our *démarche* effective." And thus Japan successfully maintained an attitude of strict neutrality throughout the Soviet-Chinese controversy of 1929.

It should be added that this same attitude governed Baron Shidehara's relations with the Sino-Japanese crisis of 1931. Before the Sino-Soviet issues over the Chinese *coup d'état* of 1929 was settled, the already tense Sino-Japanese relations in South Manchuria assumed international importance through the September-eighteenth affair. This time it was the Russian turn to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality and, inspite of persistent rumors to the contrary, the Soviet-Japanese relations remained cordial and unaffected throughout the Sino-Japanese controversy.

CHAPTER XVIII

JAPANESE IMMIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SIXTY years of studied effort enabled Japan at the close of the World War to join the ranks of the Great Powers largely on the basis of her prowess in arms. Actually, however, an invisible color line separated her from other Powers and her claim for the recognition of race equality in international politics remains still unattained. This racial issue had manifested itself preëminently in Japan's international relationships in the form of immigration questions from the closing years of the last century, especially in her relations with the United States and the members of the British Empire bordering the Pacific Ocean. Japanese diplomacy during the first three decades of the present century, thus, had to grope in the dark in its effort to solve this evasive issue and nothing but disappointment had been its reward. It is in this connection that the American Exclusion Law of 1924 implanted a profound impression upon the Japanese mind.

JAPANESE EMIGRATION

For centuries under the Tokugawa policy of closed doors, no Japanese subject was permitted to emigrate freely abroad. It was only after the opening of Japan's doors to international intercourse, therefore, that the Japanese people began to enjoy the freedom of emigration. But it was not until 1885, over thirty years after the actual opening of Japan, that the Japanese Government authorized its subjects to emigrate, and, even then, an emigrant was required to register his intention in his native prefecture, to procure

a passport, which was effective only for three years, and not to transfer his allegiance to the Mikado at home. Eleven years later, in 1896, the Government enacted the Emigrant Protection Law which provided that every emigrant should secure a responsible guarantor at home who could provide for his care during sickness and, if necessary, for his return. Previous to this enactment, on the other hand, the revision of unequal treaties was completed in 1894 and 1895, and the Powers recognized the customary right of the citizens of the contracting parties to have "full liberty to enter, travel, and reside" in the territories of the other and to enjoy "full and perfect protection for their persons and property."

Thus legalized, the Japanese emigrants began to penetrate the four corners of the world. The Japanese people, however, are not by nature fond of emigration, and only a small number emigrated during the closing years of the last century. Even today less than 750,000 Japanese, including non-immigrant classes such as government officials and international traders and students, reside outside of Japan. Few as they were at first, the Japanese emigrants were in time destined to provide the home Government with many a grave issue in international relations during the ensuing thirty-five years. Especially true was this in connection with the American-Japanese relations. The story of these relations during the first thirty years of the present century, indeed, is largely the story of discriminatory treatment of Japanese residents in the United States, culminating in the passage of the anti-Japanese Immigration Law of 1924.

THE GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT, 1907

Before 1890, the migration of Japanese to the United States was negligible, only about 2,000 Japanese being recorded there in that year. Japanese immigration into the United States, however, received a fresh impetus when the exclusion of Chinese laborers became an American national policy in 1882, superseded by more drastic laws in 1888 and 1892 and, after additional legislations, made permanent in

1904. In order to replace excluded Chinese laborers, the immigration of Japanese laborers was encouraged, mostly through ignoble means, first to enter the Hawaiian Islands and later to the continent. By 1900, therefore, the Japanese population in the United States increased to 24,000 and there was every indication that this movement would increase steadily with years.

With such an outlook, troubles began. The agitation against Chinese laborers was now directed against Japanese laborers, and in 1900 the extension of the Chinese exclusion laws to the Japanese began to be actively agitated in San Francisco. In July of that year, therefore, the Japanese Government, in order to forestall the humiliating issues similar to the Chinese exclusion acts, decided to prohibit entirely "for the present the emigration from Japan to Canada and also to the United States." This method, although well-meant and carefully enforced on the part of Japan, did not prevent the Japanese from entering the United States from Hawaii, and a new anti-Japanese campaign, led by the Japanese and Korean Exclusion Leagues in San Francisco, was organized in 1905, finally culminating in the introduction of exclusion bills in Congress but meeting President Roosevelt's opposition on account of their discriminatory character.

The first anti-Japanese explosion occurred in 1906. In April of that year, an earthquake and fire destroyed half of San Francisco, and Japan contributed \$244,960 for its relief, a sum which was more than one-half of the total sent by all other foreign nations. In direct contrast, the School Board of that very city of San Francisco passed a resolution in October, ordering all Japanese children to attend the Oriental School in Chinatown. Such an attempt at the segregation of Japanese school children, coming as it did on the heels of Japan's message of sympathy, could not but astound the Japanese people and Government. Naturally, Tokyo's vigorous protest followed. In answer, on October 23, Secretary of State Root telegraphed Ambassador Wright in Tokyo that "the United States will not for a moment entertain

the idea of any treatment of the Japanese people other than that accorded to the people of the most friendly European nations," while President Roosevelt, in his message to Congress on December 3, called an attempt to shut the Japanese children out of American public schools "a wicked absurdity" and even recommended the passage of an act providing for the naturalization of Japanese in the United States. The President finally persuaded the San Francisco School Board to rescind the resolution on the understanding that he would bring Japanese immigration to the United States to an end.

In the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907, the President was authorized to refuse entrance to immigrants who applied to enter the United States by using passports originally issued to "any country other than the United States." Under this authority, President Roosevelt issued a Proclamation on March 14, 1907, ordering that "Japanese or Korean laborers, skilled or unskilled, who received passports to Mexico, Canada, or Hawaii, and came therefrom, be refused permission to enter the continental territory of the United States." The Act of 1907 also authorized the President to enter into "such international agreements as may be proper to prevent the immigration of aliens who, under the laws of the United States, are or may be excluded from entering the United States, and of regulating any matters pertaining to such immigration." Under the latter authority, President Roosevelt entered into negotiations with Japan and he himself arranged a compromise which would provide, in his own words, "a maximum of efficiency" with "a minimum of friction." Thus was born what since came to be known as the "Gentleman's Agreement" of 1907. It was not a treaty, but an "executive agreement."

The exact text of the "Gentleman's Agreement" has never been published, but the contents of the Agreement are accurately known. It was agreed that the Japanese Government should issue passports to the continental United States to non-laborers or to laborers who came under the classification of (1) "former residents" to return to resume a for-

merly acquired domicile, (2) "parents, wives, and children of residents," and (3) "settled agriculturists." Although the "Gentleman's Agreement" was not applicable to Hawaii, Japan applied substantially the same restrictive measures to Japanese emigrants who were destined to the Hawaiian Islands; she also similarly limited the Japanese emigration to Mexico. In short, under the "Gentleman's Agreement," the Japanese Government agreed to cooperate with the United States Government in a joint control of immigration and voluntarily prohibited the immigration of new Japanese laborers into the United States. Japanese citizens otherwise continued to be subject to the restrictions imposed on all immigrants by regular legislations and later they became subject to the literacy test which was adopted in 1917.

Under the American-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, revised on November 22, 1894, Japanese subjects enjoyed the usual "liberty to enter, travel, and reside" in the United States subject only to "the laws, ordinances and regulations with regard to trade, the immigration of laborers, police and public security which are in force or which may hereafter be enacted" in the United States. And thus Japan raised no question of treaty violation in connection with the immigration Act of 1907. When the Treaty of 1894 was supplemented by the Treaty of February 21, 1911, the above provision, exempting the exclusion laws, was omitted through the insistence of the Japanese Government and the whole phraseology was changed so as to authorize admission only for purpose of trade. The new Treaty of 1911 was approved by the United States Senate with an understanding "that the treaty shall not be deemed to repeal or affect any of the provisions" of the Immigration Act of 1907, which understanding was accepted by Japan, while Japan specifically declared in a statement attached to the Treaty that she was "prepared to maintain with equal effectiveness" the "Gentleman's Agreement."

In the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, the "Gentleman's Agreement" was indirectly recognized by the provision which stipulated that "no alien now in any way ex-

cluded from, or prevented from entering, the United States shall be admitted to the United States." It was recognized more specifically in the Immigration Act of May 19, 1921, which declared that the provision in regard to quotas should not apply to "aliens from countries, immigration from which is regulated in accordance with treaties or agreements relating solely to immigration."

ANTI-JAPANESE LAND LAWS

The Pacific Coast was highly critical of the "Gentleman's Agreement" and California continued to lead the anti-Japanese movement. In 1909, the California Legislature passed a Resolution, urging the extension of the Chinese Exclusion Laws to the Japanese, but they failed to enlist federal cooperation. Then California resorted to a novel method of discouraging Japanese settlement. This took the form of the Alien Land Law of May 9, 1913, which denied to "aliens ineligible to citizenship" the right to own land or lease agricultural land for more than three years, the rights which are guaranteed under the Commercial Treaty. While this measure was still under consideration, Ambassador Viscount Chinda protested and requested President Wilson to prevent such a discriminatory legislation. President Wilson was disturbed but failed to obtain any result by communications, and sent Secretary of State Bryan to Sacramento in an unsuccessful mission to stay the legislation.

Immediately after the law was passed, therefore, Ambassador Viscount Chinda addressed a long letter, dated May 9, 1913, to Secretary of State Bryan, calling the attention of the Washington Government that the said measure was "unjust and unequitable" and "that it is not only prejudicial to the existing rights of Japanese subjects, but is inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty actually in force between Japan and the United States, and is also opposed to the spirit and fundamental principles of amity and good understanding upon which the conventional relations of the two countries depend." Secretary Bryan communicated

the nature of Viscount Chinda's letter to the Governor of California on May 11, asking him to defer his approval of the Law in question pending diplomatic negotiations with Japan, but the Governor affixed his signature thereon on May 19. The federalism in the American political structure thus placed the Washington Government in a quandary. Secretary Bryan, in his reply to Viscount Chinda on May 19, thus, expressed the Administration's regret that Japan should regard the California legislation as an indication of unfriendliness toward her people, recounted how the President and he had attempted to induce the legislative leaders of California to reconsider or modify their plans, maintained that it was not political in its spirit and object but wholly economic as the Law in question was based upon particular economic conditions in California, claimed that it "purports to respect and preserve all rights under existing treaties," and suggested that the courts of the United States "are open to all persons who feel themselves to have been deprived of treaty rights and guarantees."

The Japanese Government, and the nation as a whole for that matter, was puzzled to grasp the true meaning of such a passive and evasive logic spread over the official communication, and Ambassador Viscount Chinda, in his counter-reply on June 4, pointed out that "the question at issue is a question between the Government of Japan and that of the United States as to the true intent and meaning of their existing treaty, and the extent to which the rules and principles of fair and equal treatment may, in comity and good conscience, be involved in the present case." Viscount Chinda again maintained the same irrefutable position in a special memorandum which he communicated to President Wilson himself on June 5, with a detailed *aide-memoire*. In answer to these protests, both President Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan insisted that it was an economic question and not a racial discrimination. As a practical method of dealing fundamentally with the whole subject, the Japanese Government suggested in August the conclusion of a new American-Japanese convention for the pro-

tection of Japanese residents in the United States, but failed to enlist the American cooperation.

Because of Japan's wholehearted participation in the Panama-Pacific International Exposition at San Francisco in 1915 and because of the unsettled conditions caused by the World War in which Japan fought for the same allied cause with the United States, no further anti-Japanese agitation appeared in California between 1913 and 1919. Unfortunately, the old agitation was vigorously revived early in 1919. This time the Japanese question was made the foothold of California politics and James D. Phelan, a candidate for re-election to the United States Senate in the approaching election of 1920, assumed the role of the defender of the Golden State against the alleged Japanese invasion. It was grossly alleged that a large number of Japanese were entering the United States in violation of the "Gentleman's Agreement," that the high birth rate of Japanese in California threatened to produce a Japanese majority within ninety years, that the Japanese were already in possession of the best farm land of the State and would soon monopolize the agricultural industry, and that the Japanese were absolutely "unassimilable." On the basis of these grossly erroneous and purely sensational allegations aimed at misleading the masses ignorant of the real truth, he boldly urged that the leasing of land to Japanese subjects be prohibited, that the "Gentleman's Agreement" be abolished, that Japanese immigration be excluded by federal legislation, and that naturalization of Japanese subjects in the United States be prevented. As a result of such a vigorous campaign, measures to segregate Japanese children in the schools and to prohibit Japanese farmers from leasing land were introduced in the State Legislature, and the former was successfully passed. President Wilson was then still in Europe, attending the Peace Conferences, and requested Secretary of State Lansing to wire that "it would be particularly unfortunate" to have anti-Japanese legislation passed by the California Legislature at that time. Consequently, both measures were shelved.

It was as a result of these sensational agitations that the Japanese Government voluntarily decided to prohibit the practice of "picture brides." The institution of "picture brides," the rather picturesque name given to Japanese women who were married by proxy to Japanese residents in America, was in perfect harmony with the Japanese marriage custom and also widely practised even by the European immigrants. Therefore, they were admissible as "wives" under the "Gentleman's Agreement," but the Japanese Government desired to avoid any future complications, especially in the face of the rising tide of anti-Japanese agitations. Thus, Ambassador Baron Shidehara announced in February, 1919, the voluntary decision of the Japanese Government to stop issuing passports to "picture brides," to be effective from March 1, 1920.

But California did not cease her anti-Japanese legislation. An initiative measure of greater severity than the 1913 Law was passed in November, 1920. The new Alien Land Law of 1920 provided that all "aliens ineligible to citizenship" could not own or lease agricultural land nor could they become members or acquire shares in any corporation owning agricultural land nor could they become guardians of a minor owning agricultural land, and that any real estate acquired by such aliens after 1920 in violation of this Law should escheat to the State of California. In 1923, the series was completed when an additional legislative enactment deprived all "aliens ineligible to citizenship" of the right to enjoy the use of cropping contracts. Needless to add, the whole Japanese nation was thoroughly aroused by such a series of discriminatory acts, but the Japanese Government protested in vain. Moreover, all subsequent attempts to question the constitutionality of these land laws and to establish in test cases the fact that they were violations of the treaties failed, the United States Supreme Court finally upholding their constitutionality. As a result, similar laws were enacted in other western States.

THE QUESTION OF JAPANESE NATURALIZATION

The delicate issues involved in the alien land laws and the immigration regulations indicated that the last and only recourse to obtain justice was to combat the stigma of "aliens ineligible to citizenship" by obtaining a favorable judicial interpretation of the Japanese claim to the right of naturalization. The Naturalization Law of 1790 as amended in 1870 granted the privilege of naturalization to "free white persons and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent." In an earlier period Japanese had been naturalized in the United States by the courts without difficulty, but the practice was discontinued after an unfavorable decision was handed down in a lower federal court. Then a test case was made by Ozawa Takuo in October, 1914, when he applied to the United States District Court in Hawaii to be admitted as a citizen of the United States. The United States District Attorney opposed his petition, and the District Court held that he, having been born in Japan and being a descendant of the Japanese race, was not eligible to naturalization and denied the petition under the Section 2169 of the Revised Statutes of 1870.

The Ozawa case was then appealed and, after a considerable delay, reached the United States Supreme Court as "Takuo Ozawa v. United States." It was argued on October 3 and 4, 1922, and decided on November 13, 1922. The Supreme Court ruled that the term "white person" was synonymous with "a person of the Caucasian race," that the appellant was "clearly of a race which is not Caucasian and therefore belongs entirely outside the zone on the negative side." It significantly added that "any suggestion of individual unworthiness or racial inferiority" was "in no manner involved." With this historic decision, then, the phrase "aliens ineligible to citizenship" as applied to the Japanese race had been clearly defined beyond doubt. Elated by this decision, a new movement was started in California to secure an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, depriving the children of "aliens ineligible to citizen-

ship" of the right of citizenship even if they were born in the United States, but such a move was never successful.

Closely related to the question of Japanese naturalization in America is the question of Japanese expatriation, which also vexed the diplomats of the two countries. Under the Japanese law, every child born of Japanese parent is regarded as a Japanese citizen no matter where the child is born, and is liable to conscription duty in the Japanese army. On the other hand, a Japanese child born in the United States is an American citizen under the Constitution of the United States, and thus arose a delicate question of double citizenship. For a long time, the Japanese Government was unwilling to recognize the right of expatriation, but the Japanese question in America opened the way toward the adoption of a new policy. The first step in making expatriation possible was taken by the Japanese Diet in 1916, and finally, in 1924, Japan enacted a law abolishing the "dual nationality." It provides that a Japanese born abroad shall hereafter lose his nationality unless he takes the formal action prescribed to preserve it.

THE JAPANESE EXCLUSION LAW, 1924

The pendulum of American sentiment on immigration swung after the World War toward the policy of carefully selecting the immigrants, and in 1921 a general immigration act introduced the quota system in restricting European immigration, but it did not affect the working of the "Gentleman's Agreement." Elated by local victories, especially in the successful passage of alien land laws in several of the western States, and encouraged by the decision of the Supreme Court, barring Japanese from the privilege of naturalization, the champions of Japanese exclusion now demanded the abolition of the "Gentleman's Agreement" and the sealing of American ports to Japanese immigration. Their effort, cleverly capitalizing the important position which California occupied in the national political network, resulted in a new proposal to substitute legislative control of

Japanese immigration in place of the "Gentleman's Agreement." A new immigration bill, which was reported from the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization in March, 1924, proposed to adopt a quota system based upon the census of 1890, but it provided that "no alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States" with the exception of persons returning from a temporary visit abroad, merchants, ministers of religion, university professors, and *bona fide* students.

Ambassador Hanihara kept constant vigil over the situation and lost no time in 1923 and 1924 to file his Government's protests with the State Department. In the now famous letter of April 10, 1924, addressed to Secretary of State Hughes, he discussed at length the provisions and effective working result of the "Gentleman's Agreement," cited its bilateral nature, and offered concessions to secure a quota system through direct negotiations. After expressly recognizing the sovereign right of the United States to exclude immigrants, Ambassador Hanihara then unhesitatingly pointed out that "the manifest object" of the proposed exclusion clause was "to single out Japanese as a nation, stigmatizing them as unworthy and undesirable in the eyes of the American people, and yet the actual result of that particular provision in the proposed bill, if it becomes the law as intended, would be to exclude only 146 Japanese per year," and concluded with the following ill-fated sentence: "Relying upon the confidence you have been good enough to show me at all times, I have stated or rather repeated all this to you very candidly and in a most friendly spirit, for I realize, as I believe you do, the grave consequences which the enactment of the measure retaining that particular provision would inevitably bring upon the otherwise happy and mutually advantageous relations between our two countries." The effort of Secretary Hughes was futile in staying the tide, and the House of Representatives adopted the bill containing the Japanese exclusion clause on April 12, 1924.

Following Secretary of State Hughes's original sugges-

tion, however, the Senate Committee had already proposed to exempt from the quota provision of the bill "an alien entitled to enter the United States under the provisions of a treaty or an agreement relating solely to immigration," thus retaining the "Gentleman's Agreement." On April 8, Senator Reed of Pennsylvania, the author of the Senate bill, declared that the Japanese "are a proud people, everybody knows that, and they would resent an exclusion law just as we would resent an exclusion law passed by Japan," and, on the following day, he said that the quota system would reduce the Japanese immigration by fourteen-fifteenths. At this juncture, on April 10, Secretary of State Hughes addressed a letter to Senator Cold, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Immigration, enclosing Ambassador Hanihara's letter of the same date. Although the Hughes letter was printed in the Congressional Record for April 10, it was not discussed until the following day. On that day, after a secret executive session, the Senate was opened for debate on the proposed amendment. In that memorable session, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge brought the Hanihara letter into discussion, characterizing it as "improper" and quite erroneously and unfairly as a "veiled threat" against the United States, and declared that "the letter of the Japanese Ambassador . . . has created a situation which makes it impossible for me to support the pending amendment." Upon such a flimsy and imaginative pretext, the tide was turned and on the following day the Senate rejected the proposed amendment which recognized the "Gentleman's Agreement," and adopted a new amendment which provided for the exclusion of "an alien ineligible to citizenship."

Such an interpretation of the Hanihara letter and such a sudden turn of affairs in the Senate were beyond comprehension. On April 17, therefore, Ambassador Hanihara sent another note to Secretary of State Hughes, expressed his inability "to understand how the two words read in their context could be construed as meaning anything like a threat" as he had "no thought of being in any way disagreeable or discourteous and still less of conveying 'a veil-

ed threat,'" and explained that he "simply tried to emphasize the most unfortunate and deplorable effect upon our traditional friendship which might result from the adoption of a particular clause in the proposed measure." This note was made public on April 20, but it had no effect on the tense situation, less upon Congress.

While the bill was in conference to determine the date upon which it should go into effect, the Senate insisting upon its immediate enforcement and the House urging July 1, 1924, President Coolidge suggested that the application of the exclusion provision of the bill be postponed until March 1, 1926, in order to enable the United States to deal with Japan over the exclusion question through diplomatic negotiations. This was promptly rejected. Later, on May 7, President Coolidge again suggested a similar procedure but making the date March 1, 1925, and this time it was accepted, requesting the President "to negotiate with the Japanese Government in relation to the abrogation of the present arrangement" on Japanese immigration before that date. This amendment, however, failed of adoption in the House and the bill, providing for the exclusion of "aliens ineligible to citizenship" and going into effect on July 1, 1924, was passed on May 15. Eleven days later, President Coolidge affixed his signature upon the Immigration Act, accompanying it, however, with a statement in which he criticized the method used by the Congress to obtain Japanese exclusion, but recognizing "that the enactment of this provision does not imply any change in our sentiment of admiration and cordial friendship for the Japanese people."

Ambassador Hanihara presented the formal protest of the Japanese Government to the United States through Secretary of State Hughes on May 31, 1924. In a lengthy memorandum, one of the noblest in American-Japanese diplomatic history, the Japanese Government expressed its deep concern over the enactment of the "Immigration Act of 1924" with a discriminatory clause aimed at the Japanese immigration in spite of its repeated representations and the recommendations of the President and of the Secretary of

State. It then maintained that "international discrimination in any form and on any subject," especially "discriminations based on race," are "opposed to the principles of justice and fairness upon which the friendly intercourse between nations must, in its final analysis, depend"; that the assumption of the non-assimilability of the Japanese race to American life and ideals as used in defence of the discriminatory measure in question "seems at least premature, if not fundamentally unjust"; that, throughout negotiations concerning commercial treaties, "one of the chief preoccupations of the Japanese Government was to protect their nationals from discriminatory immigration legislation in the United States," which position was fully understood and appreciated by the United States Government in concluding the existing Treaty; and that "the new legislation is in entire disregard of the spirit and circumstances that underlie the conclusion" of the 1911 Treaty. Further it declared that "the sweeping provisions of the new Act, clearly indicative of discrimination against Japanese, have made it impossible for Japan to continue the undertakings assumed under the Gentleman's Agreement," and that "the patient, loyal, and scrupulous observance by Japan for more than sixteen years of these self-denying regulations, in the interest of good relations between the two countries, now seems to have been wasted" as the understanding of friendly co-operation was "abruptly overthrown by legislative action on the part of the United States." It also pointed out that, while "it lies within the inherent sovereign power of each state to limit and control immigration to its own domains," the "question necessarily assumes an aspect which justifies diplomatic discussion and adjustment" when, in the exercise of such right, "an evident injustice is done to a foreign nation in disregard of its proper self-respect, of international understanding or of ordinary rules of comity"; and requested that the United States Government "take all possible and suitable measures for the removal of such discrimination."

In the face of such a strong but logical and rational protest, the Coolidge administration was placed in a difficult

position. Congress had revolted against the President's policy and the administration now had to find a plausible excuse to defend the mischief-maker, at the same time preserving the friendly relations with Japan. The American reply, dated May 31, 1924, and signed by Secretary of State Hughes, naturally avoided the fundamental issues which prompted the Japanese protest, but dwelt at length upon "the determination of the Congress to exercise its prerogative in defining by legislation the control of immigration instead of leaving it to international arrangements," and declared that "this legislative action is mandatory upon the executive branch of the Government and allows no latitude for the exercise of executive discretion as to the carrying out of the legislative will expressed in the statute." He also acquiesced with the view that the Japanese Government was "to be considered released" in enforcing the Gentleman's Agreement. In short, the Coolidge administration invoked the constitutional mechanism of government to shield the American action which, in fundamental principle as affecting international relations, was entirely indefensible.

JAPANESE REACTIONS

The immediate consequences of the incident were the resignation, on May 18, 1924, of Cyrus E. Wood, the United States Ambassador to Japan, and Ambassador Hanihara's return to Japan soon afterward. While the legislation was regarded as an accomplished fact and the diplomatic issues arising therefrom as a closed affair in the United States, the Japanese Government considered it otherwise. Baron Shidehara voiced its determined sentiment when he said in the Diet on July 1, 1924, that the Japanese Government "can by no means concede that the question is closed . . . until our just contentions shall have been given satisfaction." In fact, the Government and the people were solidly united in resenting and protesting against the "glaring breach of international etiquette" and the "deliberate insult." As Secretary Hughes himself wrote while the legis-

lation was still under consideration, the Exclusion Law fixed "a stigma" upon the Japanese people and contributed cause to suspect the real American intention in connection with the work of the Washington Conference and the relief of the earthquake sufferers in Japan in 1923. Dr. Nitobe well summarized the Japanese sentiment and reaction when he wrote in 1931 that it was difficult for a foreigner to understand "what glory was thereby added" to the pages of the statute books of the United States, but that its repercussion on Japan was profound, and continued: Japan "felt as though her best friend had all of a sudden and without provocation slapped her on the cheek. She questioned the sanity of the American legislators. At heart, however silent, she does not now and never will accede to this law, passed in a manner so far from gentlemanly, whatever may be the legal rights of a country as regards its own enactments. Each year that passes without amendment or abrogation only strengthens and sharpens our sense of injury, which is destined to show itself, in one form or another, in personal and public intercourse. All talk of peace and goodwill is vain, so long as one nation sows in the heart of another the seeds of suspicion and resentment." In 1930, Mr. Hanihara himself, then retired from diplomatic service, declared that "in that incident the ambassador of a friendly power whose warmth of friendship and high regard for the government and the people to whom he was accredited was everywhere widely known and accepted, was accused of the wanton act of using a veiled threat against that very country," and that "the resentment is felt now as it was then, nor will it ever die out so long as the wound inflicted remains unhealed."

BRITISH EMPIRE AND JAPANESE IMMIGRATION

While several of the Latin-American countries exclude Asiatic immigration in broad terms, Japanese immigration as an international problem has been important, apart from

the United States, only in the dominions of the British Empire, notably in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and their policy has to a certain extent been controlled from London.

Australia was the first to face the issue and settled it satisfactorily. In 1896, the Prime Minister of Australia decided to extend the anti-Chinese laws to the Japanese, but this action was reserved by the British Crown. At the Colonial Conference in 1897, Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, requested that the colonies should "bear in mind the traditions of the Empire, which makes no distinction in favor of, or against, race or color," and suggested that Japanese exclusion could be effected by a dictation test, originally adopted by Natal in 1897. Soon afterward, Japan accepted the dictation test as a method of checking Japanese immigration and this led to the enactment of the Immigration Restriction Act of November 17, 1901. It prohibited the entrance into the Commonwealth of Australia of any person, irrespective of color or race, who, when asked to do so by an officer, failed to write out at dictation and sign in the presence of the officer a passage of fifty words in a European language. After correspondence with the Japanese Government, the Australian Government decided in 1905 to exempt from this dictation test Japanese tourists, merchants, and students who are entering the country temporarily. The Act of 1905 also substituted "any prescribed language" for "a European language" and declared that if the Australian Government should make an agreement with any country regulating the admission of its subjects to Australia, these subjects should not be required to pass the dictation test. This general principle was retained in the subsequent amendments in 1908, 1910, and 1912. This simple device worked effectively without raising any diplomatic difficulty such as occurred in the United States.

In Canada, the question was met in a different manner. At first the Canadian Government objected to the application of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1894 which granted to Japanese subjects "full liberty to

enter, travel and reside" in Canada, but it accepted the Treaty "absolutely and without reserve" in September, 1905, and in June, 1906, the Anglo-Japanese Supplementary Convention extended the Treaty of 1894 to Canada, the Canadian Parliament approving it in January, 1907. However, the influx of over 4,000 Japanese laborers, mostly from Hawaii, during the first ten months of 1907 alarmed the Canadians, and Rodolphe Lemieux, the Canadian Minister of Labor, went to Tokyo to bring about a diplomatic settlement. As a result of negotiations in Tokyo, the Canadian "Gentleman's Agreement" was effected. On December 23, 1907, Foreign Minister Hayashi addressed a letter to Labor Minister Lemieux, stating that, although the existing treaty between Japan and Canada guaranteed to the Japanese subjects full liberty to enter Canada, the Japanese Government would not insist upon the right and that, in view of recent occurrences in British Columbia, it would take "efficient measures to restrict emigration to Canada." Subsequent regulations provided that passports should be issued only to (1) former Japanese residents of Canada and their wives and children, (2) domestic and agricultural laborers, the number of which should not exceed four hundred, and (3) contract emigrants.

The Canadian Immigration Act of 1910 entrusted in the Governor-General in Council the power to exclude whatever racial or national groups he deemed as "unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada." As the Act in reality was not discriminatory, Japan naturally raised no objection. When, however, the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was concluded in April, 1911, with the usual reciprocal grant of "full liberty to enter, travel, and reside," the Canadian Government did not wish to accede thereto unreservedly as it had to the Treaty of 1894, and exchanged correspondence with Consul General Nakamura at Ottawa in which it expressed its willingness to adhere to the Treaty of 1911 subject to the provision, similar to that made by the United States to the American-Japanese Treaty of 1911, that the Treaty should not be deemed to

repeal any of the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1910. Consul General Nakamura stated that Japan would not object to Canada's proposal since she "felt assured that by the Immigration Act of Canada of 1910, being applicable, as stated in your note, to the immigration of aliens into the Dominion of Canada from all countries including the British Empire itself, no discrimination will be made against Japanese subjects in this respect." Thereupon, Canada passed the Japanese Treaty Act of 1913, acceding to the 1911 Treaty subject to the provision that "nothing in this treaty shall be deemed to repeal or affect any of the provisions of the Immigration Act." Canada's accession to the 1911 Treaty was followed by a Japanese declaration, similar to that accompanying the American-Japanese Treaty of 1911, that the Japanese Government was "fully prepared to maintain and intended to maintain with equal effectiveness the limitation and control which they have since 1908 exercised in the regulation of emigration from Japan to Canada."

The Canadian "Gentleman's Agreement," however, became a source of constant criticism, especially in British Columbia where the movement for the exclusion of Japanese laborers continued. In November, 1921, the Legislature of British Columbia requested the amendment of the Immigration Act of 1910 so as to exclude Asiatic laborers, and in May, 1922, after a vigorous debate, the Canadian House of Commons adopted a Resolution, requesting the Government to "take immediate action with a view to securing the effective restriction" of future Asiatic immigration. Thereupon, the Canadian Prime Minister entered into negotiation with the Japanese Government, which agreed to revise the "Gentleman's Agreement" so that the number of Japanese household servants and agricultural laborers entering Canada would be reduced from four hundred to one hundred and fifty annually.

In New Zealand, the Immigration Act which was adopted in 1908 provided for the dictation test similar to that employed in Australia. In 1920, this provision was repealed and the Governor General was given full power, as in the

Canadian Immigration Act of 1910, to admit or exclude "nations or peoples" at his discretion.

As to the question of naturalization, Japanese can be naturalized both in Canada and New Zealand without discrimination, while no Asiatics may become naturalized in Australia. On the other hand, the Japanese subjects enjoy the unreserved right of property ownership, including land, alike in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. A British Columbia statute to the effect that no Chinese or Japanese should be employed in all government contracts, leases, and concessions was declared invalid by the Judicial Committee of the Canadian Privy Council in October, 1923, on the ground that it violated the Treaty of 1911.

CHAPTER XIX

JAPAN AND INTERNATIONAL CO- OPERATION

THE close of the World War saw a revolution in international relations and the world entered into a new era of open diplomacy based upon international conferences. As one of the Great Powers, Japan fully shared this new spirit of a new age and participated whole-heartedly in all the important events which marked each progressive step in international cooperation. Not only the Washington Conference and the Sino-Japanese as well as the Russo-Japanese relations, but the various activities of the League of Nations, the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927, the Pact of Paris of 1928, and the London Naval Conference of 1930 all helped in a complete re-orientation of Japan's foreign policy during the third decade of the current century.

JAPAN AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The proposal and the organization of the League of Nations were hailed in Japan as elsewhere throughout the world and the Japanese Government heartily cooperated with the Powers to nurse this infant child of unknown destiny in international relations. In mobilizing this cooperative spirit to the fullest extent, the loss of her request for the inclusion of a race equality clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the disappointing withdrawal of the United States from membership in the League of Nations which her chief representative helped to create, profound as were their repercussions in Japan, did not deter her. Indeed, conquering tremendous geographical handicaps and

shouldering heavy annual financial burdens Japan gave her full and hearty support to an experiment to upbuild a new world of international cooperation during the first eleven years of its life and activities.

When the League of Nations was established, its first task was to organize the secretariat which would be as international as possible in its personnel, and it was understood that one of the Under-Secretaries-General would be chosen from Japan. The call came and the Japanese Government searched far and wide for a Japanese who personified not only broad international training but high moral character and profound scholarly attainments. Dr. Nitobe Inazo was a happy choice and he served the League of Nations in the capacities of an Under-Secretary-General and the Director of the Section of International Bureau until 1926. Upon his retirement because of his age, he was followed, upon the Japanese Government's recommendation, by Dr. Sugimura Yotaro, a trained diplomat and an accomplished jurist, who had previously taken an active part in several League meetings as a Japanese representative. Dr. Sugimura was appointed Under-Secretary-General and Director of the Political Section. In that second capacity, Dr. Sugimura was destined to handle the ticklish Sino-Japanese controversy of 1931-1933, not as a Japanese but as an international officer of the League of Nations. Among other permanent Japanese members of the Secretariat were representatives who have been serving as a League of Nations correspondent stationed in Tokyo, a member of the Political Section, a member of the Information Section, a member of the Health Section, and an officer of the International Labor Office. Thus, while there had been a marked numerical scarcity of Japanese members when one considers that there were over four hundred in the Secretariat's staff, Japan had been accorded a due regard in the composition of the Secretariat and her sons had contributed much to the international nature of the League of Nations staff which was otherwise overwhelmingly European.

In the Council of the League of Nations, Japan occupied

from the beginning a coveted permanent membership seat together with Great Britain, France, and Italy, and with Germany after 1926, whereas non-permanent memberships were rotated among other Powers on the basis of three-year terms. At its beginning in 1920, the ratio of permanent and non-permanent memberships in the Council was five to four, but the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations reduced the former to four; in 1922, it became four to six, and in 1926, five to nine. This meant important recognition of Japan's place in the League of Nations, especially when it is remembered that there were nearly three-score member-States and that the actual authority seems to have been vested in the Council alone rather than in either the Council and the Assembly together or in the Assembly alone. With this recognition, Japan had been taking as active a part in the activities of the Council as it was possible for her to take. In all matters affecting the fundamental constitution of the League of Nations, the Japanese attitude had been conciliatory and disinterested, as typified by the so-called "Council Crisis" of 1926, when Viscount Ishii, the Japanese representative, was the President of the Council and had to assume the most difficult duty of conciliating Germany and France and the Powers supported by France. The most important contributions which Japan made as a permanent member of the Council, however, was in the field of settling international disputes, although almost all of a score or more international disputes which were submitted to the Council for its consideration or settlement up to 1931 concerned purely European matters. The part played by the Japanese representative as a neutral arbitrator in these European disputes is best illustrated by the Upper Silesian Question and the Hungarian Optants Case. In the difficult Upper Silesian dispute which involved Germany and Poland and which came before the Council in 1921, Viscount Ishii, as the Acting President of the Council and the Rapporteur after a Spanish appointee in the latter capacity declined to serve, personally conducted the investigation of the various aspects and difficulties which complicated this touchy prob-

lem, and was instrumental in assisting the Council in drawing a new Polish-German boundary line which eventually resulted in the amicable settlement of the dispute. The controversy between Hungary and Roumania in 1923 arose out of the alleged mistreatment by the Roumanian Government of Hungarian optants residing in Transylvania, and it reached the Council when Roumania requested the League of Nations to consider the matter. The Council appointed Dr. Adachi Mineichiro, the Japanese representative, as the Rapporteur and his efforts brought about a tentative agreement between the disputants' representatives. Hungary rejected this agreement, however, and the Council, after a vigorous objection by the Hungarian representative, adopted the Adachi Report and Recommendations, thereby temporarily dropping the matter from the Council agenda. In Council, thus, the role played by Japan was again to make the Council international, and not local or European, in facing various international questions.

In the Assembly of the League of Nations, the part played by the Japanese representatives was less marked. Yet, its chief function being the formation of permanent policies of the League, Japan's participation was particularly helpful in directing the functions of the Assembly as a universal body rather than a European organization. In this respect, Japan had been fully cooperative, especially with the other Asiatic Powers. Such has been the case, for example, with activities involving cultural questions, economic questions including the proposal and the establishment in Tokyo of a branch of the International Labor Office and the Japanese participation in various international economic conferences in Europe, especially the World Economic Conference which was held at Geneva in 1927. In connection with the ill-fated Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance Japan advocated the principle of general, instead of partial, agreements, and in the ill-fated Geneva Protocol she proposed the incorporation of the official recognition of the Council's duty regarding the consideration of war over "domestic questions." In all of these and other questions which came

up before the Assembly, the Japanese representatives not only voiced Japan's national interests, but also endeavored to make the policies of the League of Nations from a universal standpoint.

A great volume of the work of the League of Nations is carried on through various Commissions, Committees, and "Organizations" which are created and supervised by the Council. In most of these bodies Japan had seats and demonstrated her active interest therein by sending her nationals either as authorized representatives or merely as experts. Such, for example, was the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs, which was appointed by the Council in 1921 and of which Japan was a member. At first the Japanese interest in this Committee was defensive and passive, but by 1924 it had become cooperative and active, and through it the Japanese representatives have continuously defended the Japanese position by offering explanations of policy and correcting misunderstandings, and actually demonstrating Japan's earnest effort to control the illicit traffic in opium. Japan's active participation in the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference which was created by the Council in 1925 is well known and is treated elsewhere in connection with the various disarmament conferences. Also notable has been Japan's participation in the extensive activities of the International Labor Office of the League of Nations and the international conferences sponsored by it, which have been instrumental in bringing about phenomenal changes in the labor movements and social legislation in Japan. Another important work of the League of Nations is conducted through its Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, of which Japan's part will be described also in a separate section. Among other bodies the more important ones in which the Japanese participation and cooperation have been more than casual are the Committee on the Codification of International Law, the Permanent Mandate Commission, the Committee on Armaments, the Advisory Committee on the Traffic of Women and Children, the Tem-

porary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, the Coordination Commission, the Economic Committee, the Financial Committee, the Advisory Committee for Communications, the Health Committee, and the Committee on the Allocation of Expenses.

Japan's active participation in the League of Nations and its far-flung activities was highly beneficial to the League of Nations itself, especially in the absence of the United States and Russia. Indeed, Japan has been one of the keystones on the arch which has successfully spanned the East and the West in the field of international politics. The affiliation with the League of Nations meant to Japan, on the other hand, the acceptance of tremendous obligations, which she carried out faithfully in spite of a heavy financial responsibility and geographical inconvenience. The latter handicap explains why Japan had to rely largely upon her diplomatic representatives in European capitals to represent Japan in most of the League of Nations gatherings whereas most of the European Powers could easily afford to send either their Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers. Japan's permanent membership in the Council and her active participation in the multitudinous activities of the League of Nations meant the direct recognition by the world of her place among Great Powers and the indirect attainment of her ideal of national and racial equality.

JAPAN'S MANDATE ADMINISTRATION

Closely related to the League of Nations is Japan's mandate over the former German Islands in the Pacific north of the equator. The mandate over those Islands was allotted to Japan by the decision of the Allied Supreme Council on May 7, 1919, and the same was officially recognized by the United States by the Yap Treaty, which was signed at Washington on February 11, 1922, six days after the close of the Washington Conference. With the organization of the League of Nations, the supervision of the jurisdiction over the various classes of mandates was entrusted to it and the

Mandatory Powers are required to make annual reports to the Council. To look after this important international work, the Council appointed in 1920 the Permanent Mandate Commission, of which Japan became a member and to which Japan's annual reports have been faithfully filed during the period under review.

Under the Japanese mandate administration, various reforms have been instituted on behalf of the Islanders and much progress has been effected in several directions. The military administration of the World War period gave way in 1922 to a civil administration which is under the control of the Director of the South Seas Bureau with its headquarters at Palau in the West Carolines. The Director is responsible to the Premier in Tokyo and the Bureau is organized on scientific principles. Among many improvements which were instituted by the Japanese administration may be mentioned a number of educational reforms including the maintenance of two kinds of schools, those for Japanese children and "public schools" for natives; a number of judicial reforms, including the codification of Laws especially suited to the customs and conditions of the native inhabitants; the admission of a limited number of qualified natives to the civil service; the introduction of various medical and hygienic services, especially the medical care of the inhabitants; the establishment of meteorological stations; the promotion of agriculture; the encouragement of industries, especially the growing of cocoanuts and sugar cane, the manufacture of sugar and copra, and the mining of phosphate; and the expansion of trade, which reached a total of 13,417,000 yen in 1931.

THE WORLD COURT AND ARBITRATION

Equally intimately related to the League of Nations is the Permanent Court of International Justice which it has created at The Hague. Japan's position with regard to this Court has been peculiar, for, while a Japanese jurist has been serving it as one of its elected judges, the Japanese

Government so far has not accepted its full jurisdiction by deferring official action upon the ratification of the famous "Optional Clause." Perhaps a brief résumé of Japan's experiences with arbitration will help to clarify her position.

The peaceful settlement of international disputes through arbitration has a long history. But the first application of this principle to international politics was made by The Hague Peace Congress in 1899 and 1907 which gave to the world the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, of which Japan became a signatory. As chief instrument of this new movement, the Permanent Court of Arbitration was established at The Hague. Each signatory to the above Convention nominated not more than four commissioners to constitute a panel from which five commissioners were to be selected as arbitrators for specific cases in question, each disputant Power being entitled to select two and the fifth being named by the four members so chosen. After 1899 only a few disputes were referred to The Hague Court of Arbitration and the whole mechanism existed almost in name only.

Japan's next official contact with international arbitration was in connection with the so-called Bryan treaties. William Jennings Bryan advocated bilateral treaties of arbitration during 1905-1906, and this proposal resulted in the conclusion between Japan and the United States of the Convention of Arbitration on March 5, 1908. In 1911, the Taft Administration attempted to conclude a new arbitration treaty with Great Britain, but failed. When Bryan became Secretary of State in the Wilson Administration in 1913, the American-Japanese Arbitration Convention of 1908 was extended on June 28, 1913, for another period of five years. Through Bryan's most energetic efforts, no less than twenty-two similar treaties were concluded between 1914 and 1915. In 1918, the American-Japanese Convention was extended again for a five-year period, and for the third time in 1923. In an exchange of notes on August 23, 1923, the two Powers agreed to revise the said Convention in order to bring the newly established World Court into play in case

the United States Senate approved the American affiliation thereto. In all of these treaties including the American-Japanese Convention, the fundamental principle adopted was the settlement of international disputes through inquiry and report instead of resorting to hostilities during the course of investigations. The treaties, however, turned out to be merely so much paper.

The establishment of the League of Nations added new life to arbitration as an instrument of international policy. Not only did the League of Nations make the principle of arbitration one of the corner stones of its policy, but Article XIV of the Covenant provided for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. In accordance with this provision, therefore, the Council of the League of Nations, on February 13, 1920, appointed an Advisory Committee of Jurists, which included Dr. Adachi Mineichiro, then the Japanese Ambassador to Belgium, to consider plans for the creation of such a tribunal. This Committee met at The Hague on June 16, 1920, and drew up a draft of Statutes for the Permanent Court of International Justice, usually more briefly referred to as the World Court. The draft was approved in an amended form by the Council in October, 1920, while the Assembly adopted it and stipulated the procedure for its signature and ratification on December 16, 1920. In September, 1921, the Council and the Assembly elected the members of the World Court thus evolved, and the judges assembled at The Hague for a preliminary session on January 30, 1922. They framed the rules which now regulate the procedure of the World Court, elected the President and Vice-President and appointed the Registrar. The World Court thus instituted was composed of eleven judges and four deputy-judges, which composition was amended in 1929, abolishing the office of deputy-judges and increasing the number of regular judges to fifteen, but the amendment was not in force in 1931 due to the lack of ratification.

Japan's contribution to the composition of the World Court is well known. One of the original eleven judges who were elected in 1921 was Dr. Oda Yorozu, an eminent

scholar and jurist. At the end of the first tenure of office, a new set of judges were elected at Geneva in 1930. As a result of that election, Dr. Adachi Mineichiro, then the Japanese Ambassador to France and a distinguished jurist, had the signal honor of receiving the votes of twenty-two nations, six votes more than the next highest selection and twelve votes more than the third. The Council approved his election unanimously while the Assembly gave him forty-nine out of fifty-two votes cast, the next highest votes being forty. Dr. Adachi then served the Court as its President till his lamented death in 1935.

On November 16, 1921, Japan ratified the Protocol of Signature which established the World Court, but so far has not taken any step to ratify the Statute on account of the second paragraph of Article XXXVI. This so-called "Optional Clause" imposes upon the signatory Powers the compulsory acceptance of the jurisdiction of the World Court "in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation." Up to 1929, the only Great Power who accepted this clause was Germany, the United States not even accepting the World Court. In 1929, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald of Great Britain declared at Geneva that his country was willing to accept the "Optional Clause" in view of the new situation created by the Pact of Paris. True to his declaration, the United Kingdom ratified the Statute on February 5, 1930, followed by the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. France followed the suit in April, 1931, and Italy in September, 1931. By 1931, thirty-eight nations in all had ratified the Statute, but Japan still remained silent. Japan, however, on November 11, 1930, ratified the Protocol Concerning the Revision of the Statute which was adopted at Geneva on September 14, 1929.

Behind this attitude of the Japanese Government is

Japan's bitter experience with arbitration in 1905, although Japan's first arbitration case, the "Maria Luz" incident, was decided by the Tzar in favor of Japan in 1875. Soon after the revised Treaties went into force in 1898, the cities of Yokohama and Kobe levied a house tax upon foreign residences in the foreign settlements of those cities. The foreign residents refused to pay such a tax on the ground that it was a violation of the revised Treaties, and the Japanese authorities used the penal procedure to enforce the tax. Finally, after a period of bitter controversies, the Japanese Government agreed with Great Britain, France, and Germany to arbitrate the case before the Court of Arbitration at The Hague in 1902. Three years later, the said Court decided the case against Japan, which decision was bitterly criticised as being extremely prejudicial. Since this experience, Japan opposed the compulsory jurisdiction of such a court, and her attitude still remains unchanged.

Intimately related to the establishment of the World Court was the question of the compilation of an authoritative code of international law. This work was initiated by the League of Nations in 1924, when the Council, on being requested by the Assembly, appointed a Special Committee on the Codification of International Law, consisting of fifteen members, including Minister Matsuda Michiichi. The Committee held sessions in 1925, 1926, and 1927, which eventually led to the meeting of the Conference for the Codification of International Law at Geneva in 1930, over forty nations, including Japan, participating. For the preparation of the Conference, a group of Japanese jurists cooperated with the Preparatory Committee of the Council in presenting their opinion on the various phases of the subjects to be discussed. The gigantic task thus launched still remains unachieved and will probably remain so for some years.

THE GENEVA NAVAL CONFERENCE

One of the most vital problems which attracted universal attention was the problem of disarmament. After

the Washington Conference the world became disarmament conscious and the logical body to take the leadership in this movement was the League of Nations. In 1924 the need for a future disarmament conference was envisaged, and in September, 1925, the Council appointed the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference composed of military and naval experts of various nations including Japan and also of the United States. The purpose of this Commission was not to reach an agreement as to the actual limitation of armaments, but simply to define the ways and means of a future disarmament meeting. It held three sessions between May, 1926, and April, 1927, but soon a division arose as to the general scope of the limitations. One group of nations, led by Great Britain and the United States and supported by Japan, believed that naval limitation could be achieved independently of land armament, while another group led by France took the position that land, sea, and air armaments were interdependent and that it would be impossible to agree upon the limitation of one type of armaments without simultaneously limiting other types. In the field of naval limitation, France upheld the principle of global tonnage, while Great Britain, supported by the United States and Japan, maintained that it was necessary to limit numbers as well as the size of ships and the calibre of guns.

The great practical difficulties thus developed in reaching a universal agreement for all types of armaments prompted the United States to take the initiative in bringing about an agreement among some of the States on the limitation of naval armaments apart from land armaments and aircraft. Accordingly, President Calvin Coolidge invited, on February 10, 1927, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan to empower their respective delegates to the forthcoming session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at Geneva to negotiate and to conclude an agreement for the limitation of those classes of naval vessels which had not been covered by the Washington Treaty.

Baron Shidehara, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, welcomed the American initiative and accepted the invitation

on behalf of his Government. He requested, however, that, in view of the fact that a part of the Japanese delegation must be sent from Tokyo and considering the length of time required for the necessary preparations and travel, the proposed conference should not take place earlier than June 1 although the Preparatory Commission was scheduled to meet on March 21. He also commended the American position not "to put forward rigid proposals on the ratio of naval strength to be maintained by the several Powers in the classes of vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty," and suggested that "all parties to the negotiations should approach the subject with an open mind, being always guided by the spirit of mutual accommodation and helpfulness, consistently with the defensive requirement of each nation." Great Britain also accepted the suggestion, but France and Italy declined to participate in the suggested negotiations for reasons similar to those which led them to oppose the Anglo-American thesis in the Preparatory Commission, although both agreed to send observers to the proposed conference.

The so-called Coolidge Naval Conference met at Geneva on June 20, 1927, and lasted until August 4, 1927. The Japanese delegation was led by Admiral Viscount Saito Makoto, the Governor-General of Chosen, and Viscount Ishii Kikujiro, while the American delegation was led by Mr. Hugh Gibson, the United States Ambassador to Belgium, and Rear-Admiral Hilary P. Jones, the Chairman of the General Board of the Navy, and the British delegation by Mr. W. C. Bridgeman, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, and Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. Field, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State, and India also sent their representatives, who together with the British representatives formed the British Empire delegation.

The Geneva Conference thus called confronted three important issues in the course of its deliberations: (1) the ratio of naval strength, that is, whether or not the United States and Great Britain should be on a parity with respect

to auxiliary vessels, in a ratio of five to three with respect to Japan; (2) the limitation within the total tonnage of different classes of vessels, that is, whether any restriction should be placed on the number of 10,000-ton eight-inch-gun cruisers; and (3) the amount of tonnage and the number of vessels. The American delegation contended for Anglo-American parity in both capital and auxiliary ships and presented the view that, the total tonnage limitations which they initially suggested being between 250,000 and 300,000 tons in the cruiser class for the United States and Great Britain and between 150,000 and 180,000 tons for Japan, each Power should reserve the freedom of building the number and types of vessels which they might consider best suited to their respective naval needs and of arming them freely, subject only to the limitation of the Washington Treaty. The British delegation opposed the principle of limitation by total tonnage alone and proposed the limitation of the size of vessels of all classes, including capital ships. They suggested first a strict limitation of the number of 10,000-ton eight-inch-gun cruisers and second the establishment of a secondary type of 6,000-ton six-inch-gun ships, and contended that the British Empire, due to its far-flung geographical requirement, regarded it indispensable to maintain fifteen eight-inch-gun cruisers and fifty-five six-inch-gun ships. Thus the story of the Conference became largely the story of Anglo-American rivalries.

The role which the Japanese delegation was destined to play in the Conference was, naturally, that of a mediator in the Anglo-American rivalry, as well as the defender of Japan's naval needs. The Japanese delegates, as Baron Tanaka had stated before the Diet in January, 1928, "made it their basic principle to contribute to the security of world peace and the lightening of the burdens on the peoples without losing sight of the safety of our national defence" on the one hand and "to harmonize the views of the British and American delegates on the other." Their technical advocacy included the adoption of the lowest possible tonnage vessels and the opposition to any limitation of eight-inch-gun

cruisers although they were willing to add no new eight-inch-gun cruisers provided Japan were given a total tonnage of at least 315,000 tons for cruisers and destroyers combined as compared to 480,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain.

The nearest approach to an agreement came when the British and the Japanese delegation reached a compromise figure of 500,000 tons for cruisers and destroyers combined in addition to retaining twenty-five per cent in old vessels of limited combatant value. This compromise included the limitation of twelve 10,000-ton cruisers for Great Britain and the United States and eight for Japan. The United States, however, rejected this compromise proposal on the ground that, in view of the inclusion of over-age ships, it would really mean a tonnage limitation for cruisers of at least 426,000 tons, 75,000 tons in excess of British cruiser strength after the completion of vessels under construction. The later modification of the American position did not help the procedure in the least. Back of these technical differences was a more formidable difference in the conception of their respective naval needs, Great Britain upholding a conception of "absolute" needs in safeguarding the Imperial Dominions, and the United States maintaining a position that naval needs were relative, the number of vessels required by one navy depending upon the number of vessels maintained by others. And so the Geneva Conference broke up on August 4 without reaching an agreement. Japan's attempts to harmonize the Anglo-American rivalry were in vain.

THE PACT OF PARIS

The post-war desire to lift civilized nations above the barbarism and cruelty of war expressed itself, not only in the organization of the League of Nations and the conferences for the limitation of armaments, but also in a renewed attempt to outlaw war itself. This anti-war movement existed in the leading countries of the world for years; it was agitated publicly in Japan as early as the days of the Sino-

Japanese War. But it was not until 1928 when the rising tide of public opinion was harnessed in a world-wide sentiment, binding all civilized nations never again to use war as an instrument to enforce their national policy.

This event, however, received its initiatory impetus from a most casual remark made by Aristide Briand, the veteran French Foreign Minister. The occasion was the tenth anniversary of the entrance of the United States into the World War, on April 6, 1927. In a statement made to the Associated Press correspondent at Paris, Briand announced that France would be willing to conclude a treaty with the United States "to outlaw war." "The renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy," said Briand, "is a conception already familiar to the signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties of Locarno. Every engagement entered into in this spirit by the United States toward another nation such as France would contribute greatly in the eyes of the world to broaden and strengthen the foundations on which international policy of peace is being erected."

The reception of this statement was cool in America and the news went almost unnoticed in Europe. Three weeks later, however, on April 26, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler emphasized the importance of the French proposal in a letter to the *New York Times*. Various peace organizations then began to take the matter up seriously, urging the State Department to consummate the proposed agreement and suggesting practical plans therefor. The State Department still maintained its silence. Then early in June, Briand once more took the initiative by opening a conversation with the United States Ambassador in Paris and by suggesting to him on June 20 the negotiation of a treaty as proposed. As a basis of such a negotiation, Briand now offered a draft treaty which, with later modifications, was destined to write a new page in the history of the crusade against war. It contained two simple articles in which the two Powers were to agree to "condemn recourse to war and renounce it respectively as an instrument of their national

policy towards each other" and to employ nothing but "pacific means" in "the settlement or the solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise between France and the United States of America." Again the State Department took a discouragingly disinterested attitude, but public opinion caught the fire anew and finally forced the State Department to take a definite stand.

On December 28, 1927, the State Department broke its silence and Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg at the same time proposed a revision of the Franco-American Arbitration Treaty, dealing with the Briand proposal of six-months' standing. He welcomed the French suggestion, but expressed the wish that all the principal Powers, namely the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Germany, and Italy, might sign the proposed treaty and that the other Powers might later join in the movement. The Kellogg-Briand negotiations thus initiated soon revealed the difference between the French and American positions on the proposed multilateral treaty. Briand frankly admitted that the conversion of a bilateral treaty which he proposed into a multilateral treaty affected the nature of his original suggestion. In case of a multilateral treaty, he pointed out, France would be obliged to confine the proposed renunciation of war to "all wars of aggression" as the renunciation of all wars might interfere with the French obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Agreements, and neutrality agreements. Mr. Kellogg could not believe that the League members could "do separately something they cannot do together," and feared that an attempt to define "aggressor" would virtually destroy the positive value of the treaty as a guarantee of peace. Another point which Briand insisted was "that violation of the treaty by one of the parties should release the remainder from their obligations under the treaty toward that party." This was not acceptable to Washington and the exchange of views continued without any possibility of a compromise, in the course of which Mr. Kellogg, not Briand, assumed the

leadership and eventually made this movement outwardly an American project.

On April 13, 1928, thus, Secretary of State Kellogg addressed identic notes to Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Japan. This historic note summed up the history of the Franco-American negotiations, expressed the readiness of the United States "to consider with the French, British, German, Italian, and Japanese Governments a single multilateral treaty open to subsequent adherence by any and all other governments binding the parties thereto not to resort to war with one another," and suggested "a preliminary draft" of such a treaty, which was no other than the Briand draft of June, 1927, almost in verbatim. Article I proposed that these nations "condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another," while Article II suggested that "the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means." A week later, Briand, in the name of the French Government, submitted to the same Powers a French draft, the first Article of which proposed to "condemn recourse to war and renounce it as an instrument of national policy" "without any intention to infringe upon the exercise of their rights of legitimate self-defence within the frame work of existing treaties." It also proposed that in case one party violated the treaty, the other parties would be released with respect to that party from their obligations, and that the treaty should in no wise affect rights and obligations resulting from prior international agreements. Strangely enough, the Kellogg proposal was phrased almost identically as the original Briand proposal and it was this and not the revised Briand proposal which immediately called forth an outburst of popular approval throughout the world.

The Kellogg proposal was heartily received in Japan and the public opinion fully supported it from the very beginning. Accordingly, on May 26, Baron Tanaka Giichi,

the Premier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed Washington "that the Government of Japan sympathize warmly with the high and beneficent aims of the proposal now made by the United States, which they take to imply the entire abolition of the institution of war, and that they would be glad to render their most cordial cooperation towards the attainment of that end." He assured Washington that his Government "would be happy to collaborate with cordial goodwill in the discussions with the purpose of securing what they are persuaded is the common desire of all the peoples of the world, namely, the cessation of wars and the definite establishment among the nations of an era of permanent and universal peace." He made certain, however, that the American proposal "is understood to contain nothing that would refuse to independent states the right of self-defence, and nothing which is incompatible with the obligations of agreements guaranteeing the public peace, such as are embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties of Locarno." The reference to the right of self-defence is significant, especially in the light of Japan's attitude toward the Pact of Paris in the Sino-Japanese crisis of 1931.

The other Powers also supported the Kellogg proposal. Great Britain's chief reservations concerned what since came to be known as the "British Monroe Doctrine" or the reservation with regard to her "freedom of action" in preventing interference in "certain regions of the world, the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest" for the peace and safety of the British Empire, the preservation of the obligations of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Locarno Agreements, and the right of self-defence. The Kellogg note of June 23 answered these and other important points raised by various Powers, advancing the author's own, and eventually the American, interpretation of the text, and presenting the revised draft of the proposed treaty. The first of the "American reservations" was a natural but far-reaching one. "There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which

restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defence," declared Secretary of State Kellogg and continued: "That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all time, regardless of treaty provisions, to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defence." The other Kellogg reservations upheld that the League Covenant "imposes no affirmative primary obligation to go to war," that the Treaties of Locarno might call for police action but only against a nation which had "resorted to war in violation of its solemn pledge thereunder," that the adherence to the anti-war pact would add to the guarantee of peace and not interfere with the treaties of neutrality, that "there can be no question as a matter of law that violation of a multilateral anti-war treaty through resort to war by one party thereto would automatically release the other parties from their obligations to the treaty-breaking state," and that the "proposed multilateral anti-war treaty should be world-wide in its application," but that its enforcement could be made before it was accepted by all nations. The same note also invited Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, as well as the member States of the British Commonwealth of Nations, to join the six Powers already invited in signing the proposed multilateral treaty.

Thus clarified of ambiguity, the negotiations from then on progressed smoothly and rapidly. As far as Japan was concerned, the chief subject of the negotiations which followed related to a phrase in the first Article of the proposed draft treaty, namely, "in the names of their respective peoples." Under the Japanese Constitution, the treaty-making power rests with the Mikado and not with the people or their representatives. Necessarily, the clause "The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples" was inadmissible if it meant "as the agents of their peoples." The Japanese Government, therefore, proposed to the United States Government early in June either to amend it and make it clearer or delete it en-

tirely. The American explanation was that the phrase in question was synonymous with "on behalf of the people" and that it did not signify that the Mikado of Japan signed the treaty as an agent of his people. Washington also feared that the admission of an amendment to the draft treaty at that stage would jeopardize the treaty itself by opening it to further amendments by other Powers. The negotiations were concluded on July 16 by an exchange of notes in which the United States Government assured the Japanese Government that "the words 'in the names of their respective peoples' are synonymous with 'on behalf of the people'" and that "as under the Japanese Constitution the Emperor signs in his own name and not for his people, it is quite clear that this phrase cannot signify in Japan an agency of any kind."

With these preliminaries, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed at Paris on August 27, 1928. Count Uchida Yasuya, a member of the Privy Council and former Minister for Foreign Affairs, affixed his signature to that memorable document as the Japanese representative. On the same date, Washington addressed forty-eight other nations of the world to join the Pact of Paris, most of whom eventually signed the Pact.

There was rejoicing throughout the world, but the rejoicing was temporarily halted in Japan when the constitutional question arose again in ratifying the Pact of Paris. This was the same question which supplied the subject of the American-Japanese negotiations during the months of June and July. It was quickly settled in much the same way by the American-Japanese exchange of notes on July 16, and the Mikado ratified the Pact on July 24, 1929. By 1931, fifty-eight nations of the world joined this crusade against war.

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE

The Coolidge Naval Conference which was held at Geneva in 1927 ended in failure, but the Preparatory Com-

mission of the League of Nations continued its effort to draw up a draft treaty for general disarmament. The progress of the latter work also faced a deadlock late in 1928 due largely to the difference between the naval Powers, particularly the British-American differences over cruisers and the divergent methods of disarmament proposed by France on the one hand and Great Britain and the United States on the other. On April 22, 1929, Ambassador Hugh Gibson suggested methods for the adjustment of various contentions through a new approach based upon the adoption of the Pact of Paris. Thereupon the Preparatory Commission recommended that the naval Powers examine these proposals.

Meanwhile, President Herbert Hoover was inaugurated on March 4 and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald returned to power at the head of the second British Labor Government on May 30. These changes marked the beginning of new Anglo-American informal conversations throughout the summer months for the settlement of the cruiser controversy, the progress of which was dutifully communicated to the Japanese Ambassador in London by the British Prime Minister. The two Governments reached a provisional and informal agreement on general principles, namely, to make the Pact of Paris the starting point of new negotiations, to adopt the principle of parity in each of the several categories, to reconsider the battleship replacement programs provided for in the Washington Treaty of 1922, and to secure the total abolition of submarines. "In view of the scope of these discussions" they agreed to call a conference of the principal naval Powers. Accordingly, invitations were issued by the British Government to the United States, Japan, France, and Italy on October 7, 1929, for a naval conference to be held at London in January, 1930, "to consider the categories not covered by the Washington Treaty and to arrange for and deal with the questions covered by the second paragraph of Article 21 of that treaty.

As Japan was kept well informed of the progress of the Anglo-American conversations, Tokyo was already expect-

ing such an invitation and, on October 16, Ambassador Matsudaira in London forwarded an acceptance of the invitation by the Japanese Government, signifying its "entire concurrence in the desirability of the proposed Conference" and emphasizing the importance of carrying on preliminary discussions "on various questions that are to be laid before the Conference" through Anglo-Japanese informal conversations. The Japanese Government accordingly appointed former Premier Wakatsuki Reijiro to head the Japanese delegation and Ambassador Matsudaira Tsuneo and Admiral Takarabe Takeshi to assist him. The United States, France, and Italy also promptly accepted the invitation. Great Britain was to be represented by Prime Minister MacDonald himself and the United States by Secretary of State Henry M. Stimson.

Before the meeting of the Conference, the would-be participant Powers were engaged in preliminary conversations. The Anglo-American conversations culminated in the British Prime Minister's visit to Washington in October. The Hoover-MacDonald conversations thus instituted resulted in what came to be since known as the "Rapidan Agreement." It successfully adjusted the Anglo-American differences which wrecked the Geneva Conference in 1927 by allowing the British navy a superiority in small six-inch-gun cruisers and the United States in larger eight-inch-gun cruisers. More specifically, Great Britain agreed to abandon her demand for a total of seventy cruisers as she did at Geneva in 1927 and acquiesced, on certain conditions, to a minimum of fifty ships totalling 339,000 tons, while the United States asked for twenty-one eight-inch-gun cruisers and enough six-inch-gun ships to bring the total to 315,000 tons. Great Britain proposed eighteen instead of twenty-one large cruisers for the United States, but the final settlement of the differences of three ships was left to the conference at London. The Franco-Italian conversations revealed the usual rivalry between those two Powers. Italy declared her readiness to reduce her navy to any level, however low, providing that level was not exceeded by any other conti-

mental European Power, while France contended that naval parity with Italy would in fact mean inferiority as the French fleet must patrol three seas whereas the Italian fleet was confined to the Mediterranean. The French Government suggested a Mediterranean pact similar to the Four-Power Pacific Treaty of the Washington Conference as a possible solution of the regional problems, but the Franco-Italian issues remained still unsettled before the meeting in London. In her preliminary conversations with Great Britain and the United States, Japan vigorously maintained her claim for a ratio of ten-ten-seven in auxiliary surface crafts, but could not reach any pre-conference agreement.

With these preliminaries, the London Naval Conference involving the five principal naval Powers of the world convened in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords on January 21, 1930, and adjourned on April 22, 1930. The friendly and cooperative attitude of the Japanese Government toward this Five-Power Conference was voiced by Mr. Wakatsuki, Japan's chief delegate, in a short address on the opening day, but more clearly by Baron Shidehara, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his speech before the Diet on the same day. He pointed out the two-fold political significance of the Conference which he observed to be (1) the regulation of the respective naval strengths of the participating Powers "in such a way as at once to secure to each Power the integrity of its national defences and a reduction of naval expenditure, and to promote mutual relations of peace and friendship" and (2) the clear understanding of the "ratio of naval strength" which should be based, not on the thesis that the naval strength should decide "the position of each Power in the hierarchy of States," but on the practical necessity of making "defences secure against foreign invasion." "We offer no menace to any nation; we submit to menace from none," declared Baron Shidehara, and continued: "On that fundamental principle, it is our desire to secure a naval arrangement satisfactory to all parties concerned." He then dwelt upon "the magnitude of the task before the London Conference," but expressed his faith that,

just as "the Washington Conference opened a new chapter in the history of human progress," the same measure of achievement would result from the London Conference as the Geneva Conference had failed and as "the public opinion of the world is calling in sober earnest for the security and happiness of national life and for peace and friendship in international relations" and "the nations there represented can ill afford once more to disappoint this public demand." Baron Shidehara well reflected the Government's attitude as well as the public opinion of Japan at that time.

Without going into the details of the protracted negotiations which enlivened the Conference, it is sufficient to note here the two significant developments. First of all, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, after repeated failures for more than eight years following the Washington Conference, finally succeeded in composing their outstanding differences which had so far obstructed a new agreement, and signed a new tripartite naval treaty. Before this agreement was consummated, however, Japan contended for a ratio of seventy per cent with respect to the United States in eight-inch-gun cruisers, although she was willing to accept a lower ratio in smaller cruisers and destroyers. The final solution of the problem was made as a result of a series of private conversations between Ambassador Matsu-daira and Senator Reed, which covered several weeks, and of those between the heads of the Japanese, British, and American delegations, in the course of which various proposals were discussed. In the second place, France and Italy stood as far apart at the end as at the beginning of the Conference, France being unable to discover any basis for reducing her tonnage estimates without discussing security or a solution of the Italian claim for parity.

The concrete result of the London Naval Conference was written into the new treaty. The London Naval Treaty regulated the conditions which should prevail until the end of 1936, making it clear that the amount of naval strength to be allowed to each Power after that period should be discussed and determined at a conference to be held in 1935.

It stipulated an extension of the capital ship "holiday" until 1936, before which the five Powers agreed not to lay down battleships authorized for replacement under the Washington Treaty, while Great Britain, the United States, and Japan agreed to scrap or otherwise dispose of a total of nine battleships within thirty months, five by Great Britain, three by the United States, and one by Japan. It accepted the provisions of the Washington Treaty relating to aircraft carriers by amending the definition of an aircraft carrier to include ships under 10,000 tons used for this purpose and by requiring the carriers under 10,000 tons not to be armed with guns of a calibre larger than 6.1 inches. While the proposal failed to abolish submarines, the Treaty contained a humanitarian agreement under which the five Powers agreed to apply to submarines the recognized rules of international law which govern the action of surface vessels with respect to merchant ships. It also contained a series of regulatory agreements which included the rules for replacement, scrapping, and conversion of war vessels, and the definitions of what constituted special and exempt vessels.

By far the most important agreement of the Conference related to auxiliary crafts, which subject had vexed the Powers since the Washington Conference. Part III of the London Naval Treaty, which was signed only by Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, established the maximum tonnage levels, which might be reached but not exceeded by December 31, 1936, in the categories of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, a total of 526,200 tons for Great Britain, 541,700 tons for the United States, and 367,050 tons for Japan. In more details, it assigned to Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, respectively, 180,000 tons, 146,800 tons, and 108,400 tons in cruisers with guns of more than 6.1-inch calibre; 143,500 tons, 192,200 tons, and 100,450 tons in cruisers with guns of 6-inch calibre or less; 150,000 tons, 150,000 tons, and 105,500 tons in destroyers; and 52,700 tons in submarines for all.

The London Naval Treaty was duly ratified and exchanged by Japan as well as the other Powers. Baron Shi-

dehara, in his address before the Diet on April 25, 1930, said that the arrangements prescribed by the London Naval Treaty "have now made it possible for us to economize in our naval expenditure, while the safety of our national security is adequately assured for the duration of the Treaty." In answering the critics that the Treaty was forced upon Japan, Baron Shidehara pointed out the "absurdity" of such a view and declared: "Having carefully weighed all considerations, not only of foreign policy, but also of naval, financial, economic, and all the other factors of national strength upon which the security of the nation must, in the final analysis, depend, we were brought to the conclusion that in accepting the terms of the agreement arrived at we would decidedly be serving the real interests of this Empire." In defence of his conviction, he explained that the total amount of tonnage to be possessed by Japan would be approximately 50,000 tons less than her 1930 strength, but that the strength she should actually retain at the time of the 1935 Conference would not materially differ from that which Japan originally proposed, alike in the eight-inch-gun cruiser class and in the total tonnage of auxiliary crafts, whereas she acquired parity of strength with Great Britain and the United States in submarines although the tonnage was reduced considerably below the figure which Japan had originally proposed.

PART V

THE NEW DEAL IN JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER XX

THE SINO-JAPANESE CRISIS, 1931-33

THE re-orientation of Japan's policy *vis-à-vis* China after the Washington Conference increased, not friendship and cooperation as Japanese liberal leaders hoped, but China's effort to drive Japan out to the sea. The result was the Sino-Japanese crisis of 1931-33, leading up to the birth of a new nation and the establishment of a new era in the international relations of the Far East.

THE MANCHURIAN PHASE OF THE CRISIS

The storm had been gathering in Manchuria for years. Since Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang succeeded his father in 1928, the blackness of the impending storm increased. The Young Marshal built up an imposing empire on the strength of his armed forces for the support of which he squeezed the people to the limit. He purposely misinterpreted Baron Shidehara's conciliatory policy as a sign of weakness and adopted a deliberate policy of courting trouble with Japan by both ignoring and violating her treaty rights in Manchuria. We have already seen in a previous Chapter how these irritating incidents steadily mounted in number each year. He organized in the leading cities of Manchuria variously named agencies of propaganda such as the Foreign Affairs Associations and Northeastern Cultural Associations which carried on a systematic anti-Japanese agitation through pen and platform, while he sedulously propagated Japanophobia in his army. The Nanking Government wholeheartedly backed the procedure. And thus, by the autumn of 1931, Marshal Chang had wilfully transformed Manchuria

into a veritable powder magazine and only a small spark was needed to start an explosion. On the fateful night of September 18, 1931, the needed spark was supplied, ironically enough, by the Young Marshal's own troops and the Manchurian powder magazine exploded.

The incident, completely detached from its historical background, was in itself an insignificant event, at least to the world at large. To Japan, however, it was a daring invasion by the regular Chinese troops of the Japanese Railway Zone and a challenging climax to the Young Marshal's professed overt hostility toward Japan. If the Japanese railway guards were not to be overwhelmed by the Chinese army, twenty times their superior in numbers, it was absolutely necessary to act quickly and decisively even without waiting for instructions from the Tokyo authorities. Thus, the alarm was immediately given and the whole Japanese army in Manchuria was mobilized that night for self-defence.

The Japanese action to forestall the Chinese move and thereby to protect Japanese lives and property was quick and decisive. On September 19, the Japanese army occupied Mukden and Changchun, and by the following day they commanded Yingkow, Changtu, Liaoyang, Fushun, Antung, and all other strategic points along the South Manchuria Railway lines, while on September 21 they entered Kirin without firing a single shot. Then followed the most unwelcome task of keeping law and order over a wide area for the reason that the Chinese authorities had either taken to flight or had resigned, and the police force had disappeared. Moreover, Chinese irregulars and bandit bands began to prey upon the peaceful populations, both Japanese and Manchurian. Meanwhile, the Young Marshal re-established his headquarters at Chinchow and began to stir up trouble all over Manchuria, forcing the Japanese troops farther and farther afield, until by January 2, 1932, they had captured Chinchow and, eventually, all of Manchuria.

The Manchurian incident on September 18, both to Nanking and Tokyo, however, was a local incident capable of amicable adjustment. The Japanese military action was

taken merely to protect Japanese lives and property under fire of the Chinese army and to continue only until the incident could be settled through direct negotiations. Happily, the Shidehara-Soong rapprochement was in progress and a project of appointing a Sino-Japanese Joint Commission to study the cause of various Sino-Japanese difficulties and to find a solution for them was practically agreed upon. On September 19, Mr. T. V. Soong formally proposed such a course to Japan through Minister Shigemitsu. Two days later Baron Shidehara accepted this offer but, on September 23, Mr. Soong withdrew it on the ground that the Japanese military action had completely altered the situation. Meanwhile, Nanking appealed to the League of Nations, which immediately intervened, not to help bring about a peaceful settlement, but to aggravate the situation and to prolong the deadlock thus unnecessarily created.

The Japanese Government, at a special Cabinet meeting on September 19, decided to make all possible efforts to prevent the aggravation of the situation and instructed General Honjo, the Commander of the Manchurian Garrison, to that effect. On September 24 it issued the first official statement which described how the September 18th Incident was the climax of China's anti-Japanese policy in spite of Japan's friendly and conciliatory attitude and why 10,400 Japanese railway guards had to act swiftly against 220,000 Chinese troops "in order to forestall an imminent disaster." It then clarified the Japanese position in its concluding paragraph in the following sentences:

"It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbours no territorial designs in Manchuria. What we desire is that Japanese subjects shall be enabled safely to engage in various peaceful pursuits and be given the opportunity of participating in the development of that land by means of capital and labour. It is the proper duty of a government to protect rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the nation or individuals. The endeavours of the Japanese Government to guard the South Manchuria Railway against wanton attacks should be viewed in no other light. The Japanese Government, true to its established policy, is prepared to co-operate with the

Chinese Government in order to prevent the present incident from developing into a disastrous situation between the two countries and to work out such constructive plans as will once for all eradicate causes for future friction. The Japanese Government would be more than gratified if the present difficulty could be brought to a solution which will give a new turn to the mutual relations of the two countries."

THE LEAGUE AND THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS

Previously China had shown only a casual interest in the League of Nations, not even paying her membership dues from the first year of her affiliation, but on September 21 she appealed to it for action in the Manchurian crisis by virtue of Article XI of the Covenant. Accordingly, the Council naively proceeded to settle the complicated crisis under the said Article and held three sessions, September 22-30, October 12-23, and November 6-December 10. Those sessions became memorable, not in settling the crisis, but rather in deepening the deadlock between Japan and China. Japan was represented throughout those sessions by Mr. Yoshizawa Kenkichi, the Japanese Ambassador to France.

The main effort of the Council during those three sessions was directed first toward effecting the withdrawal of Japanese troops and then to institute Sino-Japanese negotiations under its supervision. In doing so, the Council, without taking into consideration the complicated historical background and peculiar local situations, swallowed the Chinese assurances and inadvertently tried, by the Resolutions of September 30 and October 23, to bring undue pressure upon Japan, irrespective of continued Chinese provocations and the dangerous situation confronting Japanese lives and property. Tokyo insisted upon direct Sino-Japanese negotiations without outside intervention first and then the gradual withdrawal of Japanese troops as the security of Japanese nationals could be guaranteed. These two opposing views were never successfully reconciled.

The Resolution of September 30, the only result of the first session, came nearest to sharing the Japanese view.

It accepted Japan's declaration that she had no territorial designs in China and her assurance to withdraw her troops as the security of nationals could be guaranteed as well as the assurances of both the Japanese and Chinese Governments not to extend the scope of the incident or to aggravate the situation, and requested the speedy execution of these undertakings and the reports by both parties regarding future developments. Naturally, Japan immediately accepted but China assented only reluctantly. This happy preliminary to an amicable settlement was marred by the ruthless activities of Chinese irregulars and the spread of anti-Japanese movements which provoked the Japanese military intervention farther afield, resulting on October 8 in a drive toward the Young Marshal's new headquarters at Chinchow.

The Council's efforts during its second session crystallized into another Resolution which was adopted on October 24 in spite of Japan's dissenting vote. It recommended the immediate and progressive withdrawal of Japanese troops before November 16, the supervision of the evacuated territory by the Chinese authorities in cooperation with the representatives of other Powers, and the initiation of Sino-Japanese negotiations. Japan's proposal for a conditional withdrawal without date was defeated by a vote of 13 to 1. The Resolution thus adopted by a majority vote, therefore, had all the appearance of an ultimatum aimed at Japan, but actually Japan's dissent had deprived it of the legal force since absolute unanimity was required for action to be taken under Article XI of the Covenant.

Two days later, Baron Shidehara communicated to the League a statement which enumerated the five "fundamental principles," upon the Chinese recognition of which Japan insisted. These "fundamental principles" were: (1) mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct; (2) respect for China's territorial integrity; (3) complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred; (4) effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits un-

dertaken by Japanese subjects; and (5) respect for the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria.

The same session of the Council was made most memorable by Washington's unconstitutional participation in its deliberations. Tokyo vigorously opposed on constitutional ground the proposal to invite the United States, a non-member State, to participate in its sessions. The Council, over Japan's dissenting vote although a unanimous vote is essential, issued its official invitation to the United States to designate a representative to sit with it as a signatory of the Pact of Paris. The Council failed, however, to invite the Soviet Union. Washington promptly accepted the invitation and Mr. Prentice B. Gilbert, the United States Consul-General at Geneva, took a seat at the Council table on October 16. He made it clear that he could not participate in the deliberations regarding the application of the machinery of the League Covenant. Tokyo still maintained that the procedure was irregular and unconstitutional and regarded the American action as an affront to Japan.

The chief event of the third session was the initiative which Japan took in proposing a Commission of Enquiry for the purpose of expediting the solution of difficulties. The Council took up the Japanese proposal favorably and eventually adopted the third Resolution on December 10. The most important provision of this Resolution was the creation of a Commission of Enquiry composed of five members "to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends." "Should the two parties initiate any negotiations," it was to be understood, "these would not fall within the scope of the terms of the Commission, nor would it be within the competence of the Commission to interfere with the military arrangements of either party."

THE AMERICAN POLICY ON THE
MANCHURIAN CRISIS

While the League of Nations was exerting its influence upon Japan and China in its effort to untangle Manchurian complications, the attitude of the United States attracted wide attention, largely because she was not a member of the League of Nations but her traditional interest in the Far East was too great to ignore the Sino-Japanese conflict. Placed in this difficult position, the American policy was naturally a combination of "independent" and "cooperative" policies.

The first pronouncement indicating the American concern in the Sino-Japanese crisis took the form of an independent procedure. On September 22, Washington despatched an identic Note to both Japan and China, reminding them of their obligations under the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty and urging the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of troops. Between that date and January 7, 1932, the State Department issued nine communications of similar contents, five of which were addressed to the Japanese Government alone. It was this independent policy which culminated in the vigorous pronouncement of January 7, 1932.

Before the latter date, however, Washington adopted the policy of cooperating with the League of Nations. Accepting the overture made by the Council on September 22, the State Department instructed Mr. Hugh R. Wilson, the United States Minister to Switzerland, to collaborate informally with the League activities, while Secretary of State Stimson, in a series of notes, assured the Council that Washington, acting independently through its diplomatic channels, was prepared to reinforce the League action. During the second session of the Council, this cooperative policy took the form of direct participation. As already noted, Washington readily accepted the invitation to send its representative to sit with the Council and appointed Mr. Prentice B. Gilbert, the United States Consul and the League

observer, to participate in the deliberations of the Council in so far as the Pact of Paris was involved. Tokyo uncompromisingly opposed the procedure on constitutional ground but withdrew its objection only after Secretary Stimson assured the Japanese Government that the American representative "is not expected to take a prominent part in the proceedings, but will be there mainly to keep his government informed." Mr. Gilbert then participated in four meetings of the Council beginning on October 16. This policy, presumably due to the fury it raised in Japan, was discontinued during the third session of the Council, but Secretary Stimson publicly endorsed the Council Resolution of December 10 which created the Commission of Enquiry. In the January sitting of the Council, Washington followed the procedure of allowing the British representatives to speak for the United States at the Council although the American representative was at the time in Geneva. All of this deeply offended Tokyo as the Japanese Government could not see why the United States, not a member of the League of Nations, should meddle officially with the League deliberations.

Further development in Manchuria after the adjournment of the Council induced Washington to return to its "independent" policy. Thus, on January 7, 1932, Secretary of State Stimson, without first securing the support of any other Power, despatched an identic Note to Japan and China. In that famous Note, closely following the verbage of the Bryan Note of 1915, Mr. Stimson declared that Washington "can not admit the legality of any situation *de facto* nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement . . . which may impair the treaty rights of the United States . . . and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris." The proclamation of this "non-recognition" doctrine was backed by the concentration of the entire United States fleet in the Pacific, where it remained throughout the year.

A strong feeling of resentment was evident everywhere in Japan, and Tokyo's reply was forwarded to Washington on January 16. It pointed out "that the present unsettled and distracted state of China was not contemplated by the high contracting parties at the time of the Treaty of Washington," and emphasized Tokyo's contention that the Nine-Power Treaty should be applied with due regard to the state of affairs from time to time prevailing in China. "It might be the subject of academic doubt," it claimed, "whether in a given case the impropriety of means necessarily and always voids the ends secured, but as Japan has no intention of adopting improper means that question does not arise." Ten days later, on January 26, Washington took an additional step in alienating Japanese confidence by publishing, without first obtaining Tokyo's consent, the entire text of its correspondence with Japan.

The strong policy thus proclaimed at Washington and backed by the fleet in the Pacific was further clarified by Secretary of State Stimson on August 8, 1932, in an address before the Council on Foreign Relations at New York, in the course of which he vigorously defended both the Pact of Paris and his "non-recognition" doctrine and by implication charged Japan with an open violation of the Pact of Paris. Since then, the State Department maintained a studied silence even when Japan finally recognized Manchoukuo and when the Lytton Report was published. It is needless to add, the stand thus taken by Washington, both cooperatively and independently, unnecessarily aroused and antagonized Tokyo.

THE SHANGHAI AFFAIR

Late in January, while the League of Nations was preparing to despatch the Commission of Enquiry to the Far East, the scene of difficulty suddenly shifted from Manchuria to Shanghai.

For some time the increasingly severe anti-Japanese agitation and boycott were threatening hostilities of a grave

nature at Shanghai. On January 9, the *Minkou Jihpao*, a local vernacular paper, insulted the Japanese Imperial House in a defiant article. This was followed on January 18 by mob violence perpetrated against five Japanese subjects, including two Buddhist priests, of whom three were seriously injured and one subsequently died. The Japanese Consul General, under instruction from Tokyo, immediately protested to the Mayor of Shanghai and demanded a formal apology, immediate punishment of guilty persons, payment of an indemnity, suppression of all anti-Japanese manifestations, and prompt dissolution of all anti-Japanese organizations. After the usual delay, Mayor Wu accepted the Japanese demands in their entirety on January 28.

Earlier on the same day, China's Nineteenth Route Army having "assumed a disquieting attitude and making a display of warlike preparations," the Municipal Council of the International Settlement declared a "state of emergency" and the troops of the several Powers were assigned to their respective posts in accordance with a plan previously drawn up by the International Settlement Defence Commission. The American and British troops immediately occupied the sections assigned to them. The commander of the Japanese forces to which had been assigned the north-eastern sector of the International Settlement and one of the so-called Extra-Settlement Road areas, including North Szechuen and Dixwell Roads and Hongkew Park within Chapei, served notice to the Chinese troops that he was about to take steps to protect the zone assigned to his forces and demanded a speedy removal of military works constructed by the Chinese troops in Chapei. The Chinese forces, not only failed to heed the notice, but fired upon the Japanese marines advancing to take up their assigned positions, compelling the latter "to take measures of defence." Thus was started the Shanghai phase of the Sino-Japanese dispute on January 28-29.

The Sino-Japanese clash thus made worse the already threatening situation in Shanghai. The fighting front stretched along the line from the Chapei district to the

Woosung Forts at the mouth of the Wampoo River. The armistice conference under the presidency of Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister to China, brought together General Gatson Wang and Dr. Wellington Koo for China and Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo and Mr. Matsuoka Yosuke for Japan, but failed to reach a settlement and on February 28 Lieutenant-General Uyeda Kenkichi sent an ultimatum to the commander of the Nineteenth Route Army to cease hostile acts and to retire to areas 20 kilometers from the International Settlement. The ultimatum went unheeded and hostilities continued until the Chinese forces at last withdrew to the requested distance on March 3.

Previous to this, on January 29, Dr. Yen Hui-ching, the Chinese Minister to the United States and the Chinese representative to the League Council, invoked Articles X and XV of the Covenant without derogating "the measures taken or which may be taken by the League in the exercise of its functions under Article XI." The proposal was discussed at length on the following day and the Council, over Japan's strong protest, proceeded for the moment to apply the first paragraph of Article XV. The Secretary-General accordingly proposed that the neutral Council members having representatives in Shanghai assist him by organizing a committee and by reporting to him on the causes and development of the Shanghai incident. The proposal was promptly accepted. Such a committee was immediately formed at Shanghai and made reports to the Council from time to time.

As the situation at Shanghai grew steadily worse, the Council held sessions on February 2, 9, 19, and 29, as a result of which, again over the Japanese protest, it referred, in accordance with Paragraph 9 of Article XV of the Covenant, the Sino-Japanese disputes to a special session of the Assembly which was called for March 3. When the Assembly met in an extraordinary session on March 3, Japan participated in its deliberations although her representative repeated the inapplicability of Article XV. The Assembly gave deaf ear to the Japanese protest, proceeded to assume

full jurisdiction over the dispute, and, on March 11, created a Committee of Nineteen, the functions of which were defined to be: "(1) to report as soon as possible on the cessation of hostilities and the definitive armistice at Shanghai; (2) to follow the execution of the resolutions of September 30 and December 10; (3) to prepare drafts of an agreement to be submitted to the Assembly to facilitate the exercise of its conciliatory functions for the settlement of the dispute under Paragraph 3, Article XV, and to propose, if necessary, resort to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion; (4) to prepare, if necessary, a draft report according to Paragraph 4, Article XV—i.e., a definitive proposal for the settlement of the dispute which could be approved by a majority vote, including members of the Council but excluding those of the disputants; and (5) to propose any urgent measure that might be necessary." The Assembly remained in session, ready to be convened at any time.

The Committee of Nineteen thus created was organized under the presidency of M. Hymans of Belgium with the twelve neutral members of the Council and the six members elected by the Assembly, namely, the representatives of Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Portugal, Hungary, and Sweden. The Japanese representative challenged its authority to interfere in the armistice negotiations at Shanghai, but the Committee assumed supervision of the negotiations and insisted that the terms of the armistice should be in accord with the principles of the Resolutions of March 4 and 11. The truce parley at Shanghai under the presidency of Sir Miles Lampson, however, failed and the direct Sino-Japanese negotiations succeeded in reaching a provisional agreement by April 30 and the Armistice on May 5.

The Armistice provided for the definitive cessation of hostilities. The Chinese troops were to remain in their existing positions pending later arrangements, while the Japanese troops were to withdraw to the position which they held before the clash on January 28. A mixed commission,

including neutral representatives, was to supervise the evacuation and arrange for the transfer of the evacuated area to the Chinese police. The territory thus evacuated became in effect a demilitarized zone for an indefinite period of time as the Chinese forces were forbidden to enter therein "pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions."

As to the Manchurian phase of the dispute, the Committee of Nineteen wisely refrained from initiating any action until the Commission of Enquiry had made its report.

THE BIRTH OF MANCHOUKUO

Meanwhile, a momentous movement was taking place in Manchuria. When the Japanese railway guards answered the armed challenge of the Chinese soldiers on September 18, they little suspected that they were unconsciously releasing the irresistible force of a hitherto suppressed independence movement which was destined to result in the formation of a new political entity in Manchuria.

The independence movement in Manchuria had been nourished over the years by the interactions of several factors. Foremost among those factors was the revolt against the deceptive grandeur of the Chang war-lordism which was built up at the expense of the people and was characterized by maladministration and corruption. Then there was a strong general desire to keep Manchuria out of the politico-military turmoil of China proper, which spirit came to be popularly expressed as "Pao-chin An-min," signifying "Peace within Borders and Security for Inhabitants" or more broadly "Manchuria for Manchurians," and was championed by such men like Dr. Chao Hsin-po of Feng Yung University. Equally strong was the aspiration of the Manchu followers to restore the Manchu power at least in Manchuria, the cradle of the Manchu Dynasty.

With such a background, the quick disappearance of responsible authorities was quickly followed by the organization of local vigilance committees and the eventual pro-

clamation of independence by various local leaders. By the time the Chang authority in Manchuria was completely broken up and driven across the Great Wall after the capture of Chinchow on January 2, 1932, the leaders of various factions became convinced of the wisdom of joining hands in a united effort to seize the opportunity to establish a new state for the whole of Manchuria. In the furtherance of this movement to unite various local groups, the most effective agency was found in the "Tzuchi-Chihtao-Pu" or "Self-government Guidance Board" which was first organized at Mukden in November under the presidency of Yu Ching-han but which gradually spread its activities beyond Fengtien Province.

Started by such irresistible forces and nurtured by such determined agencies, the independence movement took a new turn early in 1932 and culminated into a conference of leaders, which took place at Mukden on February 16-17. The "Big Seven" of the Manchurian independence movement were Tsang Shih-yi, the Governor of Fengtien Province; Lieutenant-General Hsi Hsia, the Governor of Kirin Province; Chang Ching-hui, the Governor of Harbin Official District; Chi Wang Kuei Foo, representing the Mongol Banners of the Chirimu League; Ling Sheng, representing the Barga District of Inner Mongolia; and General Ma Chan-shan. General Tang Yu-ling, the Governor of Jehol Province, was absent though he advised the conference of his whole-hearted support. On the last day of the conference, they resolved (1) to establish a new state comprising the several provinces and special districts in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and (2) to institute the "North-Eastern Administrative Committee" to study and formulate the basic principles of the new state and to organize its government. As a result, the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed on February 18 and the "Big Seven" constituted themselves the "North-Eastern Administrative Committee."

Events then unfolded themselves in quick succession. On February 25, the Committee issued an outline of the draft organic law of the projected new State which was to

be known as "Manchoukuo" or the "State of Manchuria." Changchun, renamed Hsinking or "New Capital," was chosen as the seat of the new Government and "Tatung" was designated as the name of the new era. On March 1, it issued a proclamation apprising the world of the establishment of the new State and officially severed the relationship with China. Eight days later, on March 9, His Excellency Pu Yi, the deposed Manchu Emperor, was inaugurated as Chief Executive and Chang Hsiao-hsu as Prime Minister. Three days later, Foreign Minister Hsieh Chieh-shih cabled the Governments of seventeen countries which were then represented in Manchuria by consular officials, advising them of the advent of Manchoukuo and asking them to open formal diplomatic relations with her.

The new Government at Hsinking, on the very first day of its statehood, defined its aims as well as its foreign and commercial policies in a proclamation, the substance of which was as follows :

1. Pressed by the trend of the times, the Manchuria State is founded in obedience to the aspirations of thirty million people, who have for years been trampled under the autocratic rule of self-seeking militarists, who wish to be governed on the principle of racial self-determination, and to live independent of the Republic of China.

2. The fundamental aim of the Government is to guarantee the life and property of the people; to administer justice with improved laws; to advance the self-government principle; and to encourage industries by reforming a chaotic currency system.

3. The foreign policy of the State will be based on mutual sincerity and friendship with other states by observing international usages. All obligations for foreign loans secured by treaty agreement previously concluded by the Republic of China, if such obligations belong to the territory of the new State, shall be recognized in conformity with international usage.

4. The State will develop commerce and industry and be ready to welcome foreign investment, regardless of nationality, in pursuance of the principle of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity.

5. The principle of racial equality shall be adhered to, and Manchurian, Chinese, and Mongolian natives, Korean and Japanese inhabitants, and residents of other nationalities in the Manchuria State shall be accorded equal treatment."

With all of these actions and underlying principles the Japanese Government was thoroughly sympathetic and had cooperated with the leaders of Manchuria before March 1 and with the Manchoukuo Government after that date. This was natural. Japan had taken drastic action in the face of China's armed infringement of her acquired rights in Manchuria and was willing to let any government in Manchuria function as long as that primary object was respected by it. Count Uchida Yasuya, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, officially clarified this spirit of cooperation before the Diet on August 25, 1932, and emphasized the fact that Manchoukuo was organized "as a result of the separatist movement within China herself," that "the Nine-Power Treaty does not forbid all separatist movements in China or debar the Chinese in any part of the country from setting up of their free will an independent state," thus disclaiming the alleged violation of that treaty, and that "I hardly need to waste words once more disclaiming at this juncture any territorial designs on our part in Manchuria or anywhere else."

Under the circumstances, the Japanese Government sent General Muto Nobuyoshi to Hsinking as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and began negotiations with Manchoukuo for her recognition. The result was the Protocol which was signed on September 15. Japan recognized Manchoukuo "as an independent State," and Manchoukuo agreed "to confirm and respect" "all rights and interests possessed by Japan or her subjects within the territory of Manchoukuo by virtue of Sino-Japanese treaties, agreements, or other arrangements." Furthermore, Japan and Manchoukuo, "recognizing that any threat to the territory or the peace and order of one of the High Contracting Parties constitutes at the same time a threat to the safety and existence of the other," agreed "to cooperate in the maintenance of their national security," the latter permitting

“such Japanese forces as may be necessary for this purpose” to be stationed in Manchoukuo. And thus Japan went on record as the first country to recognize Manchoukuo, the new State in the Far East.

THE LYTTON COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY

The Japanese proposal for the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry was authorized by the Council on December 10, 1931, and the President of the Council proceeded upon the difficult and delicate task of selecting its members. After a month of careful negotiations, he was successful in securing a panel which was acceptable to both Japan and China and which was approved by the Council on January 14, 1932.

The Commission of Enquiry thus created consisted of the Earl of Lytton of Great Britain, who served as chairman, Count Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti of Italy, General Henri Claudel of France, Major-General Frank Ross McCoy of the United States, and Dr. Heinrich Schnee of Germany. The Secretary General of the League designated M. Robert Haas, a Director in the League Secretariat, to act as Secretary-General of the Commission, while seven experts, including three Americans, were assigned to assist the Commission as its technical advisers. The Japanese and Chinese Governments appointed as their assessors, respectively, Mr. Yoshida Isaburo, the Japanese Ambassador to Turkey, and Dr. Wellington Koo, former Prime Minister of China.

The Lytton Commission of Enquiry arrived at Tokyo on February 29 and at Shanghai on March 14. It concentrated its investigation from March 14 to April 19 in China and from April 20 to June 4 in Manchuria. Then it retired to Peiping, where, except for a few conferences with the Chinese officials and a hurried visit to Tokyo, it addressed itself to the responsible task of analysing the voluminous documentary materials in the light of their observations and writing its report. As a result, the “Report of the Commission of Enquiry,” a document of 100,000 words, with a

voluminous appendix, was signed at Peiping on September 23, and published on October 1. Besides this final report, the Commission had made two preliminary reports, one from Shanghai and the other from Mukden.

While the Lytton Report frankly recognized "that the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be" and that "only an intimate knowledge of all facts, as well as of their historical background, should entitle any one to express a definite opinion upon them," it nevertheless delivered two stern verdicts against Japan's contentions which eventually caused it to be rejected by the Japanese. In the first place, the Report ruled that the Japanese military operations during the night of September 18 "cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence." "In saying this," it qualified, "the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought that they were acting in self-defence." In the second place, it contended that the independence movement in Manchuria was "only made possible by the presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials, both civil and military" and that, "for this reason, the present regime cannot be considered to have been called into existence by a genuine and spontaneous independence movement."

The Lytton Report then brushed aside both the restoration of *status quo ante* and the maintenance of Manchoukuo, as "unsatisfactory" and proposed a settlement which should fully recognize Japan's rights and interests in Manchuria and should secure to Manchuria a large measure of autonomy under the Chinese sovereignty. It recommended an effective local gendarmerie to secure internal order and the withdrawal of all other armed forces, an economic rapprochement between Japan and China, and international cooperation in the internal reconstruction of China. As to the practical procedure, it suggested the summoning of an advisory conference, consisting of representatives of the Japanese and Chinese Governments and two delegations representing the local population, to be selected in a manner

to be prescribed respectively by the Japanese and Chinese Governments together with neutral observers as agreed by the parties for the purpose of establishing a special regime for the administration of Manchuria. The Advisory Conference thus constituted should negotiate for the establishment of an autonomous government for Manchuria, which however, would remain under the sovereignty of China. It should then effect the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese treaty dealing with Japanese interests, a Sino-Japanese treaty of conciliation and arbitration as well as non-aggression and mutual assistance, and a Sino-Japanese commercial treaty.

JAPAN AND THE LYTTON REPORT

The attitude of the Japanese Government toward the Lytton Report was clearly stated in the "Observations of the Japanese Government on the Report of the Commission of Enquiry" which was presented to the Council on November 21, 1932. The most important portion of the Observations, besides brief observations on "China" and "Manchuria," concerned the Lytton Commission's adverse verdicts upon the Japanese military action and the birth of Manchoukuo.

On the first point, the Observations maintained that the operations which was commenced on the night of September 18 "had no relation to anything but self-defence, and the Japanese Government cannot allow either their necessity or their appropriateness to be the subject of dispute." In support of this stand, the Observations quoted the Kellogg reservation to the Pact of Paris on self-defence to the effect that the right of self-defence is "inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty," that "every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions" to resort to it and that "it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defence," and the United States Senate reservation that "the exercise of the right of self-defence may, and frequently does, extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction

of the State exercising it." It then gave extracts from the British, French, German, and Japanese communications which supported the Kellogg reservation, the Japanese note of May 26, 1928, stating that "the proposal of the United States is understood to contain nothing that would refuse to independent States the right of self-defence." In the face of these reservations and after recounting the menacing situations with which the Japanese railway guards were confronted on the night of September 18, the Observations challenged the propriety of the Lytton Commission's verdict by maintaining that "the right to pronounce a decisive opinion on an act of self-defence falls solely within the sovereign appreciation of the interested state" and that "no one except the officers on the spot could possibly be qualified to judge whether or not the action undertaken by the Japanese army was a measure of self-defence."

On the establishment of Manchoukuo, the Observations first of all pointed out how, in the light of the events recounted, the conclusion of the Lytton Commission "run[s] counter to the historic elements which underlie the new regime, to the psychological and material causes which have called forth the surge of latent sentiments, and to all the facts which go to prove the spontaneous character of the independence movement among the people of Manchuria, which has had for its result the foundation of the new State." In proof thereof, it presented in detail the existence of the independence movement in Manchuria prior to September, 1931, the widespread dissatisfaction against and the determination to get rid of the Chang misrule in particular, the movement for the restoration of the Manchu dynasty, and the organization of local vigilance committees by the Chinese leaders which were vitally needed when the former Chinese authorities disappeared and which supplied the nucleus for the eventual organization of a new regime, and the general attitude of the inhabitants toward Manchoukuo. It then indicated the optimistic prospect of "a brilliant future" as against the Lytton Commission's pessimistic prophecies by describing the phenomenal progress which the

new State had made in various fields and defined Japan's relationship with Manchoukuo by referring to the Protocol of September 15, 1932, by which the Japanese Government officially recognized Manchoukuo as an independent State and under which the Japanese-Manchoukuoan alliance was effected. In connection with the latter development, the Observations declared "that nothing in this Protocol, nor in the acts of Japan in cooperating with the new government thus established, is inconsistent with any of the public engagements of this country," including the Nine-Power Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In conclusion, the Observations showed that the fundamental thesis of the Lytton Commission, namely, the non-recognition of Manchoukuo, could not solve the complex problems, especially when Manchoukuo was making such steady progress; that most of the suggestions offered by the Lytton Commission were "too refined and intricate" that "they might prove suitable if applied in Europe or America but would not prove adaptable to the realities of the Far East as they at present exist"; that Japanese Government cannot persuade themselves that "the suggestion of demilitarizing Manchuria, maintaining peace and order there by a special international gendarmerie alone, would adapt itself to the realities of the situation," as "it would make matters worse than the restoration of the *status quo ante*" which was rejected by the Commission itself; and that the suggestions of the Lytton Commission cannot be practically applied, in the words of the Lytton Commission itself, "without a strong central government in China," but that there would be no assurance of such a strong central government in China, even under international control, and that "Japan cannot idly wait for such an uncertain eventuality in order to solve the Manchurian question."

THE LEAGUE AND THE LYTTON REPORT

The formal hearing on the Lytton Report was scheduled for November 1. It was postponed two weeks and then

again for an additional week at the request of Japan to allow her adequate time for the preparation and publication of her official reply. The Council finally met on November 21 and immediately took up the consideration of the Lytton Report. It was to this historic session that Tokyo sent as its chief representative Mr. Matsuoka Yosuke, a former Vice-President and later President of the South Manchuria Railway Company, while Nanking named Dr. Wellington Koo, a former diplomat and the Chinese assessor who assisted the Lytton Commission.

On that memorable day, November 21, the Council once more saw the representatives of the Japanese and Chinese Governments pitted against each other, this time over the Lytton Report. Mr. Matsuoka forcefully outlined the motivations, justifications, and defences of the Japanese actions in the Manchurian crisis and stressed the reasons why Tokyo found the conclusions and recommendations of the Lytton Commission to be absolutely unacceptable. He reiterated at length the main arguments contained in Japan's "Observations," especially Japan's resort to military action in self-defence and the spontaneous independence movement which culminated in the establishment of Manchoukuo. Dr. Koo used all the art of oratory and rhetoric for which he is famous in again accusing Japan of being a devil and making an angel out of China.

The hearing continued, one fiery session after another, until November 25, when the Council moved to refer the Lytton Report to the Assembly. Japan at first opposed the move but subsequently agreed to conform "as a matter of conciliatory procedure" though maintaining her reservations that the Assembly had no jurisdiction to act on the Manchurian case under Article XV.

A special session of the Assembly was then convoked and met on December 6. Dr. Yen Hui-ching spoke for China while Mr. Matsuoka continued to defend the Japanese cause. After an extended debate in which various members participated, the Assembly, on December 9, referred the whole issue to a Conciliation Committee of Nineteen, requesting it

to report as soon as possible with proposals for settlement. This Committee created, on December 15, a Negotiation Committee by adding to the existing Committee of Nineteen the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union and instructing it to report by March 1 on its negotiations. The new Committee was specifically instructed that, while "not anticipating the return of the *status quo ante* in Manchuria," the maintenance of the present administration and the recognition of Manchoukuo "cannot be considered as settling the Manchurian question." Japan, of course, disapproved the entire procedure and requested the deletion of the proposal for a settlement based upon the Lytton Report, the exclusion of the United States and the Soviet Union from the Committee, and the modification of references to the non-recognition of Manchoukuo. On December 20, the Committee of Nineteen voted a recess over the holidays, to reconvene on January 16.

During the interval, Sir Eric Drummond was entrusted with the task of conciliating the Chinese and Japanese Governments. One result of this task was the evolution of the Drummond-Sugimura plan for a possible revision of the draft resolution which was then being reconsidered with a view to eliminating the features most objectionable to the Japanese Government. It was presented by the Secretariat to the Committee of Nineteen on the eve of the Committee's meeting and featured the following proposals: (1) limitation of the composition of the final Conciliation Committee to the representatives of five great member Powers; (2) avoidance of naming the United States, though the possibility of her participation was not excluded; (3) limitation of the authority and power of the Conciliation Committee to "aiding" the basic settlement of the dispute by encouraging the direct Sino-Japanese negotiations though the term itself was to be avoided; and (4) deletion of any statement actually committing the League of Nations to the non-recognition of Manchoukuo and the placing of blame upon Japan.

When the Committee of Nineteen met on January 16, however, the prospects for a settlement were again con-

spicuous by their absence. It formally rejected on January 21 the Drummond-Sugimura plan, decided on the following day to invoke Paragraph 4 of Article XV, and appointed a new Subcommittee of Nine to draw up a statement of facts to be used as a basis for definite recommendations for the settlement of the dispute. This Subcommittee presented to the Committee of Nineteen on February 1 its report which was formally adopted on February 14 by the Committee of Nineteen. In this report, a summary of the whole course of dispute was followed by the recommendations which included the non-recognition of Manchoukuo and the establishment of "a government compatible with Chinese sovereignty," the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the Railway Zone and the strict observance of the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty in the future, the constitution of a League Negotiations Commission with the United States and the Soviet Union participating, and an invitation to Japan and China to name representatives empowered to carry on direct negotiations before the said Commission.

While these developments were taking place at Geneva, the Japanese Government was gradually preparing itself to meet the inevitable. Japan's possible withdrawal from the League of Nations had been discussed extensively for some time. When the Committee of Nineteen decided to invoke Paragraph 4 of Article XV and appointed a Subcommittee of Nine to draw up its report to the Assembly, Tokyo bluntly announced that Japan would sever her relations with the League of Nations in the event the League pursued such a procedure. When the Committee of Nineteen made its report and recommendations to the Assembly, therefore, the Saito Cabinet voted unanimously on February 20 to withdraw from the League of Nations if the report was adopted, and instructed its representative at Geneva accordingly.

At Geneva, the Assembly received the Report of the Committee of Nineteen on February 21. In a statement issued on that day, the Japanese delegation again summarized the Japanese stand and called "the serious attention of the members of the League to the gravity of the action that

they proposed to take" by pointing out five points upon which the Draft Report signally failed to find the way toward a fair settlement of the Manchurian situation. The Assembly, however, adopted the Report unanimously on February 24. In a dramatic protest against this action which the Japanese believed to be arbitrary and most irrational, the Japanese delegation walked out of the Assembly. This dramatic action was preceded by Mr. Matsuoka's brief statement in which, among other things, he declared:

"The Japanese Government now find themselves compelled to conclude that Japan and the other Members of the League entertain different views on the manner to achieve peace in the Far East and the Japanese Government are obliged to feel that they have now reached the limit of their endeavours to cooperate with the League of Nations in regard to the Sino-Japanese differences."

JAPAN'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE LEAGUE

The dramatic withdrawal of the Japanese delegation from the Assembly on February 24 was in accordance with the decision already reached at an emergency session of the Tokyo Cabinet three days previously. Foreign Minister Count Uchida immediately announced that the course of action at Geneva had been decided upon after long and careful deliberation, but that the Government would not take any rash step in terminating its official relations with the League of Nations, and that the final action would only be carried out as future events dictated.

Two weeks were then required to make the necessary arrangements and the Cabinet, on March 8, sent to the Privy Council in draft form the proposed permanent resignation from the League of Nations. The Privy Council was in perfect accord, but deliberated upon the propriety of the procedure with unusual care and formally approved the proposal in the Tenno's presence on March 27. The Tenno immediately issued an Imperial Edict, announcing Japan's official resignation from the League of Nations but emphasizing

that Japan intended to continue her international cooperation in the interest of peace even after her withdrawal from the League. Count Uchida transmitted Japan's formal notification to Sir Eric Drummond at Geneva.

In that historic document, Count Uchida first of all recalled how the mission of Japan "to insure peace in the Orient and thereby to contribute to the cause of peace throughout the world is identical in spirit with the mission of the League," and how Japan, as an original member of the League and a permanent member of its Council, had "extended a full measure of cooperation with her fellow-members towards the attainment of its high purpose." He then maintained that, ever since the Sino-Japanese dispute had been submitted to the League, it had been the Japanese contention that a fair and equitable settlement of the issue required a complete grasp of actual conditions in the Far East, especially the abnormal and exceptional features of chaotic and disorganized China, and the application of the Covenant of the League in accordance with these conditions, but that the majority of the members of the League failed either to grasp these realities or to face them by taking all the facts into proper account. Because of this fundamental difference of attitude arose "serious differences of opinion between Japan and the other Powers concerning the application of various international obligations," and consequently the Report adopted by the Assembly incorporated "gross errors both in the ascertainment of facts and in the conclusions deduced." "By refusing to acknowledge the actual circumstances that led to the foundation of Manchoukuo, and by attempting to challenge the position taken by Japan in recognizing the new State," he continued, "it cuts away the ground for stabilization of the Far Eastern situation. Nor can the terms laid down in its recommendations ever be of any possible service in securing enduring peace in these regions." He then charged that "the League have attached greater importance to upholding inapplicable formulae than to the real task of assuring peace, and higher value to the vindication of academic theses than to the eradication of

the sources of future conflict." "For these reasons," he announced, "the Japanese Government has been led to realize the existence of an irreconcilable divergence of views, dividing Japan and the League on policies of peace" and leaving "no room for further cooperation." And thus Count Uchida served official notice of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations.

Under the Covenant of the League of Nations, such a withdrawal becomes effective only after two years. On March 28, 1935, therefore, Japan's official relations with the League of Nations came to an end, but her cooperation with various special agencies such as the International Labor Office still continues.

As to the question of the Japanese mandate over the Pacific Islands, Tokyo insisted that Japan's withdrawal from the League in no way affected that power. The Privy Council approved this policy on March 17, 1933, and the Foreign Office referred it to the various Japanese Embassies on April 2 for transmission to the governments of the Powers. Two days later, the Governor of the mandated Islands announced to the inhabitants that the Japanese mandatory position remains unchanged by her withdrawal from the League. The Council of the League, eventually on January 10, 1935, recognized the continuation of Japan's mandatory power.

THE TANGKU TRUCE

The last phase of the Sino-Japanese conflict centered around Jehol Province. On January 1, 1933, fighting broke out again at Shanhaikuan and the city fell before the combined Japanese and Manchoukuoan forces two days later. The drive on Jehol Province thus precipitated, culminated in the capture on March 4 of Chengteh, its capital, without a shot being fired. Within a fortnight, all Chinese resistance in Jehol collapsed and the Chinese forces were driven south of the Great Wall. This new disaster completely broke up Marshal Chang's strength and ended his usefulness to the

Nanking Government. The Young Marshal's resignation followed and was accepted on March 10, and General Ho Ying-chin, the Minister of War under General Chiang Kai-shek, succeeded him. Then followed the Japanese drive south of the Great Wall, which continued until May 22, when a preliminary truce was arranged between Huang Fu, the head of the civil government in North China, and Mr. Nakamura Shoichi, the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires at Peiping. On May 31, a formal armistice was signed by the representatives of the Tokyo and Nanking Governments at Tangku. Thus ended the military action which had started at Mukden on September 18, 1931.

The Tangku Truce contained no political provisions as it was largely military in its nature. It created a neutral demilitarized zone over a wide area between the Great Wall and an irregular line from Lutai through Tungchow to Yenching. All Chinese troops were required to withdraw south of this area, and a Chinese police force was to be organized to assume the responsibility of maintaining order within the demilitarized area, after which the Japanese army would voluntarily retire to the Great Wall. There was no time limit set for the Japanese withdrawal.

ENFORCING THE NON-RECOGNITION DOCTRINE

The Assembly of the League of Nations had taken a momentous step on February 24 in adopting the drastic report of its Manchurian Committee. On the following day, the Council, accordingly, took first steps in making operative the recommendation for dealing with the Manchurian impasse by extending invitation to the United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate in the work of the Committee of Nineteen. The Soviet Government, in a note of March 7, refused to participate in such a procedure on the ground that it would be futile to collaborate with hostile Powers as thirteen of the twenty-two nations named on the Committee had not recognized the Soviet Union. At Washington, the action was delayed on account of the change of administra-

tion and the Roosevelt Administration, on March 13, notified the League of its willingness to cooperate with the understanding that the participation of the United States be interpreted to mean the maintenance of "informative contact" rather than full membership in the Committee and that the United States reserved the right to take independent action in Far Eastern affairs. Two days later, the League's Manchurian Committee named subcommittees to carry out its mandate. One of the subcommittees was to deal with the question of an arms embargo in the Far East and the other to study the practical application of the principle of non-recognition of Manchoukuo.

The second step was taken on June 7 when the League's Far Eastern Advisory Committee addressed a circular letter to all nations and recommended certain measures to carry out the policy of non-recognition. This procedure was recommended by the Non-Recognition Subcommittee which submitted its report on June 2. The circular letter urged, not only the abstention from diplomatic *de jure* recognition, but also the exclusion of Manchoukuo from all international conventions such as postal, telegraph, and radio, the refusal to accept her currency in the world exchange market, the refusal to honor her passports, and the refusal to accept her postage stamps for international carriage. The recommendations also included more indirect procedures: that consuls in Manchuria might be replaced but that they should avoid actions which might be interpreted as a recognition of the local regime; that each government should decide for itself whether it was desirable to call the attention of its nationals to the special risks attendant on acceptance of concessions or appointments in Manchuria; and that the export of opium and other dangerous drugs to Manchuria against import certificates issued by Manchoukuo should be permitted but that, in order to avoid even implied recognition, the government of the exporting country should not send a copy of its export authorization to Manchoukuo.

To make these procedures effective, the Subcommittee recommended the transmission of circular letters to all

nations concerned, suggesting their general accession to these terms of procedure. On June 7, the Manchurian Advisory Committee approved the text of the recommended circular letter and appealed to all nations to cooperate with the League in making the concrete application of the non-recognition and the outlawry of Manchoukuo effective through their participation in the recommended procedures.

It was a curious irony of history that, in spite of such international non-recognition, Manchoukuo steadily grew, showing a wholesome growth in every branch of her national activities and all non-recognition plans merely existed as paper plans.

CHAPTER XXI

THE NEW DEAL IN JAPANESE DIPLOMACY

THE re-orientation of Japan's foreign policy during the third decade of the present century, executed with untold sacrifices, bore most disappointing results in the Far East. It precipitated the Sino-Japanese crisis which revolutionized once more the outlook for Japan by giving birth to Manchoukuo and by forcing the Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations. On the other hand, Japan's phenomenal trade expansion was arousing national protective consciousness everywhere and Japan faced a gloomy future of looming international trade wars. Moreover, the evident failure of international disarmament conferences was steadily increasing the possibility of an approaching "crisis of 1935-36." This new international outlook became, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Hirota, the basis of a new deal in Japanese diplomacy.

THE HIROTA DIPLOMACY

The outlook for Japan's international relations was none too bright when Mr. Hirota Koki was inducted into the Tokyo Foreign Office on September 14, 1933. But the new Foreign Minister accepted the responsible task before him and soon offered a new program for Japanese diplomacy. Brushing aside the militant dogma of "Japan-against-the-world" as perilous and costly, Foreign Minister Hirota stressed the policy of cooperation and conciliation much as Baron Shidehara had done during the preceding decade. The Hirota diplomacy, however, was characterized by an adroit aggressiveness in anticipating and preventing trouble-

some problems rather than waiting for those issues to rise. Indeed, the secret of his diplomacy seems to have been his ability to take the initiative in smoothing out differences with the Powers and thereby forestalling all possible, and oftentimes imaginary, tensions in Japan's international relations.

The pivot around which the Hirota diplomacy has revolved, and is still revolving, is naturally the sound development of Manchoukuo. The Foreign Minister wisely founded this policy on the impregnable Imperial Rescript of March 27, 1933, which officially announced Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations and which advised the nation "to respect the independence of the New State [Manchoukuo] and to encourage its healthy development in order that the source of evil in the Far East may be eradicated and an enduring peace thereby established." It was this fundamental conviction which prompted him to exert all possible efforts in assisting Manchoukuo's struggling growth. "While we must safeguard our rights and interests in Manchoukuo," he declared before the Prefectural Governors' Conference on May 5, 1934, "we should be extremely careful not to commit any act which may in any way weaken the independence of the country, because such act is in direct contravention of our policy."

The necessary corollary to this policy was the assumption of responsibility for keeping the peace in East Asia. "We should not forget for a moment," he announced in his first address before the Diet on January 23, 1934, "that Japan, serving as the only corner-stone for the edifice of the peace of East Asia, bears the entire burden of responsibilities. It is this important position and these vast responsibilities in which Japan's diplomacy and national defence are rooted. Our national defence is organized in its very nature for defensive and self-protective purposes. At the same time our diplomacy has no claims to put forth save what is legitimate and rational and consonant with our national mission." Again on May 4, 1934, addressing the Governors' Conference, Mr. Hirota called "the maintenance of peace

and order" in East Asia the basic obligation which "Japan must bear in common with other East Asiatic States." "The very significance of Japan's existence as a great power lies essentially in our awareness and acceptance of this mission." It was this pronounced policy which the Western critics definitely styled Japan's "Monroe Doctrine" for Asia.

To realize this ideal the stabilization of China and the rehabilitation of Sino-Japanese cooperation were essential and the Hirota policy was designed to attain those ends. Mr. Hirota emphasized the urgent need of cooperation for the peaceful development of East Asia before the Diet on January 23, 1934. "Should China appreciate our true motives and give tangible signs of sincerity on her part," he ventured to announce, "Japan would be glad to reciprocate and meet her more than half way in a spirit of good-will." It was this phase of the Hirota diplomacy which sought to win back Nanking's confidence in order that satisfactory solution of all outstanding difficulties might be reached.

The Hirota regime, needless to add, avowed the maintenance of friendly relations with all Powers, especially with Japan's other two closest neighbors, the Soviet Union and the United States. Mr. Hirota's faith in diplomacy as a means of improving Soviet-Japanese relations was slowly but steadily justified. The successful conclusion of the transfer of the North Manchuria Railway to Manchoukuo through his good offices and the subsequent initiation of negotiations for the solution of pending questions clearly pointed the hopeful direction toward which the vacillating Soviet-Japanese relations were travelling under his guiding hands. On the other hand, his faith in American-Japanese cooperation across the Pacific found its first direct expression in his personal message to Secretary of State Hull on February 21, 1934. He took the occasion of the appointment of Mr. Saito Hiroshi as the Japanese Ambassador to Washington to assure Secretary Hull that "no question exists between our two countries that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution." Even in the field of commercial relations, he pointed out "that each supplies what the

other wants, that they are good customers of each other's products, and that they are strengthening their relation of interdependence year after year." The same sentiment was reciprocated by Secretary Hull in his note of March 3, 1934. Again on March 31, 1934, on the eightieth anniversary of the conclusion of the first American-Japanese Treaty of Amity, Foreign Minister Hirota issued a statement in which he pointed out that the foundation of the traditional friendship between the two countries "is increasing in firmness and solidity," and expressed his conviction "that our two countries, close neighbors across the Pacific, are bound to cooperate economically and culturally, and that the continued cooperation must powerfully contribute, as in the past, to the peace and prosperity of the entire world."

It should be added also that the new deal in Japanese diplomacy assigned an important place to cultural diplomacy in bringing about a better understanding of Japanese motives through an appreciation of Japan's cultural heritage. For this purpose the International Cultural Promotion Society was created with a budget of 1,000,000 yen, of which one-fifth was borne by the Foreign Office. The work began to materialize late in 1934.

Essentially, then, the Hirota diplomacy is the modified revival of the Shidehara policy, modified to meet the new situation in East Asia, namely, the emergence of Manchou-kuo. It is built upon a conviction that an armed peace divorced from pacific diplomacy can not endure forever, for foreign policy and national defence form the two sides of a national shield.

THE LONDON ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

The World War endowed the world with various economic problems. This led to the convocation of several international economic conferences, notably the Brussels Conference in 1920, the Genoa Conference in 1922, and the Geneva Conference in 1927. Yet these attempts did not materially help the ailing world. The situation was made

worse by the financial crisis which crushed Wall Street in October, 1929. The world since then has been engulfed in a gloomy sea of depression.

The attempts to solve the problem of depression through national action alone having failed, a resort to international action was once more revived. When, however, the Lausanne Conference was called in June, 1932, to deal with the problem of reparation as well as "the measures necessary to solve the other economic and financial difficulties which are responsible for and may prolong the present world crisis," the plan failed to secure American cooperation. Then the British Government proposed that the United States be invited to an international economic conference at London. Washington signified its willingness to participate in such a conference "for the purpose of considering methods to stabilize world commodity prices" on the understanding that war debts, reparation, and disarmament would not be discussed and that tariffs be dealt with only in general terms. Assured by this move, the Lausanne Conference took steps to organize a Preparatory Commission of Experts for the purpose of making a preliminary examination of world recovery.

The Preparatory Commission thus created, in which Japan was represented, formulated draft agenda, after two prolonged and stormy sessions, for an international conference. This movement eventually led to the Preliminary Conference which was held at Washington late in April, 1933. Prime Minister MacDonald personally represented the British Government, while Viscount Ishii represented the Japanese Government. Several other Powers including France and Canada participated therein. At the same time, the Preparatory Commission was meeting in London and announced a "tariff truce" during the proposed London Conference to which forty-seven nations eventually acceded. The way was thus cleared and the World Monetary and Economic Conference met at London on June 12, 1933. Sixty-four nations participated in the Conference and Japan was represented by Viscount Ishii Kikujiro. The agenda of

the Conference thus convened contained (1) monetary and credit policy, (2) prices, (3) resumption of the movement of capital, (4) restriction on international trade, (5) tariff and treaty policy, and (6) organization of production and trade.

Tokyo was in general accord with this movement. While the Japanese representatives were participating in the Preparatory Commission sessions and the Washington Preliminary Conference, therefore, Tokyo was seriously studying and formulating its basic policy with regard to the proposed London Conference. For this purpose, the Government appointed a Preparatory Commission composed of the representatives of Six Ministries, namely, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Army, Navy, Commerce and Industry, and Agriculture and Forestry. Japan's international economic policy thus formulated and adopted included four major planks: (1) that international trade and commerce should be based upon the principle of equality and that, necessarily, special effort should be directed toward the abolition of tariff barriers, the stabilization of foreign exchange, the resumption of the movement of capital, and the freedom of coast-wise trade throughout the world; (2) that the immediate resumption of the gold standard is difficult and unwise and that, rather, a clear definition of an agreeable ratio of the relative price of gold in national currency should be first attempted; (3) that the stabilization rather than the raising of the price of silver should be effected although Japan is prepared to consider the establishment of bimetallism; and (4) that the lowering of tariff walls is a matter of prime importance but that, in effecting a controlled reduction, careful consideration should be accorded to special conditions prevailing in Japan where the tariff schedule has been of longer duration and the rates lower as compared with those of other countries.

Tokyo, in the light of the Sino-Japanese crisis and its aftermath, was aware that the problems of the Far East as well as of disarmament might be injected into the deliberations of the London Conference. In addition to this international economic policy, therefore, the Preparatory Com-

mission also discussed and formulated political and naval policies. Should the Far Eastern problems become a subject of discussion, Tokyo decided to insist upon the independence of Manchoukuo as an accomplished fact, the resumption of the Sino-Japanese-Manchoukuoan relations based upon the recognition of Manchoukuo as prerequisite to the improvement of political and economic conditions, and the suppression of China's anti-foreign boycott as an essential factor in the stabilization of the Far Eastern market. As to the Pact of Paris, Tokyo favored further implementation provided a consultative method was used in defining an aggressor and an act of treaty violation and the interposition of a third power was rejected in the interpretation of "self-defence." In the field of disarmament, Tokyo could not agree to any proposition for the further limitation of land, sea, and air armaments on account of Japan's recognition of Manchoukuo and the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol of 1932.

The World Monetary and Economic Conference was an impressive gathering. That Japan was in whole-hearted sympathy with the object of the Conference and was ready to cooperate unreservedly was made clear by Viscount Ishii on June 13 in his first address before what he called the "great Conference—great in its conception, great in the number of nations represented, and great in its significance for the future well-being of humanity." True to the policy already adopted at home, he proposed that the Conference should emphasize "most vital and urgent problems," and outlined such problems as being in agreement with Tokyo's basic policy.

The pivotal interest of the Conference was fixed from the beginning upon the question of currency stabilization. The discussions in the various fields all turned out to be dependent upon a satisfactory settlement of this primary issue. Necessarily, the entire work of the Conference was upset by a sudden reversal of policy on the part of the United States. The dollar fluctuated violently with a steadily downward tendency, and its stabilization became a subject for all concerned. It was this situation which finally prompted the

American delegation, on June 22, to announce that Washington found "measures of temporary stabilization now would be untimely." In spite of this stand, a new compromise formula for the establishment of financial and monetary stability was agreed upon on June 30 by the five nations constituting the "gold bloc" and the United States and Great Britain, but, three days later, on July 3, President Roosevelt repudiated it. This was practically the death blow to the already dying Conference. Thus, after seven weeks of tempestuous existence, the Conference adjourned *sine die* on July 27, without being able to attain any of its objectives.

Among various factors which undermined the successful work of the London Economic Conference may be mentioned the much-denounced but all-powerful spirit of nationalism, the collapse of the disarmament conference which increased the political unrest in Europe, and the gradual lessening of interest in the Conference itself, notably on the part of Great Britain and the United States.

THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference was created by the Council of the League of Nations in December, 1925. Its main task was to draw up a draft treaty for general disarmament and was originally expected to require about a year. Actually, however, it required five years and the Draft Treaty for World Disarmament Conference was completed, as a result of six tempestuous and prolonged sessions, on December 9, 1930. It was designed to provide a framework within which the limitation and reduction of armaments could be achieved by outlining methods without attempting to set up ratios or defining the strength of armies, navies, and air forces. The Council of the League of Nations on January 24, 1931, formally invited the governments of the world, including the United States, the Soviet Union, and other non-member States, to participate in the first World Disarmament Con-

ference and submitted the Draft Treaty as its working basis. February 2, 1932, was set for this historic gathering.

The World Disarmament Conference began its arduous task under the presidency of Arthur Henderson on the appointed date. The Conference was attended by the delegates from sixty nations, and Tokyo was represented by Mr. Sato Naotake, the Japanese Ambassador to France. The gathering was most impressive and became the focal point of the widening movement for international disarmament. However, the opening session was terminated on March 17, occupying itself largely with the task of organization and of exchanging views with regard to the main theses of the sixty Powers represented at the Conference. The next session of the Conference from April 11 to July 23 accomplished very little. It had a lingering existence from September 21 to December 14, 1932, and from January 31 intermittently to June 8, 1933, but no progress was registered. Then extensive diplomatic negotiations were tried and the Conference had spasmodic sessions, notably October 16—November 21, 1933, and May 29—June 11, 1934, but a complete deadlock was the only result. The year 1934 saw no further session.

Japan was in perfect sympathy and accord with the movement for disarmament and heartily cooperated with the League of Nations in the work of the Preparatory Commission. She was most vitally concerned, however, in that phase of the Disarmament Conference which dealt with the limitation of naval armaments. It was for this reason that Tokyo presented to the Disarmament Conference on December 11, 1932, "a proposal calculated to effect a drastic reduction in the naval armaments of the world." The proposal covered, among other items, as Foreign Minister Count Uchida had ably summarized it before the Diet on January 21, 1933, "a reduction in size of vessels of various classes, the abolition of aircraft carriers, a reduction in the number of capital ships and A-class cruisers, and a reduction of the total tonnage allotments of B-class cruisers and destroyers, according to which, through the abolition of air-craft carriers

and the reduction in the number of capital ships and A-class cruisers alone, it is calculated that a reduction amounting altogether to 1,360,000 tons will be realized in the navies of Japan, Great Britain, the United States, France, and Italy." The proposal was based upon the fundamental principles that "power for attack should be reduced and power for defence strengthened" and that "greater sacrifice should be made by a superior naval Power than by an inferior one as a reduction in equal ratio would unduly and unjustly diminish the navy of an inferior Power." It proposed, moreover, the conclusion of two separate agreements, a general agreement covering all categories of vessels and applying to all five great naval Powers, and special agreements in which "quantitative reduction would be applied mainly to B-class cruisers, destroyers, and submarines which would be effected within each groups of Powers most closely related, taking into account their geographical situation and special circumstances."

The Disarmament Conference stumbled upon the chief obstacle to successful procedure soon after it convened. This fundamental obstacle was the clash of resurgent nationalism in Europe. Especially conspicuous was the deep-rooted rivalry between France and Germany which assumed irreconcilable proportions in the form of the French claim for security based upon the Versailles Treaty and the German demand for defensive equality in armament. This rivalry forced Germany to stay out of the Conference sessions, which began on September 21, 1932, and finally precipitated the announcement by the German Government, on October 14, 1933, of its withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference as well as from the League of Nations. "The failure of the Conference," Berlin ventured to inform, "is due solely to unwillingness on the part of highly armed states to carry out their contractual obligation to disarm." This turn of events made the Disarmament Conference completely and hopelessly an impotent body.

In such a complicated tangle of nationalistic European politics the Japanese Government was little interested. Ex-

cept on occasions when something more vital to the Japanese interest became the subject of general discussion, therefore, the Japanese delegation kept conspicuously quiet. Notable among such exceptions was the occasion when naval questions were considered, but even then the Japanese participation was brief. For example, on May 25, 1933, Mr. Sato proposed the deletion of an article in the draft convention which provided that the naval armaments of states which were parties to the Washington and London Naval Treaties should remain subject to the limitations imposed by those treaties, and intimated the Japanese intention not to continue the ratio principle after the expiration of those treaties. On June 8, Mr. Sato made a brief statement on the subject of air bombardment and signified that the Japanese Government can not accept the abolition of air bombardment unless aircraft carriers were also abolished, which contention was in line with the Tokyo's proposal to curtail offensive armaments.

By the close of 1934, the Disarmament Conference, if it existed at all, became a mere forum of the enmities of resurgent European nationalism. After almost three years of intermittent labor, it ended in confusion.

THE TERMINATION OF THE WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY

The apparent failure of the World Disarmament Conference once more focussed the attention of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan on the question of naval armaments. By virtue of the Washington and London Naval Treaties, another naval conference was scheduled for 1935, and the naval Powers began to prepare for that gathering.

The approaching expiration of the term of the Washington Naval Treaty became a subject of continuous discussion in Japan. It was especially so after the Manchurian explosion in 1931 and Japan's subsequent withdrawal from the League of Nations. As a result of such discussions, it became increasingly clear that Japan was resolving to pro-

pose a drastic modification of the principles contained in that Treaty. As Admiral Osumi Mineo, the Minister of Navy, said in 1933, "whereas twelve years ago the terms of the Washington Treaty *might* have been adequate to guarantee Japan's security, the subsequent changes in international relations have been such as to make those terms wholly inadequate to-day." Thus were evolved the solid national demands that each nation must reduce its armaments to its minimum requirements for self-defence and that each nation has an equal right to armaments.

Behind this movement lie several important factors, all of which combined helped to solidify Japan's new position. First of all, there was the question of national honor. Then there was the increasing realization that international goodwill is too uncertain a factor to be relied upon even as a partial guarantee of national security. The League action in connection with the Sino-Japanese crisis was eloquent proof of this contention. Moreover, Japan's responsibilities in the Far East had increased tremendously, especially as a result of the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol of 1932, under which Japan undertook to defend the Manchoukuoan seaboard in precisely the same way as that of her own Islands. In addition, the conception of economy as applied to naval limitation had undergone a considerable change. Under the London Treaty, for instance, Japanese must build, maintain, and equip types of vessels which were not essential to her needs if she desired to maintain her ratio in total tonnage, while she must refrain from constructing or maintaining types of vessels which, although of lesser cost, were suited to her specific defensive needs. To cap these circumstances, Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations would become effective in March, 1935, and both the Washington and London Naval Treaties would terminate at the end of 1936. It is not difficult to understand why Japan became apprehensive of a so-called "crisis of 1935-36."

Mr. Hirota became Japan's Foreign Minister in the midst of such an atmosphere. It was his opinion, however, that there would be no "crisis of 1935-36" if Japan took

the initiative in smoothing out her differences with the other Powers. Accordingly, no sooner than he was installed in his new position in the Foreign Office, he began to make arrangements for preliminary negotiations. Similar desires were evident also in London and Washington, as well as in Paris and Rome, largely because of the snail-like pace of the World Disarmament Conference. Thus was begun in the middle of 1934 the bilateral conversations in London, involving Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. These conversations continued for a month between June 18 and July 16, during which Ambassador Matsudaira acted as Tokyo's spokesman. Then they were suspended for the summer holidays and resumed on October 23. This time, Japan was represented by Rear-Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku and Ambassador Matsudaira.

Meanwhile, the naval leaders in conference at Tokyo on July 16 decided upon Japan's basic naval policy which was eventually approved by the Supreme Military Council, the Cabinet, the Privy Council, and the Throne. In line with this basic policy, the Cabinet approved, on September 7, the draft instruction for the Japanese delegates to the preliminary naval conference in London. While rigid secrecy guarded the true nature of the basic policy thus approved, the Foreign Office issued a semi-official statement on October 17 and enunciated five points as representing the policy of the Government with regard to the naval question. These were: (1) that the maintenance of a strength sufficient to assure adequate defence is an inalienable right of all nations and that to Japan security in her own defence is an absolute necessity for the sake of the peace in the Far East; (2) that Japan is seeking a reduction in tonnage for each nation in accordance with the spirit of disarmament to reduce the tax burdens on the peoples and to promote peaceful relations; (3) that limitation should be effected in accordance with the principle of abolishing or reducing aggressive armaments and of rendering adequate defensive armaments; (4) that Japan intends to terminate the Washington Treaty and to conclude a new pact in its place; and (5) that Japan is pre-

pared to take proper measures for security in case the Conference failed but that she would continue to cooperate with the Powers in an effort to realize the ideal of naval limitation. More important parts of this proposal related to the abolition of the ratio principle and the adoption of the "global" basis of limitation, allowing each nation to distribute the total tonnage among the different classes of ships as it deems best fitted to its needs.

When the preliminary conversations were resumed on October 23, Germany joined the five Powers already named. Like the World Disarmament Conference, however, the conversations dragged and were finally adjourned indefinitely on December 19. The unexpected failure and termination of these preliminary conversations cast another gloomy shadow over the approaching "crisis of 1935-36." In Tokyo, it served as a signal for a decisive step to be taken and Ambassador Saito, on December 29, exchanged Notes with Secretary of State Hull at Washington, announcing and acknowledging the intention of the Japanese Government to terminate the Washington Naval Treaty, which would "accordingly cease to be in force after December 31, 1936." Secretary Hull took immediate steps to notify Great Britain, France, and Italy.

The Japanese Government then issued a statement which reviewed the circumstances which prompted the termination of that Treaty. Tokyo was convinced that the cause of disarmament could best be served and the security of the Powers permanently assured by concluding an equitable agreement founded upon the following principles: (1) establishment of a common upper limit in place of a ratio; (2) fixing of such a limit as low as possible; and (3) total abolition or drastic reduction of offensive arms and adequate provision for defensive armaments. Tokyo deemed it impossible to acquiesce in the further continuation of the term of the Washington Naval Treaty as it "not only permits the retention of offensive arms, but admits disparity in naval strength through the adoption of a ratio system. Moreover, the allocation of an inferior ratio, so detrimental

to our national prestige, is bound to remain a source of permanent and profound discontent to our people." The statement looked forward to the conclusion of another pact to supersede the Washington Treaty and affirmed: "So far from entertaining the slightest wish to enlarge her armaments, Japan endeavors to promote the cause of peace by establishing the principle of non-menace and non-aggression through the suppression or drastic reduction of the offensive weapons." Secretary Hull was equally strongly convinced that Washington stood unalterably for the right of nations to equality in national security, but that "conditions of peace or measures of disarmament cannot be promoted by the doctrine that all nations, regardless of their varying and different defensive needs, shall have equality of armaments."

JAPAN AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

The first four years of the fourth decade of the century saw a miraculous expansion of Japanese trade which took the world markets by storm. As its consequence, nations, already struggling to enlarge their international trade in their effort to stem the tide of depression, began to raise trade barriers against Japanese goods and Japan's international trade became a subject of delicate concern to the Island Empire.

The phenomenal expansion of Japan's foreign trade during 1931-34, indeed, was a worthy challenge to the world. In 1930, Japan's total trade amounted to 3,198,888,000 yen, 1,518,574,000 yen in exports and 1,680,314,000 yen in imports. The amount declined during 1931 and 1932, respectively, to 2,498,617,000 yen and 2,981,825,000 yen, due largely to the Sino-Japanese crisis, but it began to soar again during the two following years, reaching 3,949,573,000 yen in 1933 and 4,658,504,000 yen in 1934, or in term of exports and imports, respectively, 1,932,069,000 yen and 2,017,504,000 yen in 1933 and 2,258,081,000 yen and 2,400,424,000 yen in 1934. In the field of exports, finished goods contributed by far the largest amount, 1,032,000,000 yen in 1933 and

1,346,000,000 yen in 1934, while raw materials made up the correspondingly largest amount in the realm of imports, 1,181,000,000 yen in 1933 and 1,400,000,000 yen in 1934. In other words, in 1933 and 1934, respectively, finished goods made up 53.4 per cent and 59.6 per cent of Japan's total exports, while raw materials constituted 58.5 per cent and 58.3 per cent of total imports. And thus, in spite of a phenomenal increase in her export trade, imports rose accordingly and trade balances remained unfavorable to Japan.

Behind such a phenomenal expansion of Japan's export trade was an equally phenomenal development of Japan's industries and various unique factors enabled Japan to produce goods so cheaply as to make successful inroads in all markets. Among such factors may be mentioned, not only the depreciation of the yen, but cheap and plentiful power, cheap and relatively efficient labor, adaptability in the use as well as remarkable improvement in the manufacture of modern machinery, low overhead cost of plants and buildings, prevalence of the household system which entirely eliminates factory overhead, effective localization of various industries, efficient organization and management both in buying raw materials and selling finished goods, minimum of labor troubles, and an urge that Japan must expand economically if she was to exist.

It was only natural that such a miraculous expansion of Japanese trade should provoke the nations of the world to exert every effort to stem the rising influx of Japanese merchandise. Consequently, the Japanese traders, not only increasingly faced high tariff barriers and prohibitive quotas, but became the victim as well of special restrictions designed to offset the depreciated value of yen. This movement became more severe after 1932 and in two years produced an alarming situation. During 1934, for instance, the tariff rates against Japanese goods were raised in no less than twenty-three countries, Japanese imports were restricted by nineteen countries, and new exchange control devices were introduced in Europe and South America.

It was this alarming situation on Japan's trade front

which Mr. Hirota faced in September, 1933, in addition to other baffling international questions. Necessarily, the removal of obstacles to international trade and the acceleration of the movement of Japanese commodities in the international market became the fundamental policy of his new deal diplomacy. His program was built upon the principle of "supplying each other's needs" and of adjusting the mutual interests of the Powers concerned on that basis through the exchange of special trade missions, the holding of trade parleys, and the conclusion of new trade conventions. The best illustration of his achievement was the successful conclusion of the Indo-Japanese Agreement.

The Indo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce with most-favored-nation provisions was to end on October 10, 1933, and, on April 10, 1933, the Indian Government, through the Government at London, notified Japan of its intention of terminating the Treaty within six months. On the same date the Indian Government issued an Act for Safeguarding of Industries which authorized the Viceroy to impose higher duties at his discretion upon foreign goods for the purpose of protecting the native industry. By virtue of this Act, the Viceroy on June 6 increased the duty on Japanese cotton goods to 75 per cent as compared with 25 per cent levied upon imports from England.

Behind this discriminatory action was the story of Anglo-Japanese trade rivalry in cotton fabrics. Japanese cotton goods made steady inroads in India after the World War and began to shake the foundation of the British monopoly there by 1930. In 1929, for example, England sold 66 per cent of India's total imports of cotton fabrics as against Japan's 30 per cent. This ratio was changed to 59 per cent and 35 per cent in 1930, 50 per cent and 45 per cent in 1931, and to 48 per cent and 50 per cent in 1932. This situation well reflected the condition of the textile industry at home. In 1913, England had a total of 55,000,000 spindles or more than one third of the world's entire number of spindles and exported 6,780,000,000 square yards of cotton fabrics, easily dominating the world market. In 1932, how-

ever, England had 50,000,000 spindles or a decline of 5,000,000 and exported 2,200,000,000 square yards of cotton fabrics or a decrease of 4,580,000,000 square yards. On the other hand, Japan in 1913 had only 2,400,000 spindles, which increased to 8,000,000 in 1932, while her export of cotton fabrics increased from a negligible amount in 1913 to 2,030,000,000 square yards in 1932. In other words, possessing only 16 per cent of the British total in the equipment of spindles, Japan exported only 170,000,000 square yards less than England. Alarmed by this steady expansion of Japanese trade, the British interests at home and in India successfully caused the Indian Government to raise, in August, 1932, the import duty on non-British cotton fabrics, which in effect meant Japanese products, from 31 per cent to 50 per cent, while the duty on British goods remained 25 per cent as before.

Moreover, the Indian action appeared to Japan as ridiculous as the killing the goose to get the golden egg. Again, the figures speak eloquently. During the ten years from 1921 to 1931, the Japanese factories bought from India an average of 1,600,000 bales of raw cotton, amounting to 240,000,000 yen, while Lancashire and Manchester almost exclusively used American cotton. In other words, in the last twenty years, Japan bought materials from India worth 2,600,000,000 yen more than what she sold to that country, while England sold to India 2,300,000 yen more than what she bought from that country. It meant that, during that period, Japan annually poured into India 130,000,000 yen, while England took away 110,000,000 yen every year. Therefore, a boycott of Indian cotton as a retaliatory measure was seriously proposed in Japan.

It was with such a background that Foreign Minister Hirota proposed to hold a conference. His move eventually resulted in the Simla Conference in which the representatives of the British, Indian, and Japanese Governments participated. After prolonged discussions covering four months, a three-year agreement was reached finally on January 8, 1934. Tokyo was represented in that Conference by Mr.

Sawada Setsuzo.

Under this Agreement, India agreed to buy from Japan, cotton fabrics not exceeding 400,000,000 square yards a year, a sacrifice of 138,770,000 square yards as compared with the 1932 figures. In return, Japan agreed to buy from India 1,500,000 bales of cotton, 100,000 bales less than the 1932 total. India, moreover, was to levy a 50 per cent duty on Japanese cotton goods, while duty on British goods was to remain at 25 per cent.

Foreign Minister Hirota's attempts to reach similar agreements with Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies were not successful. A trade mission visited the South American countries in 1934 and another was dispatched to Australia in 1935. Meanwhile, the Government passed, as a retaliatory measure in March, 1934, a Trade Protection Act which was aimed at protecting Japanese trade against restrictions imposed in foreign countries and which empowered the government to restrict or prohibit the import or export of merchandise specified after consultation with the Permanent Tariff Commission.

Canada became the first country to which this new policy was applied. As a result of unreasonable measures of suppression imposed by the Canadian Government against Japanese goods, negotiations for a new trade agreement were started between Tokyo and Ottawa early in 1935 but failed. Accordingly, Japan invoked the Trade Protection Law by an Imperial Ordinance and a proclamation of the Ministry of Treasury on July 20, under which a 50 per cent surtax was levied upon the principal articles imported from Canada. Thereupon, Canada replied with an Order-in-Council on July 22, inaugurating a retaliatory 33½ per cent *ad valorem* surtax on all Japanese goods, and arbitrarily proclaimed on August 1 the value of the yen at 41.51 cents. The negotiations which were consequently instituted were of no avail, as Ottawa rejected the Tokyo proposals to exercise a measure of control on a few items of Japanese exports as in the case of the United States, to send technical experts for consultation with the Canadian authorities and

for the investigation on the spot of the matter apprehended by the Canadian Government. The impasse thus created continued until October, when the Conservative rule under Prime Minister Bennett fell and the Liberal forces gained power under Prime Minister Mackenzie King. The negotiations were then resumed, the difficulties were successfully ironed out, and a new agreement was reached on December 26, 1935, by an exchange of notes between Prime Minister Mackenzie King and Minister Kato at Ottawa. Under this Agreement, Japan agreed to cancel on January 1, 1936, the 50 per cent surtax on certain Canadian goods and Canada agreed, among other things, to abolish her 33½ per cent surtax, to impose her exchange dumping duty only on goods competing with domestic products made in sufficient quantity to meet 10 per cent of the demand, and to reduce to the average years the value of the yen in computing the value of dutiable imports. And thus was brought to a close an unfortunate Japan-Canada trade controversy.

JAPAN AND MANCHOUKUO, 1933-35

The development of Manchoukuo during this period was indeed a marvel. Administrative machinery and activities were solidified; the financial foundation was strengthened, taxes reduced, currency unified, and banking facilities improved; peace and order were maintained with more ease; the judiciary was reinforced by steady improvement in laws and courts; the transportation system was completely unified, especially after the acquisition of the Soviet rights in the North Manchuria Railway, and the communication chain expanded; educational projects were widened and sanitation activities pushed; industrial development was encouraged and a construction program accelerated. Encouraged by these phenomenal internal developments, Manchoukuo became an Empire with the coronation of Chief Executive Pu Yi as Emperor Kang Te on March 1, 1934.

With all of these developments, Japan was most sympathetic and heartily cooperative. The keynote of Japan's

policy toward Manchoukuo was to accelerate its wholesome progress as an independent State and to promote the inseparable and interdependent relations between the two nations. Outwardly, this relationship was strengthened, in addition to the exchange of various missions, by Prince Chichibu's visit to Manchoukuo in June, 1934, and Emperor Kang Te's visit to Japan in April, 1935. Organically, the Japanese interests in Manchuria were further consolidated by the reorganization of the Japanese offices which became effective after September 13, 1934. Henceforth the Japanese Ambassador at Hsinking would control all diplomatic and consular activities there, including consular jurisdiction and police administration in the Railway Zone and other places where Japan had extraterritorial rights and functions exercised by the Governor of Kwantung, including the administration of the Railway Zone and the supervision of the railways, under the direction of the Overseas Ministry. In consequence the office of Governor of Kwantung was to be replaced by an ordinary civil administrator who was subordinate to the Ambassador. The offices of the Ambassador and the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army would remain separate but would be held by the same person. In Tokyo, to facilitate the Japan-Manchoukuo relations, a new Bureau of Manchurian Affairs was organized and the legation was raised to the rank of embassy. General Minami Jiro, a former Minister of Army, became the first Japanese Ambassador to Hsinking under this reorganized system.

(1) *Japan-Manchoukuo Economic Cooperation*

The detailed economic construction program of Manchoukuo which was promulgated on March 1, 1933, was based upon the idea that a certain amount of national control must be applied to the use of capital in all branches of national economy, and contained four basic policies: (1) prevention of "any exclusive class of people from monopolizing the benefits of the exploitation of natural resources and the development of industries"; (2) application of na-

tional control on important economic activities and adoption of measures for their rationalization; (3) observance of "the principle of the open door and equal opportunity"; and (4) encouragement of cooperation between Japan and Manchoukuo. It is in line with these basic policies that Japan has been and still is cooperating with Manchoukuo to the fullest extent in unfolding the latter's economic construction program. The result became known as the Japan-Manchoukuo economic block.

" The Japan-Manchoukuo economic block thus initiated assumed various forms. It was most evident in the industrial field, resulting in the organization of corporations relating to basic industries such as Manchuria Chemical, Manchuria Petroleum, Showa Steel, Japan-Manchuria Aluminium, Japan-Manchuria Magnesium, Manchuria Electric, Manchuria Mining, Manchuria Soda, Manchuria Gold Mining, and many others, eventually embracing establishments involving coal, gold, cement, leather, and other basic industries. It was also widely shown in construction activities, especially in the construction of new railways, harbors, roads, and buildings. In agriculture, the immigration of organized Japanese farmers in North Manchuria and the increased cultivation of cotton in South Manchuria were most noteworthy, while extensive research work goes on. In the realm of foreign trade, the increase of Japan-Manchoukuo trade was phenomenal. In 1933 and 1934, for instance, the trade with Japan totalled, respectively, 486,646,000 yen and 555,590,000 yen or 51.6 % and 53.3 % of the total amount. Of these amounts, the imports from Japan amounted to 313,696,000 yen in 1933 and 383,296,000 yen in 1934. In the field of transportation, the South Manchuria Railway Company began to manage in trust all of the Manchoukuo State Railways, while the Manchuria Air Transport Company and Manchuria Telephone and Telegraph Company unified the activities in their respective fields. In all other fields of Manchoukuo's economic development, the Japanese cooperation has been full and complete.

Special mention should be made of an extensive railway

construction program, the execution of which had been entrusted to and undertaken by the South Manchuria Railway Company. The total mileage of the railway lines thus built was over 3,200 kilometers involving 358,000,000 yen. Among them the more important lines were the following: the Tunhua-Tumen line which completed the railway connection between Hsinking and the Japan Sea; the Lafa-Harbin and Hailin-Paian-Heiho lines which established through traffic between Heiho on the Amur and the Japan Sea; the Tumen-Mutanchiang line which will be eventually extended to Chamussu; the Hsinking-Talai and Paichengtzu-Talai lines; the Tsitsihar-Paian line which completed the Harbin-Tsitsihar semi-circular connection; the Chiaoyang-Pingchuan line which will eventually reach Chengteh; and the Paichengtzu-Solun line which will eventually reach Halu-nerhshan. The construction of Rashin harbor has been proceeding under the same management.

To further aid the development of Japanese-Manchoukuo economic interdependence, the Japan-Manchoukuo Joint Economic Commission was organized as a result of an agreement which was signed at Hsinking on July 15, 1935. The Commission is composed of eight members, four from each country, and was instituted with a view of realizing harmony in the economic relations between the two countries. It is an advisory body, however, and "may be consulted by the Governments of Japan and Manchoukuo as to important matters regarding the supervision of the management of special companies set up as Japan-Manchoukuo enterprise" and "may, when necessary, make recommendations to the Governments of Japan and Manchoukuo in regard to all matters pertaining to the national coordination of the economics of the two countries."

(2) The North Manchuria Railway Transfer

The proposal for the sale of the North Manchuria Railway was first officially made by Moscow to Tokyo on May 2, 1933. Foreign Minister Count Uchida replied on May 29

that Manchoukuo would be the proper body to buy the line and that Japan is prepared to offer her good offices to materialize such negotiations. The preparations progressed smoothly and the negotiations were opened at Tokyo between Lieutenant-General Tinge Shih-yuan, the Manchoukuo Minister to Japan, assisted by Mr. Ohashi Chuichi, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs at Hsinking, and M. Constantine Yurenev, the Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo. The Soviet offer centered around the transfer price of 250,000,000 gold roubles, which was countered by the Manchoukuo proposal of 50,000,000 yen. The Soviet offer was based upon the claim that 411,000,000 gold roubles had been invested in the Railway, making it 210,000,000 gold roubles by allowing for depreciation and decreased economic importance, plus 40,000,000 gold roubles for railway and forest areas. Manchoukuo contended that the Railway could be duplicated with a new line at a cost of 130,000,000 yen, that therefore the line was worth half of this sum due to its decrepit condition, that the Soviet Union owns only a half interest, which makes the price 32,500,000 yen, but that Manchoukuo is willing to pay 50,000,000 yen out of courtesy to Moscow.

The negotiations were deadlocked time and again due to the tremendous gap in the two prices offered. By August 4, Moscow reduced the offer to 200,000,000 gold roubles but the negotiations reached a complete impasse by the middle of September. Mr. Hirota then became Japan's Foreign Minister and wisely capitalized upon his experiences at Moscow to expedite the negotiations. Through his harmonizing interposition, therefore, the negotiations were resumed in February, 1934. Yet the price gap still separated Moscow and Hsinking. Then followed the Hirota-Yurenev conversations, which resulted in reaching the transfer price of 170,000,000 yen, including 30,000,000 yen as a retirement fund, which was acceptable both to Moscow and Hsinking. The details of the transfer were then rapidly arranged and the agreement was signed at Tokyo with a gala ceremony on March 23, 1935.

Under this Agreement the Soviet Union transferred its share in the North Manchuria Railway for 140,000,000 and Manchoukuo agreed to pay an additional sum of 30,000,000 yen as retirement allowances. One-third of the price was to be paid in cash and the balance in kind, while the transfer of the Railway and its appurtenances was to be effected on the date of the signature and the dismissal of the Soviet employees was to take place upon three-months' notice. The Japanese Government, in the Hirota-Yurenev Note, undertook to guarantee the exact fulfilment by the Manchoukuo Government of "all the obligations of payment, in money as well as in goods," while a Hirota-Tingé Note explained that such a guarantee was given in compliance with the wishes of the Soviet Union "in view of the close and special relations existing between Manchoukuo and Japan." On the same date the Agreement was signed, an elaborate ceremony was held at Harbin and the North Manchuria Railway passed out of the Soviet hands.

(3) *Manchoukuo Oil Monopoly*

The Oil Monopoly Law of Manchoukuo was promulgated on November 14, 1934, and went into force on April 10, 1935. As a result, all petroleum products, including gasoline, kerosene, light and heavy oil, benzine, and fuel oil substitutes, became a government monopoly and the manufacture, importation, and exportation was permitted only to authorized dealers. For this purpose, the country was divided into ten sales zones with one officially-appointed general wholesale dealer and several wholesale subdealers under it in each zone, and the Government fixed the sale price at each place of delivery for the authorized general dealer. The basic policy behind this law, as the Finance Department at Hsinking explained on October 30, 1934, was "to devise measures for giving positive aid and protection to the development of oil resources and manufacture of oil in Manchoukuo" and the government monopoly thus devised "intends to exercise fair and adequate control over

supply, at the same time bringing about a gradual and rational improvement of the price situation." In finally arranging the machinery of such a control, the Government paid due regard to the existing sales organizations and the interests of established firms. Thus, of the seventy-nine shareholders of the new authorized wholesale dealers, the existing foreign firms furnished fifty-eight and the Japanese companies only twenty-one.

During the spring of 1934, a rumor of the proposed Manchoukuo oil monopoly became widespread and the British and American Embassies, unable to make an inquiry at Hsinking on account of their non-recognition policy, made an inquiry at the Japanese Foreign Office as early as July 2 and 7, respectively, at the same time submitting their views. The Tokyo Foreign Office made it clear that the Japanese Government had, and could have, nothing to do with the actions of the Hsinking Government in this case as Manchoukuo was an independent State and an oil monopoly was a purely domestic matter. In spite of this stand, the British, American, and Dutch Governments continued to protest directly to Japan. In these protests, they vigorously asserted that the Manchoukuo oil sales monopoly violated the Open Door principle, the observance of which was guaranteed in treaties and statements by both Japan and Manchoukuo, and that Japan could not evade the responsibility for action taken by Manchoukuo. However, the Foreign Office stood firm in its contention and advised that the firms involved should negotiate directly with the Manchoukuo Government. Here was, indeed, an anomalous position for the Powers which opposed the recognition of Manchoukuo but desired to continue their commercial relations with her as before.

JAPAN AND CHINA, 1933-35

The two years following the conclusion of the Tangku Truce saw a continuous improvement in the Sino-Japanese relations. The anti-Japanese boycott gradually died away

in spite of periodical attempts of local anti-Japanese organizations to revive it. Its decline resulted in reducing the number of hostile manifestations against the persons and property of the Japanese. This improvement was attributed to several factors. First and foremost was the remarkable change which had occurred in the internal conditions of China, especially the strengthening of the position of the Nanking Government through its successful campaign against the Chinese Communist Army in Kiangsi Province. The general awakening of the Chinese people to Orientalism which has been manifested in the rise of Chinese Fascism, the revival of Confucianism as a part of national policy, and the spread of the so-called "New Life" movement must not be overlooked. Perhaps more directly responsible than any other factor has been the disappointment of the Chinese people over the actions of the League of Nations regarding their disputes with Japan over Manchuria. China's "moral victory" brought in fact no salvation to them, but instead they were urged to reconsider their position in the Orient and enthusiasm was aroused for a "self-salvation" movement.

This situation was greatly expedited by Japan's new Foreign Minister himself. Mr. Hirota's policy of conciliation and friendly cooperation lodged the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the Far East as something to be "shared by Japan and her neighbors" on the basis of "non-menace and non-aggression" principle. This approach gradually thawed the ice of Sino-Japanese rapprochement and a new era of friendly conversations was ushered in. So successful and confident was he in this work that, in an address before the Diet on January 22, 1935, he was able to affirm that "the Japanese Government are glad to acknowledge the fact that, as has been indicated in the gradual solution of various long-pending questions, there is to-day a growing trend among the Chinese people to appreciate the true motive of Japan." A month later, on February 20, Mr. Wang Ching-wei, the President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Foreign Minister of the Nanking Government, also

voiced the turn in China's policy toward Japan and avowed "that eventually the existing differences will be straightened out by sincere efforts on both sides."

With this prelude, a new drama of Sino-Japanese negotiations has been proceeding throughout 1935 to liquidate the past and to plan in a cooperative way for the future. Tokyo's friendly overture in this work was the elevation of the Japanese legation in China to the rank of an embassy, which example was followed by the leading Powers, and Mr. Ariyoshi was promoted accordingly to be the Japanese Ambassador to China. Nanking, of course, immediately reciprocated this move.

While the new drama of Sino-Japanese rapprochement was shaping itself so auspiciously, the League of Nations and leading Powers were exerting themselves to the utmost in winning China's favor under the guise of offering technical and financial assistance to her. Among these activities, the most noteworthy were the League's proposed technical collaboration and the rumored American complications in the matter of China's military equipment and supplies. Prompted by these reported activities, therefore, Mr. Amau Eiji, the Foreign Office spokesman, made, on April 18, 1935, one of the most important diplomatic pronouncements *vis-à-vis* China of the period under review.

In a verbal statement, Mr. Amau registered Tokyo's opposition against (1) China availing herself of "the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan" or any action "calculated to play one Power against another" and (2) projects for "supplying China with war aeroplanes, building aerodromes in China, detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses" on the ground that such activities would eventually assume political significance and "would obviously tend to alienate friendly relations between Japan, China, and other countries and to disturb peace and order in Eastern Asia." He made it clear, however, that Tokyo "will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of

finance and trade as long as such negotiations benefit China, and are not detrimental to peace in East Asia."

As an explanation of the motives behind this policy, Mr. Amau emphasized Japan's "special position" with regard to China and her mission as well as "special responsibilities in East Asia." "It goes without saying that Japan at all times is endeavoring to maintain and promote friendly relations with foreign nations," he went on, "but at the same time we consider it only natural that to keep peace and order in East Asia we must even act alone on our own responsibility and it is our duty to perform it" for "there is no country but China which is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in East Asia." Accordingly, he affirmed that "unification of China, preservation of her territorial integrity, as well as restoration of order in that country, are most ardently desired by Japan" but that history shows "these can be attained through no other means than the awakening and voluntary efforts of China herself."

The reaction in other countries was strongly critical and antagonistic and the Tokyo Foreign Office was obliged to issue an official statement on April 25, endorsing Mr. Amau's verbal statement. Profoundest impressions were left, as usual, upon Washington and London. Secretary of State Hull, on April 30, after clarifying the reciprocal obligations of States to respect rights, obligations, and legitimate interests of others, indirectly criticized the Tokyo policy by claiming that "no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations in which are involved the rights, obligations, and legitimate interests of other sovereign States." Foreign Secretary Sir Simon informed the Parliament that Great Britain through her Ambassador at Tokyo reminded Japan that she could not possess special rights except such as were recognized by other Powers and that Great Britain could not admit Japan's right to decide alone whether any action, such as the provision of technical or financial assistance, was a danger to the peace and in-

tegrity of China, and contended that she "must continue to enjoy all rights in China which are common to all signatories or are otherwise proper, except in so far as their rights were restricted by agreements such as the consortium agreement, or in so far as Japan had special rights recognized by other Powers and not shared by them."

JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-35

During the Sino-Japanese crisis, 1931-32, the Soviet Union on the whole maintained strict neutrality. Even in connection with the League of Nations, Moscow, as a non-member State, kept aloof from the various Geneva overtures while Washington, not only cooperated with the League, but even resorted to the wholly unconstitutional action of participating in the Council sessions. This Moscow stand was remindful of Japan's strict neutrality during the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1929-30.

And yet the Soviet-Japanese relations were none too cordial when the Sino-Japanese crisis reached the first stage of its settlement with the conclusion of the Tangku Truce. This tension was largely due to the Soviet concentration of a huge army and an imposing fleet of aeroplanes all along the Soviet-Manchoukuo frontier which was lined with "tochka" or permanent defence works of reinforced ferro-concrete structure. Because she was bound by the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol of 1932, Japan could not afford to remain disinterested in this frontier situation. Naturally, irritation and friction were constant. Moscow naively called its action defensive and charged the Japanese with intentions to capture the North Manchuria Railway, the negotiations for the transfer of which were under way since June 26, while Tokyo charged that a series of provocative activities had been committed. Late in 1933, therefore, the situation assumed increasingly menacing proportions, intensified by the arrest of six Soviet employees of the North Manchuria Railway and the bogey of the alleged communications between General Hishikari and the Tokyo Foreign

Office for the capture of the said Railway. Moscow most efficiently capitalized the crisis in spreading its anti-Japanese propaganda abroad and the world was made to believe that a second Russo-Japanese War was imminent.

It was this critical situation which Foreign Minister Hirota was called upon to face and he proceeded to solve this question. The new Foreign Minister, relying upon his past ambassadorial experiences at Moscow, immediately approached the deadlock which was marring the Soviet-Manchoukuoan railway transfer negotiations, won the confidence of Ambassador Yurenev by his new-deal diplomacy, and eventually succeeded in effecting a compromise which resulted in the transfer of the Railway to Manchoukuo in March, 1935. By the time the negotiations were resumed late in February, 1934, the tense feeling which existed between Tokyo and Moscow was fast disappearing.

The successful conclusion of the Soviet-Manchoukuoan agreement for the transfer of the North Manchuria Railway was the first master stroke of Foreign Minister Hirota's new-deal diplomacy. It eliminated, as the Foreign Minister had predicted in his address before the Diet on January 22, 1935, the major source of Soviet-Japanese disputes with consequent improvement in relations, thereby paving the way for an auspicious start in settling other pending questions. The Hirota-Yurenev conversations thus opened in April, 1935, progressed so smoothly that a tentative agreement in principle was reached in July for the appointment of a Soviet-Manchoukuoan-Japanese Border Commission. When such a Commission is appointed and begins to function, the Soviet-Manchoukuoan frontier tension is bound to disappear, and one more step will be taken toward the assurance of peace in the Far East.

Among other pending Soviet-Japanese questions the more important ones are the proposal for the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact, the fishery question, and the oil question in North Sakhalin. Of these problems, the proposal for negotiations for a non-aggression pact was seriously made by the Moscow authorities first in December,

1932, when Mr. Yoshizawa was passing through Moscow on his way to Tokyo to become the Foreign Minister in the Inukai Cabinet. Already in the autumn, Mr. Hirota, then the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, urged Foreign Minister Count Uchida to conclude such a pact and Premier Viscount Saito was known to be in favor of it. In December, however, Tokyo formally replied to Moscow that the time was not considered ripe for superimposing a non-aggression pact upon existing treaties, especially the Pact of Paris and the Soviet-Japanese Convention which embodied the non-aggression principle. Instead, Tokyo proposed the settlement of all outstanding disputes then pending and the creation of a Soviet-Manchoukuoan-Japanese committee for the purpose of dealing with the Soviet-Manchoukuoan border incidents. The question, although it found reverberation from time to time in diplomatic conversations, remained essentially in that status until the close of 1935.

After the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Fishery Convention of 1928, the fishery problem in the northern seas supplied constant trouble to Tokyo and Moscow. This led to the conclusion of another agreement in 1931 whereby the Japanese fishery interests were enabled to pay the fees with the bonds of the Ako, a Kamchatka fishery trust, which they were to purchase at the rate of 32.5 sen per gold rouble. Further negotiations resulted in the Hirota-Karahan Agreement of August, 1932, by which the maximum number of fishery lots to be turned over to the Soviet State enterprise was increased, but the contracts regarding the majority of the fishery lots then leased by Japanese were extended until 1936 when the current Fishery Convention expires. Tokyo notified Moscow on May 26, 1935, the Japanese desire to revise the Fishery Convention and thus new negotiations were soon begun at Moscow by Ambassador Ota. Tokyo at this writing is proposing to eliminate all sources of future trouble and dispute, to make rational operation of fishing industry possible, and to provide for an adequate conservation of fish. More than twenty sessions were held in the negotiations at Moscow before the close of

1935 but the task of concluding a new agreement remained unaccomplished.

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE

The beginning of 1935 revealed no sign of a possible naval conference. The failure of bilateral conversations at London late in 1934 and the subsequent notification by Japan in December, 1934, of her desire to terminate the Washington Naval Treaty cast a gloomy shadow upon an already dismal outlook. Nevertheless, Great Britain continued to exert efforts in paving the way for such a conference by resuming conversations with the United States, Japan, France and Italy. Before she was able to proceed very far, however, Germany early in March announced her studied determination to augment her national air force and to restore her national army to 500,000 men by denouncing the terms of the Versailles Treaty. Grave as this announcement was, it gave a welcome opportunity for Great Britain to enter into negotiation with Germany upon the question of the latter's possible naval expansion and an Anglo-German naval accord was successfully reached on June 18, thereby adopting a ratio of 10:3.5 respectively for the British and the German navies. With this feather in her cap, Great Britain began to push anew her negotiations with the four other leading naval Powers.

In the course of these preliminary negotiations, Tokyo made it unmistakably clear that her naval stand remained unchanged since the London conversations in 1934, and urged the Powers to recognize Japan's fair and just aspirations. Finally, in answer to the British invitation dated September 28, Foreign Minister Hirota prepared Japan's reply of acceptance, for which the approval of the Cabinet was obtained on October 15 and which was forwarded to the British Foreign Office on October 18. In that memorandum, the Foreign Minister assured the British Government of Japan's willingness to participate in a forth-coming naval conference but reiterated that Japan desired naval dis-

armament based upon the general principle of non-menace and non-aggression, that she insisted upon the recognition of parity in naval armaments and a "common upper limit" as the basis of a new naval treaty, and that she could accept neither a qualitative and quantitative scheme of limitations nor a plan of exchanging naval building plans based upon a "gentleman's agreement." With this understanding, it seems, Great Britain issued an official invitation on October 24 and Japan readily accepted it five days later. The stage was cleared also through simultaneous British negotiations with the United States, France and Italy, all accepting a similar invitation in due time.

The Five-Power Naval Conference, called to draw up a naval treaty to take the place of the Washington and London Naval Treaties, met in the Locarno Room of the British Foreign Office at London on December 9, 1935. It adjourned for a holiday recess on December 21 and resumed its labors on January 6, 1936. Japan was represented by Admiral Nagano Osami, a member of the Supreme Defence Council, and Ambassador Nagai Matsuzo; Great Britain by Sir Samuel Hoare, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs (later replaced by Foreign Secretary Eden), and Viscount Bolton Eyres-Monsell, the First Lord of Admiralty; the United States by Mr. Norman H. Davis, Admiral William Standley, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Under-Secretary of State William Phillips; France by Ambassador André Corbin and Italy by Ambassador Dino Grandi. The impressive gathering even presented the appearance of a British Imperial Conference with the presence of representatives of the six member-States of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Conference lost no time in preliminary talks and immediately addressed itself to the task before it; it met, however, in the midst of an ill-doomed atmosphere and a transparent gloom.

The conflicting aims of the various participating Powers were presented and defined on the very first day of the Conference and on successive days. The British position remained the same as that communicated to the Disarmament

Conference at Geneva in 1932. Great Britain proposed both qualitative and quantitative limitations under the existing ratio system, namely, the reduction of the size of capital ships, the lowering of the calibre of the guns they carry, and the entire abolition of submarines. As an alternative, she advanced a plan for an exchange of naval building programs over a period of years, coupled with a "gentleman's agreement" that they shall not be exceeded and that no nation shall spring a surprise upon another. The American proposal was simpler. The United States proposed "a total tonnage reduction of 20 per cent below the existing treaty tonnage." Failing that, she proposed a 15 per cent, 10 per cent, or even 5 per cent reduction in the same manner. As a possible alternative, she proposed "the maintenance and extension of the present treaties over as long a period as possible." France merely advanced a claim for an increased total tonnage in view of Germany's new navy, while Italy insisted upon equality with France, proposed the retention of the present 35,000-ton battleships, and urged a three-power agreement regulating the size of the British, French, and Italian fleets in the Mediterranean.

In contrast with these proposals which aimed at the perpetuation of the ratio system as contained in the existing treaties, Japan once more presented her determined claim for parity in naval armaments as adopted in July, 1934, and consistently voiced since. She proposed (1) the establishment of a "common limit of naval armaments to be fixed as low as possible," thus abolishing the ratio principle, and (2) the drastic reduction in offensive forces to assure "a state of non-menace and non-aggression among the Powers." She was uncompromisingly opposed to the abolition of submarines, as they constituted the chief weapons of defence.

As expected, Japan's proposal immediately became the absorbing subject of discussion at the Conference. Searching questions were hurled at the Japanese representatives in quick succession, and most of the time before the holiday recess was consumed in clarifying the Japanese formula. The chief argument against the principle of a "common

upper limit" was, as before, the degree of vulnerability of the three naval Powers advanced by Great Britain and the United States, the former on the basis of her far-flung possessions and the latter on the ground of her territory facing the two great oceans. The Japanese spokesman met this old argument by simply pointing out the possibility of easy fleet concentration in both cases. Other criticisms and questions, technical or otherwise, were raised and answered in general conferences and in smaller committees until the Conference adjourned for a holiday recess without witnessing any possibility of an agreement.

When the Conference resumed its labors on January 6, the prospect for a successful agreement was even thinner. Japan's demand for naval parity remained the crucial matter before the Conference, but no sign of satisfying such a determined urge was as yet in sight. On the other hand, the American plan failed to win any support, while France and Italy suggested a modification of the British alternative proposal, namely, an annual exchange of building programs. Great Britain accepted it in general principle and the United States was inclined to support it, but no agreement could be reached on account of the difference of views with regard to the details. Japan opposed the measure on the ground that any plan without quantitative limitation would be meaningless and that it would merely encourage naval building competition. The Conference struck an impasse again.

Meanwhile, the Japanese delegation attempted to find a possible solution through separate conferences, notably Anglo-Japanese conferences on January 10 and 13, but failed. They then realized the uselessness of their continued participation in the Conference, and cabled to Tokyo for instructions. The Tokyo authorities were already manoeuvring to meet the inevitable, and public opinion was rising to their support. Foreign Minister Hirota prepared the notice of withdrawal, the Cabinet and the Privy Council quickly approved the procedure, a conference of officials of the Foreign and Navy Offices passed upon the text, and the Japanese delegation was notified. Accordingly, on January 15,

Admiral Nagano served notice of Japan's withdrawal from the Conference. That simple but historic note regretted that Japan's further participation became futile as her proposals had gained no support, assured Japan's readiness to send an observer to the subsequent Four-Power Conference and to give her moral cooperation, and emphasized her preparedness to join in any future conference which should be able to accept the Japanese proposals. With this the Japanese delegation left London, leaving the Four-Power Conference to continue to explore its unknown destiny.

THE END

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